

The available materials do not support the version that Soviet intelligence "succeeded in revealing the intention of the German command" and "timely revealed, as a rule, the political substantiate this"⁹⁹². versions cite those provisions of the and strategic plans of Germany to report of the head of the Intelligence Directorate of March 20, 1941 "Statements, organizational measures and options for military operations of the German army against the USSR", which says that "of the most likely military operations planned against the USSR, the following deserve attention: Option No. 3, according to ... as of February 1941, "... for an attack on the USSR, it is written in the message, three army groups are being created: the 1st group under the command of Field Marshal Bock strikes in the direction of Petrograd; The 2nd group under the command of Field Marshal Rundstedt - in the direction of Moscow and the 3rd group under the command of Field Marshal Leeb - in the direction of Kyiv. The beginning of the offensive against the USSR is approximately May 20 ". Further, with reference to the report of the military attache, it was indicated that "the start of hostilities against the USSR should be expected between May 15 and June 15, 1941."

True, at the same time they forget about the conclusions that were made in this report: "1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action this spring, I think that the most possible date for starting actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion 2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR this spring must be regarded as disinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence. As a rule, researchers, following G.K. Zhukov, condemn Golikov, only V. Sakharov notes that the conclusion that there will be no war in the spring turned out to be absolutely correct⁹⁹³. Now that this report has been published, it has become clear that it is a compilation of available intelligence. At the same time, the drafters of the document noted that "most of the intelligence data regarding the possibilities of war with the USSR in the spring of 1941 comes from Anglo-American sources, whose task today is undoubtedly to worsen relations between the USSR and Germany," although they recognized the need taking into account some information. The materials cited in the report gave a too mosaic and contradictory picture, and the information about the Anglo-German negotiations seemed to confirm Golikov's conclusion⁹⁹⁴. Knowing the further development of events, modern researchers can accurately indicate which information corresponded to reality and which did not, but at the moment When compiling this document, Soviet intelligence did not have such knowledge and, by virtue of its capabilities, tried to identify reliable information from the entire flow of information.

Until 1998, researchers were forced to use quotes from the memoirs of Zhukov, who for some reason forgot to mention that when in 1965 this document was shown to him by V.A. Anfilov, the marshal said that he was seeing him for the first time, since Golikov "did not obey me" and "reported directly to Stalin, and sometimes to Timoshenko. But, apparently, he did not inform the people's commissar about this document, because he shared basic intelligence information with me received from Golikov"⁹⁹⁵. A rather strange statement, given that Golikov was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and, due to his official position, was fully accountable to Zhukov. In addition, as P.I. Ivashutin, "the texts of almost all documents and radiograms concerning the military preparations of Germany and the timing of the attack were reported regularly according to the following list: Stalin (2 copies), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defense and Chief of the General Staff"⁹⁹⁶. A report dated March 20, 1941 was also sent to Stalin, Molotov and Timoshenko⁹⁹⁷. In addition, being a structural unit of the General Staff, the Intelligence Directorate regularly brought to the attention of the heads of other units the most important information about potential adversaries.

Returning to the above quotation from Golikov's report, it should be noted that this information was reflected in the telegram of the British ambassador in Moscow S. Cripps to London dated March 24, 1941. Among other things, it was noted that "the invasion will be carried out by t

large armies: the first, based in Warsaw under the command of Beck (? - M.M.), the second, based in Koenigsberg, the third, based in Krakow under the command of List. "In London, this information was regarded as part of the "war of nerves" against Russia, in order to force it to unite even more closely with Germany, "and accordingly, this information is being disseminated in order to force the Soviet government to conclude an alliance with Germany by means of threats"998 As we can see, the assessments in Moscow and London

coincided. G. Kuznetsov dated May 6 with a message from the naval attache in Berlin, according to a German officer, that "the Germans are preparing an invasion of the USSR through Finland, the Baltic states and Romania by May 14. At the same time, powerful air raids on Moscow and Leningrad and the landing of paratroopers in the border centers are planned. "" I believe, - Kuznetsov concluded, - that the information is false and was deliberately sent along this channel in order to reach our Government and check how the USSR will react." The authors, who believe that this information was "of exceptional value", and disavowed their conclusions, do not want to admit that this message, as V. Sakharov rightly showed, was disinformation, and the admiral's conclusion was absolutely correct. Now, when this document was published in full, it turned out that the information was received from the Soviet citizen Bozer, to whom they became known from the words of a German officer, and "an attempt to find out the source of the information and expand this information has not yet yielded results, because Boser avoided this. Work with him and verification of information continue. "Consequently, the admiral's conclusion was fully justified999

As a result, Soviet intelligence failed to reveal the strategic plan of the German command. Information about the directions of the offensive of the Wehrmacht was too contradictory and did not always correspond to reality. Preparing for the use of the main forces in Belarus, the German command was interested in weakening the opposing group of the Red Army. To do this, rumors spread about a possible strike on Ukraine or the Baltic states. Moreover, Soviet intelligence did not have accurate information about the possible nature of hostilities against the USSR. As P.A. Sudoplatov, all pre-war estimates proceeded from the idea of a protracted war, while Germany relied on the "blitzkrieg" 1000. Moreover, this confidence of Moscow was supported by incoming intelligence information.

One of the goals of Soviet intelligence on the eve of the war was to identify the military preparations of Germany, the concentration of troops on the borders of the USSR and determine their number. Materials published in recent years make it possible to trace the results of this work on

the whole. Estimated data on the German military potential played an important role in the work of Soviet intelligence. Unfortunately, they tend to be significantly overpriced. So, at the end of 1938, according to the Intelligence Directorate, the Wehrmacht had 7,300 tanks and 5,160 aircraft. In fact, on September 1, 1939, i.e. 8 months later, the German armed forces numbered 3,474 tanks and 4,288 aircraft. These overestimations, which became the basis for further calculations, constantly increased. Thus, according to subsequent estimates, the aircraft fleet of the German Air Force reached 5,500-6,000 aircraft by October 1939, although in reality, on October 1, the Luftwaffe had only 4,756 aircraft. The production capacity of the German aircraft industry, on the contrary, was underestimated. For example, the average monthly productivity in 1939, according to these estimates, was 330-350 aircraft, instead of the actual 690 aircraft. aircraft and remained so

until the summer of 1940, as the monthly production of 600-700 aircraft made up for the losses. In reality, the German Air Force had 5,895 aircraft on May 1, 1940, and the average monthly production in 1940 was 902 aircraft1002. Assessing the development of the German armed forces, the Intelligence Directorate in a report dated March 11, 1941

noted that it is capable of annually producing 25-30 thousand aircraft and 18-20 thousand tanks. In fact, these figures were achieved for aircraft in 1943 (produced 24.8 thousand), and for tanks in 1944 (produced 18.3

thousand)¹⁰⁰³. The estimates of the German armed forces were just as overestimated, and active German military operations in Scandinavia and Western Europe contributed to an even greater their increase. The results of the activities of Soviet intelligence to establish the number German armed forces are presented in table 22 (numbers in brackets - real position). According to a general estimate on March 1, 1941, there were 8 million in the Wehrmacht people, 260-270 divisions (221 infantry, 22 tank, 20 motorized), 11-12 thousand people. tanks, over 52 thousand guns, the Air Force was combined into 5 air fleets and had armed with 20,700 aircraft. In reality, the Wehrmacht numbered 6,954 thousand people (as of March 15) and had 175 divisions, 5,008 tanks, 33,189 guns (for 1 April), and the Air Force had 5,259 aircraft (as of February 22)¹⁰⁰⁴.

Table 22

Evaluation of the combat strength and strength of the Wehrmacht¹⁰⁰⁵

Date of the Division	Number (thousand people)
March 1, 1940	190 (116)
April 15, 1940	200 (123)
June 15, 1940	235 (157)
October 1, 1940	255 (156)
March 15, 1941	265 (191)
May 31, 1941	290 (206)

groups near the Soviet borders. It was found that with the end of active fighting in In Poland, the German command began the transfer of troops to the Western Front. TO unfortunately, information about intelligence reflecting the number of German troops on East in the fall of 1939 - in the winter of 1940, was not published, so the effectiveness intelligence work is not clear. German forces in Poland and East Prussia were assessed in March 1940 in 32 divisions, while in reality there were only 10 of them, and at the end of May 1940 in 20 infantry and 2 tank divisions, although in reality there were only 7 infantry divisions ¹⁰⁰⁶. Soviet intelligence correctly pointed to the transfer of troops from East to West, but overestimated the number of divisions. According to the Intelligence Directorate, of those operating in the West 170-180 divisions from June 25 to August 1, 1940. 70-80 of them were dispersed across Central Europe. 30-40 divisions were transferred to the East, and the deployment of troops in Germany was unknown. In fact, only 15 divisions ¹⁰⁰⁷. Thus, Soviet intelligence correctly determined the transfer of troops to East after the end of the fighting on the Western Front, but exaggerated their numbers.

There are no concerns in connection with these transfers in the available documents. viewed. Moreover, on July 9, 1940, the German military attache in Moscow notified the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army of the forthcoming relocation and organizational measures in the Wehrmacht¹⁰⁰⁸. For example, in intelligence report of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO) No. 20 (20-31 July 1940) the following conclusion was made: "The arrival of German troops within the limits of the General Government is explained, on the one hand, by Germany's desire to strengthen its eastern border, since it was significantly weakened during the period of decisive operations in the West, on the other hand, the need to deploy troops liberated after the armistice with France, in territories richer food resources. The transfer of German troops to the territory of the former Poland, since July 20, has significantly decreased compared to the first half July. Together with the arriving troops, the number of German troops in the territory the general government is 35 divisions"¹⁰⁰⁹.

In the available materials, there is a certain discrepancy in the assessment of German troops in the East. So, according to the NKVD, on July 16, 1940 there were 40 infantry and 2 tank divisions, and according to the Intelligence Department of the headquarters of the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO) - 28 infantry. On July 23, the Intelligence Department of the KOVO headquarters assessed the German grouping of 50 infantry divisions, 2 tank brigades and 2 tank regiments, NKVD intelligence - in 50 infantry and 4 tank divisions, and the Intelligence Department of the headquarters of the ZapOVO - in 40 infantry divisions and 5 tank brigades. According to one information, on August 1, 1940 in the territory of Poland and East Prussia had 41 infantry, 1 tank and 1 cavalry divisions, and according to others - on August 8, there were 54 infantry, 6 tank and 2 cavalry divisions¹⁰¹⁰. Why did these discrepancies arise and how did they affect the assessment of the German groups in the East, unfortunately, remains unknown.

German troops so far had defensive tasks in the East and were engaged in engineering equipment of the future theater of military operations¹⁰¹¹. Soviet intelligence closely followed these works, and they did not cause any concern. According to her according to information, fortifications in the territory east of the Vistula are outdated, and were partially destroyed in 1914-1918 and 1939. "All these old fortifications cannot be a serious obstacle to troops advancing from the east without significant modernization", which is why the Germans began to build defensive structures in border strip. At the beginning of September 1940, the Intelligence Department of the KOVO headquarters made the conclusion that "the fortifications under construction along the Vistula River show that the Vistula River is probably will be the second defensive line on the territory of the Governor-General"¹⁰¹².

Comparison of intelligence data on the number of German troops deployed at Soviet borders with valid data (see tables 23-24, figures in brackets - real situation) shows that, having correctly revealed the fact of the transfer of German troops to the border of the USSR, Soviet intelligence did not have accurate information about the number concentrated troops and, in her assessments, proceeded from inflated information about the total the strength of the Wehrmacht¹⁰¹³.

Table 23

Estimation of the number of German troops on the border with the USSR 94 (79) Tank 1 (0) 8 (3) 5 (6) 7 (3) 13 (3) 14 (3) Motorized 0 (0) 5 (1) 5 (0) 6 (0) 12 (1) 13 (1) Cavalry 0 (0) 6 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) Total 51 (22) 89 (30) 88 (32) 84 (47) 119 (71) 122 (84) Table 24 Estimation of the number of German troops in the directions

German troops on our borders by transferring them to the Balkans (Romania), as well as to Hungary and Slovakia ... "- reported the 5th department of the GUGB NKVD on November 6, 1940. A similar conclusion did the Intelligence Department of the KOVO headquarters, noting that the increased transfer of troops to Poland in September was replaced in November by their transfer to Romania¹⁰¹⁴. This led to a reduction the number of German troops on the borders of the USSR. Unfortunately, intelligence with estimates German grouping in the East in November 1940 - March 1941 was not published, therefore it is impossible to compare them with the actual situation. Available documents include to the period from April 1941 to the start of the war. Let's turn to them.

But first, it should be said about the memoirs of V.A. Rookie about his work in Intelligence Directorate in 1940-1941, which are quite widely used in the latest Russian historiography to confirm the thesis about honest intelligence officers and opportunistic leaders. Particularly frequent are references to statements memoirist that the intelligence report on the West No. 8 of December 1940 contained information about 110 German divisions (of which 11 are armored) deployed near our borders. At the same time, no one

drew attention to the fact that earlier the author writes that in this grouping at the turn of 1940-1941. there were 70 divisions. It follows from the text that in December 1940 Rookie was not the acting head of the Information Department and could not prepare this report on the West, since he was the deputy head of the department for the East and was engaged in assessing potential opponents in Asia. In addition, intelligence report No. 8 contained information about the grouping of German troops on November 15, 1940 and was unlikely to seriously differ from the assessment given on November 11¹⁰¹⁵. Probably, there were discrepancies in the Intelligence Directorate in assessing the size of the German grouping in the East, and the Rookie, if he held the indicated position at all, could hold views that were different from the opinion of the leadership, for which, apparently, he was removed from his post, but not in early May, as he assures, and the beginning in April 1941, which is confirmed by documents. These disagreements could have taken place in March 1941, which is indirectly indicated by the memoirist himself and cited by A.G. Khorkov estimated the German grouping at the borders of the USSR on March 25, 1941 at 120 divisions, which was revised after 10 days¹⁰¹⁶.

Soviet intelligence was able to detect in February - March 1941 a new transfer of German troops to the East, where, according to its data, 6 infantry and 3 tank divisions arrived. In fact, from February 20 to March 15, 1941, 7 infantry divisions were redeployed to the East, and their number increased from 26 in February to 33 on March 15¹⁰¹⁷. On April 16, the Intelligence Directorate reported on the transfer of 3 infantry and 2 motorized German divisions in the first half of April, which led to an increase in the grouping in East Prussia and Poland to 78 divisions. Having again correctly noted the fact of the transfer of troops, the Intelligence Directorate reported incorrect data. In fact, from March 16 to April 10, 18 infantry and 1 tank divisions were redeployed to the East, which increased the total number of German troops to 52 divisions. The concentration of 6,995 wagons of ammunition and 993 wagons of fuel in the East in January - the first half of April 1941¹⁰¹⁸ again correctly noted the regrouping of German troops in late April - early May 1941, which led to the strengthening -

of groups near the borders. USSR, Africa, the Middle East and Norway. As noted in a special report of the Intelligence Directorate dated May 5, "the essence of the regroupings of German troops carried out in the second half of April, after the successful completion of the Balkan campaign, and up to the present time, is: 1. Strengthening the grouping against the USSR along the entire western and southwestern border, including Romania 2. To the further development of operations against England through the Middle East (Turkey and Iraq), Spain and North Africa 3. To the strengthening of German troops in Scandinavia, where they can be used from the territory of Norway against England, Sweden and USSR..."¹⁰¹⁹

On April 25, the Intelligence Directorate estimated the Wehrmacht grouping in the East at 95-100 divisions, on May 5 - at 103-107. According to reports, troops from Yugoslavia were returning to the Protectorate, where a group of 10 divisions was recreated. Reporting this information, the Intelligence Directorate made the following conclusion: "1. In two months, the number of German divisions in the border zone against the USSR increased by 37 divisions (from 70 to 107). Of these, the number of tank divisions increased from 6 to 12 divisions. From the Romanian and Hungarian armies, this will amount to about 130 divisions. 2. It is necessary to take into account the further strengthening of the German concentration against the USSR at the expense of the liberated troops in Yugoslavia with their grouping in the area of the Protectorate and on the territory of Romania. which in the future can be used against the USSR through Finland and by sea. 4. The available forces of the German troops for operations in the Middle East at this time are expressed in 40 divisions, of which 25 in Greece and 15 in Bulgaria. For the same purpose, up to two parachute divisions with their probable use in Iraq"¹⁰²⁰. As you can see, the statement of the fact of the concentration of German troops in the East is accompanied by the expectation of German actions in the Middle East, and not an attack on the USSR.

According to the Intelligence Directorate, the German Air Force had 8-10 parachute divisions, of which 1-2 were in Greece, 5-6 were in northern France and Belgium, and 2 were in Germany. Unfortunately, this was German disinformation, distributed in accordance with the directive of February 15, 1941, which stated that "of particular importance is the dissemination of disinformation about the air corps, which would indicate the intention to use it against England." In reality, the Air Force had only the 7th Airborne Division, and the 22nd Infantry Division of the Ground Forces was considered an air landing division. Reporting these data, the Intelligence Directorate concluded that "the increase in German troops on the border with the USSR continues. The main areas of concentration are: the southern part of the general government, Slovakia and the northern part of Moldova"¹⁰²¹.

On May 31, 1941, the Intelligence Directorate submitted a regular report on the Wehrmacht grouping for June 1, which noted that the transfer of troops after the Balkan campaign to other theaters was basically completed. It was believed that 120-122 German divisions were deployed against the USSR, 44-48 were in reserve in Germany, and 122-126 were deployed against England. These data ended with the statement: "As for the front against England, the German command, having already at this time the necessary forces for the development of operations in the Middle East and against Egypt (29 divisions, counting Greece with the island of Crete, Italy and Africa), at the same time quite quickly restores its grouping in the West, while continuing to transfer to Norway (from the port of Stettin), with the prospect of carrying out the main operation against the English Isles "¹⁰²². Soviet intelligence assumed that the headquarters of two army groups and six armies were located near the borders of the USSR, although in reality by June 1 there were headquarters of three army groups, seven armies and three tank groups of the Wehrmacht. These data were included in the next intelligence report on the West No. 5, which was put into production on June 4, and signed for publication on June 23. Germany deployed three army groups, 7 armies and 4 tank groups for the invasion, in which there were 122 divisions, 1 brigade and 1 infantry regiment, 4 more divisions were in Northern Norway¹⁰²⁴. In addition, one should pay attention to the documents of Soviet military planning that have become available, which estimated the likely number of German troops for the war with the USSR. So, in documents dated July and September 18, 1940, it was noted that Germany would deploy up to 173 divisions for the war with the USSR (140 infantry, 15-17 tank, 8 motorized, 5 light and 3 airborne). The 11 March 1941 document raised this estimate to 200 divisions (165 infantry, 20 armored and 15 motorized), while the 15 May document expected deployment of 180 divisions (137 infantry, 19 armored, 15 motorized, 4 cavalry and 5 airborne)¹⁰²⁵. These calculations were excessively overestimated, and their comparison with the assessment of the German grouping at the Soviet borders showed that the process of concentrating the Wehrmacht for the war with the USSR was still far from over. As already noted, according to the Intelligence Directorate, on June 1, only 41.6% of German divisions were concentrated in the East, and 42.6% were concentrated against England. Based on these indicators, no one in Moscow would have come to the conclusion that the preparations for a strike against the USSR had been completed. In fact, by June 21, 62% of Wehrmacht divisions were deployed against the USSR.

Thus, Soviet intelligence failed to reliably establish the composition of the German armed forces and its grouping in the East, which made it difficult to assess the threat to the Soviet Union. The

state of military intelligence of the western border districts on the eve of the war is shown in the work of A. Pranovich. Undercover intelligence was poorly staffed with trained personnel, agents were recruited from local residents, most of whom did not have access to important information, and their reports were delivered by couriers, which led to a loss of time. Agents were not trained to work in war conditions or to sabotage, since it was believed that the war would be fought on enemy territory. German

counterintelligence managed to limit the leakage of information by tightening control at the border. Aerial reconnaissance was carried out by 10 reconnaissance aviation regiments, which had only 157 aircraft, and due to the lack of photographic equipment and trained specialists, its effectiveness was low. Only in May 1941 was it decided to equip the air regiments by July 1 with qualified flight personnel and 50% with SB aircraft. Troop and radio intelligence, being not staffed with experienced personnel and equipment, acted inefficiently. Only from May 24, 1941, undercover reconnaissance of the border troops was focused on revealing Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR. The intelligence agencies of the districts were not involved in the preparation of cover plans, the interaction of all types of intelligence was poorly established, as well as the exchange of information between different departments. The absence of agents in the headquarters of the enemy did not allow obtaining documents about Germany's plans, this did not happen even when on June 18 the German command notified the command staff, up to and including the company, of the upcoming invasion. The low effectiveness of reconnaissance in the border military districts did not allow the command to see a clear picture of the situation and draw appropriate conclusions. Often the headquarters of the districts did not know anything about the opposing enemy groupings, which, naturally, affected the course of the Red Army's military operations in the context of a strategic surprise attack¹⁰²⁶.

Unfortunately, this conclusion is confirmed by the available documents of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the border districts, which refute the version that they clearly understood the situation on the ground. Thus, the Intelligence Department of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) in report No. 02 dated June 21, 1941, which noted the further advance of German troops to the border, made the following conclusions: "1. The concentration of German troops continues to the state border and from the depths to the regions East Prussia 2. The general grouping of troops continues to remain in the former areas 3. It is required to establish the reliability of the deployment in the city of Königsberg of the headquarters of the 3rd ak, the headquarters of the 1st army (our data for a long time marked the headquarters of the 18th army. his departure was not reported.) Do the units not indicated in this report, previously noted by us, continue to remain? (so in the

text of M.M.) ¹⁰²⁷ . The intelligence department of the headquarters of the ZapOVO in the intelligence report of June 21, 1941, in which the opposing German grouping was determined in 45-46 divisions, concluded: "1. According to available data, the main part of the German army in the zone against the Western OVO took its original position. 2. At all 3. All means of reconnaissance check the location of troops near the border and in depth "¹⁰²⁸. The intelligence department of the KOVO headquarters in report

No. 3 of June 20, 1941 stated: "1. The movement of German troops to our borders is confirmed by various sources, the main mass of the arriving troops is concentrated in the Tomashev-Sandomierz direction north of the Tanev forests. [...] 3. Data about the numbering of the armies require verification and clarification, but the presence of two army headquarters in the Lublin and Tomaszew-Sandomierz directions is quite possible. 4. The replacement of the previously located units in the Krakow direction deserves attention, especially since the newly arrived units belong to the less stable units of the German army. 5 The large movement of all types of troops and transport to the south of Tomashov is pursuing some kind of demonstrative goal or is associated with ongoing exercises "¹⁰²⁹.

What the error in estimates led to can be seen from the example of the fighting on the Southwestern and Southern fronts, whose forces outnumbered the enemy troops. In the work of A.A. Gurov about the actions of the Southwestern Front at the beginning of the war, it is noted that "the headquarters of the KOVO as a whole revealed the concentration of enemy troops. However, intelligence failed to determine its main grouping," which "later had a negative impact on the course of hostilities." In addition, as can be seen from the material cited by the author, the intelligence of the KOVO did not accurately determine the total number of enemy troops, which did not allow a correct assessment of the impending danger¹⁰³⁰. Even more unfavorably intelligence assessments affected the actions of the troops of the Southern Front. As of July 2, 1941, the size of the enemy grouping in

the Stefanesti area was defined as 9-10 divisions (including 5-6 tank and motorized), although in reality there were only 5 infantry divisions and 5 brigades (including tank). Intelligence assumed the presence of 900-960 tanks in this area instead of the 60 available there. This information led to an incorrect assumption about the direction of a possible enemy strike, and an incorrect overall assessment of his forces in front of the Southern Front in 40 infantry and 13 tank and motorized divisions caused a decision to withdraw Soviet troops to the Dniester. The authors rightly point out that the low effectiveness of the actions of the troops of the Southern Front is caused by intelligence errors, which did not clarify, but distorted the real situation¹⁰³¹. The literature states that the reports from Berlin of the sources "Starshina"

and "Korsikanets", who transmitted extensive and reliable information about the military preparations of Germany¹⁰³², were of great value. Indeed, the published reports contain a lot of curious and important information, but these people did not have access to secret documents and therefore their information about the most important issue - the timing of the attack on the USSR - was contradictory, which significantly reduced the value of other information. Particularly illustrative in this regard is the "Calendar of messages" Corsican "and" Sergeant "on the preparation of Germany for war with the USSR for the period from September 6, 1940 to June 16, 1941."¹⁰³³

Reporting on March 20, 1941, about preparations for a war with the USSR, "Starshina" noted that "there is only a 50% chance that this performance will happen, all this may turn out to be a bluff." On April 14, 1941, according to them, before the start of the war, which could begin after the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece, a German ultimatum should be expected. On April 24, they announced that the action against the USSR had given way to a strike in the Middle East, and on April 30, that it was finally decided to start a war with the USSR. On May 1, information was received about the impending German ultimatum in order to clarify relations with the USSR before decisive operations in the Middle East, and on May 14 there was a message that the attack on the USSR had been postponed. On May 11, they reported that the presentation of an ultimatum would be preceded by a "war of nerves" to demoralize the USSR. On June 9, sources again reported the expected German ultimatum and that the decision to attack the USSR was postponed until mid-June, on June 11 it was reported that the decision had been made, and on June 16 that everything was ready for the attack. The sequence of reports makes it possible to understand Stalin's irritation, which was reflected in his very rude resolution addressed to the People's Commissar of State Security at the last of them: "T-schu Merkulov. You can send your" source "from the German aviation headquarters to the motherfuck. This is not a" source ", and the disinformers"¹⁰³⁴. Of course, now we know that their reports of June 11 and 16 contained the most important information about the attack on the USSR, but this contradicted their own recent reports, which naturally made it difficult to assess the situation in June 1941.

Until the German attack, the NKGB intelligence reports did not conclude that there was an immediate threat of war. So, in the report No. 1510 of June 20, 1941, it was noted that "the transfer of troops from France and Greece in the direction of Lublin, Brest and East Prussia continues. that one of these days large maneuvers of the German army will be carried out, in connection with which the population is called upon to comply.

As a number of authors rightly point out, this was the result of the desire of the German command to hide their military preparations in the East¹⁰³⁶. For this, systematic and targeted disinformation was carried out through all possible channels. Thus, in the Instructions of the OKW of September 6, 1940, on counterintelligence and intelligence, it was stated that "Russia must understand that strong and combat-ready German troops are in the general government, in the eastern provinces and in the protectorate." It was necessary "1. To mask the total number of German troops in the East, if possible, by spreading rumors and

news of the allegedly intensive replacement of military formations taking place in this area. [...] 2. To create the impression that the main direction in our movements has shifted to the southern regions of the General Government, to the protectorate and Austria, and that the concentration of troops in the North is relatively small. 3. Exaggerate the state and level of formations, especially

tank divisions"1037. The OKW directive of February 15, 1941, ordered until about April "to maintain in public opinion uncertainty about our intentions." As a means of disinformation, it was proposed "emphasizing the upcoming invasion of England; wide information about new means of attack on transports; exaggeration of the importance of the auxiliary operations Marita, Sonnenblume, the actions of the 10th Aviation Corps and the number of forces intended for these operations. "The deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa" should have been "carried out under the guise of an exchange of forces between the West, Germany and the East, pulling up rear echelons for Operation Marita, or, in the end, under the guise of providing rear cover from Russia in case of going on the defensive. "In the next stage," the strategic deployment of forces in the East must be presented in the light of the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of wars with In order to divert attention from the last preparations for the invasion of England "1038 On May 12, 1941, the OKW

headquarters ordered the start of the second phase of disinformation simultaneously with the introduction of the most compact train schedule on May 22. The main idea of camouflage remained the same - this is a maneuver to cover up an attack on England. Especially emphasis was placed on preventing the dissemination of information about the actual intentions of the troops. Orders had to be given to the troops deployed in the East to move to the West in order to generate a wave of corresponding rumors. As noted by V.A. Anfifov, "the German occupation of the Balkans, the capture of Crete, the offensive of Rommel's corps in Libya, the intensification of the actions of German agents in Iraq, Syria and Iran - all this gave serious grounds for concluding that the Middle East was becoming the next object of Germany's aggressive aspirations. In the West, this opinion was The British had no doubts about this. They only wondered how soon and from where a blow would fall on their troops stationed in this area: either from the north through Turkey and Syria, or from the west through Egypt, "" The leaders of the Western powers also believed that the German army would not attack the Soviet

Union in the summer of 1941. The campaign in the Western press about the preparation of the German offensive in the Middle East, which unfolded after the occupation of the Balkans, allowed Berlin to present the concentration of troops in the East as one of its stages1040 According to G.K. Zhukov, on June 11, 1941, in response to a request from the military to be allowed to bring the troops of the western border districts into full combat readiness, Stalin stated that "in order to wage a big war with us, the Germans, firstly, need oil and they must first conquer it, and in Secondly, they need to liquidate the Western Front, land in England or make peace with her." For greater persuasiveness, Stalin approached the map and, pointing to the Middle East, declared: "This is where they (the Germans) will go"1041. At the same time, rumors appeared about the reciprocal nature of the German concentration in the face of similar actions by the Red Army and the unclear prospects for Soviet policy. On June 15, a version was circulated through diplomatic channels that by the

beginning of July, Germany would clarify relations with the USSR by presenting certain demands. Even the German Minister of Propaganda J. Goebbels took part in the disinformation campaign, who, with the consent of Hitler, in complete secrecy from everyone, using materials from the OKW, prepared an article "Crete as an example", containing a hint that the airborne operation in Crete was a kind of rehearsal for the invasion to the British Isles. The article received Hitler's approval and was published in the NSDAP newspaper "Völkischer Beobachter" dated June 13, 1941. However, early in the morning,

country and abroad at the same time there is a hype, - Goebbels wrote in his diary on June 14. - Everything works flawlessly ... A huge sensation is evident. British radio stations are already declaring that the concentration of our troops against Russia is a bluff with which we cover up our preparations for a landing in England. That was the idea!" At the same time, rumors were spreading in Berlin about a skirmish allegedly taking place between Hitler and Goebbels, who fell out of favor, and about the preparations for Stalin's visit to Germany, for which red banners are being made¹⁰⁴² As a result, "to our great regret, the political leadership of our country, right up to the very beginning of the war, was in captivity of the disinformation activities of German intelligence"¹⁰⁴³.

In addition, Germany by all means spread the version that the war with the USSR is for it a last resort compared to negotiations, during which it is possible to put forward ultimatum demands. It is no coincidence that since April 1941, information about a possible German ultimatum has become an indispensable content of intelligence information coming from various sources and countries, which, as it were, increased its reliability¹⁰⁴⁴. The British ambassador in Moscow, Cripps, was also sure that Germany would present an ultimatum to the USSR, which he reported to London at the end of April 1941. Information about the ultimatum also came from the Lyceum Student. Under this pseudonym, O. Berlinsk acted, who also worked for the German special services. In his memoirs, P.A. Sudoplatov writes that Moscow knew that this was a double agent. According to the materials of V. Peschersky, the assessment of this agent was rather cautious: on the one hand, valuable information was received from him, but on the other hand, it contained many rumors and speculations drawn from journalistic and diplomatic circles. It is curious to note that the resident of the NKGB in Berlin, A. Kobulov, who was in touch with the "Lyceum student", had conversations with him, the contents of which were reported to Hitler. In June 1941, Kobulov assured the Lyceum Student that Moscow wanted peace with Germany. Reported to Hitler, this information provoked his negative reaction. Most likely, "Lyceum student" was used by both sides to misinform each other¹⁰⁴⁵.

Accordingly, Berlin intensified spreading rumors about the upcoming or already ongoing negotiations with the USSR. So, on May 26, Soviet intelligence in England obtained a document from the political intelligence department of the British Foreign Ministry, which dealt with Soviet-German negotiations, which may already be underway. On May 31, Finnish President R. Ryti announced at a government meeting that Germany and the USSR were conducting secret negotiations, which was reported to Moscow. In May - June 1941, the head of the Reich Chancellery and Hitler's secretary of state, O. Meisner, assured the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, V.G. Dekanozov that Hitler was preparing to take an important step aimed at strengthening relations with the USSR, and hinted at his desire to meet with Stalin, who became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR¹⁰⁴⁶ The contacts of Dekanozov and F. Schulenburg in Moscow on May 5, 9 and 12, 1941 were also the question of possible Soviet-German negotiations, and were not "warnings" of the German ambassador, as some authors believe¹⁰⁴⁷. As a result, Moscow not only expected the start of negotiations, but also tried to initiate them.

As a result, as a number of authors note, the Soviet leadership was aware of the inevitability of a war with Germany, but connected the moment of its beginning with the outcome of future Soviet-German negotiations and with a possible settlement of the issue of ending the Anglo-German war. The USSR is possible only after the defeat of England or the achievement of peace with her. Soviet agents in England and the USA reported that "the question of an attack on the USSR depends on a secret agreement with the British government, since it would be too dangerous to wage a war on two fronts"¹⁰⁴⁹. As a number of authors point out, Stalin did not believe that, all the more so since she did not have Germany at her disposal, she would decide the resources for a protracted war. As already noted, to wage a war on two fronts¹⁰⁵⁰, economic contacts with Germany allowed the USSR to study its economic potential quite well, and Moscow knew well that a protracted war was an unaffordable luxury for Berlin. According to G.K. Zhukov, Stalin believed that "Germany was up to its neck in the war in the West, and

I believe that Hitler will not risk creating a second front for himself by attacking the Soviet Union. Hitler is not such a fool not to understand that the Soviet Union is not Poland, it is not France, and that it is not even England and all of them put together "1051 Apparently, the Soviet leadership fully assumed that Hitler could take certain steps to intimidate the USSR with its military power, but things will not go beyond these rather amorphous threats, since an attack on the USSR would immediately put Germany in an extremely disadvantageous position. Hitler is unlikely to want to give up the economic and political benefits of maintaining peace with the USSR, and will throw Germany into the ring of war on two fronts.

Under these conditions, Soviet intelligence paid great attention to identifying possible contacts between Germany, Britain and the United States. It is no coincidence that the flight of R. Hess to England in May 1941 attracted the close attention of Moscow. Some circumstances of the situation at the end of April - beginning of May 1941 are touched upon in the work of L.A. Bezymensky. On April 18, the British Ambassador S. Cripps in Moscow handed over to the Soviet leadership a statement in which he indicated that "it is possible that in the event the war was extended for a long period, that Great Britain (especially certain circles in Great Britain) might smile at the thought of concluding a deal on the subject of ending the war on the basis, again proposed in some German circles, under which the former situation would be restored in Western Europe, Germany would not be hindered in expanding her "living space" in an easterly direction. Further, the British ambassador wrote that "the possibility of such an agreement on peace is completely excluded at this time," and suggested that Moscow begin rapprochement with London. This document, handed over by the official representative of England, was regarded by Stalin as a serious warning about a possible Anglo-German conspiracy. Moreover, soon a message came about the flight of Hess, which, according to Soviet agents, was an attempt at this conspiracy before the war with the USSR. The author rightly points out that the British government, keeping everything connected with the Hess mission a secret, thereby tried to put pressure on the USSR in order to draw it into the war with Germany.

In the 20th of May, Moscow was informed that negotiations with Hess would continue. True, G.L. Rozanov notes that from the British residency, Stalin received information about the failure of a new attempt at an Anglo-German conspiracy. Nevertheless, in June, Soviet diplomats in Berlin clarified the prospects for Anglo-German and American-German relations, for their part, imitating rapprochement with Britain and the USA. Since no changes took place, Stalin, being sure that Germany would not attack the USSR without eliminating the threat from England, probably completely stopped taking the "warnings". At the same time, the question has not yet been finally clarified: what did Moscow know about the Hess mission? According to V.M. Molotov, the flight of Hess led to the inhibition of Soviet military offensive preparations due to the threat of the Anglo-German alliance¹⁰⁵⁵

Introduction to scientific circulation O.V. Vishlev¹⁰⁵⁶ materials from the German archives posed a new interesting problem for researchers related to the activities of Soviet intelligence to disinform Germany. First of all, we are talking about a purposeful demonstration by the Soviet leadership of peacefulness and readiness for further mutually beneficial economic relations with Germany. These include increased supplies to Germany in March-April 1941, economic agreements with Germany and the countries occupied by it, Stalin's friendly gesture towards Germany during the farewell from Moscow on April 13, 1941, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the closure of the diplomatic missions of the occupied European countries, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the anti-British government of Iraq, proposals for new economic agreements. In mid-May, Germany was notified of Stalin's desire to come to Berlin to negotiate accession to the Tripartite Pact. In May 1941, Soviet-German consultations were held on the Middle East.

To explain the Soviet military preparations, a version of a split between the political and military leadership of the USSR on the issue of relations with Germany was brought to the attention of Berlin. The military allegedly insisted on toughening Soviet policy, and under their pressure, Stalin was forced to carry out some military measures. In order to pull off part of the German grouping from the southern regions of Poland, Berlin was inspired by the idea of concentrating the main forces of the Red Army against East Prussia, where, in the event of war, the main events would unfold. Thus, Moscow, like Berlin, used outdated military plans to misinform the enemy. Germany was hinted that its military preparations in Eastern Europe were strengthening anti-German sentiments in the Soviet leadership, while Stalin was the guarantor of the Kremlin's pro-German course. In mid-May, Germany was notified of Stalin's desire to come to Berlin to negotiate accession to the Tripartite Pact. At the same time, through various channels, the Soviet side conveyed to Berlin its unshakable intention to defend its own interests. In April 1941, the Soviet aviation enterprises were shown to the German aviation delegation for a show of force. In May - June, rumors were initiated about the preparation of the Soviet Air Force, in the event of a German attack, to strike at Berlin, about the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Demonstrating to Germany the danger of war with the USSR and on two fronts, Moscow tried to seat her at the negotiating table.

However, Hitler was reported mainly to those materials that did not contradict his opinion that the USSR was "a colossus with feet of clay." As a result, the German leadership did not imagine the complexity of the future campaign to the East, expecting quick victories. German intelligence also failed to establish the number of Soviet troops. On January 15, 1941, the German command believed that the Red Army had 20 armies, 30 rifle, 9 cavalry and 6 mechanized corps, while in reality in December 1940 the Red Army had 16 armies, 47 rifle, 4 cavalry, 9 mechanized corps. On June 11, 1941, the German command proceeded from the fact that the future enemy had 20 armies, 40 rifle, 9 cavalry and 3 mechanized corps, but in reality the Red Army had 27 armies, 62 rifle, 4 cavalry, 29 mechanized and 5 airborne corps. German intelligence data on the number of divisions in the Red Army on January 15 and June 11 and the deployment of Soviet troops in the directions on January 15 and June 21, 1941 are presented in tables 25-26 (numbers in brackets - the actual situation) 1057. Table 25 Estimation of the size of the Red Army Table 26 Estimation of the deployment of Soviet troops in directions The Soviet special services were engaged not only in disinformation of a potential

enemy, but

also prepared for actions in a future war. On

April 18, 1941, a directive was signed, according to

which all Soviet "residences in Europe were ordered to intensify the work of the agent network and communication lines in every possible way, bringing them into line with wartime conditions. Military intelligence sent a similar directive along its line." It was planned to strengthen the residency in Germany and Poland with experienced workers and to equip the agents with radio equipment. In May-June 1941, during negotiations with the Czechoslovak government in exile, an agreement was reached on coordinating intelligence work and creating Czechoslovak units in the USSR for sabotage activities on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The children of Soviet diplomatic workers were taken out of Berlin. On June 16, 1941, on the very day when Stalin refused to believe in the threat of a German attack, an order was given to organize a special group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs for reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines in case of war. The special group was to be ready for action by July 1, 1941,

the task was to destroy the fuel depots that supplied the German tank units that were concentrated near the Soviet borders¹⁰⁵⁸.

Moscow received information about the actions of British intelligence aimed at provoking a clash between Germany and the USSR. In an effort to avert the threat of invasion from England, her intelligence spread rumors that "the Soviet Union intends to immediately take further aggressive military action as soon as Germany is involved in major operations." According to K. Philby, the British leadership tried by all means to whip up fear among the German leadership of Soviet military preparations in order to stimulate tension and conflicts in Soviet-German relations. According to Yu. Bokarev, England managed to provoke the Soviet-German war. In the United States, British agents spread rumors about the inevitability of a Soviet-German war on the initiative of the Soviet Union, which would strike at Southern Poland. Information about Churchill's "warnings" to Stalin fits well into this activity. In Russian historiography, this version is extremely widespread. What did the British Prime Minister write to Moscow? "I received reliable information from a credible agent that the Germans, after they decided that Yugoslavia was in their networks, that

is, after March 20, began to transfer three of the five armored divisions located in Romania to the southern part of Poland. the moment they learned of the Serbian revolution, this movement was cancelled. Your Excellency will easily appreciate the significance of these facts."¹⁰⁶⁰ This letter, written on April 3, was handed over to Stalin on April 21 and, as V. Suvorov convincingly proved, was not Churchill's "warning", but his attempt to get help from the USSR during the fighting in the Balkans. It is curious that this conclusion is fully shared by V. Suvorov's longtime opponent G. Gorodetsky, who, relying on British documents, showed that until the beginning of June 1941, British intelligence denied the possibility of an attack. Thus, Churchill's "warnings" in April May 1941 Germany on the USSR¹⁰⁶¹ were just another attempt to draw the USSR into a war with Germany to alleviate the situation of England. K. Andrew and O. Gordievsky write that Soviet agents in England reported that the British government had a different view of the military situation in Europe than Churchill did in his messages to Moscow. Even when, in early June 1941, the British government came to it believed until June 22 · the conclusion that Germany was preparing for war with the USSR, that Berlin would present an ultimatum to Moscow, backed up by the threat of the use of force, and not launch a surprise invasion. On June 16, 1941, the British leadership handed over to the Soviet ambassador in London, I.M. Maysky a map with a diagram of the German grouping at the Soviet borders. According to these data, there were 76 divisions in Poland (of which 2 were armored and 2 motorized), in Romania, Hungary and Slovakia - 29 divisions (of which 4 were armored and 2 were motorized), it was also planned to transfer 2 divisions across the Baltic and 2 divisions from Scandinavia to

Northern Finland. The diagram shows a total of 109 German divisions, which, according to V.Ya. Sipols, was an underestimate. In fact, by this time, 104 divisions were deployed (75 infantry, 1 mountain infantry, 3 light infantry, 1 cavalry, 3 security, 10 tank and 11 motorized), of which only 7 infantry divisions were in Romania. Taking into account 4 divisions in Finland, their total number reached 1,081,063 One cannot but admit the high accuracy of British intelligence data on the total number of German troops in the East, but their information on the number of tank and motorized divisions was significantly underestimated. In addition, Soviet intelligence believed that a large grouping was concentrated on the borders of the USSR, so it is unlikely that this information was perceived in Moscow differently than another English disinformation.

One of the constant plots of Russian historiography is the version about the most valuable materials of R. Sorge, which were not taken into account by Stalin. However even the selectively published reports of Sorge show that they contain many inaccurate and conflicting information about Germany's intentions. Getting information in German embassy in Japan, Sorge unwittingly became a channel for the dissemination of German misinformation. To the observations and conclusions of V. Sakharov and V. Suvorov on this issue¹⁰⁶⁴ a few more touches should be added. So, on March 11, 1941, Sorge reported to Moscow that, According to the German military attache in Tokyo, "After the end of the present [Anglo-German] war, Germany's fierce struggle against the Soviet Union "¹⁰⁶⁵ . On May 6, it was reported that the German leadership was sure that "the war with the USSR will not in the least interfere with the conduct of the war against England, and the decision to start a war against The USSR will be accepted by Hitler "either in May or after the war with England"¹⁰⁶⁶ May 21 . he transmitted to Moscow that "the war between Germany and the USSR could begin at the end of May", but "this year the danger may pass"¹⁰⁶⁷ the action against . On June 1, Sorge announced that "the German the USSR will begin in the second half of June"¹⁰⁶⁸ On June 17 it was reported .

that "the war against the USSR is being delayed, probably until end of June. The military attache does not know whether there will be a war or not"¹⁰⁶⁹ June 20 to Moscow a message was received that, in the opinion of the German ambassador in Tokyo, "a war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable."¹⁰⁷⁰ I wonder what conclusions about Germany's intentions should have to do in Moscow from this conflicting information? It is also not clear what the conclusion is based on. the compiler of the latest collection of documents about R. Sorge A.G. Fesyun that "on messages about approaching German attack, the Center did not react"¹⁰⁷¹. After all, in these messages you can see the "imminent" German attack only now, knowing what happened in 1941 In any case, no other messages from Sorge have been published so far.

Any other information for today are only legends. In addition, it should take into account that, as P.A. Sudoplatov, Sorge, who received Moscow's sanction for cooperation with German intelligence in Japan, from 1937 did not enjoy full confidence. In addition to him, there were other agents in the Far East, for example, the German consul in Shanghai or the head of the gendarmerie service of the Kwantung Army, whose reports are not were published. Surely Moscow received information about the assessment of the situation in Europe Japanese leadership, which believed that Germany's military preparations in the East are disinformation to cover up the invasion of England¹⁰⁷² Thus, information received from Sorge, for a number of reasons, cannot be considered the most valuable.

Although, from the height of today, the desire of many authors to quote some information from his reports to confirm the established version. In recent years, several works on the history of intelligence have been published, which allow for a more detailed look at the evaluation mechanism in the central office special services received information. P.A. Sudoplatov claims that before the start of the Great During the Patriotic War, neither the intelligence of the NKVD nor the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff had departments for processing and analyzing incoming information, which were already created during war. However, the Information and Analytical Department of the 5th Department of the GUGB just engaged in the processing and analysis of intelligence information, it included an analytical a group led by M.A. Alakhverdov. In the Intelligence Directorate functioned information department, whose memorandums were approved by the head Intelligence departments and sent to the leadership of the country and the army. Another thing is that the quality the work of these units was low, and, as noted by L.A. Bezymensky, intelligence often she herself discredited the incoming information, transmitted to Stalin without any analysis. According to A.G. Pavlova, the conclusions of military intelligence were peculiar a tribute to the oppressive atmosphere that existed and a kind of pass for a report Stalin, who could himself draw conclusions from the reported information, and on the conclusions Intelligence departments do not pay attention¹⁰⁷³ .

The compilers of the collection of documents "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table" also believe that the information received "in its totality allowed us to conclude that Germany was intensively and comprehensively preparing for an attack on the Soviet Union." But then they admit that the special services "did not evaluate the totality of the information obtained, did not analyze the information received, did not draw the necessary conclusion," and the absence of generalizing reports was a minus in their work. As a result, "being reported to the leadership of the country in a fragmented form, information about military preparations did not create a convincing holistic picture of ongoing events, did not answer the main question: what is the purpose of these preparations, whether the rulers of Germany made a political decision to attack, when aggression should be expected. what will be the strategic and tactical goals of the enemy's conduct of hostilities"¹⁰⁷⁴. In addition, it is not clear whether anyone in Moscow assessed the incoming reports as a growing threat of a German attack. Unfortunately, the documents confirming this are still not known, so it is hardly legitimate to lay the responsibility for the absence of such conclusions only on Stalin. According to G.K. Zhukov, Stalin "even from what was reported to

him through military intelligence, could see an unconditional increase in the threat of war, but he did not do this," since he believed the disinformation coming from Hitler and, with the help of a cautious policy, sought to delay or avoid war. "So did the entire Stalinist leadership of the country," writes Zhukov, hinting that the military leadership was of a different opinion. True, we read further the following: "Could the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense in a timely manner open the exit of enemy troops to the border of the USSR directly to the starting areas, from where their invasion began on June 22? Under the conditions in which the military leadership was placed, it was difficult to do this. We categorically aerial reconnaissance was prohibited, and intelligence data was late"¹⁰⁷⁵. That is, the military leadership was also unable to determine the moment when the preparations for the German attack were completed, which somewhat devalues the accusations against Stalin. It is interesting to compare the quoted quotes with the

marshal's manuscript, which instead says the following: "I don't know what intelligence gave Stalin, which was not in the hands of the General Staff, but the intelligence, which was headed by General F.I. Golikov before the war, could not reveal the events, which were worked out in deep secrecy at the headquarters of the German troops according to the war plan. Intelligence did not manage to penetrate the hiding places where the goals and tasks of the German troops in the war with the Soviet Union were planned. We learned about all this only after the war, reading captured documents "¹⁰⁷⁶. Then Zhukov spoke even more categorically: "Now there are different versions that we knew about the advance of enemy troops to their starting lines and even specifically about the day of the German attack. These versions are without foundation and cannot be officially confirmed. The military leadership knew only general conjectural information that was known to many"¹⁰⁷⁷ Moreover, G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky testify that in Moscow they did not know not only about the timing of the German attack, but also about whether there would be an attack at all. It is clear that such evidence settled in the archives.

We must not forget that Soviet intelligence failed to obtain a single document about Germany's intentions in the East. As rightly noted by P.A. Sudoplatov, intelligence had sources surrounded by the military-political leadership of Germany, but did not have access to the documents of the German command. Therefore, the information received was largely based on hearsay and reflected the hesitations in the German leadership on the issue of relations with the USSR.¹⁰⁷⁹ All this also made it difficult for Moscow to correctly assess the situation. Note that not only the Soviet leadership, but also the leadership of other countries did not have accurate information about the intentions of Germany in June 1941. The closest to the correct assessment of Germany's actions was British intelligence, which had a system for deciphering some German military ciphers, but its conclusions were not completely reflected the actual plans of Berlin. This situation is certainly the result

successful actions of the German counterintelligence and measures to maintain secrecy and disinformation of the enemy. This should be remembered by researchers who, as a rule, proceed in their assessments from the anti-Stalinist conjuncture of the "Khrushchev" period.

In the work of A. Goryanin, another answer is proposed to the question why Stalin was not afraid of a German attack in June 1941. The version that at the end of June Germany will present political and economic demands to the USSR, backed up by troops on the border, is almost impossible but capable of becoming the subject of negotiations - was perceived in Moscow. The forthcoming negotiations allowed the USSR to complete military preparations and get ahead of Germany by attacking it. Considering the German actions on the border as a bluff ("big game"), the Soviet side continued to prepare for an attack, not for defense. The general situation in the world was unfavorable for Germany, which could not wage war on all fronts, but sought to establish its hegemony in Europe in several stages. The first stage was the defeat by Germany of its continental opponents. The second stage - the withdrawal of England from the war - was in full swing. Under these conditions, it would be too risky to fight also with the USSR. First, it was necessary to secure the Mediterranean, to increase the effectiveness of the blockade of England, to create a solid diplomatic bloc of allies and neutral countries.

But it was not possible to eliminate the British from the Mediterranean, despite the capture of the Balkans and Crete, the battles of May-June 1941 in Syria-Iraq ended unsuccessfully for Germany, Italy lost its possessions in East Africa. The losses at sea of the German and Italian navies made the hopes of these countries for success all the more problematic. It was not possible to create a continental pro-German bloc and use the French fleet to their advantage. On the other hand, England enjoyed more and more support from the United States, which strengthened its control over the Atlantic, created bases in Greenland and Iceland, and provoked Germany and Italy in every possible way. Under these conditions, a German victory was impossible, and her position would only worsen. Therefore, Stalin did not believe that Germany would dare to create another front for itself. But he miscalculated, because in Berlin they were sure of the weakness of the USSR, since German intelligence did not have reliable information. Hitler was convinced that nothing threatened him from the USSR, and did not perceive Moscow as a serious force. Stalin hoped that Germany would seek his alliance. According to A. Goryanin, Stalin's incorrect assessment of the situation gave Germany a chance to succeed in the Soviet-German war because nothing had been done

for defense¹⁰⁸⁰. Traditionally, in Russian historiography, the problem of surprise was practically not raised, since it was already clear that Germany had made a sudden, treacherous and unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union. However, in the last decade this issue has become the subject of lively discussion. Influenced by an uncritically perceived concept of intelligence agencies about their activities on the eve of the war, some authors argued that since the Soviet leadership received a lot of intelligence information and had all the data on Germany's preparations for an attack up to the day, hour and directions of the enemy's strikes, it was difficult to talk about the surprise of the German attack. Nevertheless, researchers admit that Stalin did not believe in the reliability of this information and the outbreak of war turned out to be sudden for the troops of the border districts¹⁰⁸¹. This concept is formulated more clearly in the works of representatives of intelligence agencies who defend "the honor of the uniform." So, P.I. Ivashutin, outlining the successes of intelligence, concludes that "the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, neither in strategic nor in tactical terms, was sudden. Another thing is that the invasion of fascist troops on our territory took the Soviet troops by surprise, since they were not in advance put on full alert." A. Baidakov takes a similar position, noting that intelligence failed to convince Stalin of an imminent German attack, although he puts the blame for the mistake on the political leadership¹⁰⁸².

In the work of A.G. Pavlova states that "military intelligence has completed its task. Under these conditions, it does not seem legitimate to assert that the German attack on

The USSR was unexpected." But two pages later he writes the following: "Some authors express the opinion that by coordinated disinformation, the German aggressors were able to ensure the surprise attack on the USSR. But they also managed to achieve this as a result of miscalculations made by the political and military leadership of the USSR. Difficult not agree with this conclusion" 1083 . According to V.A. Kirpichenko, "pre-war intelligence fulfilled her duty. She used all available information about Germany's preparations for war. There was a mass of irrefutable material from very solid sources. The fact that they were not given due importance, this no longer depended on intelligence. "Although he admits that intelligence" slipped and disinformation, nevertheless, in his opinion, the given position is the final word of intelligence and "revision of our concept will not be"1084. At the same time, many authors continue to recognize the sudden nature of the German invasion, as a rule, explaining this by Stalin's mistakes in assessing the situation1085

Now the passions around the question of the surprise of the German attack have somewhat cooled down. Moreover, the opponents of its presence did not manage to prove their case, since it is clear that even if the leadership had important intelligence at their disposal, they did not believe them, then it is difficult to talk about the absence of a surprise attack. Today it is clear that the contradictory data of Soviet intelligence and the Kremlin's own vision of the international situation, which is characteristic of the Kremlin, including the certainty that Hitler would not dare to embark on an adventurous protracted war in the East, did not allow an objective assessment of the situation in May-June 1941, and The Soviet leadership made a fatal mistake. However, the reasons why it was allowed are still debatable. Only the solution of this question will make it possible to come closer to understanding the situation on the eve of the war. The presence of several channels for obtaining intelligence information, it seemed, should have contributed to the high level of awareness of the Soviet leadership. However, unfortunately, this did not happen. Most likely, this was the result of a lack of coordination between the work of the special services and a centralized assessment of incoming intelligence. Intelligence cooperation, which was already small, was undermined by rivalry between them. At the same time, it should be noted that the relationship between the Soviet intelligence services has not yet become the object of

research. An analysis of the available materials on the history of Soviet intelligence on the eve of the war shows that, despite the presence of a fairly developed intelligence network, it was unable to obtain and present to the leadership materials that would give an unambiguous answer to the question of Germany's intentions in the summer of 1941. Intelligence found itself in the same situation other great powers, therefore it is hardly worth it, as Yu.A. Gorkov, to argue that Soviet intelligence worked poorly both before the war and at its beginning. Rather, the opinion of V. Sakharov, who believes that the agents obtained the maximum possible amount of information, is closer to the truth. But in the face of targeted disinformation and highly effective secrecy measures carried out by the German secret services, this information turned out to be too contradictory1086. The weakness of the analytical apparatus of the secret services in Moscow did not allow to narrow the flow of German disinformation to the Kremlin, which ultimately disorientated the Soviet leadership. Much greater results were achieved by Soviet intelligence in England, the USA and Japan, where there were opportunities for agents to access government documents. At the same time, the Soviet secret services managed to effectively hide from Germany not only the available forces of the Red Army, but also the conduct of most of the military activities in May-June 1941. No less comprehensive than the German one was the disinformation activity of the Soviet intelligence, although, unfortunately, its results did not influence the actions of Berlin. It seems that the German and Soviet secret services were better able to hide their secrets than reveal others.

Red Army before the war: organization and personnel

The history of the construction of the Soviet armed forces in the prewar years, due to the secrecy of documents of that period, is still insufficiently studied. Although in recent years, Russian historiography has been replenished with the publication of some important documents and works in which various aspects of this topic are considered in much more detail, there are still no generalizing works in the open literature. Accordingly, the general characteristics used by various authors are mainly conclusions not based on careful research, but general phrases of a semi-propagandistic nature. Often, Russian historiography uses assessments of the Red Army given by Western observers in 1939-1941, which can hardly serve as an example of objectivity and impartiality. In addition, one should not forget that comparisons of the Soviet armed forces with the armed forces of other countries are rather conditional and, as a rule, lack clear criteria for comparison. It seems that the generalization of the available documents and data of the latest national historiography will make it possible to show in more detail the process of the organizational development of the Red Army before the war.

By the beginning of 1939, the territory of the Soviet Union was divided into 14 military districts: Leningrad (LVO), Kalininsky (KaVO), Belorussian Special (BOVO), Kiev Special (KOVO), Kharkov (HVO), Orlovsky (ORVO), Moscow (MVO), North Caucasian (SKVO), Volga (PriVO), Transcaucasian (ZakVO), Ural (UrVO), Siberian (SibVO), Central Asian (SAVO), Transbaikal (ZabVO) and the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies (OKA) in the Far East. Of these, 4 were formed in 1918, 3 - in 1921-1926, 5 - in 1935, and 4 - in 1938.¹⁰⁸⁷ In addition, troops of the 57th Special Rifle Corps (OSK), created by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0037 dated September 4, 1937 and was operationally subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Defense¹⁰⁸⁸.

With the end of the Civil War, the army departments in the Red Army were gradually disbanded (except for the Far East), and until the summer of 1938 there were no similar military structures. However, in the conditions of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938, fraught with the outbreak of war, in which, due to its allied obligations towards Czechoslovakia and France, the USSR was to take part, the Soviet leadership on June 26, 1938 decided to form 6 army groups in Belorussian (BVO) and the Kiev (KVO) military districts. According to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0151 of July 26, 1938, the BVO was renamed into a special military district (BOVO), and the Vitebsk Army Group (AG) was formed within it (on the basis of the 4th Rifle Corps), which included troops located on the territory of the Vitebsk and Minsk regions, and the Bobruisk AG (based on the administration of the 5th Rifle Corps), which united troops on the territory of the Mogilev, Gomel and Polesye regions¹⁰⁸⁹ According to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. military district (KOVO), and within it were formed the Zhytomyr AG (on the basis of the administration of the 8th Rifle Corps), whose troops were stationed on the territory of the Chernihiv, Kiev and Zhytomyr regions, Vinnitsa AG (on the basis of the administration of the 17th Rifle Corps), uniting troops on the territory of Vinnitsa and Kamenets-Podolsk regions, the Odessa AG (on the basis of the management of the 6th rifle corps), which included troops located in the Nikolaev region and the Moldavian ASSR, and the Cavalry AG as part of the 2nd and 4th cavalry corps. These administrations were a camouflaged form of the usual army administration¹⁰⁹⁰. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 07 dated January 15, 1939, a new Minsk AG was formed in the BOVO on the basis

of the 16th Rifle Corps, which included troops located on the territory of the Minsk and Mogilev regions. Accordingly, the composition of the Vitebsk and Bobruisk AG changed, and the 23rd Rifle Corps was allocated to the subordination of the district administration¹⁰⁹¹. In accordance with the decision of the Main Military Council (GVS) by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0030 dated July 5, 1939 in the Far East, to unite and direct the actions of the 1st, 2nd OKA, ZabVO and the 57th USC in Chita,

Management of the front group¹⁰⁹², and according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0036 of July 19 1939 The 57th OSK was reorganized into the 1st AG¹⁰⁹³ on August 13 by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0129 in the LVO, the formation of the Novgorod AG¹⁰⁹⁴ of World War II . So to the top began in the Red Army, there were 2 separate armies and 9 army groups.

The mobilization deployment of the Red Army that began on September 7, 1939 caused new transformations of the departments of army groups. Vitebsk, Minsk and Bobruisk AG BOVO were renamed respectively into departments 3rd, 11th and 4th armies. In addition, a horse-mechanized group was created using personal composition of the KalVO administration, and on the basis of the MVO administration, the administration of the 10th army. In KOVO, the procedure for renaming army groups took longer. So, Zhytomyr AG was renamed on September 16 into Shepetovskaya, from September 18 - into Northern and from September 28 - to the 5th Army. Vinnitsa AG became Volochisk from September 16, from September 24 September - Eastern, and from September 28 - the 6th Army. Cavalry AG from September 16 became be called Kamenetz-Podolsk, from September 20 - South, and from September 24 - the 12th Army, which, in turn, was again divided from September 28 into the 12th Army and Cavalry AG. Odessa AG was renamed into the 13th army¹⁰⁹⁵. Dedicated 11 September 1939 for the Polish campaign, the field departments of BOVO and KOVO, actually being the departments of the fronts, were in accordance with the order of the people's commissar Defense No. 0053 dated September 26, 1939 was renamed into the directorates of the Belarusian and Ukrainian fronts. At the same time, to command troops in the territories of both districts BVO and KVO departments were formed, which were subordinate to the Military Councils corresponding fronts¹⁰⁹⁶ .

In the Leningrad Military District, on September 14, 1939, the Novgorod AG was renamed the 8th Army, based Directorate of the KalVO, the administration of the 7th Army was deployed, and in the Murmansk region By order of the People's Commissar No. 0052 of September 16, the Murmansk AG was created. Completion of the Polish campaign and the expansion of the territory of the USSR led to the reorganization of the military-territorial structures in the BSSR and the Ukrainian SSR. According to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0057 dated 11 October 1939, the Belorussian Front was subordinated to the troops located on the territory BSSR, and the Smolensk region was transferred to the KalVO. As part of the troops of the front the 3rd (deployment - Molodechno), 11th (Grodno), 10th (Bialystok) and 4th departments were preserved (Kobrin) armies. The Ukrainian Front included the territories of Kyiv, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr, Kamenetz-Podolsk regions and the territory of Western Ukraine. As part of the troops of the front, the departments of the 5th (Luts'k), 6th (Lviv), 12th (Stanislavov) remained armies and the Cavalry AG (Proskurov). Territories that were previously within the borders of the KOVO Odessa, Nikolaev, Kirovograd, Chernihiv regions and the Moldavian ASSR from its members were excluded. On the territory of Odessa, Nikolaev, Kirovograd, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye regions, Moldavian and Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics formed Odessa Military District (ODVO). The boundaries of the KalVO were changed, which was transferred by the Moscow Military District Yaroslavl, and received the Smolensk region. In turn, the Moscow Military District transferred the Tambov the region was included in the ORVO, and the KhVO included Chernihiv, Kharkov, Poltava, Sumy, Voroshilovgrad, Stalin regions and excluded Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye region and Crimean ASSR. At the same time, the strengthening of controls was canceled BVO and KVO¹⁰⁹⁷ .

On October 23, 1939, the people's commissar of defense, by order No. 0160, ordered to use Directorate of the KVO to form the Directorate of the OdVO, the commander of which was appointed the former commander of the KalVO troops commander I.V. Boldin. Office 13th the army should have been redeployed to Stanislavov and renamed the 12th army, and the personnel of the 12th army department located there, after the surrender of cases should have been returned to the place of former service in the management of HVO¹⁰⁹⁸ on November 14 by order People's Commissar of Defense No. 0177 of the Directorate of the Belorussian and Ukrainian Fronts were renamed respectively to the directorates BOVO and KOVO¹⁰⁹⁹ Meanwhile, the main the attention of the Soviet command was drawn to the development of the situation around

Finland, on the border with which the administration of the 8th Army was transferred on October 26, on November 15 - the administration of the 7th Army, and on November 29, the People's Commissar of Defense issued order No. army in the Kem direction¹¹⁰⁰. During the Soviet-Finnish war, the command of the Red Army had to

improve the structure of command and control. Since the front management was not created to manage operations in Finland, the general leadership was initially entrusted to the commander of the LVO troops, commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskova. However, the slow advance of the Soviet troops at the beginning of the operation led to the fact that on December 9, 1939, the Headquarters of the High Command was formed, which took over the direct leadership of the troops in the theater of operations. According to the GVS directive No. 0691 / op dated December 25, part of the troops of the 7th Army operating on the Karelian Isthmus was allocated to the new 13th Army, and the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0977 / op dated January 7, 1940 to guide their actions on the basis of the control of the LVO, the control of the North-Western Front was created (commander commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko). To manage the rear and supply of the armies operating north of Lake Ladoga, by order of the High Command No. 0897 dated January 3, 1940, the Office of the Deputy Commander of the LVO Troops for Material Supply and Evacuation in Vologda was formed (chief commander M.V. Zakharov). By order of the GVS No. 01663 dated February 11, 1940, the 15th Army¹¹⁰¹ was created from part of the troops of the 8th Army.

The end of the Soviet-Finnish war required new organizational measures. According to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0013 dated March 26, 1940, it was required to disband the administrations of the North-Western Front, the 7th, 13th and 9th armies. The management of the 8th army should have been transferred to Novgorod, and the 14th army should have been left in Murmansk. The LVO was again created in the territories of the Murmansk, Leningrad regions and the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and in the territories of the Arkhangelsk, Vologda regions and Komi ASSR that were previously part of the district, the Arkhangelsk Military District (ArkVO) was created, the management of which was formed on the basis of the management of the 15th Army and the Office of the Castle Command of the LVO for material supply and evacuation. All administrations were transferred

to peacetime states¹¹⁰². New organizational changes in the command and control structure took place in June 1940. On June 13, the People's Commissar of Defense asked the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to approve a new organization of troops in the Far East. It was proposed to create the Far Eastern Front as part of the 1st, 2nd Red Banner and 15th Armies on the basis of the Chita Front Group Directorate, and to form the 16th Army Directorate in the ZabVO and rename the 1st AG Directorate to the 17th Army. The directorates of the 15th Army were formed on the basis of the directorates of the 20th Rifle Corps, and the 16th Army - on the basis of the directorate of the 32nd Rifle Corps¹¹⁰³. This proposal was approved, and on June 21, the People's Commissar of Defense issued

Order No. 0029, according to which all these measures began¹¹⁰⁴. Meanwhile, in the West, Soviet troops were preparing for an operation to liberate Bessarabia. On the basis of the KOVO Directorate, the Southern Front Directorate was deployed, which united the troops of the 5th, 12th Army, the Cavalry AG and the 9th Army created on the basis of the OdVO Directorate. After the successful completion of the Bessarabian campaign, from July 10, the departments of the Southern Front and the 9th Army were disbanded¹¹⁰⁵. On July 6, the government approved the proposals of the People's Commissar of Defense on the formation of the Baltic Military District (PribVO) on the territory of Lithuania, Latvia and the western regions of the Kalinin Region. KalVO was to be disbanded, and its department applied for the formation of the PribVO department in Riga. The territory of Estonia was included in the LVO, the eastern regions of the Kalinin region - in the MVO, and the Smolensk region - in the BOVO, which was renamed the Western OVO. These measures began to be carried out by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0141 dated July 11¹¹⁰⁶. The territory of Bessarabia was included in the OdVO, and Northern Bukovina - in the KOVO. On July 29, 1940, there were 14 army depart-

People's Commissar of Defense issued Order No. 0184, according to which uniform states were established for the directorates of military districts. The LVO, PribVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, ZabVO, Far Eastern Federal District, OdVO and ZakVO (the last two smaller numbers) received the same organizational structure of departments. MVO received a similar structure, but without some departments. This made it possible to deploy front-line departments on their base in the shortest possible time. The departments of the ArchVO, ORVO, HVO, SKVO, PriVO, UrVO, SibVO and SAVO received reduced staffing, which made it possible to deploy army departments on their basis¹¹⁰⁸.

According to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0190 dated August 17, 1940, the territory of Estonia was transferred to the PribVO and the district was renamed Special (PribOVO), and the western regions of the Kalinin Region departed MVO¹¹⁰⁹. On September 18, the People's Commissar of Defense issued order No. 0050 on the formation of a department in Petrozavodsk as part of the LVO 7th Army at the base of the 56th Rifle Corps¹¹¹⁰. On December 27, 1940, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0074 was issued to transfer from January 1, 1941 the department of the army cavalry group KOVO to a new state and rename it to the department of the 26th Army¹¹¹¹. In addition, the administration of the 25th army was formed as part of the troops of the Far Eastern Fleet. In May 1941, in accordance with the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. armies in the LVO, whose commanders and chiefs of staff were approved by the Politburo on May 24, 1941¹¹¹².

The departments of the internal districts for mobilization were to be allocated to the army department. So, on the basis of the KhVO Directorate, the Directorate of the 18th Army was created, the North Caucasus Military District - of the 19th Army, OrVO - of the 20th Army, PriVO - of the 21st Army, UrVO - of the 22nd Army, SibVO - of the 24th Army, ArchVO - 28th Army. The creation of most of these army departments began in May - June 1941, and by June 22 only the department of the 28th Army had not been created. Since February 1941, on the basis of the PribOVO, ZapOVO and KOVO departments, the departments of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts, respectively, have been formed, however, it still remains unknown when exactly the corresponding order was given. At the same time, on the basis of the OdVO Directorate, the Directorate of the 9th Army was formed. On June 14-19, 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense ordered by June 22-23 to withdraw to the field command posts of the 9th Army, the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts. On June 21, 1941, the Politburo decided to create, on the basis of the MVO Directorate, the Directorate of the Southern Front, which was supposed to unite the troops of the 18th and 9th armies deployed on the border with Romania¹¹¹³. Thus, in 1939 - the first half of 1941, the

military-territorial structures of the Red Army were replenished with 2 military districts and 1 front, and by June 1941, 16 military districts and 1 front were deployed on the territory of the USSR. In mid-June 1941, the deployment of 4 more front-line departments in the Western theater of operations began, which brought the number of front-line departments to 5 out of 8, provided for by the Red Army's mobilization deployment scheme. Accordingly, the number of army departments increased sharply from 6 at the beginning of 1939 to 27 by June 1941, which had only to switch to wartime states and focus on the Western theater of operations.

Now we should turn to the organizational development of the ground forces of the Red Army, which by the beginning of 1939 consisted of 25 directorates of rifle corps, 98 rifle divisions, 5 rifle brigades, 5 directorates of cavalry corps, 26 cavalry divisions, 4 directorates of tank corps, 24 light, 4 heavy and 3 chemical tank brigades¹¹¹⁴. In the first half of the year, the directorates of the 31st, 56th and 59th rifle corps, the 104th mountain rifle division, the 1st, 4th and 5th separate rifle brigades were formed. In addition, the Soviet military leadership was developing a new system of mobilization deployment of troops. May 5, 1939 Chief of the

General Staff Commander of the 1st rank B.M. Shaposhnikov introduced the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR to Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov a report in which he assessed the organizational

the development of rifle troops in accordance with the decision of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of November 29, 1937. The reorganization of 1938 was aimed at eliminating the existing heterogeneity of rifle divisions, strengthening the mobilization readiness of personnel border divisions, ensuring a uniform rise in military reserve during mobilization between districts and reducing the time for mobilization deployment of troops. For this, four types of rifle divisions were created: 14 rifle divisions of the Far East (staff 14 thousand people), 37 regular rifle divisions (staff 6,950 people, including the 36th Rifle Division - 9,000), 10 personnel mountain rifle divisions (staff 4,000 people) and 37 triple deployment rifle divisions (staff 5,220 people), each of which, upon mobilization, deployed into three new rifle divisions (a total of 111 divisions). In addition, at the end of 1938, the Kamchatka and Sakhalin rifle divisions were formed according to the type of personnel divisions. The deployment of 172 rifle divisions was envisaged for wartime. However, the report

stressed, the changing political situation in the world requires strengthening the combat and mobilization readiness of our rifle troops and increasing their personnel. For this, it was proposed to leave 14 rifle divisions of the Far East and the 36th rifle division of the 57th USC unchanged. 27 rifle divisions (including Kamchatka and Sakhalin) to transfer to the states 8,554 people each, 9 rifle divisions of fortified areas to transfer from a state of 7,300 people to a state of 8,878 people. The report expressed the desire to deploy all 37 triple deployment rifle divisions into ordinary divisions with a staff of 4 thousand people, which required the formation of another 74 rifle divisions. However, this event required an expansion of the base and was not yet possible. As an intermediate option, it was proposed to increase the staff of these divisions from 5,220 to 7,854 people, which required 154,968 people, of which 132,000 were covered by disbanding construction battalions maintained at the expense of other departments¹¹¹⁵. Changes in the existing system of mobilization deployment of rifle troops in the event of war

were discussed on July 16, 1939 at a meeting with the people's commissar of defense. It was proposed to abandon the content of triple deployment divisions and deploy 106 rifle divisions, of which 94 in peacetime would be maintained by a staff of 4,000 people, and 12 by a staff of 3,000 people. Part of the personnel divisions, including those in the Far East, should have been transferred to 14 thousand. state. In addition to the existing 37 divisions, it was necessary to form and arrange deployment sites for 69 divisions. In addition to the existing 30 directorates of rifle corps, another 20 directorates should have been formed. Thus, all hidden, that is, intended for deployment in the event of a mobilization of the division, were transferred to the open. This created a standing army ready for use with minimal deployment. Carrying out all these activities required an additional 297 thousand people, which increased the size of the army to more than 2 million people¹¹¹⁶

The Commission on Organizational Measures under the NPO, created by the decision of the GVS, chaired by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Commander of the 1st Rank G.I. On July 27, 1939, Kulik decided to create ordinary rifle divisions of 4,100 people on the basis of triple-deployment rifle divisions. The commission concluded that all military districts could accommodate new divisions, material reserves were also sufficient, therefore, by November 1, 1939, it was necessary to switch to a new organization of rifle troops and prepare new mobilization plans by May 1, 1940¹¹¹⁷. In addition, the issue of preserving the existing tank corps was discussed. B.M. Shaposhnikov, G.I. Kulik and K.E. Voroshilov spoke in favor of their liquidation, and S.K. Timoshenko, S.M. Budyonny and M.V. Zakharov - for the preservation, but with a revision of the staffing structure. As a result, a compromise decision was made to disband the rifle and machine gun brigades, but with the preservation of tank corps for joint operations with infantry and cavalry¹¹¹⁸.

In accordance with the decision, on August 15, 1939, the people's commissar of defense gave Directives No. 4/2/48601-4/2/48611 LVO, KalVO, MVO, OrVO, HVO, PriVO, SKVO, UrVO, Siberian Military District, BOVO and KOVO, according to which they followed from August 25 to December 1, 1939. form 18 directorates of rifle corps, transfer personnel divisions to a new staff of 8,900 and deploy 36 triple deployment divisions in 92 divisions of 6,000

people¹¹¹⁹ On August 22, the People's Commissar of Defense reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR about

provision of weapons for the proposed organizational measures. Taking into account the presence of weapons in the emergency reserve, the activities carried out were generally provided with rifles, machine guns, 82mm mortars and 76mm cannons. By self-loading rifles, 45 mm anti-tank guns, 122 mm howitzers and 76 mm anti-aircraft guns coverage of shortfalls was expected during 1939 on the basis of receipts from industry, and the need for anti-tank guns, 12.7 mm easel machine guns, 50 mm, 107 mm and 120 mm mortars, 152 mm howitzers, 37 mm and 45 mm anti-aircraft guns guns and cars was satisfied with the income from industry in 1939-1940. The People's Commissar of Defense asked to be allowed to use the emergency reserve, to oblige industry to fulfill the plan of military orders for 1939 and produce additional order for cars¹¹²⁰ .

On September 1, 1939, the Politburo approved the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Defense, according to which in the Red Army provided for, in addition to 51 ordinary rifle divisions (33 rifle divisions of 8,900 men each, 17 rifle divisions of 14,000 men each each and 1 rifle division of 12,000 people) to have 76 ordinary rifle divisions 6,000 men each, 13 mountain rifle divisions and 33 ordinary rifle divisions, 3 each 000 people ¹¹²¹ . Accordingly, on September 2, 1939, the decision of the Council of People's Commissars No. 1355-279ss, approved the "Plan for the reorganization of the ground forces of the Red Army for 1939-1940 years." It was decided to transfer the divisions of triple deployment to ordinary and have in Red Army 173 rifle divisions. It was proposed to increase the strike force of the infantry cores in rifle divisions, increase the number of corps artillery and RGK artillery, moving it from triple to double deployment. Should have disbanded 4 cavalry divisions and 2 separate cavalry brigades, in tank troops rifle and machine gun brigades in tank corps and rifle and machine gun battalions in tank brigades were disbanded (see Appendix A). Should have cut the number of service and rear units and institutions. Headcount The Red Army was established in 2,265 thousand people¹¹²² .

Table 27

The deployment of rifle troops on August 15 and September 5, 1939¹¹²³

However, the development of the international situation in early September that on the night of September 7, it was decided to carry out a partial mobilization of the Red The armies and troops were ordered to start "Large Training Camps" (BUS). According to Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 2/1/50698 dated May 20, 1939, the name BUS was encrypted designation of covert mobilization. Carrying out the BUS on the letter "A" meant that there was a deployment of individual units that had a readiness period of up to 10 days, with rears in wartime states. Spare parts and civilian formations departments on BUS were not raised. The mobilization itself took place under conditions of maximum keeping these events secret¹¹²⁴ participation of . In total, in the "Large training camps" took the management of 22 rifle, 5 cavalry and 3 tank corps, 98 rifle and 14 cavalry divisions, 28 tank divisions, 3 motorized rifle and machine gun divisions and 1 airborne brigade (see table 28)¹¹²⁵ . Table 28 Number

of troops

that took part in the BUS LVO KalVO BOVO

KOVO MVO HVO OrVO Total Corps: 5 2 9 9 2 2 1 30

rifle 4 2 6 5 2 2 1 22

cavalry - - 2 3 - - - 5 tank 1 -
1 1 - - - 3 Divisions: 18
4 24 30 12 15 9 112 rifle 17 4 18
23 12 15 9 98 cavalry 1 - 6 7 - - - 14
Brigades: 8 1 9 11 3 - - 32 tank
6 1 8 10 3 - - 28 motorized
1 - 1 1 - - - 3

organizational measures, and on September 13, the Ural Military District, the Siberian Military District, the PriVO and the North Caucasian Military District received directives No. 4/2/48962-4/2/48965, according to which instead of 32 rifle divisions 6- the thousandth of the district were to form 36 rifle divisions (20 to 6 thousand, 16 for 3 thousand people), 3 tank brigades, 3 corps artillery regiments, 1 RGK howitzer artillery regiment and 2 howitzer artillery regiments of high power (BM)1126. Mobilization deployment Red Army in the western districts and the Polish campaign September 17 - October 12, 1939 did not made it possible to fully implement the planned plans for the reorganization of the ground forces. The political changes that took place on the western border of the USSR forced People's Commissariat of Defense to develop a new plan for the reorganization of the Red Army, which was 23

October 1939 No. 81229 ss / s was sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Document stated the need to maintain troops in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States in a reinforced composition, and the planned disbandment of 4 cavalry divisions were considered impossible. Therefore, it was proposed to have in the rifle troops 173 divisions, of which 46 to contain in the states 14-12 thousand people with a tank battalion in 54 tanks, and in 24 divisions, maintained by the state of 6 thousand people, to have a tank battalion in 30 tanks. Of the 48 peacetime rifle corps directorates, 29 had anti-aircraft artillery battalions (of which 22 are double-deployed). military time, 58 directorates of rifle corps and 51 anti-aircraft artillery divisions were deployed. It was proposed to abolish the directorates of fortified areas (URs), except for those located in the Far East, Karelian, Kamenetz-Podolsky and Mogilev-Podolsky, and preserve the existing structures. It was necessary to have 14 departments of SD, 34 separate machine gun battalions, 20 separate artillery battalions, 13 separate machine gun companies, 187 caponier artillery platoons and 4 regiments of URs in the 1st and 2nd OKA. The regular strength of the UR troops was reduced from 75 thousand to 48 thousand people.

Based on the experience of the Polish campaign, during which "the actions of tank corps showed the difficulty of control and its cumbersomeness", and "separate tank brigades acted better and more mobile", it was proposed to disband the management of 4 tank corps, reduce the rear in the tank brigades and abolish the rifle and machine gun brigades and rifle and machine-gun battalions of tank brigades. It was planned to create 16 tank brigades armed with 238 BT tanks, 16 brigades of 238 T-26 tanks, 3 brigades of 117 T-28 tanks and 38 BT tanks and 1 brigade of 32 T-35 tanks and 85 tanks T-28. In addition, 10 light tank regiments and 4 motorcycle battalions were created. IN wartime, it was planned to have 17 BT tank brigades, 25 - T-26, 3 - T-28 and 1 - T-35, in which there would be 11,085 tanks in the state. In peacetime, the staffing tank troops was installed in 105,086 people and 8,201 tanks. The following

organization of corps artillery was envisaged. Western border districts should have in all rifle corps two corps artillery regiment of 36 guns each. Of the 40 artillery regiments, 20 located in the immediate proximity to the border, it was proposed to keep in reinforced states. 9 buildings on Dalniy East had 1 artillery regiment of 48 guns each, and 13 corps of internal districts - 1 dual-deployment artillery regiment (48 guns each), of which in wartime it was created 26 artillery regiments with 36 guns. To increase the combat readiness of the RGK artillery of its regiment were transferred from triple to double deployment, and those located in the Far East

remained ordinary. In the artillery of the RGK, it was proposed to have 12 howitzer regiments of 152-mm howitzers (48 guns each), 4 cannon regiments of 122-mm and 152-mm guns (48 guns each), 17 howitzer regiments of 203-mm howitzers (36 guns each), 1 regiment BM (36 152-mm guns) and separate divisions of 280-mm (6 guns each) and 305-mm howitzers (8 guns each). The regular number of artillery increased by 19.8 thousand people. For wartime, it was supposed to have 23 152-mm howitzer, 8 cannon, 30 203-mm howitzer artillery regiments, 2 BM regiments, 3 divisions of 280-mm and 5 divisions

of 305-mm howitzers. With regard to the cavalry, it was planned to reinforce it with small-caliber and anti-aircraft artillery, disband 2 separate cavalry brigades in the North Caucasian Military District and ZabVO, retain 4 cavalry divisions and 1 directorate of the cavalry corps, previously intended for disbandment, and deploy a separate NPO cavalry regiment into a separate cavalry brigade (see Appendix A). In connection with the increase in the total number of rifle divisions of 14 thousand personnel, the number of spare parts was reduced by 10.8 thousand people. It was proposed to keep the Air Force in the existing organization. It was planned to increase the staffing of military schools and academies by 30,000 people. The number of air defense troops increased to 75 thousand people due to the formation of 4 regiments, 10 divisions of the RGC and 6 divisions of the Air Force. It was envisaged to increase the staffing of automobile, engineering and topographical units, while communications units, chemical troops, logistics agencies, district administrations and the central office of the NPO remained in the existing organization. It was proposed to approve the staff strength of the Red Army at 2,408,583 people and the call for training camps during 1940 1,620,500

people¹¹²⁷ November 2, 1939 the structure of the rifle troops of the Moscow Military District, KhVO, OrVO, which instead of 32 rifle divisions of 6,000 troops were to have 23 rifle divisions (3-6,000 and 20-3,000 strong). In the OdVO, it was ordered to have 1 rifle division of 14,000, 2 rifle divisions of 9,000, 1 rifle division of 6,000 and 4 rifle divisions of 3,000. In addition, in the Moscow Military District and the KhVO, it was ordered to form 1 tank brigade each¹¹²⁸.

However, the plan submitted to the government was not approved, and on November 15, 1939, under No. 81306 ss / s, the People's Commissar of Defense presented the Politburo and SNK of the USSR with a new version of the plan for the reorganization of the ground forces of the Red Army. It proposed the creation of 12 motorized divisions of 10 thousand people and 240 tanks each, 12, 6, and 3,000 rifle divisions were established, the total number of which was reduced to 170 units. The staff of mountain rifle divisions was reduced and the deployment of rifle troops in military districts was specified. Proposals for the reorganization of tank troops and artillery were in line with the previous plan. In the cavalry, it was necessary to disband 2 separate cavalry brigades in the North Caucasus Military District and ZabVO, reorganize 4 cavalry divisions into 2 mountain cavalry divisions and 2 separate cavalry brigades, due to which the regular number of cavalry was somewhat reduced (see Appendix A). It was proposed to increase the number of local rifle troops in connection with the construction of new warehouses in the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine. The remaining sections of the document almost completely corresponded to the previous plan. It was proposed to approve the total staffing of the Red Army at 2,300 thousand people and during 1940 to attract 1,600 thousand people to training camps¹¹²⁹

On November 21, 1939, a meeting of the GVS was held, which considered in the presence of I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov the question of the organization and strength of the Red Army. As a result, it was decided to have 170 divisions in the rifle troops, 15 of them motorized (8 to form in 1940 and 7 in the first half of 1941). These divisions contained 9 thousand people in peacetime and 11.6 thousand people in wartime and had 257 tanks and 73 armored vehicles each. The regular organization of the remaining rifle formations was specified. A proposal was approved to disband 4 directorates of tank corps, 4 rifle and machine gun brigades and rifle and machine gun battalions in tank brigades, the total number of which corresponded to the above proposals

People's Commissariat of Defense, although the total staffing of tank troops was somewhat reduced. Three types of corps artillery regiments were installed: I - 36 guns, 10 regiments of 1,600 people each and 10 regiments of 1,250 people each; II - 36 guns, 10 regiments of 1,300 men each and 10 regiments of 900 men each; III - 48 guns, 13 regiments of 1,535 people each (double deployment) and 9 regiments of 1,535 people each in the corps of the Far East. For artillery, the RGC approved the above proposals of the people's commissar of defense (see Appendix A).

The number of cavalry and spare parts was somewhat reduced, proposals from the People's Commissariat of Defense on organizing the troops of the URs were accepted. The following staffing was established: automobile troops - 35,320 people, air defense troops - 75 thousand people, engineering troops - 25 thousand people, signal troops - 24 thousand people, chemical troops - 10,470 people, topographic units - 3.5 thousand people, local rifle troops - 42,810 people, railway troops - 14,848 people, central and district administrations and rear services - 65 thousand people. The total staff strength of the Red Army was set at 2,300 thousand people. It was envisaged to strengthen the troops of the ZakVO, OdVO, KOVO and SAVO and keep the Air Force in the existing organization¹¹³⁰. On the basis of the decision of the GVS, all these measures were approved on December 1, 1939 by the decision of the Defense Committee No. 433ss. The approval of measures for the reorganization of the ground forces allowed the People's Commissar of Defense on December 7, 1939 to issue directives to the troops of the 1st and 2nd OKA, ZabVO, Siberian Military District, UrVO, PriVO, SAVO, SKVO, MVO, KhVO, OrVO, OdVO No. 4 / 2 / 54077-4 / 2 / 54088, which contained instructions on the new organization of troops and the deployment of rifle divisions¹¹³¹.

However, the delay of the Soviet-Finnish war again did not allow the full reorganization of the Red Army. On December 27, 1939, the People's Commissar of Defense submitted a report to the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars, which indicated that the reorganization of troops in the LVO, KalVO, BOVO and KOVO had been disrupted, and in the remaining districts it would be completed by January 1, 1940. The need to strengthen troops at the front led to that 40 rifle divisions were deployed in wartime states (32 to 17 thousand people, 6 light rifle and 2 mountain rifle divisions - 10.5 thousand people each). The People's Commissar proposed to reduce the approved total number of rifle divisions to 160, to deploy the corresponding spare parts and regimental schools, to carry out early graduation of cadets of military schools and asked to approve the total staff strength of the Red Army at 4,163,400 people a new report, which proposed, in addition to 40 rifle divisions, to deploy 5 more rifle divisions in wartime states, and to transfer the remaining formations from 6 and 3 thousand people to 12 and 6 thousand people, respectively, reducing, however, their total number to 160. In addition, it was proposed to strengthen the spare parts and regimental schools of junior commanders, to call up the remaining 505 thousand people left in the surplus from the draft of the current year, to call up 50 thousand reserve command personnel¹¹³³. On the same day, these proposals were approved (see Appendix A).

On December 31, 1939, the People's Commissar of Defense sent the troops of the ZakVO, BOVO, KOVO, MVO, OrVO, KalVO, KhVO, OdVO, PriVO, SKVO, UrVO, SibVO, ZabVO, 1st, 2nd OKA and 1st AG directives No. No. 4 / 2 / 103001-4 / 2 / 103018 ss, according to which all rifle divisions were ordered to be kept in reinforced strength, the dismissal of assigned personnel called up for the BUS was stopped, further clarification of the deployment of troops was envisaged. According to the directive of the People's and schools¹¹³⁴. 0/2/103687ss dated January 15, 1940. Commissar of Defense No., new spare parts 3 rifle divisions of the 1st AG were converted into motorized rifle divisions¹¹³⁵. On February 1, 1940, the Chief of the General

Staff sent a report to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the People's Commissar of Defense, stating that there were 65 rifle divisions in the Army and that another 23 rifle divisions (9 motorized, 12 rifle divisions) were to be transferred to the theater of operations. and 2 volunteer) (see Appendix A), and the reorganization of other military branches in peacetime was not carried out¹¹³⁶. On February 7, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense issued directives No. 0/2/103693-0/2/103694cc to the Military Councils of the B

KOVO, which provided for the reorganization of artillery, the transfer of rifle formations to peacetime states and the partial redeployment of troops. However, the assigned staff was ordered not to be fired, but to be assembled in reserve regiments at military units. The LVO should

have 21 rifle, 1 motorized and 1 cavalry divisions, 5 tank and 1 airborne brigades, and 2 rifle divisions as part of the ArchVO1138. On March 31, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense issued order No. 0015 to disband the 1st Rifle Corps, the 4th and 5th separate rifle regiments of the "Finnish People's Army" (FNA)1139.

In connection with the end of the Soviet-Finnish war and the threat of an Anglo-French attack on the USSR in Transcaucasia, on April 4, the People's Commissar of Defense sent a report to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in which he proposed to strengthen the composition of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District, ZakVO, KOVO and OdVO. It was supposed to send the directorates of the 34th and 47th rifle corps, the 8th, 100th and 164th divisions to the North Caucasus Military District, which would bring the composition of the district troops to 10 rifle divisions. In ZakVO, it was proposed to send the directorates of the 3rd and 23rd rifle corps, the 4th, 136th and 138th rifle and 24th cavalry divisions, to reorganize the 20th and 63rd mountain rifle divisions into rifle divisions of 12 -to a thousandth staff, and to bring the number of 4 mountain rifle divisions to 9 thousand people. In addition, the 17th Tank Brigade, which was formed in the North Caucasus Military District on the basis of the 6th Tank Regiment, should have been redeployed to the ZakVO, and the 41st Tank Brigade should have been formed on the basis of the 11th Tank Regiment. In KOVO, 2 howitzer artillery regiments and 1 artillery division should have been transferred, in OdVO - 1 corps, 1 heavy corps, 3 BM howitzer artillery regiments and 1 artillery battalion, in the North Caucasus Military District - 5 corps and 1 heavy corps artillery regiments, in ZakVO - 4 corps, 2 howitzer, 2 howitzer artillery regiments BM and 1 artillery division. It was necessary to strengthen the air defense units of the ZakVO, forming 20 divisions of medium-caliber and 7 divisions of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery, and increase the number of air force units in the ZakVO to 9 fighter and 8 bomber air regiments, in the KOVO - up to 14 fighter, 10 bomber

and assault air regiments, in the OdVO - up to 6 fighter, 7 bomber aviation regiments1140 On April 7, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR that, according to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of April 4, out of 117 rifle divisions contained in wartime states, 107 should be left in a 12,000-strong state, and 10 transferred to peacetime states. Some redeployment of the reduced divisions and the disbandment of 32 reserve regiments were proposed. This proposal was approved by the decision of the Politburo on April 9, 1940.1141 According to the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of April 10, 1940, the troops of the LVO, ArchVO, KalVO, BOVO, KOVO, OdVO, MVO, OrVO, KhVO, PriVO, SKVO, ZakVO, UrVO, SAVO , ZabVO, 2nd OKA were to be transferred to peacetime states. The redeployment of troops was envisaged in accordance with the proposals of the People's Commissar of Defense of April 4, 1940, and it was ordered to dismiss the enlisted rank and file, remaining behind the state from non-combatant units. The rest of the private, junior commanding and commanding staff called up from the reserve should be detained until further notice1142. On May 7, the Military Council of the Leningrad Military District received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0/2/104204ss, according to which it was necessary

to form the 71st Special Karelian-Finnish Division with a staff of 9,000 based in Petrozavodsk1143 on the basis of the 1st Rifle Corps of the FNA. On May 9, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense sent report No. 0/1/104224 ss / s to the Politburo and SNK, in which he noted that the reorganization of the Red Army ground forces in accordance with the decision of the Defense Committee of December 1, 1939 was never completely carried out. On April 4, 1940, measures were approved to organize and number rifle troops and to strengthen the troops of the KOVO, OdVO, SKVO and ZakVO, but no decisions were made on the rest of the military branches. Therefore, the people's commissar proposed to have i

buildings. The organization of corps artillery and artillery of the RGK did not change compared to the decision of December 1, 1939, the regular number of cavalry increased slightly. Tank troops, in which 3 brigades were formed during the war and 2 more are currently being formed, were proposed to be transferred to peacetime states, except for 3 tank brigades in the Baltic states and 2 in the Western Military District (see Appendix A). The regular strength of the Air Force was maintained in the same composition. It was necessary to reduce the troops of the URs, chemical units, air defense units, except for those located in the OdVO and ZakVO, to transfer to peacetime states, as well as signal troops, engineering, railway, road, automobile, spare parts, local rifle troops, etc. The total staff strength of the Red Army should have been set at 3,200 thousand people¹¹⁴⁴.

However, the replacement of Voroshilov as People's Commissar of Defense by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko led to the revision of the development plan of the Red Army. On May 21, 1940, the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff reported to Stalin and Molotov a new revised plan "according to your personal instructions" for the organization and strength of the Red Army. It was proposed to have 163 rifle divisions and 52 directorates of rifle corps. All divisions should have been transferred to peacetime states, tank battalions should be excluded from their composition, except for 18 rifle divisions of the Far East. Of the 19 corps artillery regiments, 4 cannon, 9 152-mm howitzer, 9 203-mm howitzer artillery regiments and 5 280-mm separate artillery divisions of the RGK contained in the wartime states, it was proposed to keep in this composition 6 corps, 3 cannon, 4 152-mm howitzer, 6 203-mm howitzer artillery regiments and 2 280-mm separate artillery divisions of the RGK in the LVO, ZakVO and OdVO, and 28 corps, 2 cannon, 5 152-mm howitzer, 6 203-mm howitzer artillery regiments, 3 separate 280-mm artillery divisions and 5 305 -mm separate artillery divisions to transfer to 80% of the wartime staff. It was necessary to disband 5 cavalry divisions, reducing the number

In the tank forces, it was proposed to deploy the tank regiments of the 2nd OKA, ZabVO, North Caucasian Military District and SAVO into tank brigades, leave in wartime states 2 tank brigades in the ZakVO, 1 in the OdVO and 2 in the KOVO, have 3 tank brigades in reinforced Baltic and 8 - in the Far East and in the ZabVO, to disband the rifle and machine gun brigade in the LVO and the training tank battalion in the ZabVO, and the 34th tank brigade should be reorganized into a tank regiment of a motorized division and include flamethrower units in the tank brigades (see Appendix A). It was proposed to leave the Air Force in the same composition and reduce the number of troops of the URs, air defense, engineering, railway, automobile, road, spare, topographic units, central, district and rear institutions. The number of local rifle troops was maintained, it was proposed to create 10 disciplinary battalions. The total staff strength of the Red Army was set at 3,302,220 people, and it was envisaged in 1940 to let 1 million reserve people go through training camps¹¹⁴⁵. On the same day, these proposals were approved by the Politburo, and on May 22 they were formalized by a resolution of the Defense Committee No. 215 ss¹¹⁴⁶. May 31 In 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense sent directives to the districts,

according to which new staffs of troops were established, instructions were given on the procedure for holding organizational events, and a list of units and institutions to be disbanded was given. Separate rifle divisions were disbanded and turned to the formation of tank units. It was required "to fully staff all military units and institutions with rank and file and commanding personnel according to the states established for each unit and institution. To staff units and institutions, use primarily the existing private and junior commanding staff of the conscription service of 1938-1939, as well as the rank and file the call of 1937, which is delayed in the ranks of the army until the autumn of this year, and secondarily those called up from the reserve, who will be detained in the army until they are replaced by conscripts drafted into the army. It was required to bring all units "to full staff and keep them in full combat readiness", and the detainee

assigned commanding staff "needed to be carefully studied" and "for the most trained of them, physically healthy and verified, submit lists to the Directorate for Commanding Staff of the Red Army." The rank and file and junior commanding officers called up from the reserve, remaining in excess after the transfer of the district troops to the states established for them and the disbandment of units and institutions, should have been dismissed into the reserve¹¹⁴⁷

At the same time, in the spring of 1940, the GVS commission proposed reorganizing the tank forces of the Red Army (see Appendix B), "creating powerful tank formations with the organic inclusion of motorized infantry, artillery and the necessary aircraft in May 1940,"¹¹⁴⁸ the question of the organization of tank divisions. On May 27, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff submitted a memorandum to the Politburo and SNK, according to which it was proposed to have 2 tank regiments, 1 artillery regiment, 1 motorized rifle regiment and 1 anti-aircraft artillery division in the tank division. According to the state, the division should have had 11,343 people, 386 tanks, 108 armored vehicles, 42 guns and 72 mortars. It was proposed to include in the composition of the tank corps 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions, an air squadron of 12 aircraft, a road battalion, a communications battalion and a motorcycle regiment, which "in the hands of the corps commander will be a means of pursuing an offensive, providing support for divisions during the actions of the corps on a wide front, belonging to the corps", but "to ensure the offensive operations of the tank corps or when repelling enemy counterattacks ... attach at least 1 air brigade to the tank corps, consisting of 2 bomber and 1 fighter air regiments." It was necessary to form 6 directorates of tank corps and

12 tank divisions, turning to their formation the directorate of 2 cavalry and 4 rifle corps, 4 BT tank brigades, 3 T-28 tank brigades, 1 T-35 tank brigade, 3 motorcycle battalions, 5 cavalry divisions and 1 to form a rifle-machine-gun brigade, 2 motorized divisions not by reducing the cavalry, but by reorganizing 2 rifle divisions (1 each in BOVO and KOVO). The implementation of these measures made it possible to have 173 divisions in the Red Army: 12 tank, 6 motorized, 3 motorized rifle, 142 rifle and 10 mountain rifle. It was proposed to deploy 1 tank division in the LVO, 2 tank corps in the BOVO (1 motorized division in the MVO), 2 tank corps in the KOVO, 1 tank corps in the OdVO and ZabVO. In total, the tank troops should have had 1,260 heavy, 8,711 medium BTs, 7,238 T-26s, and 1,140 flamethrower tanks; while on 1 April 1940 there were 468 heavy tanks, 7,300 BTs, 7,985 T-26s, 1,027 flamethrower tanks and 3,223 T-38s. The military command requested approval of the organization and strength of tank corps and divisions, the proposed measures for their formation and an increase in the total staff strength of the Red Army to 3,405,512 people¹¹⁴⁹

However, these proposals were not approved, and on June 2, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff submitted to the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars a revised plan for the creation of tank corps. Some changes were proposed in the organizational structure of the corps and divisions, which made it possible to meet the established by the government staffing of the Red Army at 3,410 thousand people. It was necessary to form 8 tank corps, 18 tank and 8 motorized divisions, 4 of which already existed. Their formation was addressed by the departments of 2 cavalry and 5 rifle corps, 6 rifle, 5 cavalry divisions and 17 tank brigades. As a result of these measures, the Red Army would have 177 divisions (18 tank, 8 motorized, 3 motorized rifle, 92 rifle and 10 mountain rifle) and 25 tank brigades. In total, tank troops, excluding the mob reserve and T-37 and T-38 tanks, will have 22,398 tanks, of which there were 16,851 on May 1, 1940. The following deployment of tank corps was proposed: 1 tank corps in the LVO, MVO, OdVO and ZabVO, 2 tank corps in BOVO and KOVO and 1 tank division in ZakVO and SAVO. The military asked to approve the proposed measures¹¹⁵⁰.

It was proposed to turn the following units into the formation of tank corps: in the LVO - the 6th, 18th, 20th and 34th tank brigades, the 163rd rifle division, the 15th rifle machine-gun brigade, the 25th cavalry division and tank battalions of rifle divisions, in BOVO - directorates of the 3rd cavalry and 10th rifle corps, 2nd and 21st tank brigades, 29th and 185th rifle divisions, motorcycle battalion, 7th, 11th cavalry divisions and a tank regiment of the 36th cavalry division, tank battalions of rifle divisions, in the KOVO of the 4th cavalry and 49th rifle corps, 5th, 10th, 14th, 23rd, 24th tank brigades, 141 -I rifle division, some parts of the 146th rifle division, 81st motorized division, 34th cavalry division and some parts of the 32nd cavalry division, tank battalions of rifle divisions, in the OdVO - management of the 55th rifle corps (from the KhVO), 4th tank brigade, 15th motorized division, 173rd rifle division, tank battalions of rifle divisions, in the Moscow Military District - the department of the 57th rifle corps, 39th and 55th tank brigades, 1st motorcycle battalion, 1 1st motorized division, tank battalions of rifle divisions, in the ZabVO the control of the 51st rifle corps (from the Ural Military District), the 15th and 37th tank brigades, the 109th motorized division. In ZakVO - 16th Cavalry Division (from KOVO), 7th Tank Brigade, tank battalions of rifle divisions of ZakVO and North Caucasus Military District. In SAVO - the management of the 25th cavalry division, the 146th rifle division, the 10th tank regiment, tank battalions of rifle divisions¹¹⁵¹. Apparently, the Soviet leadership agreed with these proposals, since on June 9, 1940, the people's

commissar of defense approved the plan for the formation of mechanized corps, and the districts received the appropriate directives, according to which by June 30 the 5th mechanized corps was formed in ZabVO, and the 9th tank division in SAVO, in the ZakVO the 6th tank division, in the LVO - the 1st mechanized corps, in the BOVO the 3rd and 6th were formed, in the KOVO - the 4th and 8th, in the OdVO - the 2nd, and in the MVO - 7th mechanized corps¹¹⁵². However, the preparation and conduct of the Baltic and Bessarabian campaigns in June 1940 did not allow the planned formations to be carried out in the European part of the USSR. On June 30, 1940, the Chief of the

General Staff prepared for the People's Commissar of Defense a project for a new deployment of troops in the western districts. The newly created PribVO should have 10 rifle divisions, mechanized corps, 2 cavalry divisions and 1 tank brigade. In the LVO - 14 rifle divisions, a mechanized corps and 4 tank brigades. In BOVO - 23 rifle divisions, a mechanized corps, 1 cavalry division and 3 tank brigades. In KOVO - 21 rifle divisions, 2 mechanized corps, 4 cavalry divisions and 3 tank brigades. In the OdVO - 9 rifle divisions, a mechanized corps and 1 tank brigade. At the same time, it was necessary to strengthen the border districts at the expense of the internal ones, transferring to the ZapOVO 5 rifle divisions from the LVO, 2 from the North Caucasus Military District, and 1 each from the Moscow Military District, PriVO, UrVO, OrVO and KalVO. 6 rifle divisions would be relocated to the PribVO - from the BOVO and 1 each from the ArchVO, KhVO, MVO, and KalVO. 1 rifle division from the KhVO, 1 cavalry division and 1 tank brigade from KOVO were transferred to the OdVO. In place of these rifle divisions, it was proposed .

to place 23 newly created divisions of a 3,000-strong staff¹¹⁵³ On July 4, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the necessary measures "to strengthen the western military districts (BOVO and KOVO) and general strengthening of the Armed Forces of the USSR. It was necessary to "commence the completion of the delayed organizational measures in the Byelorussian, Kyiv and Odessa military districts" and the formation of mechanized corps in them. The military leadership proposed to clarify the existing organization of military districts. In the rifle troops, it was proposed to transfer most of the divisions to the main staff of 12 thousand people. The decrease in the

number of rifle divisions was proposed to be compensated by the formation of 23 new divisions of a reduced composition (3 thousand people each) with 1 cannon artillery regiment. To reinforce the troops of the western border districts, it was proposed to leave 14 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorize

transferred from BOVO, KalVO, MVO, KhVO and ArchVO, to ZapOVO - 24 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions, strengthening it by transferring troops from the LVO, North Caucasus Military District, Moscow Military District, OrVO, PriVO, UrVO and KalVO, to KOVO - 25 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions, and in the OdVO - 10 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions (see Appendix A). A new deployment of the Air Force was proposed. The military asked to approve the proposed organizational measures¹¹⁵⁴. On June 23, the People's Commissar of Defense ordered the Military Council of the LVO to complete the formation of the 1st mechanized corps by July 31, and on July 4, the Military Councils of the BOVO, KOVO, OdVO and MVO received similar orders, which were supposed to complete the formation of mechanized corps by August 9, 1940. July 6 Military The PribVO Council received an order by August 20 to form

the 18th Panzer Division for the 7th Mechanized Corps MVO¹¹⁵⁵ solving particular problems in separate directions, but for a deep shock to the enemy front. Therefore, motorized mechanized corps should be considered as a means of front command and only in certain main areas of army command. The tasks of motorized mechanized corps will be: a) Destruction, together with the Air Force and combined arms formations operating from the front of the enemy's main grouping b) Destroying, together with the Air Force, suitable operational reserves and such a shock to the enemy's operational depth that the creation of a new front becomes impossible. These major tasks require the introduction of mechanized corps in a position from which it is most easy and complete to deliver a devastating blow to the main enemy grouping. Such provisions will be: a) Actions of motorized mechanized corps on the flank; b) Actions of motorized-mechanized corps behind enemy lines "¹¹⁵⁶. On July 6, 1940, the Council of People's Commissars, by its resolution No. 1193-464ss, approved the proposed staffing of tank divisions and the organization of mechanized corps. It was necessary to form 8 such corps and 2

separate tank divisions. It was allowed to change the structure of military districts. The People's Commissariat of Defense got the opportunity to form 23 new rifle divisions with a staff of 3,000 and had to accumulate stocks of weapons and equipment to form 30 rifle divisions in the first three months of the war and another 30 rifle divisions and 2 mechanized corps by the end of the first year of the war. The Council of People's Commissars approved the proposed deployment of troops and allowed to begin its implementation. The total authorized strength of the Red Army was approved in the amount of 3,461,200 people. by the government, transfer troops to places of permanent deployment, disband the units and institutions created for the Baltic and Bessarabian campaigns, and begin the dismissal of assigned

staff in accordance with the directive of May 31, 1940 ¹¹⁵⁸ August 24-26, 1940 in the LVO, PribOVO, ArchVO, North Caucasus Military District, ZapOVO, KOVO, OdVO, MVO, KhVO, OrVO, PriVO, UrVO, ZakVO, SAVO, Siberian Military District, ZabVO were sent directives of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0/2/105192-0/2/105222ss on the transfer in the first half October 1940 of rifle divisions to new 12,000-strong states with the exclusion of anti-tank rifle units from their composition¹¹⁵⁹. On October 4, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff reported to the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars that the formation of 8 mechanized corps, 18 tank and 8 motorized divisions was basically completed. 12 BT tank brigades, 4 T-35 and T-28 brigades, 3 chemical brigades, 2 T-26 tank regiments and tank battalions of rifle

divisions, except those stationed in the Far East, were assigned to their formation. All this led to a reduction in direct infantry support tanks, and "for successful advancement of infantry in modern combat, one tank brigade must be available for each rifle corps."

The existing 20 T-26 brigades are not enough, so another 32 tank brigades should be formed. The military command asked for permission to form 25 tank brigades by June 1, 1941, using T-37 and T-38 tanks, which would make it possible to train tankers, and to approve the staff strength of the Red Army at 3,616,724 people¹¹⁶⁰. However, these proposals were considered too radical, and the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense was instructed to develop organizational measures that would fit into the regular strength of the Red Army. It was necessary to provide for the formation of 18 T-26 tank brigades, 20 rifle and machine-gun brigades, 1 mechanized corps and the deployment of 42 rifle divisions in the first month of the war.

On October 14, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff sent a report No. org / 1/106163 ss / s to the Politburo, in which they proposed measures necessary to strengthen the troops in the first half of 1941. It was necessary to form 8 corps artillery regiments, which made it possible to bring their total number is up to 73 in peacetime and up to 83 in wartime for 62 rifle corps. To reinforce the artillery of the RGK, it was proposed to form 3 cannon 122 mm, 4 howitzer 152 mm, 1 howitzer 203 mm artillery regiments, 1 cannon 210 mm, 3 howitzer 203 mm and 1 howitzer 305 mm artillery divisions. Moreover, the corps and artillery regiments of the RGK in the ZakVO, North Caucasian Military District, OdVO, KOVO, ZapOVO and PribOVO were proposed to be maintained partly in wartime states, and partly in 80% of these states. It was necessary to form 20 machine-gun and artillery mechanized brigades, "having powerful cannon and machine-gun weapons, designed to fight and counter enemy tank and mechanized troops", form a new mechanized corps in KOVO, reorganize the existing 6 airborne brigades into more powerful brigades capable of independent action, and to form 20 separate T-26 tank brigades, designed to reinforce and accompany infantry in battle, based on the calculation of one brigade per rifle corps.

All these measures were proposed to be carried out through the redistribution of military personnel in units in connection with the clarification of the staffing table, changes in the system for training reserve command personnel and the reduction of rear units. The creation of the units should have been completed by May 1, 1941, and fully provided with their materiel by October 1, 1941. In addition, to ensure the deployment of 42 rifle divisions in the first month of the war, it was proposed to reorganize the existing 35 reserve rifle regiments into 42 reserve regiments, which would be deployed in the division. The military leadership asked to approve the total staff strength of the Red Army in the amount of 3,574,705 people. , 6 airborne, 45 .

tank and 3 armored brigades (see Appendix A). A new stage in the organizational improvement of the Red Army began in 1941. On February 12, the military command presented the Soviet government with a new mobilization plan, according to which, in the event of mobilization, Soviet troops were to deploy 198

rifle, 10 mountain rifle, 2 motorized rifle, 60 tank, 30 motorized, 14 cavalry divisions , 2 rifle and 6 airborne brigades. The approval of this mobplan made it possible to begin the formation of those compounds that did not yet exist. First of all, this concerned the creation of 20 new mechanized corps (40 tank and 20 motorized divisions), which began in February - March 1941. On March 8, 1941, the Politburo approved the appointment of commanders of the formed mechanized corps, tank and motorized divisions¹¹⁶³. At the same time, the formation of the missing rifle divisions and the reduction of cavalry divisions began.

In addition, on April 23, 1941, by decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1112-459ss, it was allowed to form 10 anti-tank artillery brigades by June 1 (5 in KOVO, 3 in ZapOVO and 2 in PribOVO), 16 airborne brigades and 5 airborne

corps of a three-brigade composition (2 - in KOVO, 1 each - in PribOVO, ZapOVO and OdVO). With the aim of carrying out these activities while maintaining the regular strength of the Red Army it was necessary to disband 11 rifle divisions and control of the 29th mechanized and 46th Rifle Corps, and transfer 10 rifle divisions to the states

mountain rifle 1164 . to On June 4, 1941, the people's commissar of defense issued order No. 0034, according to which the 1st, 3rd

1st, 4th, 7th and 250th heavy bomber regiments. At the same time, it was necessary to transfer the 7th air regiment from LVO to PribOVO, and the 250th air regiment - from ZabVO to OdVO. In addition, it required form by July 1, 1941 5, and by August 15 another 3 long-range bomber regiments for through the use of supernumerary TB-3 aircraft and revenues from industry aircraft PS-84 (DS-3). The implementation of these measures made it possible to have 2 air regiments per 1 airborne corps and 1 air regiment - for 1 separate airborne brigade

DVF1165. June 12, 1941 by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0202, the Directorate was created airborne troops of the Red Army On May 14, 1941,

the head of the GABTU, Lieutenant General Ya.N. Fedorenko drew attention People's Commissar of Defense to the fact that due to the incomplete provision of mechanized corps tanks by state, they "are not fully combat-ready. To increase them combat readiness until they are provided with tanks, I consider it necessary to arm tank regiments of mechanized corps with 76- and 45-mm guns and machine guns so that in case they necessary, they could fight like anti-tank regiments and divisions. "To carry out this event, there were 1,200 76-mm guns, 1,000 45-mm anti-tank guns and 4 000 machine guns "DP", which would be enough for 50 tank regiments of 24 76-mm guns, 18 45 mm guns and 80 machine guns. For the transportation of these weapons, it was proposed to allocate 1 200 ZiS vehicles and 1,500 GAZ vehicles. A distribution sheet was attached to the report weapons and vehicles on the 19th, 16th, 24th (KOVO), 20th, 17th, 13th (ZapOVO), 2nd, 18th (OdVO), 3rd, 12th (PribOVO), 10th (LVO), 23rd (ORVO), 25th (HVO), 26th (SKVO), 27th (SAVO) and 21st (MVO) mechanized corps, approved by the People's Commissar of Defense 15 May 19411167 On May 16, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff sent directives to carry out this measure by July 1, 1941, which followed "carry out in such a way as not to violate the organizational principle of the regiment, as a tank units, bearing in mind that in the future tanks will be put into service "1168 .

Thus, the ground forces of the Red Army in the second half of 1939 - the first half of 1941 significantly increased and organizationally transformed. During this time directorates were formed of 42 rifle, 29 mechanized, 5 airborne corps, 125 rifle, 31 motorized, 61 tank divisions, 108 artillery regiments, 3 separate artillery divisions, 29 motorcycle regiments and other support units.

Significant development in the 1930s the Soviet Air Force also received (see tables 29-30), which at the end of 1937 consisted of 77 air brigades (24 heavy bombers, 19 medium bomber, 6 light bomber, 10 assault, 14 fighter and 4 reconnaissance) 1169 . In 1936-1938. created an independent strategic aviation - 3 separate special-purpose aviation armies (GAS) of a two-brigade composition1170 In 1938, the existing air squadrons were disaggregated and reorganized into air regiments. The main point of the reorganization of the Air Force was the separation of the rear from the front units, which ultimately increased their operational mobility and mobilization readiness.

Table 29

Number of aircraft in the VVS1171

1.10.28 1.10.29 1.01.31 1.01.32 1.01.33

Heavy bombers 47 48 86 183 330 Light bombers, attack aircraft, reconnaissance

aircraft 703 860 886 911 1 135 Fighters 143 232

449 408 487 Combat aviation 893 1

140 1 421 1 502 1 952

Auxiliary 103 145 161 142 145 Air Force
 educational institutions 352 455 500 634 1 640
 Total 1 348 1 740 2 082 2 278 3 737

According to the Red Army Air Force Development Plan approved by the Decree Defense Committee on November 29, 1937, by January 1, 1939, aviation should have had 38 air brigade directorates, 115 air regiments (10 heavy bombers, 9 long-range bomber, 27 medium bomber, 11 light bomber, 13 assault, 43 fighter and 2 mixed), 8 long-range reconnaissance squadrons, 10 army reconnaissance squadrons, 30 military reconnaissance squadrons and 22 corrective detachment¹¹⁷². If by This plan was fulfilled, and during 1939 it was overfulfilled. the beginning of the year the Air Force had 3 GA directorates, 38 air brigade directorates and 115 air regiments¹¹⁷³ then by October 1, 1939 there were 48 air brigade directorates, 136 air regiments and 93 air bases. In a report to the government dated October 23, 1939, the People's Commissar of Defense proposed to keep the Air Force in the regular strength of 230 thousand people and continue them re-equipment with more modern aircraft¹¹⁷⁴. Commander of the Air Force in report No. 325778ss dated November 16, 1939 addressed to the Chief of the General Staff offered the main attention in Give 1940 a re-equipment of flight units with new aircraft. It was envisaged formation of 1 long-range bomber regiment for the 2nd OKA, 1 fighter air regiment - for the Ukrainian Front, 3 spare air regiments, a training air regiment of the academy Air Force, a separate special-purpose aviation regiment (OSNAZ) and an air squadron for ferrying aircraft, as well as the reorganization of the 1 SAVO fighter squadron into an air regiment. In addition, in connection with the implementation of the Air Force development plan until January 1, 1943, it was proposed raise the issue of increasing the number of combat regiments in 1941-1942¹¹⁷⁵

Table 30

Number of aircraft in the Air Force¹¹⁷⁶

01.01.34 1.01.37 1.03.38 1.10.38 1.01.39 1.04.39 1.07.39

4,688* 10,742* 10,350* 7,022** 7,714** 10,397*** 11 167*** * Including

the Air Force of the Navy.

** Excluding military training aviation and the Air Force of the Navy. *** Excluding the

Air Force of the Navy. In the winter of 1939-1940. in the conditions of the Soviet-Finnish war, new units were formed Air Force. By January 1, 1940, there were 143 air regiments in aviation (63 fighter, 61 bomber, 13 assault and 6 mixed)¹¹⁷⁷. By February 1, 1940, the Soviet Air Force had 48 air brigade directorates, 149 air regiments (4 heavy bombers, 13 long-range bombers, 40 medium bombers, 4 light bombers, 13 assault, 63 fighter, 7 mixed, 5 reserve), 49 separate squadrons, 22 corrective, 5 transport and 16 other units, 101 air base and 19 airfield engineering battalions¹¹⁷⁸ In the first half of 1940 the formation of 35 new air regiments began (20 medium bomber and 15 fighter) and 30 air bases, taking into account which the total number of air regiments increased by July 1, 1940 to 188 (178 combat and 10 reserve)¹¹⁷⁹. Established the number of aviation also grew, which reflected the process of formation of new air regiments and creation of new flying schools¹¹⁸⁰. By May 1940, the Air Force had 58 directorates air brigades, 188 air regiments, 10 long-range reconnaissance, 8 army, 20 military reconnaissance squadrons, 18 corrective detachments and 160 air bases. May 21 was it was decided to maintain the regular strength of the Air Force in the amount of 291,210 people¹¹⁸¹.

Formed in the spring of 1940, the GVS Commission on Air Force issues on April 21, 1940 proposed, given the significant increase in air units, to switch to a divisional structure organization of the Air Force, to strengthen the Air Force of the border districts, to increase the number of operational games with aviation in probable theater of operations, strengthen aerial photography, reduce army aviation, reducing it into large operational formations for better use, strengthen engineering training of the theater, especially in the OdVO, ZakVO and SAVO, develop a procedure

service by the personnel of the VVS¹¹⁸² July 8, 1940, head of the Red Air Force Army commander 2nd rank Ya.V. Smushkevich submitted a report to the People's Commissar of Defense, in which proposed to create 34 air divisions (25 mixed, 5 bomber and 4 fighter) as part of 144 air regiments and maintain 34 separate air regiments. Plans are attached to the report. Air Force deployments and other documents. These measures required an increase in the staff of the Air Force by 4,370 people¹¹⁸³ .

July 25, 1940 was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1344-524ss, according to which changed the organizational structure of the Air Force. From now on, aviation should have aviation divisions (4-5 air regiments) and separate aviation brigades (2-3 air regiment). Three types of air divisions were created: mixed, "having their purpose direct interaction with troops and support of mechanized, cavalry and combined arms formations", long-range bomber, "having their own purpose of destroying military installations and disorganizing the rear of the enemy", and fighter, "having as their purpose the struggle for air supremacy and cover political and economic centers" of the USSR. Required by September 1, 1940 form 38 air divisions (26 mixed, 7 long-range bomber and 5 fighter), which included 163 air regiments. Before January 1, 1941, it was necessary form another 48 air regiments, combining them into 12 new air divisions (5 mixed, 4 long-range bomber and 3 fighter)¹¹⁸⁴. In addition, as part of the Air Force ArchVO, The Siberian Military District, SAVO and Far Eastern Fleet retained the directorates of separate air brigades¹¹⁸⁵.

On the same day, the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense on the reorganization of the Air Force were issued. IN The MVO should have formed the directorates of the 23rd bomber, 24th fighter, 46th th mixed air divisions and 3 corps air squadrons. KOVO formed control of the 14th, 44th fighter, 15th, 16th, 17th, 19th mixed, 18th, 36th bomber air divisions, 2 reconnaissance air regiments and 12 corps squadrons. Directorates of the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 45th mixed air divisions were formed in the OdVO, 1 reconnaissance aviation regiment and 4 corps squadrons. Departments were formed in ZakVO 25th, 26th, 27th mixed air divisions, 1 reconnaissance air regiment and 2 corps squadrons. The directorates of the 50th long-range bomber air division were formed in the North Caucasus Military District and 2 corps squadrons. In OrVO, the departments of the 47th mixed, 35th bomber, 48th long-range bomber air divisions and 1 corps squadron. IN HVO formed the management of the 49th bomber air division and corps squadron. In the Leningrad Military District, the departments of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 41st mixed, 39th fighter, 40th long-range bomber air division, 1 reconnaissance air regiment and 5 corps squadrons. In the PribVO, the departments of the 6th, 7th, 8th mixed air divisions, 1 reconnaissance air regiment and 5 corps squadrons. In ZapOVO the directorates of the 9th, 10th mixed, 11th, 43rd fighter, 12th, 13th, 42nd bomber air divisions, 2 reconnaissance air regiments and 8 corps squadrons. In the ZabVO, the directorates of the 28th, 30th, 37th mixed, 38th fighter air divisions, 1 reconnaissance air regiment and 3 corps squadrons. In the Far East the directorates of the 29th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th mixed air divisions, 5th separate air brigade, the 71st mixed, as well as 1 reconnaissance air regiment and 7 corps squadrons ¹¹⁸⁶ . In the

second half of 1940, 48 air regiments were formed - 13 long-range bomber, 18 medium bomber and 17 fighter¹¹⁸⁷, taking into account which in the Air Force there would be 50 directorates of air divisions, 4 directorates of separate air brigades, 249 air regiments, 5 separate and 59 corps squadrons with 15,325 aircraft¹¹⁸⁸ Air . On September 1, 1940 as part of combat, training and transport units Force had 22,442 aircraft¹¹⁸⁹ Table .

31 Growth

in the number of Air Force units¹¹⁹⁰

On October 23, 1940, the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff reported to Stalin and Molotov the revised program "on your instructions for training flight personnel and strengthening the Red Army Air Force (bringing up to 20,000 aircraft in service)". In accordance with the government decision of July 25, 1940, by January 1, 1941, 239 air regiments and 62 corps squadrons should have been in place - 15,672 aircraft in the state. Taking into account the aviation of the military educational institutions of the Air Force - 6,942 aircraft (according to the list of 8,081 aircraft) and transport aviation - 105 aircraft, the state should have had 22,719 aircraft. In the total composition of the Air Force, combat aviation, excluding reconnaissance regiments and corps squadrons, will total 14,108 aircraft. The implementation of this program will give the following ratio of types of aviation: long-range bomber - 14.7%, bomber - 42.5%, fighter - 42.8%. It was proposed in the future to have a ratio of 60% bombers to 40% fighters. To implement this program in 1941, it was necessary to form 98 new air regiments, which was difficult to do. Therefore, as a compromise measure, it was proposed to increase the number of aircraft in the squadrons of existing air regiments and form 20 new air regiments (15 long-range bomber and 5 short-range bomber), which would make it possible to have 19,977 aircraft in service and 3,082 aircraft in auxiliary aviation. It was proposed to reduce the aviation of the Air Force military educational institutions from 8,081 aircraft to 7,018 aircraft, which made it possible to train up to 50 thousand people at the same time. True, this reduction in the number of aircraft could only be carried out by the end of 1941, so for now the total number of military training aviation will be 8,202 aircraft. The implementation of the proposed measures would give the Air Force a total of 31,596 aircraft.

At the same time, 60,000 pilots and 144,945 aircraft technicians should have been trained by the end of 1941, of which in the fall of 1940 there were 37,558 pilots and 81,563 aviation specialists. For this, it was proposed to increase the staff of existing schools by 7,680 people and form 33 new schools. Moreover, in 1942 the question of the further development of the network of military educational institutions of the Air Force will again arise. At the same time, the military command proposed to improve the preparation of the theater of operations by expanding the network of operational airfields, the number of which did not ensure the normal operation of aviation. During 1941, the number of airfields should have been increased to 3 per 1 air regiment, which required the creation of 16 new airfield engineering battalions. To create conditions under which the advanced airfields of the western border districts would be in constant readiness to receive aviation units, it was proposed to form 53 aviation technical companies. The implementation of all these measures required an increase in the size of the army by 138,692 people, which would have brought the staff strength of the Air Force to 502,954 people, and the total staff strength of the Red Army to 3,713,397 people. Instead of those disbanded.

by order of the head of the Air Force Directorate No. By order of the General Staff of January 12, 1940 of the three special-purpose aviation armies, it was decided to create Long-Range Bomber Aviation (DBA). The draft decision of the Council of People's Commissars, prepared on October 31, 1940, proposed to allocate air regiments armed with TB-3, DB-3 and TB-7 aircraft into separate air divisions, which were to be called long-range air divisions (DD). To manage them, the post of Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force for DBA was introduced. In total, it was proposed to form 13 DD air divisions, 10 of them to be combined into 5 air corps, which should have formed 1 air division of twin-engine fighters. During 1941, bring the number of combat aircraft to 20,000 with a ratio of bombers (without attack, reconnaissance and military aircraft) of 45% and fighters of 55%. To form in 1941 2 long-range bomber, 23 short-range bomber, 22 twin-engine and 53 single-engine fighter and 4 mixed air regiments (a total of 104 air regiments) and control 25 air divisions. The implementation of these measures was supposed to give the Air Force by the end of 1941 32,432 aircraft, of which 22,171 were combat. The formation of new air regiments should have begun on February 1, 1941 and completed by January 1, 1942. For training in 1941

32,500 pilots and 69 thousand aviation specialists created 33 new aviation schools, as well as relevant parts for the construction and maintenance of airfields. Respectively the staff strength of the Air Force would increase to 542,746 people, and the Red Army to 3,753,189 people¹¹⁹³.

On November 5, 1940, the Politburo approved this program. On the same day it was accepted Decree of the Council of People's Commissars No. 2264-976ss "On the recruitment of schools and schools for air force pilots Red Army", according to which Osoaviakhim by May 15, 1941 had to prepare 20 thousand pilots, and the Civil Air Fleet by October 1, 1941 - 10 thousand pilots on the U-2, for which it was allowed to attract, with a break from work, high school students, rural and office workers youth with a scholarship of 250 rubles per month. Additionally to Osoaviakhim 350 aircraft were allocated, and the Civil Air Fleet - 720 aircraft and the corresponding number of spare parts, fuel and food funds. On the same day, the decision of the Council of People's Commissars No. 2265-977ss "On the Air Force of the Red Army", according to which to form 13 air divisions (3 air regiments each), combined into 5 air corps, and 1 separate air regiment DD. Assistant Chief of the Main Directorate of the Air Force for DBA was appointed lieutenant general of aviation I.I. Proskurov. The resolution claimed the above program for the development of the Air Force in 1941. By the end of the year, the Air Force should have had 32 432 aircraft and 60 thousand flight crews. The People's Commissariat of Defense had to prepare proposals for the maintenance of the Air Force flight personnel reserve after the program has been completed 1941 and maintaining his flying qualifications. The strength of the Air Force increased to 542,746 people, and the total staffing of the Red Army from January 1, 1941 - up to 3,753 189 people¹¹⁹⁴.

On December 7, 1940, the GVS discussed the draft "Regulations on the service of the flight personnel of the Red Army Air Force", in which it was concluded that aviation "heavily loaded with command personnel" and it was proposed to transfer the entire average commanding staff, who held positions below the squadron commander, to the position junior command staff¹¹⁹⁵. On December 11, the GVS approved proposals for changing the terms of service in the Air Force and the recruitment system for military schools. Now instead of voluntary recruitment to flight schools, they received the right to recruit cadets from another call to active military service. December 22, 1940 People's Commissar Defense issued order No. 0362, according to which a new term of service in the Air Force was established - 4 years. The entire average flight crew that did not serve 4 years was transferred to 1 February 1941 to the barracks, and graduates of aviation schools received the title "sergeant"¹¹⁹⁷. On December 25, these innovations were legalized by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, which was announced on December 27 by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 4771¹¹⁹⁸. True, it quickly became clear that such a system for recruiting flight schools

does not justify itself, and on June 19, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided on its saving only for recruitment to schools for the initial training of aircraft mechanics¹¹⁹⁹.

In 1941, the reorganization of the Air Force continued. According to the mobilization plan from 12 February 1940, the Air Force was supposed to have 5 air corps directorates, 79 directorates air divisions, 36 heavy bombers, 102 medium bombers, 6 heavy bomber, 91 fighter, 15 assault, 3 mixed, 10 reserve air regiments, 42 separate reconnaissance squadrons, 39 separate communications squadrons, 76 corps squadrons, 24 detachments of observation balloons¹²⁰⁰. On January 1, 1941 in the Air Force there were 26,392 aircraft, of which 14,954 were combat and 11,438 were training and transport aircraft, with a staff of 32,628 aircraft¹²⁰¹.

On February 25, 1941, the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 368-167ss "On the reorganization of the aviation forces of the Red Army", according to which a new system of personnel training for the Air Force was established. Schools were created initial training with a course of 4 months in peacetime and 3 months in wartime with a general raids on a cadet 30 hours, as well as the School of Military Pilots with a course of 9 months in peacetime and 6 months in wartime with a total of 20 hours of bomber raids and

fighters 24 hours. The task of the schools was to teach the cadet-pilot to pilot and the use of a combat aircraft in simple weather conditions, group flights as part of a link and give practice in cross-country flights as part of a flight with landing on unfamiliar airfields, for which 10 such flights were included in the training program. fighters, in addition, it was required to teach initial aerial shooting and the basics of aerial combat, and bombers - diving at an angle of 40 degrees. It should have been by June 1, 1941. to form 6 military aviation schools for the training of Air Force commanders with training 2 years in peacetime and 1 year in wartime. The first set was to be trained in one year course. During 1941, 30 primary schools were to be formed. education with a total annual output of 45 thousand people. In combat units installed a total flight time of 160 hours for each pilot, who should have been trained first in simple, and then in difficult weather conditions and at night. To speed up the retraining of pilots for a new equipment a month before it was received, 2-3 new aircraft should have been transferred for retraining from initial flying time of 8-10 hours. It was required by July 1, 1941 to transfer air rears to organization of air base areas and build in 1941 240 concrete runways¹²⁰² According to the order of the People's

Commissar of Defense No.

d. to form 5 military aviation schools, and on the basis of flying clubs to create 30 schools initial training. It was necessary to expand the training of technicians at the Air Force Academy. NOT. Zhukovsky and on the basis of the Leningrad Institute of Engineers

GVF¹²⁰³ On the same day, by order No. 080, the People's Commissar of Defense installed a new system training of the flight technical staff of the Air Force in accordance with the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of February 25 1941 ¹²⁰⁴ By order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0020 dated March 11, 1941, deadlines were set flight time in combat units of the Air Force - 160 hours (140 hours for combat training and 20 hours for joint exercises with ground forces and flight technical teachings). Retraining on new aircraft should be organized so that by July 1 In 1941, the command staff studied and flew around the new technology. It also needed to speed up training of dive bombers on SB, Ar-2 and Pe-2¹²⁰⁵ aircraft All these measures led to an increase in the number of military educational institutions of the Air Force from 32 in 1939 to 64 in 1940 and up to 111 in the middle of 1941. By June 1941 there were 3 academies, 4 military aviation schools, 2 advanced training courses for Air Force command personnel, 2 higher schools navigators, 29 primary schools, 21 fighter pilot schools, 22 bomber pilot schools, 12 bomber gunners schools, 16 aircraft mechanic schools. In addition, there were naval aviation schools, training squadrons of the Civil Air Fleet and schools for the training of junior aviation specialists - mechanics, gunsmiths, air shooters¹²⁰⁶. Only in 1940 in the military schools of the Air Force about 10 thousand aviation specialists were trained¹²⁰⁷.

The deployment of such a large number of aviation units required an increase production of aircraft by the aviation industry. From the middle of 1939, the expansion began production capacities of the NKAP through the construction of new and reconstruction existing enterprises were to be generally completed at the end of 1940 - the first half of 1941. In addition, 60 enterprises from other departments. Since August 1940, the transfer of aircraft factories to the daily production schedule began products, completed by March 1941. From that moment on, the aircraft industry actually switched to wartime mode¹²⁰⁸.

The history of the creation of new combat aircraft in 1939-1941. good enough studied¹²⁰⁹. By the summer of 1940, several samples had passed flight tests, most of them them was adopted by the Air Force in June 1940 by the decision of the GVS, which was 27 August approved by the Defense Committee¹²¹⁰. I-26, I-200, I-301 fighters, BB-1 and BB-22 short-range bombers, Il-2 attack aircraft, medium Ar-2 bomber, PB-100 dive bomber, long-range bombers DB-240 and TB-7, and DB-3f was put into service in 1939¹²¹¹ on December 26, 1940 by order

Commissar of Defense No. 0365, new aircraft designations were established: I-26 was renamed Yak-1, I-200 - MiG-1 (then MiG-3), I-301 - LaGG-3, BB-1 - Su-2, BB-22 - in Yak-4, PB-100 - in Pe-2, DB-240 - in Er-2, TB-7 - in Pe-8, DB-3f - in Il-4¹²¹² .

On July 9, 1940, the Air Force mobilization application was submitted to the People's Commissar of Defense, according to which in 1941 the industry was to produce 15,813 fighters, 17 522 bombers and 2,370 trainers. July 13 People's Commissar of Defense and Chief The General Staff suggested that the government transfer the aviation industry to the position wartime. On July 16, 1940, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars N.A. Voznesensky a meeting was held on the issues of mobilization deployment of the aviation industry, where the military proposed to increase the capacity of the aviation industry in 1941 to 36 thousand combat aircraft per year. July 19 People's Commissar of Defense in accordance with the decision The Politburo on the deployment of the aviation industry for the production in 1941 of 36 thousand aircraft. combat aircraft presented to the Chairman of the Defense Committee, Deputy Chairman SNK and the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry a mobilization request for the production of 15,820 bombers, 13,300 fighters, 2,800 attack aircraft, 1,680 spotters and 1 400 reconnaissance and 4,850 training and transport aircraft¹²¹³ However, .

the application of the People's Commissariat of Defense was considered excessive, and after a series of On December 7, 1940, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved by their resolution No. 2466-1096ss aircraft production program in 1941. According to this decree, the NKAP was supposed to produce 16,530 combat (6,070 bombers, 8,510 fighters, 1,750 attack aircraft, 200 naval reconnaissance aircraft) and 3,620 training and transport aircraft. At the implementation of this program, the NKAP was allowed to stop the repair of aircraft and engines, in service with the Air Force, which were supposed to carry out repairs with their own ¹²¹⁴ Correspondingly, the production of new aircraft also grew, amounting in 1940 to 1 536 machines (18.4% of the production of combat aircraft), and in the first half of 1941 3,601 aircraft (87.2%)¹²¹⁵ . The deployment of serial production of new aircraft required command of the Air Force for the rearmament of 239 air regiments. As approved on January 23 1941 plan, in the first half of 1941 it was supposed to rearm from 34 12 long-range bomber regiments, 19 out of 79 short-range bomber regiments, 11 out of 11 assault - 5, out of 96 fighter - 41, out of 10 reconnaissance - 5 and out of 62 corps air squadrons - 5¹²¹⁶ .

In 1939 - the first half of 1941 there was a significant development of the Soviet Air Force. Behind At that time, the directorates of 5 corps and 79 air divisions were formed. In 1939-1940. was 124 air regiments were formed, and in the first half of 1941, the formation of another 106 began air regiments, of which 19 were formed by June 22, including 13 long-range bomber ¹²¹⁷ . As a result, the Soviet Air Force became the largest in the world.

Among the many poorly studied issues of the pre-war history of the Red Army, its the question of its numbers in 1939-1941 is almost completely undeveloped gg. Two types of personnel statistics are commonly used: regular and list. The first is a purely calculated indicator, and the second reflects real state of the armed forces. Table 32 lists only recently declassified data on the payroll of the Soviet armed forces in 1930-1937, which exceed the previously published figures. Parts outside the norms were considered formations that could be used in peaceful production and were kept on the budget of civilian departments. These included a special railway corps, operational railway regiments, construction corps, construction battalions and other similar formations. Using these parts in production allowed to partially compensate for the costs of their maintenance. It is clear that these parts were not officially included in the statistics of the armed forces. Moreover, in the military there were civilian workers who are not included in the number of the Red Army, as well as those liable for military service (the so-called assigned staff), who periodically underwent retraining in the troops.

Table 32

The size of the Soviet armed forces¹²¹⁹ True, it should be noted that in connection with the 1937 census, the number Soviet armed forces provided other data. So, on January 26, 1937, the head Divisional Commander A. Volpe of the Administrative and Mobilization Department of the NPO reported to the head of the TsUNKhU of the State Planning Committee of the USSR K.A. Koval that on January 6 in the armed forces consisted of 1,494,369 military personnel and 191,190 soldiers of units outside the norm, that is, 1,685 279 people. On February 11, Volpe reported to the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.I. Egorov, that On January 1, 1937, there were 1,447,812 personnel and 214,039 people in units in the troops outside the norm; and on January 6 - 1,451,448 and 213,015, respectively. But on the same day in Tsunghu Wolpe announced new "updated preliminary results" - 1,451,448 military personnel personnel and 231,121 people in units outside the norm, that is, 1,682,569 people¹²²⁰ .

On December 30, 1937, the People's Commissariat of the Navy was separated from the People's Commissariat of Defense. From that moment on, the statistics of the size of the Red Army reflect the composition only ground forces and aviation. It is only known that "from 1930 to 1939 the number armed forces of the USSR increased by more than 3.5 times"¹²²¹, that is, it was about 2,210 656 people. According to the materials of the USSR census in 1939, in the armed forces there were 2,118,777 people¹²²² Unfortunately, to find statistics on the number Navy in 1938-1941 failed, so the rest of the discussion applies only to the size of the Red Army, excluding the size of the fleet.

Data on the payroll of the Soviet ground forces and air force in 1938-1939. are given in table 33. As statistics show, at the beginning of 1939 for 1 person command staff accounted for 7 Red Army men, for 1 political staff member - 27 Red Army men, for 1 person of other command staff - 10 Red Army soldiers, and for 1 junior commanding staff - 3 Red Army men¹²²³. The total number of conscripts reserve on July 1, 1939 was 11,902,873 people born in 1899-1918, out of of which 7,892,552 were trained and 4,010,321 were not trained. Assumed in 1940 through 1-1.5-month fees to train 3 million people, mostly in short supply military specialties¹²²⁴ . Table

33 The size of the Red Army in 1938-1939¹²²⁵ The fragmentation of the documentation does not allow us to fully trace the dynamics the strength of the Red Army in 1939-1941. Documents often use rounded numbers. Nevertheless, these data give a general idea. Summer 1939 the size of the army was 1,698.6 thousand personnel (apparently, units outside rules are not taken into account). The military conflict at Khalkhin Gol required the conscription of 173 thousand people reserve to reinforce the troops of the ZabVO and the 1st AG. Formally, this contingent was called to training camps, but on July 16, 1939 by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the order People's Commissar of Defense No. 0035 dated July 17, he was mobilized for the period until February 1, 1940¹²²⁶ The beginning of the German-Polish war and the preparation of the Red Army for a campaign in Poland led to the fact that on September 7, 1939, partial mobilization (PMU) began in 7 military districts. In total, 2,610,136 people were called up (see table 34), which, on September 22, 1939, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 177 of September 23 were declared mobilized "until further notice"¹²²⁷. Table 34 Number of reservists

called up for

BUS¹²²⁸ District Commanders Junior officers Enlisted

personnel Total LVO 25,306 90,001 210,004 325,311 BOVO 15,074

37,006,327,987 380,067 KOVO 32,428

47,969 5 75 974 656 371 CalVO 6 249 17

939 138 662 162 850 MVO 38 359 115 831

270 392 424 632

ORVO 8,489 19,922 191,493 219,904
KhVO 26,555 43,642,342 241 412,438
SKVO - - 15,494 15,494
UrVO - - 7,817 7,817
PriVO - - 5,252 5,252 Total
152 4 60 372 360 2 085 316 2 610 136 At the same

time, in accordance with the decision of the Council of People's Commissars No. 1348-268 ss of September 2, 1939, from September, another call for active military service for troops should have begun Far East and 1 thousand people for each newly formed division, and from 15 September and for all other districts¹²²⁹. Total to the Red Army until December 31, 1939, 1,076 thousand people were called up¹²³⁰. In addition, under the new Law on Universal military duty dated September 1, 1939, the service life of 190 thousand people was extended for 1 year. conscripts in 1937. By the 20th of September 1939, the number of the Red Army exceeded 5 million people. Unfortunately, it is not clear if this figure includes parts outside the norm. Normalization the situation on the western borders of the USSR made it possible on September 29 to start reducing the strength of the Red Army, and by January 7, 1940, 1,613,803 people were dismissed¹²³¹ K 1 December 1939, the troops of the LVO and KalVO remained mobilized, BOVO and KOVO continued the dismissal of those called up from the reserve, and the Moscow Military District, Ordinance Military District and the KhVO finished them dismissal and switched to the organization of peacetime. On December 27, 1939, the total the number of the Red Army was up to 3,568 thousand people (units outside the norms are not taken into

account)¹²³². However, the outbreak of war with Finland required replenishment of losses and increase in the size of the Red Army. On December 28, 1939, it was decided to call in Red Army 546,400 people to reinforce the troops of the western military districts and 50 thousand reserve command staff. At the same time, 5 junior military age - 376 thousand people. Thus, it took to strengthen the army 972 400¹²³³ During the Soviet-Finnish war, 550 thousand soldiers were drafted into the Red Army. Human. In total, from September 1939 to March 12, 1940, the Red Army was called up from reserve 3,160 thousand people, of which 1,613 thousand were dismissed, and 1,547 remained in the army thousand people¹²³⁴.

After the end of the war with Finland, the Soviet command again faced the question of reducing the size of the army. March 14, 1940 Head of the Main Directorate Red Army Divisional Commander M.G. Snegov sent the demobilization plan to the People's Commissar of Defense active army and the disbandment of spare parts¹²³⁵ In a report dated March 29, 1940. in the name of Stalin and Molotov, the people's commissar of defense reported that on March 1, 1940 in the Red The army had 4,416 thousand people, of which 1,591 thousand were called up from reserve reservists and 163 thousand - the Red Army conscription of 1937. People's Commissar asked permission to dismiss 93,149 people from the rear units and institutions formed for active army, and 160 thousand people of assigned staff, called up in September 1939 in BOVO, KOVO, KalVO and OdVO. In addition, the People's Commissar announced the dismissal of 80 thousand people. volunteers ¹²³⁶. All these measures were approved by the Defense Committee Resolution No. 159

ss dated April 4, 1940. ¹²³⁷ On April 26, 1940, the

People's Commissar of Defense informed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR that on April 1 1940, there were 4,174 thousand people in the Red Army, of which 2,724 thousand personnel composition, and 1,450 thousand assigned composition. To bring the Red Army to full-time the peacetime population of 3,320 thousand people, the people's commissar proposed to dismiss the personnel rear units formed for the army, all henchmen from hospitals and 440 thousand people assigned to the composition. After that, 540 thousand soldiers would remain in the Red Army. people assigned to the staff, detained before June 15, 1940 and in units, deployed in wartime states in the North Caucasus Military District, ZakVO and OdVO. May and end of June it was proposed to call for 345 thousand military men of the 2nd category of the reserve 1912-1919 birth, who, together with the Red Army soldiers of the 3rd year of service, should have been detained up to 1

October 1940

release of cadets of military schools¹²³⁸. Total as of February 15, 1940 in the country there were 785,596 reserve people of the 2nd category, which included men, not women who served in the army and registered in the military (doctors, veterinarians, technicians etc.)¹²³⁹. It was believed that 441,322 of them could be sent to the frame of the Red Army man, however, it was decided to call only 250 thousand people¹²⁴⁰.

Table 35

Change in the size of the Red Army¹²⁴¹

. May 24

1940, the People's Commissar of Defense approved the "Plan for the recruitment of the Red Army for organizational measures and dismissal of assigned staff", according to which it was subject to dismissal of 691,220 assigned employees. On the same day, the conscription plan was approved 250 thousand people liable for military service of the 2nd category of the reserve¹²⁴³. June 3, 1940 People's Commissar of Defense issued order No. 0110, according to which it was necessary to "detain until further notice middle and senior commanding staff of the reserve", until November 1, 1940 of the Red Army conscription in 1937, and the dismissal of junior officers and privates of the reserve, "called up for large training camps, to be carried out gradually and completed by August 15"¹²⁴⁴. On the same day By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Red Army conscripts of 1937 were detained in the army until January 1, 1941.¹²⁴⁵ In June 1940, only 71,845 people, because in the context of the preparation and holding of the Baltic and Bessarabian campaigns reduction of personnel was curtailed.

From the beginning of July 1940, in accordance with the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense, the dismissal of the assigned composition of the stock resumed. Of those available as of July 1, 839,400 assigned staff 830,299 people were dismissed, of which 446,952 people in July, 254,035 people in August, September - 24,947 people, in October - 76,719 people, and from November 1 to November 10 - 27,646 people¹²⁴⁶. As of November 10, 9,101 servicemen remained detained and should have been fired until January 1, 1941¹²⁴⁷. On January 20, 1941, the People's Commissar for Defense issued order No. to which the commanding staff of the reserve, "meeting the requirements of the service", detained until further notice by order of June 3, 1940, should have been enrolled in the cadres of the Red Army. All the rest were subject to dismissal "to the reserve by February 15, 1941."¹²⁴⁸

Based on the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of July 4, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense issued on July 10 order No. 196 on the re-registration of ordinary and junior commanding staff of the reserve and persons from 19 up to 50 years of age, exempted from military service, on the territory of the USSR in the period from August 1 to 5 September 1940. At the same time, a medical examination of persons fit for non-combatant service, 40-50-year-olds, and 19-50-year-olds of those nationalities who are not were registered with the military. On November 6, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense issued a directive on carrying out from January 5 to February 15, 1941 registration to the recruiting stations of citizens 1922 year of birth, persons with completed secondary education, and students of 10th grade secondary schools and graduation courses of technical schools born in 1923, not assigned citizens older ages and persons born in 1920-1921 in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Registration on the territory of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina must was held later than 1250.

The dismissal of assigned staff led to the fact that from the autumn of 1940 the payroll the size of the Red Army was below regular (see table 33). Unfortunately, it didn't work find documents reflecting the number of personnel of the Red Army in winter - spring 1940-1941. It is only known that both the staff and payroll of the army grew. From 25 March to April 5, 1941 in all military districts, except for PribOVO and the Far East Fleet, was produced partial conscription to the Red Army of citizens born after September 1, 1921 and not who were called up in 1940. A total of 394 thousand people were called up. Call passed organized, within a strict deadline, without publicity in the press and at meetings. ABOUT only a narrow circle of local party and Soviet

leaders - secretaries and heads of military departments of regional committees, regional committees, district committees

and city committees of the party, chairmen of the executive committees and heads of the NKVD and police. No orders for the appearance of conscripts at the points were issued, they were only notified by personal summonses. The recruiting stations were equipped only from the inside, no posters and slogans were hung out from the outside¹²⁵¹

On May 15, 1941, the conscription of the assigned reserve staff for the BUS began, which were to last until July 1, 1941. In total, by June 22, 1941, 805,264 people were called up, which accounted for 24% of the contingent called for mobilization, and the Red Army numbered 5,080,977 people¹²⁵²

Another important problem in the history of the Soviet armed forces on the eve of the war is the question of the consequences of repression in the officer corps. Unfortunately, this topic is still widely used in the political and ideological struggle, and, as has already been shown in the literature¹²⁵³, despite a significant amount of research, it is still far from a final decision. Most of the usual theses in the

literature on these issues are predominantly propaganda and are not supported by documents. Studies of the fate of military leaders convicted in the "Tukhachevsky case" showed that although these people apparently did not commit the crimes they were accused of, they became victims of the struggle within the Soviet military-political elite. In the literature, the version of the former chief of the SD V. Schellenberg is widespread that it was the documents fabricated by the German special services that led to repressions in the Red Army. However, modern research does not confirm it. In fact, it is not even known whether these documents existed at all¹²⁵⁴. Some researchers believe that the repressions of 1935-1938. were a reflection of real disagreements in the Soviet leadership on issues of domestic and foreign policy, which naturally aggravated relations between the military, on the one hand, and the bureaucratic and economic elites, on the other. Unfortunately, these issues are still poorly understood¹²⁵⁶. Relationships within the officer corps are also practically not studied. As a rule, the most popular is the version about the struggle in the highest command staff of two

tendencies: "motorists" (M.N. Tukhachevsky, I.P. Uborevich, etc.) and "cavalrymen" (K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny and etc.). However, since the army in the 1930s was constantly saturated with new technical means of combat, it remains unclear to what extent this version is true. Attempts to attribute to Stalin a lack of understanding of the importance of army mechanization run into his own assertion: "to defend its existence, the country must have a qualified army ... There must be a permanent, trained, qualified army, savvy on all four legs, an army that will have first-class aviation, chemistry, tanks, artillery, engineers, technicians, because technology decides everything here"¹²⁵⁷. In addition, it is known that among the military there were different views on the methods of warfare¹²⁵⁸, but these disagreements did not lead to repression. This makes it doubtful that the repressions were provoked precisely by professional discussions.

Most likely, the reason for the repression was the struggle within the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense for power. Moreover, as it became known, in May 1936, Tukhachevsky and his supporters had already raised the question of Voroshilov's resignation from the post of people's commissar before the Politburo¹²⁵⁹. Thus, a conspiracy existed in the Red Army, but not "anti-Soviet", but "anti-Voroshilov". It seems that all these contradictions dictate the need to study questions about the presence of different groupings among the top command staff, their influence on the political and military leadership. This aspect of the problem, which was for the first time quite clearly formulated in the work of V. Suvorov,¹²⁶⁰ due to the lack of documentary sources, cannot yet be elucidated in any satisfactory way. S.T. Minakov points out that in the top command staff of the Red Army there was a rather broad opposition to the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, but there was no agreement on the issue of his successor. All this led to the fact that each candidate for this post (Tukhachevsky, A.I. Egorov, I.E. Yakir)

supporters, in addition, they were divided by different views on military problems. The military elite, as usual, demanded new funds for the army, but could not agree on their distribution and use. For Stalin, the removal of Voroshilov from the post of people's commissar would mean a reduction in his power and was completely unacceptable. As a result, the situation allowed Stalin and Voroshilov to play on the contradictions among the military, which they did¹²⁶¹.

Apparently, the authors are right who believe that the purpose of the repressions in the army was to create a military mechanism obedient and loyal to Stalin, making the command staff a puppet in the hands of the political leadership¹²⁶². In this case, "it is obvious that the main reason for the destruction of the leadership of the army was the fear that it might try to play an independent political role, thereby threatening Stalin's position as the sole leader of the army and the people"¹²⁶³. Since Tukhachevsky "dared to raise the issue of changing the military leadership (Voroshilov - a member of the Politburo)", this indicated that "he could create a potential military force independent of the government." If we consider the purge of the officer corps as a struggle of the political leadership for complete control over the army, then it should be noted that this goal was achieved, since "repressions taught the command not to take initiatives of a cardinal nature that affected the political interests of the state or the alignment of forces in the leadership"¹²⁶⁴. The prevailing opinion in the literature is that it was the repressions in the Red Army

that led to its weakening and were one of the main reasons for the failures at the beginning of the war. Usually, the consequences of repression include a decrease in the quality of the officer corps as a result of the elimination of experienced officers, frequent job relocations, the creation of a shortage of military personnel, and a decrease in the educational level of command personnel, especially higher ones. True, it should be noted that frequent relocations and a shortage of military personnel were generated not so much by repressions as by technical re-equipment, organizational improvement and the accelerated deployment of new units and formations of the Red Army. This process has been accelerating since at least 1935, when the transfer of the Soviet armed forces to a personnel recruitment system began. At the same time, the main organizational measures took place in 1937-1938. The large-scale process of creating new military formations continued in

1939 - the first half of 1941. During these years, the shortage of command personnel changed as follows: 1935 - 17.9%; 1936 - 18.7%; 1937 - 21.7%; 1938 - 25.2%; 1939 - 31.6%; 1940 - 19%; January 1, 1941 - 13%. Despite the fact that only for 1938-1940. the army received 271,518 officers¹²⁶⁶, such a shortage cannot be explained by anything else. It was the result of "a sharp discrepancy between the army's need for personnel and their training in the period 1928-1938, as well as the huge deployment of the army in 1938-1939 and 1940." is calculated by correlating its staff and payroll. IN AND. Ivkin showed that "the Red Army was 'burdened' with middle, senior and senior command staff," which amounted to 15.5% of the regular and 13.3% of the payroll of the Soviet armed forces. In other words, in the Red Army, 1 officer accounted for 6 soldiers and sergeants, while in the British army this figure was 1:15, in the Japanese 1:19, in the French 1:22, and in the Wehrmacht 1:29¹²⁶⁸. Further study of this aspect will help clarify the issue of a real shortage of command personnel in the Red Army. Assessing the repressions, D.M. The projector expressed the most widespread opinion that "it was a blow that undermined the Armed Forces of the country just before the war. New, inexperienced, poorly trained" nominees "had to master

everything from the beginning. The overwhelming task of preparing for war fell on their shoulders ..." ¹²⁶⁹. A. Filippov disputes the version about the elimination of the most experienced officers, noting that at best they had experience of the civil war, and service in the territorial and personnel Red Army of the 1920s - early 1930s hardly contributed to gaining experience in modern warfare. In his opinion, the commanders and staff members of the higher

the link were "a competent, promising cohort of the highest command staff, adequately making up for the loss of the repressed top practical commanders"¹²⁷⁰. Yu.Yu. Yumasheva believes that "the highest commanding staff of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War was a new, young (average age 43), created and educated during the years of Soviet power, a highly professional military elite, which occupied a leading position in the military sphere at the end of 1930- At that time, not "green lieutenants" (as the generally accepted opinion asserts), but experienced (albeit young) military leaders "¹²⁷¹ By the way, the version about the replacement of repressed military leaders by "young" officers did not correspond to reality. So, in the highest command staff, there was not a change of generations, but the replacement of some military leaders by others from the same generation. As G. Gerasimov notes, "today it is impossible to say with certainty who would be better in command of the troops: the executed military leaders or those who eventually won the war. But in terms of the main objective indicators, the latter were not inferior to their repressed predecessors." Moreover, the educational level of the highest command staff even increased, since "the number of those appointed with a higher military education exceeds the number of those arrested with a similar education by 45%"¹²⁷² for conclusions and available documentary material for study.

A popular motif of historiography is the assertion that by January 1, 1941, 12.4% of the command staff had no military education. The authors of the latest generalizing work on the history of the war note that in the ground forces there were 15.9% of officers who did not have a military education. However, V.P. Borodin points out that most of these officers were in political, military-economic, administrative and military-legal positions, and command positions were occupied by only 4% of them. Moreover, in positions from the battalion commander to the corps commander, there were only 0.1% of those ¹²⁷³. Despite the expansion of the network of military educational institutions, it was not possible to significantly increase the educational level of the command staff, because in the conditions of its deficit, it was necessary to use reserve officers, who basically did not have a higher military education. Therefore, the number of officers with higher and secondary military education decreased from 79.5% on January 1, 1937 to 63% on January 1, 1941. secondary military education increased by 2.2 times - from 164,309 to 385,136 people th years. So, D.M. Projector believes that the repression led to the abandonment of the "deep offensive operation" theory, which was returned.

to only in 1940. The author not only does not explain why this turnaround occurred, but also does not provide any evidence that it took place at all¹²⁷⁸. After all, if this were indeed the case, then the army would have received new military regulations and instructions that were radically different from those adopted before 1937, and, accordingly, in 1940 this process would have gone in the opposite direction. However, nothing of the kind happened, so the version of D.M. The projector hangs in the air. The version of A.N. Mertsalova and L.A. Mertsalova, who believe that after the repressions in the Red Army, the Soviet Union did not have a military doctrine¹²⁷⁹. Since military doctrine is called "the system of views adopted in the state for a given specific time on the essence, goals and nature of a possible future war, on the preparation for it of the country, the Armed Forces and on the methods of its conduct"¹²⁸⁰, the elimination of part of the command staff does not at all cancel its presence, since its principles are enshrined in military regulations and manuals of the armed forces.

L.A. Kirchner argues that the rejection of the "deep operation" theory led to exaggerated position of the cavalry in the Red Army¹²⁸¹. But from these positions completely inexplicable reduction of cavalry from 32 cavalry divisions on January 1, 1937 to 26 on January 1, 1939. Despite the fact that by the beginning of the war in the Red Army there were only 13 cavalry divisions¹²⁸², statements about the prevalence of cavalry look somewhat strange. Other authors, in support of their point of view, give only general arguments. The most serious argument is the indication that the military-scientific works of "enemies people" were withdrawn from libraries. However, we should not forget that the troops are not trained according to the works of individual military leaders, even if they are brilliant, and according to military regulations and instructions that no one canceled. As a rule, from instructions, manuals and instructions, they simply removed the title pages or covered up the signatures of the repressed persons and until the new edition, all these documents were valid and used in troops¹²⁸³. It has been shown in a number of papers that the theory of "deep operation" not only does not was discarded, but, on the contrary, determined the entire training of the Red Army¹²⁸⁴. Thereby it must be admitted that the above versions are unlikely to ever be proven.

The greatest disagreement was caused by the question of the scale of repression in the Red Army. So, V.S. Koval believes that the entire officer corps¹²⁸⁵ died, and L.A. Kirchner believes that only 50% of the officers were repressed¹²⁸⁶. According to V.G. Klevtsov, in 1937-1938. 35.2 thousand officers were physically destroyed¹²⁸⁷. YES. Volkogonov and D.M. projector they write about 40 thousand repressed, A.M. Samsonov - about 43 thousand, N.M. Ramanichev - about 44 thousand, Yu.A. Gorkov - about 48 773, G.A. Kumanev increases this figure to 50 thousand, and A.N. Yakovlev before 70 thousand. In the book of V.N. Rapoport and Yu.A. Geller talks about about 100 thousand officers, however, personal information is provided only about 651 repressed officers, which accounted for 64.8% of the top command staff as of January 1, 1937¹²⁸⁸. O.F. Souvenirs first published a list of 749 people, and then expanded it to 1,669 officers, who died in 1936-1941. ¹²⁸⁹ Information about the rest of the repressed so far missing. Table

36 Dismissal

of officers from the Red Army in 1937-1939 ¹²⁹⁰ E.D.

Danilov F.B. Komal A. Filippov V.P. Borodin V.G. Klevtsov Dismissed 24,547
42,514 38,000 29,000 45,571 Arrested 9,579

9,579 9,500 6,000-8,000 41,406 Reinstated 11,178 12,070
12,000 13,000 14,160 Total 13,369 30,444 26,000 16,000

31,411 The results of the study of archival

materials by different authors are shown in the table

36. F.B. Komal quite rightly pointed out that it is unacceptable to confuse the concepts "dismissed" and "repressed", which should include only those arrested and dismissed for political reasons. True, officers were arrested for various crimes, which should also be taken into account. A.T. Ukolov and V.I. Ivkin based on data judicial bodies of the Red Army note that in 1937-1939. was convicted of political crimes of approximately 8,624 people, while pointing out that it is hardly worth classifying as repressed convicted for criminal and moral crimes¹²⁹¹. IN in his latest study by O.F. Suvenirov writes about 1,634 dead and 3,682 convicted by military tribunals in 1936-1941. for counter-revolutionary crimes officers ¹²⁹².

So far, the limited source base does not allow unequivocally solving this problem. key question. Available materials show that in 1937-1939. from the armed forces were dismissed over 45 thousand people (36,898 in the ground forces, 5,616 in the air force and over 3 thousand in the fleet) ¹²⁹³. However, only those dismissed for communication can be classified as repressed. with conspirators and on a national basis, as well as those arrested on political motives. But, unfortunately, it is precisely the data on the reasons for layoffs that are still not exactly known. Apparently, about 17 thousand people can be considered repressed in the ground forces.

Human. To answer the question about the number of dead, a concrete study of the fate of all dismissed officers is necessary, which has not yet been done. The question of the distribution of the repressed according to the categories of commanders also remains unexplored, which does of the composition of the Soviet armed forces. A

comprehensive review of studies on the issue of repressions in the Red Army shows that the widespread version of their catastrophic consequences for the army has not been proven and requires further careful study. Questions about the place of 1937-1938 still remain poorly investigated. In the system of purges of the officer corps of the Red Army, their connection with Stalin's plans for the army, the combat and political training of the command staff and the real combat readiness of the Red Army on the eve of the war. So far, all these problems contain many more questions than answers. The central one - the consequences of repressions for the combat readiness of the Red Army - cannot yet be considered finally resolved, since objective scientific criteria for its solution have not been formulated and researchers have not received access to the necessary documentary material.

During the two pre-war years, the Red Army was significantly increased, its strength, excluding units outside the norm, increased almost three times. By the summer of 1941, it included directorates of 4 fronts, 27 army directorates, directorates of 62 rifle, 4 cavalry, 29 mechanized, 5 airborne corps, 198 rifle, 13 cavalry, 61 tank, 31 motorized divisions, 5 rifle, 1 tank, 16 airborne, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 94 corps, 14 cannon, 29 howitzer, 32 howitzer artillery regiments BM RGK, 12 separate OM artillery battalions, 45 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions, 8 separate mortar battalions, 3 air defense corps, 9 brigades air defense, 40 air defense brigade areas, 29 motorcycle regiments, 1 separate tank battalion, 8 armored train divisions, 34 engineer regiments and 20 separate engineer battalions. The Air Force consisted of 5 DBA corps, 79 air divisions, 5 separate air brigades, 218 combat-ready air regiments. 1295 The Soviet armed forces were the largest army in the world.

Back in 1989, D.M. The projector wondered: "Didn't Stalin prepare all this mass of troops not only for defense, but also for the offensive? There are many signs that yes. Apparently, by the spring of 1941 he had the opinion that we were strong, we could get ahead of the enemy, strike him and defeat him on his territory before he attacks us. I think, when historians study all the documents, they will find confirmation at least that there were such intentions and, in accordance with them, a grouping of forces near the border began to take shape" 1296. Of course, it is still far from studying all the documents, but the materials already available allow us to get a fairly complete picture of the intentions Soviet leadership. They should be contacted.

Soviet military planning in 1940-1941.

In the specific military preparations of the USSR, a key place was occupied by the activities of the General Staff on military planning, which, unfortunately, still contains a significant number of "blank spots", which is associated with the preservation of the secrecy of the relevant documents of 1939-1941. Currently, Russian historiography has a fairly complete picture of the development of military planning documents at the strategic level, but their content, as well as their connection with planning at the level of military districts, are still poorly studied. The content of Soviet military plans is traditionally presented in Russian literature according to a well-established scheme: the plans were developed in response to the growth of the German threat and provided for repelling an enemy attack, delivering retaliatory counterattacks and a general offensive to defeat the enemy. In accordance with this plan, the covering armies were tasked with

defend for 10-15 days on the state border line, preventing the enemy from invading Soviet territory, and prepare to go on the offensive together with the armies of the second strategic echelon¹²⁹⁷

However, documentary materials, which became available in the early 1990s, and studies of recent years significantly correct such approaches. It became known that Soviet military planning of military operations against Germany began in October 1939 and continued until mid-June 1941. ¹²⁹⁸ During this period, five variants of the plan for the operational use of the Red Army in the war with Germany were developed. This, of course, does not exclude the existence of other working options that are still inaccessible to researchers. At the same time, one should

not forget that the published documents, although they played a key role in Soviet military planning, did not exhaust it. First, there were a number of graphical and textual appendices to these documents, detailing their content. Secondly, in addition, there was a note on the procedure for the strategic deployment of the armed forces (tasks of the fronts and fleets) with a map and a summary table of the distribution of military formations, aviation and parts of the RGC by fronts and armies; a strategic transportation plan for the concentration of armed forces in the theater of operations; cover plans for strategic deployment; a plan for organizing the rear and material support of the army in the field; plans for communications, military communications, air defense and other documents. A comprehensive study of all these materials, which together constituted the Soviet operational plan, which ensured the organized deployment and entry into combat operations of the Red Army in accordance with the goals and objectives of the first strategic operations,¹²⁹⁹ still remains, unfortunately, unrealizable. In the meantime, we are forced to confine ourselves to considering the available texts of four memorandums addressed to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, containing the main ideas of military plans¹³⁰⁰ The direct development of these documents was carried out by the deputy chiefs of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, Major General A.M. Vasilevsky (northern, northwestern and western directions) and A.F. Anisov (south-western and southern directions) ¹³⁰¹ . Before proceeding to the analysis of these documents, we should at least briefly dwell on the chronology of the process of their development.

Document conditionally titled "Considerations on the Fundamentals of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East in 1940-1941." began to be developed after the establishment of the Soviet-German border in accordance with the agreement of September 28, 1939. This process acquired particular intensity from the second half of March 1940, and at the end of July the drafting of this document was completed. Regarding his fate in the literature, there are two versions that complement each other. Some authors believe that the change in the western borders of the USSR in August 1940 and the formation of new formations of the Red Army required a significant revision of the document. According to others, this plan was reported to the People's Commissar for Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, who did not approve of it, because he believed that it attached excessive importance to the enemy grouping located north of Warsaw and in East Prussia, and insisted on a more thorough study of the option when the main enemy forces would be deployed south of Warsaw¹³⁰².

Be that as it may, by September 18 a new version of the plan was prepared, which took into account the possibility of using the main forces of the Red Army, depending on the situation, in the North-West or South-West directions. It is these options for the deployment of Soviet troops that are referred to in historiography as "northern" and "southern" respectively. This feature of planning was a kind of tradition of the Soviet General Staff, since in 1921-1939. The Western Theater of Operations (TVD) was divided almost exactly in the middle by the Pripyat River basin. From September 1939, this river flowed completely through the territory of the USSR, but out of habit, it was this line, extrapolated further to the west, that divided the theater of operations into two main directions. October 5, 1940 this version of the plan was

reported to Stalin and Molotov. During the discussion, the General Staff was instructed to finalize the plan, taking into account the deployment of an even stronger main grouping as part of the Southwestern Front. As a result, it was planned to increase the number of troops on the Southwestern Front by 31.25% in divisions, by 300% in tank brigades, and by 59% by the aviation. On October 14, the revised "southern" version of the plan was approved in regiment 1303 as the main one, but it was decided "to have developed" and "northern" option. The development of both options on the ground was planned to be completed by May 1, 1941.

Thus, the Soviet armed forces received a valid document, on the basis of which more detailed military planning was carried out. Troop commanders, members of the Military Councils and chiefs of staff of military districts were called to the General Staff to develop operational documents, which were immediately approved by the People's Commissar of Defense. In addition to this document, the plans for military operations against Finland, Romania and Turkey were reported to the Soviet leadership, which, in the opinion of their developers, gave the entire operational plan the necessary completeness and flexibility, made it possible to act depending on the specific military-political situation.¹³⁰⁴ Unfortunately, almost all of these documents remain secret, and it is unlikely that historians will soon be able to investigate them.

However, the development of military plans did not end there. The military leadership sought to comprehensively evaluate both options for the actions of the Red Army, incorporated in the operational plan. To test the "northern" version of the operational plan for November 17-19, 1940, the General Staff planned an operational-strategic game on cards under the leadership of the People's Commissar of Defense on the topic "Offensive operation of the front with a breakthrough of SD", during which, along with working out the foundations of modern operation, it was planned to "study the Baltic theater of operations and East Prussia." Later, the term of the game was linked to the end of the December (1940) meeting of the top command staff of the Red Army, and during it it was decided to work out both versions of the war plan. To work out the "northern" and "southern" options, on January 2-6 and 8-11, 1941, respectively, two operational strategic games were held at the General Staff, the details of which are disclosed in the works of P.N. Bobylev. In the first game, offensive actions of the Red Army were played out in the North-West direction (East Prussia), and in the second - in the South-

West (Southern Poland, Hungary and Romania). Although it was noted in the assignments for the games that the "Western" attacked, "no tasks related to the actions of the" Eastern "to repel aggression were not solved." The parties were informed that the "Western" were driven back to the border, and in the South-West direction even to the line of the Vistula and Danube rivers in the territory of Poland occupied by the Germans, and the game was already underway from these lines. Based on this, P.N. Bobylev criticizes the opinion of M.V. Zakharov that the games were held to "work out some issues related to the actions of the troops in the initial period of the war." However, as A.M. Vasilevsky, "in January 1941 ... the main points of the operational plan were tested on a strategic military game." Even more categorical was General I.N., commander of the 6th Army. Muzychenko: "We lost the war plan in January at the General Staff." As we will see later, the Soviet General Staff did not plan any defensive operations, therefore the offensive operations of the Red Army that were being played out should have become the content of the initial period of the war. During the game, the offensive of the "Eastern" in the territory of East Prussia bogged down, and in the South-West they achieved significant success, which led to the abandonment of the "northern" option of the Red Army. Thus, Southern Poland

was identified as the main direction of the Soviet offensive. Zhukov. According to the "Plan for the Development of Operational Plans", it was required to clarify the documents for the "southern" option by March 22, and for the "northern" option - by March 8, 1941. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether this task was completed, because prepared for March 11, 1941 d. finalized the new version of the plan

rejection of the "northern" option and reoriented the main efforts of the troops to the South-Western

direction¹³⁰⁶. The fate of this version of the plan is controversial in the literature. So, B.N. Petrov notes that on April 10, 1941, a directive was prepared to develop a plan for the operational deployment of troops in the border districts, based on the ideas laid down in the plan of March 11, ¹³⁰⁷. Yu.A. Gorkov, on the other hand, points out that "according to this version of the plan, clarifying directives were prepared for the western border districts and the People's Commissar of the Navy, but they were not sent to the addressees"¹³⁰⁸. However, as A.M. Vasilevsky, in this case, the above-mentioned practice of calling to Moscow the commanders of the troops and chiefs of staff of the districts, who received all the necessary instructions, was again applied¹³⁰⁹. Therefore, the conclusion of Yu.A. Gorkov that "the plan revised in March 1941 was not put into motion"¹³¹⁰, without an analysis of the still secret military

planning documents of the districts, it seems premature. Be that as it may, work on refining the operational plan continued, and by May 15, 1941, another version was developed. Around this document in domestic historiography, a discussion unfolded on the question of whether it was approved by the Soviet political leadership. There are no documented data that would give an unambiguous answer to this question, therefore the main arguments of the debating parties are based on circumstantial information. Some authors refer to the fact that this document lacks the signatures of the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff¹³¹¹. Indeed, it is difficult to explain the lack of signatures of military leaders, but Yu.A. Gorkov notes that "after 1938, all operational plans developed by the General Staff did not have the signatures of the People's Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff (except for the September 1940 plan signed by Timoshenko and Meretskov)"¹³¹². That is, the execution of the document dated May 15, 1941 is not at all something extraordinary. It can be assumed that the clarifications of the strategic deployment plan approved in October 1940 were drawn up in a working order. Doubts that Stalin was familiar with this plan are probably based on the fact that it lacks any of his resolutions. But the information reported by A.M. Vasilevsky about the procedure for considering such documents by the Soviet leadership, confirm that Stalin gave all

instructions orally¹³¹³. The main argument of the supporters of the traditional version about the defensive intentions of the USSR was the materials of the conversations of G.K. Zhukov with some military historians in the 1960s. According to V.A. Anfilov, in 1965, Zhukov told him the following: "The idea to prevent a German attack came to Timoshenko and me in connection with Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 to graduates of military academies, in which he spoke about the possibility of acting in an offensive manner. "When the enemy was concentrating forces near our borders, convinced us of the need to develop a directive that provided for a preventive strike. A specific task was assigned to A.M. Vasilevsky. On May 15, he reported the draft directive to the People's Commissar and me. However, we did not sign this document, we decided to report it in advance to Stalin. But he really boiled over when he heard about the warning strike on the German troops. "Are you out of your mind, do you want to provoke the Germans?" speech on May 5 ... "So I said this to encourage those present to think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, as the newspapers of the whole world are trumpeting," Stalin growled. So our idea of a warning strike was buried ... "¹³¹⁴

In 1966, Zhukov told N.A. Svetlishin that "I handed over my report to Stalin through his personal secretary Poskrebyshchev. I still don't know either the further fate of this note or Stalin's decision on it. Poskrebyshchev, who met me in Stalin's waiting room, reported his reaction to my note, He said that Stalin was very angry at my

report and instructed him to pass it on to me so that I would no longer write such notes "for the prosecutor" that the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was more aware of the prospects for our relations with Germany than the chief of the General Staff, that the Soviet Union still had enough time to prepare a decisive battle against fascism. And the implementation of my proposals would only play into the hands of

the enemies of Soviet power "1315 It is difficult not to notice the complete difference between the two versions, which is very strange: after all, according to the publishers, their author was the same person, a participant in the events described. Svetlishin's version looks especially implausible "First of all, it is not clear why Zhukov passes a top secret document of particular importance not to Stalin himself, but to his secretary. Not only is this practice not confirmed by other materials, it was expressly prohibited by the "Instructions for the development, use, accounting and storage of top secret documents of special importance in the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense and at the headquarters of military districts and armies", put into effect by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. Red Army", which is confirmed by the presence on the document dated May 15, 1941 of the vultures "top secret/special importance". The instructions clearly stated that "transmission of documents for signature, report, etc. through third parties (secretaries, adjutants, etc.) is prohibited. Documents must be handed over to the relevant officials from hand to hand"1316. It is also not clear why Stalin could not personally tell Zhukov everything that he allegedly conveyed through Poskrebyshchev, who informed the general about this in Stalin's waiting room (!?).

Anfilov's version is more plausible, but it also contains clearly falsified information. First, the idea of preventing a German attack arose long before May 1941 and formed the basis of Soviet military planning in 1940-1941. Although it is possible that it was Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941 that prompted the military to prepare a clarifying document. Secondly, Stalin's answer to this proposal looks completely out of place - what does "provocation" have to do with it? Thirdly, it is hardly worth reducing the meaning of Stalin's speech to a refutation of the statements of the foreign press, which was clearly not read in the USSR. Now this speech has been published¹³¹⁷, and everyone can see for himself the complete discrepancy between its content and the cited version. The only thing that both versions agree on is Stalin's refusal to approve this document. It seems that this was precisely the purpose of the stories of Zhukov, who was one of those who were interested in hiding the truth about the failed attack on Germany. Moreover, Zhukov was not in a position to allow himself to tell the truth, even if only by virtue of an undertaking not to disclose state secrets. Yu.A. Gorkov puts forward a slightly

different version to justify that "the Soviet Union was not preparing for aggression against Germany in 1941", referring to "the absence of a decision to start a war on the part of the Soviet political leadership and government ... Until now, documents confirming the existence of such a political decision have not been found."1318 Unfortunately, authors who like to talk about a "political decision" about starting a war are in no hurry to determine exactly which document is a "political decision". Moreover, disagreements exist even with regard to the actions of the German leadership. Some authors believe that Hitler made a political decision to start a war with the USSR in June - July 1940, when he gave the order to start planning it, while others argue that in December 1940, when he signed Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa". However, it is known that even the order of the Wehrmacht to attack the USSR on June 10, 1941, suggested the possibility of its cancellation, and only on the afternoon of June 21 did the troops receive final confirmation of the planned operation¹³¹⁹. Or, for example, the actions of the Anglo-French leadership, which planned intervention in the Soviet-Finnish war and attacks on Baku and Batumi, but, despite significant preparations for the implementation of these plans, London and Paris did not make a "political decision" to begin their implementation¹³²⁰.

As rightly pointed out by P.N. Bobylev, "one should distinguish between the decision to prepare for war and the decision to start it. The first could have been made long before the second"¹³²¹. By the way, the experience of the Red Army's actions against Poland, Finland, the Baltic countries and Romania shows that initially the troops received an order containing their combat missions and instructions on the period of concentration on the border. The specific date of the invasion was announced by a separate order in the last hours before its implementation. Thus, literally until the last moment, the Soviet leadership had the opportunity to take into account the likely change in the political situation and not bring the matter to war. Thus, only an order to the troops to carry out an invasion can be considered a "political decision" to start a war. Naturally, until June 22, 1941, the Soviet military-political leadership did not and could not give such an order to the Red Army, and therefore the whole discussion on this issue is groundless.

According to V.N. Kiseleva, V.D. Danilov and P.N. Bobylev¹³²² is the process of strategic concentration and deployment of the Red Army in accordance with this plan and its subsequent refinements, which unfolded in April - June 1941. These events clearly speak in favor of the fact that the plan was approved. True, the moment of his approval remains unknown. It is possible that this could have happened on May 19, 1941, when Molotov, Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin were at Stalin's reception at the same time. Yu.A. Gorkov, who was the first to publish this document in Russian scientific periodicals, also believes that the plan was approved and "in the initial period of the war, the actions of Soviet troops on the Soviet-German front were determined by the strategic concept of the operational plan developed in May 1941"¹³²⁴. In another publication of his, he directly writes that this plan was approved on May 15, 1941 by "the political leadership of the state"¹³²⁵.

To discuss the current situation and the tasks of the troops of the western border districts arising from this plan, on May 24, 1941, a meeting of Stalin and Molotov with People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. took place in the Kremlin. Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, his first deputy lieutenant general N.F. Vatutin, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev, commanders of troops, members of military councils and commanders of the Air Force of the Baltic (PribOVO), Western (ZapOVO), Kiev (KOVO) special, Leningrad (LVO) and Odessa (OdVO) districts. In June, the refinement of this document continued. On June 13, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General N.F. Vatutin prepared a certificate on the deployment of the USSR armed forces in the Western theater of operations, specifying the composition of the troops and their distribution along the fronts. At the same time, the idea of creating another front, the Southern Front, was being worked out, which was formed in accordance with the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 21, 1941.¹³²⁶

Such is the generalized picture of the course of Soviet strategic planning in 1939-1941. Now we should turn directly to the analysis of the content of the available materials. The first parts of the documents were devoted to the assessment of the armed forces and possible actions of potential adversaries¹³²⁷. Germany, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and Japan appeared as such, i.e. almost all the neighbors of the USSR. The developers of the documents assumed that Germany, Finland, Hungary and Romania would be able to deploy from 236 to 270 divisions, more than 10 thousand tanks and from 12 to 15 thousand aircraft against the western borders of the Soviet Union. In the document dated May 15, 1941, this part contains information only on Germany, which could deploy up to 180 divisions for the war with the USSR. Probably, such a reduction is due to the fact that this document contains a plan of military operations mainly only against Germany. To prepare this part of the documents, the estimated data of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff were used, which were significantly overestimated, since in reality, by June 22, 1941, much smaller forces were allocated for the war with the USSR (see Table 37). Table 37

Estimation of the size of the probable enemy grouping and real data for June 22, 1941. Outlining

the "probable operational plans of the opponents", the developers of the documents constantly emphasized that "the General Staff of the Red Army does not have documentary data on the operational plans of probable opponents both in the West and in the East" 1328. And further we are talking only about the most probable assumptions on this check.

Germany's intentions were assessed in the July 1940 plan as follows. Deploying its main forces north of the mouth of the San River, it will deliver "the main blow to Riga, Kovno [Kaunas], Vilna [Vilnius] and further to Minsk" from East Prussia. At the same time, in Belarus, attacks are being made on Baranovichi and Minsk, as well as on Dubno and Brody, with the aim of capturing Western Ukraine. According to this option, up to 130 divisions would be concentrated to deliver the main attack, while the remaining 50 would operate in the south. However, the opposite option was not ruled out, when the main blow would be delivered in Ukraine, and auxiliary operations would be deployed to the north. In this case, the Wehrmacht will be deployed in reverse proportion. Offensive actions were planned from the territory of Romania to Zhmerinka and from Finland to the Karelian Isthmus, and later to Kandalaksha and Petrozavodsk. Having outlined both options for Germany's actions, the

authors of the document made the following conclusion: "The main most politically beneficial for Germany, and therefore the most likely, is the 1st option for its actions, i.e. with the deployment of the main forces of the German army north of the mouth of the river. San" 1329

In the course of further revision of this part of the document, only partial changes were made to the text regarding the directions of development of German offensive operations and deployed forces. Much more important are the changes in the assessment of the main option for the German armed forces. If in the plan of September 18, 1940 it remained unchanged, then in the plan of March 11, 1941, it was believed that the main blow of the Wehrmacht would be inflicted on Ukraine, and in the north, auxiliary blows would be delivered to Riga, Dvinsk [Daugavpils], Volkovysk and Baranovichi, however, the northern option was not completely excluded. The document of May 15, 1941 already proceeds from the probability of only the southern direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht 1330.

Thus, the assessment of the enemy's intentions, with the exception of the possible direction of the main attack, has not undergone significant changes. At the same time, it should be noted that in the absence of specific data on the actual plans of Germany, such assessments proceeded only from the configuration of the Soviet-German border. It is also not clear why the authors of the documents completely ruled out the option of delivering the main attack of the Wehrmacht in Belarus and on what basis they made a conclusion about the northern or southern directions of the main attacks of the enemy. When analyzing these sections of documents, one constantly gets the feeling that their authors are engaged in simple fortune-telling. Moreover, A.M. Vasilevsky points to the developers' lack of "a direct answer to the main question - about the likelihood of Nazi Germany attacking us, not to mention determining at least the approximate timing of this attack" 1331, which directly refutes the official version about the development of plans to repel German aggression.

In planning the operational use of the Red Army, the authors of the documents carefully worked out the issues of its strategic deployment. Military planning documents make it possible to trace the dynamics of strengthening the Western theater of operations, to which it was supposed to allocate the main forces of the Soviet troops. According to the July plan of 1940, 68.7% of the available forces of the ground forces were allocated for operations in the West; according to the September plan - 68.9%; the March plan of 1941 assumed the allocation of 83.5%, the May plan 85.1%, and the June documents 79.2% (see Table 38) 1332. Documents dated July, September 18, 1940, May 15 and June 13, 1941 allow us to trace the dynamics of changes in the distribution of troops along the fronts (see table 39).

The main grouping of Soviet troops was to deploy in the zone from Baltic to the Black Sea. The dynamics of changes in the distribution of forces in two strategic directions is presented in table 40, which shows that the main the group deployed in the South-West direction. In domestic literature it has become commonplace to claim that this happened due to an incorrect definition Soviet military-political leadership of the direction of the future main strike enemy. However, as rightly pointed out by M.A. Gareev, "direction of concentration the main efforts of the Soviet command was not chosen in the interests of the strategic defensive operation (such an operation was simply not envisaged and was not planned - and this is the main mistake), but in relation to completely different methods of action. "However, in the event of a Soviet offensive "the mentioned option for choosing the direction of concentration main effort in the South-Western direction was fully justified and more profitable than in the western direction, "because" it lay on more advantageous terrain, cut off Germany from the main allies, oil, withdrew our troops to the flank and rear of the main enemy groupings", while "the main blow in the Western direction led to head-on collision with the main forces of the German army, demanded a breakthrough fortified areas on very difficult terrain "1333" And completely different conditions, but consequently, considerations could arise if the strategic plan it was planned to carry out defensive operations at the beginning of the war to repel aggression. In this case, of course, it was more profitable to have the main efforts in the band Western Front. But such a method of strategic action was not envisaged at that time.

Table 40

Options for the distribution of Soviet troops in areas¹³³⁵ What tasks were assigned to all these troops? According to a document dated July 1940, "the main task of our troops is to defeat the German forces, concentrating in East Prussia and in the Warsaw area; auxiliary kick inflict defeat on enemy groupings in the area of Ivangorod [Demblin], Lublin, Grubeshov, Tomashov, Sandomierz. According to the troops of the North-Western Front (8th, 11th I army, 37 divisions and 2 brigades) the task was set - "to concentrate on attacking enemy with the ultimate goal, together with the Western Front, to defeat him grouping in East Prussia and capture the latter. "The Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th Army, 51 divisions and 4 brigades) was supposed to "with a blow north of the Bug River, in the general direction of Allenstein, together with the armies of the Northwestern Front, inflict a decisive defeat on the German army, concentrating in East Prussia, take possession of the latter and reach the lower reaches of the river. Wisla. At the same time, with a blow from the left-flank army in the general direction of Ivangorod [Demblin], together with the armies of the Southwestern Front, defeat Ivangorod-Lublinskaya enemy grouping and also go to the river. Vistula". The troops of the Southwestern Front (5th, 6th, 12th, 18th, 9th armies, Konno mechanized group, 57 divisions and 4 brigades) were tasked with "active defense in Carpathians and along the border with Romania to cover Western Ukraine and Bessarabia, at the same time, with a blow from the front Bridges-Veliky, Rava-Russka, Senyava in the general direction to Lublin, together with the left-flank army of the Western Front, defeat Ivangorod-Lublin grouping of the enemy, go out and gain a foothold in the middle reaches of the river. Vistula "1336.

According to the plan of September 18, 1940, "the main forces of the Red Army in the West, in depending on the situation, can be deployed either south of Brest-Litovsk, so to a powerful blow in the direction of Lublin and Krakow and further to Breslau (Bratislav) (so in the text. - M.M.) at the very first stage of the war, cut off Germany from the Balkan countries, deprive her the most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in questions of their participation in the war; or north of Brest-Litovsk with the task of defeating the main forces of the German army within East Prussia and take possession of the latter.

It should be noted that, outlining two options for the use of the Red Army, the authors of the document emphasize that it is the "southern" option that is the main one. The substantiation of this conclusion is also interesting: "The strike of our forces in the direction of Krakow, Bratislava, cutting off Germany from the Balkan countries, acquires exceptional political significance. The general task of the Red Army in the West was formulated as follows: "1. Active defense to firmly cover our borders during the period

of concentration of troops; 2. In cooperation with the left-flank army of the Western Front, the forces of the Southwestern Front, inflict a decisive defeat on the Lublin-Sandomierz enemy grouping and reach the Vistula River. In the future, strike in the general direction on Kielce, Krakow and reach the Pilica River and the upper course of the Oder River; 3. During the operation, firmly cover the borders of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia; 4. Active actions of the North-Western and Western fronts to pin down most of the German forces north of Brest-Litovsk and in East Prussia, while firmly covering the Minsk and Pskov directions.

The fronts also received corresponding tasks. The North-Western Front (8th, 11th armies, 23 divisions and 2 brigades) were assigned the following tasks: "1. Defending the coast of the Baltic Sea, together with the Baltic Fleet, to prevent the landing of enemy amphibious assaults; 2. Firmly cover the Minsk and Pskov directions and in no case prevent the Germans from invading our territory 3. In order to reduce the front of the 11th Army and occupy it with a more advantageous starting position for the offensive during the period of concentration of troops in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front, to capture the Sejny area, Suwalki and go to the front of Shitkemen, Filipovo, Rachki; 4. After concentrating troops with a strike in the general direction of Insterburg, Allenstein, together with the Western Front, tie down the German forces in East Prussia.

The Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th Armies, 42 divisions and 4 brigades) received the task: "Firmly covering the Minsk direction, to concentrate troops with a simultaneous strike with the North-Western Front in the general direction of Allenstein, to pin down the German forces concentrating in East Prussia. With the transition of the armies of the Southwestern Front to the offensive, with a blow of the left-flank army in the general direction to Ivangorod [Demblin], to help the Southwestern Front to break the Lublin grouping of the enemy and, further developing the operation on Radom, to ensure operations Southwestern Front

from the North. The Southwestern Front (5th, 19th, 6th, 12th, 18th, 9th and Horse-Mechanized armies, 96 divisions and 5 brigades) received the task: "Firmly covering the borders of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, to concentrate troops in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Western Front, inflict a decisive defeat on the Lublin-Sandomierz enemy grouping and reach the Vistula River. the Pilica River and the upper course of the Oder River".

The main tasks of the "northern" version of the deployment of Soviet troops were to be: "1. Strong cover for the directions to Minsk and Pskov during the period of concentration of troops. 2. Inflicting a decisive defeat on the main forces of the German army, concentrating in East Prussia, and capturing the latter. 3. Auxiliary with a strike from Lvov, not only to firmly cover Western Ukraine, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, but also to defeat the enemy grouping in the area of Lublin, Grubeshov, Tomashev. The developers of the document emphasized that "the defeat of the Germans in East Prussia and the capture of the latter are of exceptional economic and, above all, political significance for Germany, which will inevitably affect the entire future course of the struggle against Germany." However, "there are fears that the struggle on this front could lead to protracted battles, tie up our main forces and not give a reliable and quick effect, which in turn will make inevitable and accelerate the intervention of the Balkan countries in

war against us". The main tasks of the fronts remained the same as in the previous version of the plan¹³³⁷ In

the above documents, the troops of the Northern Front deployed against Finland received limited tasks to ensure the defense of Leningrad, cover the Murmansk railway and maintain "complete dominance in the Gulf of Finland". The authors of the documents assumed that "Finland alone is unlikely to enter the war, the most real case is the simultaneous participation of Finland in the war with Germany," and believed that "our actions in the north-west should be reduced mainly to the active defense of our borders." True, the tasks The Northern and Red Banner Baltic (KBF) fleets testify that "active defense" was supposed on the territory of Finland.¹³³⁸ We allowed ourselves such a lengthy quotation, since this material

demonstrates the absence of any connection between the actions of the Red Army and the possible actions of the enemy, which were mentioned above. It is clear from the document the real scenario of the outbreak of war, which is the basis of planning, emerges: under the cover of the troops of the western military districts, the Red Army is concentrating and deploying in the Western theater of operations, simultaneously conducting private offensive operations, the completion of the concentration serves as a signal to switch to a general offensive along the entire front from the Baltic to the delivering the main blow to southern Poland. The German troops, as in the first version of the plan, are designated by the term "concentrating", which means that the initiative to start the war will come entirely from the Soviet side, which is the first to begin and complete the deployment of troops in the theater of operations. This conclusion is confirmed by a direct indication in the document that in the case of the concentration of the main forces in the North-West direction, "provided that the railways are operating in full accordance with the transportation plan, the day of transition to the general offensive should be set on the 25th day from the start of mobilization, i.e. e. The 20th day from the beginning of the concentration of troops "¹³³⁹ That is, the transition to the offensive is not connected with the situation at the front, but with the completion of the concentration of the Red Army.

The widespread opinion that the USSR first waited for an enemy attack, and only then planned an offensive, does not take into account the fact that in this case the strategic initiative would actually voluntarily be given into the hands of the enemy, and Soviet troops would be placed in obviously unfavorable conditions. Moreover, the very transition from defense to offensive, so simple in abstraction, is a very complex process that requires careful and comprehensive preparation, which should have begun with the equipment of four defensive lines at a depth of 150 km. But nothing like this was done before the start of the war, and it is hardly worth seriously defending the thesis that the Red Army could successfully defend itself on unprepared terrain, and even in the event of a sudden attack by the enemy, which Soviet plans did not provide for at all. After all, "it was conceived to repel aggression by conducting strategic (front-line) offensive operations in the main directions" ¹³⁴⁰ . In addition, it is not clear why it is necessary to plan offensive operations if the troops have to defend against an attacking enemy. After all, no one knows how the situation at the front will develop during the defensive operation, where our troops will end up, what condition they will be in, and so on. In addition, the expectation of an enemy attack will not allow timely mobilization, which will accordingly make it impossible to carry out all these plans.

It should not be forgotten that in developing the problems of the initial period of the war, the attention of Soviet military science throughout the entire interwar period "was focused on bringing your main forces into battle ahead of your enemy and in more favorable conditions, with the outbreak of war, and reliably seizing the strategic initiative. The solution to this problem could be provided by: the creation of strong armies in peacetime, which could form the core of the main forces; advance comprehensive preparation of infrastructure, especially railways and roads, allowing timely implementation

deployment of the main forces; detailed development of a plan for mobilization, concentration and operational-strategic deployment; creation of appropriate bodies for managing these processes; formation and concentration in the border area of special mechanized and aviation formations, designed to disrupt the mobilization and concentration of the main enemy forces with the outbreak of hostilities; theater engineering equipment; preparation of the air defense system of the country; organization of the cover of the State Border for unimpeded mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops; advance, covert conduct of partial mobilization and concentration of troops" 1341 As is known, these measures were consistently carried out in the pre-war period, which once again refutes the version of defensive intentions of the Soviet military-political leadership.

Since it was precisely the offensive operations of the Soviet troops that were described in detail in the documents, it is not possible to talk about the response actions of the Red Army. The content of these documents shows once again that the actions of the covering troops during the period of concentration and deployment are not necessarily connected with repulsing an enemy attack, but are a kind of combat protection of the concentrating troops. In addition, it should not be forgotten that cover operations were undertaken by the Red Army in the autumn of 1939 when concentrating troops to attack Poland and Finland and in the summer of 1940 for operations against the Baltic countries and Romania.

In the plan of March 11, 1941, the rejection of the "northern" option was finally fixed, since "the deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in the West with the grouping of the main forces against East Prussia and in the Warsaw direction raises serious fears that the struggle on this front may lead to protracted battles" 1342 attention was , and main paid to the further development of the "southern" option. This document noted that "the most advantageous is the deployment of our main forces south of the Pripyat River in order to set ourselves the first strategic goal with powerful attacks on Lublin, Radom and Krakow: to defeat the main forces of the Germans and cut off Germany in the first stage of the war from the Balkan countries, deprive it of its most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of their participation in the war against us "1343 As S.N. · Mikhalev, in this regard, "the strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the Western Theater received a clear design. Its plan included: 1) a strong (apparently active. - M.M.) defense to tie down the enemy forces on the flanks in the areas of Memel, Ostrolenka and along the borders with Hungary and Romania; 2) the main forces of the Southwestern Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the Western Front, strike with the aim of decisively defeating the Lublin-Radomsko-Sandomierz enemy grouping, capture Krakow and Warsaw and go to the Warsaw, Lodz, Oppeln front "1344. "The further strategic goal for the main forces of the Red Army, depending on the situation, can be set - the development of an operation through Poznan to Berlin or actions to the southwest to Prague and Vienna, or an attack to the north to Torun and Danzig in order to bypass East Prussia" 1345.

Now, thanks to the research of S.N. Mikhalev, we have the opportunity to get acquainted with the tasks of the Western and Southwestern fronts according to this plan. The Western Front "was to strike with the left wing in the general direction of Sedlec, Radom to assist the Southwestern Front in defeating the enemy in the Lublin area, and to ensure operations in the main direction, deliver an auxiliary blow in the direction of Warsaw, capture it and "take out the defense" on the river. Narew. The immediate task of the front was to capture the areas of Sedlec, Lukov and capture the crossings over the Vistula River. Later, actions in the direction of Radom were meant to encircle the Lublin enemy grouping in cooperation with the Southwestern Front. "

The Southwestern Front was given the task of "encircling and destroying the main enemy grouping east of the Vistula River with the simultaneous removal of mobile actions by the right wing armies in cooperation with the Western Front

groups (two mechanized corps) to the western bank of the river. Vistula to capture Kielce. The main forces of the front, upon completion of the defeat of the Lublin grouping on the tenth day operations to be ready to force the river. Wisla. At the same time, the left wing of the main groups to strike in the direction of Krakow and, developing success with the forces of mobile groups (four mechanized corps), on the eighth day of the operation, capture Krakow, on the tenth day of the operation, the main forces of this grouping should be withdrawn to the area of Mechow, Krakow, Tarnov "1346.

The above material clearly indicates the continuation of mining offensive operations of the Soviet troops. The view expressed in the literature that "the plan of March 11, 1941 is the most accurate final expression of the generally accepted views and most accurately reflects Stalin's personal position", one can only accept partially. Indeed, this document sets out the quintessence of "generally accepted views" of the Soviet leadership on the beginning of the war, but it was not final, since the process of developing the Soviet operational plan continued. The version that "the basis the document laid down a defensive strategy "1347, The fact is that has no basis. it clearly stated:" The offensive will begin on 12.6 "1348. The exact date the beginning of an offensive, as is well known, is determined by the side that plans to have initiative to start hostilities. True, this period was not met, but its appearance in the document is very revealing, as well as the fact that this is the only document of the Soviet military planning, which is published in the latest documentary collection in extraction1349 .

The clarification of the tasks of the Soviet troops found its further development in a document dated 15 May 1941. For the first time, it openly and clearly articulated the idea that the Red Army should "preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the stage of deployment and will not yet have time to organize a front and interaction of troops". This idea, as we saw above, was present in a latent form in all previous plans. Naturally, the developers of this document are talking about the possibility of a German attack on the USSR is only presumably1350.

The troops of the Red Army were tasked with striking at the German army, for which should have been "the first strategic goal of the actions of the Red Army troops to put - the defeat of the main forces of the German army deployed south of the Brest-Demblin line and exit by the 30th day of the operation to the Ostrolenka front, r. Narew, Lovich, Lodz, Kreutzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. The subsequent strategic goal is to have an offensive from the Katowice area to north or northwest direction to defeat the large forces of the center and northern wing of the German front and seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia. The immediate task is to defeat the German army east of the river. Vistula and Krakow direction, go to the river. Narew, Vistula and capture the Katowice area, for which:

- a) deliver the main blow by the forces of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, cutting off Germany from her southern allies; b)
- deliver an auxiliary blow by the left wing of the Western Front in the direction Sedlec, Demblin, with the aim of pinning down the Warsaw grouping and capturing Warsaw, as well as to assist the Southwestern Front in defeating the enemy's Lublin grouping;
- c) to conduct an active defense against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary and Romania and be ready to strike against Romania with a favorable environment.

Thus, the Red Army will begin offensive operations from the Chizhov front, Lutowski forces 152 divisions against 100 German. On other sections of the state border active defense is envisaged". The term

"active defense" should not be misleading, since it meant set of defensive and offensive operations. Because the document it is repeatedly emphasized that it is the Red Army that will be the initiator of military

actions, this term, most likely, hides private offensive operations to pin down the enemy. The fronts received the

following tasks. The northern front (14th, 7th, 23rd armies, 21 divisions) was supposed to provide the defense of "Leningrad, the port of Murmansk, the Kirov railway and, together with the Baltic Navy, ensure our complete dominance in the waters of the Gulf of Finland". True, it remains unclear how the ground forces could ensure dominance in the bay without occupying the southern part of Finland. The Northwestern Front (8th,

11th, 27th armies, 23 divisions) was supposed to "strongly cover the Riga and Vilna directions with stubborn defense, preventing the enemy from invading from East Prussia; the defense of the western coast and the islands of Ezel and Dago did not to allow the landing of enemy amphibious assaults. True, as the authors of the latest military-historical work note, the troops of the North-Western Front and two armies of the right wing of the Western Front "were instructed, under favorable conditions, to go on the offensive, capture the Suwalki area, strike at Insterburg and Allenstein, thereby tying down the enemy forces" in East Prussia 1351. The Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th Armies, 45

divisions) was supposed to "stubborn defense on the front of Druskeniki, Ostrolenka, firmly cover the Lida and Bialystok directions; with the transition of the armies of the Southwestern Front to the offensive, strike the left wing of the front in the general direction of Warsaw and Sedlec, Radom, break up the Warsaw grouping and capture Warsaw, in cooperation with the South-Western Front, break up the Lublin-Radom grouping of the enemy, reach the river Vistula and capture Radom with mobile units." The Southwestern Front

(5th, 20th, 6th, 26th, 21st, 12th, 18th, 9th armies, 122 divisions) had the immediate tasks "a) a concentric strike of the armies of the right wing of the front, encircle and destroy the main enemy grouping east of the Vistula River in the region of Lublin; b) simultaneously with a blow from the Seniava, Przemysl, Lutowska fronts, defeat the enemy forces in the Krakow and Sandomierz-Kielce directions and capture the area of Krakow, Katowice, Kielce, meaning in further advance from this area in a northern or northwestern direction to defeat the large forces of the northern wing of the enemy front and capture the territory of former Poland and East Prussia; c) firmly defend the state border with Hungary and Romania and be ready to deliver concentric strikes against Romania from the Chernivtsi regions and Chisinau with the immediate goal of defeating the northern wing of the Romanian army and reaching the line of the river Moldova, Iasi "1352

Thus, as rightly pointed out by S.N. Mikhalev, the May "plan was a somewhat transformed development of the idea laid down earlier" in the March plan¹³⁵³ and it was planned to ensure the achievement of the immediate strategic goals by offensive operations, primarily by the troops of the South-Western direction, on which more than half of all divisions intended for operations in the West were deployed. To ensure a strong initial strike against the enemy, it was planned to deploy the main forces in the armies of the first echelon, which included most of the mobile formations. The offensive nature of the tasks of the ground forces was also

consistent with the active tasks that were developed by the command of the Soviet Navy, as evidenced by the memorandums of the command of the KBF to People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov and to the Main Naval Headquarters. So, the chief of staff of the fleet, Rear Admiral Yu.A. Panteleev, in a note dated July 5, 1940, analyzing the current situation in the Baltic, noted that, despite the hostile attitude towards the USSR of Finland and Sweden, "the only enemy ... in this situation can only be Germany, which uses Sweden to deploy operations and especially Finland to use its flanking and rear location in relation to our bases at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. Probable German operations in the Baltic Sea could be actions against the Moonsund Islands, Hanko and other bases of the KBF, which was supposed to provide their defense from the sea,

create an anti-submarine line at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and ensure their communications from Kronstadt to Tallinn. At the same time, it was proposed to carry out landing operations against Finland to capture the Aland Islands, Kotka, the Aspe skerries and the occupation of the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland. Against Sweden, it was proposed to carry out a landing on the island of Gotland, where it was necessary to create a submarine base and an air force fleet.

Against Germany, active mine laying and submarine operations on its communications, landing and support of the flank of the ground forces south of Liepaja and preparation of the fleet for a naval battle with the German Navy, breaking into the Gulf of Finland, were proposed. Panteleev considered the priority operations of the fleet to be "the capture of the Aland Islands in all cases of the situation in the Baltic and immediately. Operations to lay minefields and cover them at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, the Irben Strait and at the German bases.] and to the west of Vyborg. Deployment of submarines on German communications in the Baltic (Kiel-Memel coast of Germany)." According to the author of the report, it was necessary "immediately in the same year to get the Aland Islands and the possibility of real control over all Finnish bases in the Gulf of Finland by any means - up to war, otherwise the Germans will use all these opportunities later and this will create great difficulties for us." In addition, it was necessary to strengthen the naval composition of the fleet, its air force, anti-submarine defense, concentrate the required number of mines and change the control structure at TVD1354. Just as radical was the memorandum of Rear Admiral N.N., commander of the KBF squadron. Nesvitsky dated July 10, 1940 to the Main Naval Staff, in which, based on

an analysis of the unfavorable situation for the USSR in the Baltic, he proposed "in order to ensure both bases and communications that feed them ... to resolve the issue of the independent existence of Sweden and Finland in favor of the USSR and make the Baltic Sea an inland sea". To ensure their bases, it was proposed to create a number of mine positions at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland and in the Irben Strait, to prepare for the active use of the Air Force and submarines to ensure their communications. As offensive operations, the KBF was supposed to support the flanks of the ground forces on Hanko and on the border with East Prussia, capture Gotland and the Aland Islands with landing operations, land troops on the Finnish coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, "which will ensure the offensive of our forces on the Hanko Peninsula", in Kotka and in Helsinki, "providing an offensive from Vyborg." It was also proposed to carry out operations to disrupt communications and destroy the German fleet¹³⁵⁵.

The directives of the People's Commissar of the Navy dated February 26, 1941 set the following tasks for the fleets on the western borders of the

USSR. The Northern Fleet was supposed to destroy the enemy fleet when it appeared in the Barents and White Seas; together with the 14th Army, defend the coast of the Sredny, Rybachy and Kola peninsulas and prevent enemy landings; assist the 14th Army in the capture of Petsamo; to prevent the passage of enemy ships into the White Sea, the coast of which should have been defended jointly with the Arkhangelsk Military District; conduct submarine cruising operations on enemy sea communications off the western coast of Norway and in the Skagerrak.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet was supposed to prevent the landing of German amphibious assaults on the coast of the Latvian and Estonian SSR, on the islands of the Moonsund archipelago; together with the Red Army Air Force, defeat the German fleet when it tries to enter the Gulf of Finland; prevent enemy ships from entering the Gulf of Riga; to assist the ground forces on the coast of the Gulf of Finland and on the Hanko peninsula, providing their flanks, and also, in the event of Finland opposing the USSR, to destroy the coastal defenses of the Finns; to destroy the combat fleets of Finland and Sweden when they act against the USSR; to ensure the transfer of one rifle division from the northern coast of Estonia to the Hanko Peninsula in the very first days of the war, and also to be ready for

landing on the Aland Islands; interrupt the enemy's sea communications in the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia.

The Black Sea Fleet received the task of ensuring dominance at sea; to prevent the passage of the hostile coalition fleets to the Black Sea by active mine laying and submarine operations; to prevent the enemy from transporting troops and military equipment by sea to the ports of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey; prevent enemy landings; prevent enemy ships from operating along the Soviet coast; in the event of Romania's entry into the war, destroy or capture its fleet and interrupt communications, block the coast of Romania, including the mouth of the Danube; be ready for the landing of tactical assault forces; to assist the left flank of the Red Army in forcing the Danube River and in further advance along the Black Sea coast; provide air defense of the Main Base and the Kerch sector of coastal defense. The Danube military flotilla of the Black Sea Fleet was supposed to prevent the enemy from forcing the Danube from the mouth of the river. Prut to the mouth of the Kiliya girl; to prevent the passage of military and other vessels in the section of Reni - the mouth of the Kiliya branch; to assist the ground forces in repelling a possible enemy strike from the direction of Galati towards Giurgiulesti. The Pinsk military flotilla received the task

of assisting the troops of the Red Army on the Western Bug, Vistula and Neman rivers in conducting offensive operations; the fire of ships, the crossing and transportation of troops, the landing of tactical assault forces, the covering of the flanks of troops resting on the river; fight with river forces and enemy crossings; provide their water communications¹³⁵⁶.

By April 15, 1941, the fleets developed operational plans and cover plans, which were approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy. In the second half of June 1941, a Special Purpose Detachment was created at the Baltic Shipping Company, consisting of 19 transports, 6 icebreakers, 5 boats, 5 tugboats and 10 other civilian ships, which was capable of lifting 14-15 thousand people, 300 -350 vehicles and 3 thousand horses, that is, one division for transfer to Hanko. Exercises were scheduled to begin at the KBF on June 23, so from June 19 the fleet switched to readiness No. 2. At the same time, general fleet exercises of the Black Sea Fleet took place in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, which were usually held at the end of summer or autumn. For their implementation on June 10, 6 civilian ships were mobilized into the fleet. During the exercises, under the guise of anti-amphibious operations, the troops of the OdVO, as previously the troops of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian military districts, worked out the issues of landing. Developed on the eve of the war by the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, the "Temporary Manual on Fire Interaction between the Black Sea Fleet Ships and the Ground Forces of the Odessa Military District", which was taken as a basis by other districts, did not provide for joint actions in repulsing an amphibious landing. It was only during the course of the war

that the Directives on anti-amphibious operations were developed¹³⁵⁷. Since the strategic deployment plan and the concept of the first strategic operations were designed for the complete mobilization of the Red Army, they were closely linked to the mobilization plan. From April 1940, the development of a new mobilization plan began, which was approved by the government on February 12, 1941. The mobilization deployment of the Red Army according to the MP-41 plan (officially called "Mobplan No. 23") was supposed to lead to the creation of a wartime army. In total, it was planned to deploy 8 front and 29 army directorates, 62 rifle directorates, 29 mechanized, 4 cavalry, 5 airborne and 8 air corps, 177 rifle, 19 mountain rifle, 2 motorized rifle, 61 tank, 31 motorized, 13 cavalry and 79 air divisions, 3 rifle, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades and 72 RGK artillery regiments, as well as the corresponding number of rear units. After mobilization, the strength of the armed forces of the USSR was to be 8.9 million people, the troops were to have 106.7 thousand guns and mortars, up to 37 thousand tanks, 22.2 thousand combat aircraft, 10.7 thousand armored vehicles, about 91 thousand tractors and 595 thousand cars.

Most of these troops had already been formed or were completing their formation, since, according to the system of mobilization deployment adopted in the summer of 1939, the number of units and formations was brought to the wartime level, which simplified the mobilization process, shortened its terms and should have contributed to a higher degree of combat effectiveness of the mobilized troops. The main "feature of military construction in these years was that covert mobilization deployment of the armed forces took place"¹³⁵⁸ Only in the second half of 1940 - the first half of 1941, 18 army directorates, 16 rifle corps directorates, 29 mechanized corps directorates, 5 air -airborne corps, 86 rifle, 61 tank and 31 motorized divisions, 2 rifle, 10 airborne and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades. According to the MP-41 plan, the mobilization of the Red Army was planned to be carried out by echelon within a month.

Depending on the situation, the mobilization was planned to be carried out covertly or openly. The covert mobilization method was developed in detail. It was planned to mobilize the troops of the covering armies in two echelons. The first echelon, which included 114 divisions, fortified areas on the new border, 85% of the air defense forces, airborne troops, over 75% of the air force and 34 artillery regiments of the RGK, was supposed to complete mobilization within 2-6 hours from the moment the mobilization was announced. Reducing the mobilization period was achieved by calling up personnel and vehicles from nearby areas. The remaining troops of the border districts completed mobilization on the 2nd-4th day of mobilization, using assigned personnel from all over the territory of the districts and from the interior of the country.

Other troops completed mobilization on the 8-15th day, and spare parts and stationary hospitals - on the 16-30th day. The mobilization of the Air Force was completed on the 3rd-4th day, and the combat units and the rear services serving them were brought to combat readiness already 2-4 hours after the start of mobilization. Air defense troops were mobilized in two echelons. The first had a constant readiness up to 2 hours, and the second was deployed on the 1st-2nd day of mobilization. The deployment of the newly formed units was planned to be completed on the 3rd-5th day. Thus, out of 303 divisions of the Red Army, 172 had the terms of full readiness on the 2-4th day, 60 divisions - on the 4-5th day, and the rest - on the 6-10th day of mobilization. All other combat units, front-line rears and military educational institutions were mobilized on the 8th-15th day. The full mobilization of the armed forces was envisaged on the 15th-30th day, while the main part of the troops was deployed approximately on

the 10th-15th day¹³⁵⁹. An important problem of the entry of the Red Army into the war was the issue of covering the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops. In the interwar period, it was believed that cover should be carried out by invading enemy territory, which would exclude his active actions against the concentrating and deploying troops of the Red Army. Initially, these tasks were to be carried out by invasion groups, however, "the experience of strategic games and exercises of the 1930s showed that invasion groups were not able to fulfill the tasks that were assigned to them at the first strategic stage of the struggle. They were weak in composition and aimed "¹³⁶⁰ In this sense, the problem of special operations cover was touched upon at the December (1940) meeting of the highest command staff in the speech of the chief of staff of the Baltic Special Military District, Lieutenant General P.S. Klenova¹³⁶¹

Unfortunately, documents on cover plans for the entire interwar period are not available for study due to their secrecy. Only in 1996 were the plans for covering the western border military districts developed in

May - June 1941. The basis for their development was the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense, which, as indicated in the literature, were sent to the ZapOVO, KOVO and LVO on May 5, to the OdVO on May 6, and to the PribOVO on May 14, 1941. In the publication 1996, for some reason, it is indicated that the directives were sent to the OdVO on May 6, to the LVO, PribOVO and ZapOVO - on May 14, and to the KOVO - on May 15, 1941, although even their business records do not correspond to this statement. At the same time, it should be noted that the published documents on LVO require clarification of the contradictions in the date of the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense. This is all the more curious that all researchers refer to the same archival documents¹³⁶². In any case, today it is known that the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense were sent to the ZapOVO and KOVO on May 5, to the OdVO on May 6, and to the LVO and PribOVO on May 14, 1941.¹³⁶³

In addition, it should be noted that this publication, for all its importance, has not escaped a certain bias. First of all, the authors present these documents as the operational plans of the districts, although these are just "cover plans for the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment." That is, these documents, although important, are only a part. Therefore, contrary to the statement of the "enable to determine how authors of the publication, these operational plan¹³⁶⁴ documents do not the strategic plan of the war was realized, to clarify its nature at the initial stage." The conclusion of the authors of the publication that "an analysis of the directives of the General Staff, dated May 1941, on the whole shows that no offensive tasks were set for the troops of the western border military districts," is fair, but it should be borne in mind that these directives were devoted to the development of cover plans, not the first operations of the war. Therefore, they cannot contain such instructions. After all, as noted by V.B. Makovsky, "operational cover was a component. Thus, the authors are part of the strategic deployment of the armed forces" ¹³⁶⁵ publications seek to pass off one of the areas of the war as the only one. Therefore, they hardly should have used the · Red Army's preparation for headline "The end of the global lie." The authors of the publication themselves note that the published documents "sin with formalism, the lack of an accurate assessment of the enemy, the definition of the

balance of forces and means. Variants and methods of military operations were not developed"¹³⁶⁶. The actions of the Air Force were planned in much more detail, which, according to the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense, were tasked with "active actions ... to gain air supremacy and powerful strikes on the main railway junctions, bridges, spans and groupings of troops to disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of enemy troops ". From the first days of the war, air supremacy had to be won by "a sudden strike on enemy aircraft at its airfields and by inflicting maximum losses in air battles." It is clear that the most effective way to defeat enemy aircraft would be the first strike on its bases. Therefore, after the air forces of the districts "concentrate, and the enemy's airfield network is opened, it is necessary to proceed with the decisive destruction of enemy aircraft" and other objects in the 200-km border zone¹³⁶⁷ The planned grouping of troops of the western border districts for cover (see Table 41) included 15 armies, which included 107 divisions and 2 brigades, 51 divisions remained in the reserve of the fronts, and 8 divisions were at the disposal of the High Command. As military historians note, "a comparative analysis of the latest pre-war plans with the plans of the

summer of 1940 shows that ... the line between cover operations and the first operations was practically erased" ¹³⁶⁹, since the combat composition of the cover armies almost completely corresponded to the plan of strategic concentration and deployment troops in the theater. According to V.A. Anfilova, B.N. Petrova and V.A. Semidetko, the planned grouping of covering troops was more adapted to the offensive than to defense¹³⁷⁰, which could not but affect in the event of an enemy attack, because, as M.A. rightly points out. Gareev, "the disadvantageous position of the Soviet troops was aggravated by the fact that the troops of the border military districts had tasks not for defensive operations, but only for covering the deployment of troops"¹³⁷¹

Table 41.

Planned grouping of troops of the districts for cover.

The introduction of these plans into action did not at all coincide with the attack of the enemy. So, they emphasize that "the first flight and border crossing by our units can be made only with the permission of the High Command"¹³⁷². That is, the initiative for this action will come from Moscow. In the PribOVO cover plan, it was noted that "the purpose of reconnaissance is to reveal the enemy's intentions, his grouping and the timing of readiness to go on the offensive from the first day of the war"¹³⁷³. This once again confirms that the introduction of cover plans depended not on the actions of the enemy, but on the decision of the Soviet command. According to M.A. Gareeva, "on the eve of the war, at some point, the most important circumstance was lost sight of, that in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, both politically and militarily, one cannot proceed only from one's own wishes and motives, not taking into account that the enemy will strive to do everything in such a way. and when it is convenient and profitable for him"¹³⁷⁴, and "the idea of indispensably transferring the war from its very beginning to the territory of the enemy ... so captivated some leading military workers that the possibility of conducting hostilities on their own territory was practically excluded. Of course, this negatively affected the preparation not only of defense, but also of theaters of military operations in the depths of its

territory in general"¹³⁷⁵. This conclusion is confirmed by the published documents on cover plans, which did not provide for serious opposition to the concentration of Soviet troops from the enemy. Thus, according to plans, the full deployment of the troops of the border districts in the cover zones took up to 15 days, which, naturally, would be extremely difficult in the event of an enemy offensive. Moreover, in the event of an enemy attack, the troops of the first echelon would not have time to occupy their defense lines on the border. As rightly noted by V.P. Krikunov, "a characteristic feature of the cover plans was that they proceeded from such an option for the start of the war and the situation that had arisen, in which it would be possible to advance to the border without interference from the potential enemy, to occupy the deserts, to prepare to repel an attack, carry out mobilization ... A feature of all army cover plans was the lack of an assessment of possible enemy actions, primarily the option of a sudden transition to the offensive of superior enemy forces ... The essence of a tactical maneuver was to quickly assemble and reach the border ... It was assumed that in the concentration areas time would be given for the final preparation for battle "¹³⁷⁶ If the covering troops were really preparing to repel enemy attacks, then this

would mean, - in the fair opinion of M.A. Gareev, that the border military districts should have carefully developed plans for repelling the enemy invasion, that is, plans for defensive operations, since it is impossible to repel the offensive of superior enemy forces in passing, just as an intermediate task. This requires the conduct of a whole series of long-term fierce defensive battles and operations. If there were such plans, then in accordance with them, in a completely different way, namely, taking into account defensive tasks, the groupings of forces and means of these districts would be located, management would be built differently and the separation of material reserves and other mobilization resources would be carried out differently. Readiness to repel aggression also required that not only plans of operations be developed, but that these operations be fully prepared, including in logistical terms, so that they would be mastered by commanders and staffs. It is quite obvious that in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy, there is no time left for additional preparation of such operations. But this was not done in the border military districts "¹³⁷⁷. Since defensive operations were not envisaged, the troops of the first echelon of the covering armies received excessively wide cover strips on the border. Thus, in

PribOVO, a division accounted for 33 km, in ZapOVO - 47 km, - 50 km, in OdVO - 90 km This was not provided for by any norms, according to which the width of the front

the division's defense was to be 8-10 km. The army lines averaged 170-176 km instead of 80-100 km according to pre-war views, the cover lines of rifle corps were just as stretched (84-92 km instead of the authorized 20-25 km). As noted by V.B. Makovsky, "the plans provided for a relatively uniform formation of covering troops ... Such a formation of troops of the first strategic echelon in the event of a sudden attack by the enemy creates the conditions for defeating them in parts, as happened later"¹³⁷⁸. Naturally, under these conditions, "the ability of the covering armies to provide troops from a possible surprise attack by the enemy on an operational-strategic scale was doubtful, since the solution of this task should have been preceded by measures for the operational deployment of covering armies and engineering equipment of defensive lines"¹³⁷⁹. Of course, the creation of rear defensive lines, envisaged by these plans, would be impossible in the event of an enemy strike. In addition, if the Soviet troops were really preparing to conduct defensive operations, it is not clear what prevented the creation of these lines, for example, in the spring of 1941.

It should not be forgotten that the planning of the operations of the western border districts to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops took place in accordance with the plan of May 15, 1941. It clearly indicated the purpose of these measures, carried out "in order to protect ourselves from a possible surprise strike the enemy, cover the concentration and deployment of our troops and prepare them for going on the offensive" (highlighted by me. - M.M.). Therefore, it was necessary, firstly, "to organize a solid defense and cover of the state border, using for this all the troops of the border districts and almost all the aviation assigned for deployment in the west", and secondly, "to develop a detailed plan for the country's air defense and bring it to full air defense readiness. According to the May directives of the People's Commissar of Defense, "the development of plans for the defense of the state border and air defense was completely" completed by June 1, 1941, but later this deadline was pushed back, and the plans for covering the districts were submitted for approval to the General Staff on June 6-19, 1941.¹³⁸⁰

Since defensive operations were not planned, the directives and cover plans contain the following: "Under favorable conditions, all defending troops and reserves of the armies and the district should be ready, at the direction of the High Command, to deliver swift strikes to defeat enemy groupings, transfer combat operations to its territory and capture advantageous frontiers" ¹³⁸¹. In this sense, the conclusion of the authors of the publication that these documents are "a logical continuation of the strategic plan of the war", which, as shown above, provided for the active offensive actions of the Red Army, is correct.

Setting the troops of the border districts the task of delivering strikes against the enemy, the Soviet military leadership had to give an order to prepare these operations. This is confirmed by the aforementioned directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to the commander of the ZapOVO dated April 10, 1941, according to which, in accordance with the strategic plan, the North-Western Front was to "cover the Riga and Kovno-Vilna directions with stubborn defense." The Southwestern Front was tasked with "strike by the armies of the right wing of the front, in cooperation with the left-flank army of the Western Front, to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping east of the Vistula River", the line of which was supposed to be reached on

the 10th day of the offensive. The troops of the Western Front were supposed to: "1. During the period of mobilization and concentration of troops - by stubborn defense, relying on fortified areas, firmly cover our borders and prevent the enemy from invading our territory. wing of the front to break the Lublin-Radom grouping of the enemy. The immediate task of the front is to capture the area of Sedlec, Lukov and capture the crossings over the Vistula river;

with the Southwestern Front. 3. To ensure the main attack of the front, launch an auxiliary attack in the direction of Warsaw, with the task of capturing Warsaw and putting up defenses on the river. Narew. 4. The stubborn defense of the armies of the right wing of the front in the sector of the river. Neman, Shchuchin, Ostrolenka firmly cover the Lida and Volkovysk-

Baranovich directions. The armies of the Western Front also received the corresponding tasks. Neman, Shchuchin, Kolno firmly cover Grodno and directions to Lida and to Bialystok and Volkovysk. "The 10th Army followed" a strong defense of the front claim. Kolno, Novogrudok to the river. Bug, cover the Bialystok direction. With the advancement of the left-flank armies of the front to the river. Vistula, take out the defense of the left wing of the army on the river. Narew and secure its eastern bank for itself. "The 13th Army received the task "simultaneously with the 4th Army of the Front to strike with the forces of at least seven rifle divisions and two mechanized corps in the direction of Kossov, Volomin, with the goal of reaching the river. Vistula to ensure the attack of the 4th Army on Sedlec, Lublin from the north; in the future, by actions from the north, strive to capture Warsaw, the actions of mechanized corps, with access to the river. Vistula, move to the south to assist the 4th Army. "In turn, the 4th Army was supposed to," striking in the direction of Drohichin, Siedlce (Sedlec), Garvolin, force the river. Bug, to break the opposing enemy and take control of the moving parts - on the 3rd day of the Sedlec operation and on the 5th day of the operation, crossings on the river. Vistula, the main forces on the 8th day to reach the river. Vistula, in readiness to

force it. In the future, we should keep in mind actions on Radom. "At the same time, it should have been," taking into account the possibility of the enemy going on the offensive before the end of our concentration, to organize the cover of the border on the front of all armies according to the type of solid defense, gradually strengthening as troops arrive, with the full use of fortified areas and field fortifications, with their comprehensive development during the period of concentration. "It is clear that the cover plan was to be put into effect not as a result of enemy actions, but by order from Moscow. Naturally, the directive indicated that" the first flight and crossing the state border allowed only with the special permission of the High Command", and it was required to develop "a plan for the implementation of the first operation of the 13th and 4th armies and a plan for the defense of the 3rd and 10th armies"¹³⁸². As A.M. Vasilevsky testifies, "in a few weeks before the attack on us by fascist Germany ... all the documentation on the district operational plans was transferred by the General Staff to the command and headquarters of the respective districts "¹³⁸³. All this once again points to the inadmissibility of mixing cover plans with the operational plans of the border military districts, which are

Now only separate military planning documents in the LVO and KOVO 1940 are known. ¹³⁸⁴ On September 18, 1940, the General Staff prepared a plan for the war with Finland, which emphasized that "the General Staff of the Red Army does not have documentary data on the plan for the operational deployment of the Finnish army," but the possibility of active actions on her part in the first days of the war with the aim of capturing Vyborg and access to Lake Ladoga was not ruled out. Although the concentration of 49 divisions and 3 tank brigades of the Red Army intended for the war with Finland required from 35 to 45 days, the document did not provide for any countermeasures to possible enemy actions, except for a cover operation. And it's hard to imagine that Finland, fighting the USSR one on one, would decide to open hostilities. The general task of the Soviet troops was to: 1. firmly cover our borders during the period of concentration of troops; 2. "By a strike by the main forces of the Northwestern Front through Savonlinna to San Michel [Mikkeli] and through Lappeenranta to Heinola, bypassing the fortifications created in the Helsingfors direction, and by a simultaneous strike from Vyborg through Sippol to Helsingfors [Helsinki] to invade central Finland, defeat the main forces of the Finnish army here and take control of the central part of Finland. Combine this attack with an attack on Helsingfors from the side of the Hanko peninsula and with the actions of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Gulf of Finland; Uleaborg, in order to access the coast

the Gulf of Bothnia to cut off northern Finland and interrupt the direct communications of central Finland with Sweden and Norway; 4. By active actions in the north in the very first days of the war, deprive Finland of the port of Petsamo and close the Norwegian border for it in the Petsamo, Nautsi sector "1385. Finland, according to which the LVO

was transformed into the North-Western Front and the main tasks had "the defeat of the armed forces of Finland, the capture of its territory ... and access to the Gulf of Bothnia on the 45th day of the operation, for which: 1. During the period of concentration of troops, firmly cover Vyborg and Kexholm directions, under all circumstances, keep Vyborg behind you and prevent the enemy from reaching Lake Ladoga. 2. After concentrating troops, be ready on the 35th day of mobilization by special order to go on the general offensive, deliver the main blow in the general direction of Lappeenranta, Heinola, Hämeenlinna and auxiliary blows in the directions of Korniselkä, Kuopio and Savonlinna, Mikkeli, defeat the main forces of the Finnish army in the area of Mikkeli, Heinola, Hamina, on the 25th day of the operation, capture Helsingfors and reach the front of Kuopio, Jyväskylä, Hämeenlinna, Helsingfors. On the right, the Northern Front (Kandalaksha Headquarters) on the 40th day of mobilization goes on the offensive and on the 30th day of the operation takes possession of the Kemi region. concentration and deployment of the troops of the front", "cover", "performing the first operation" and other documents that together made up the plan "S.Z-20" 1386.

At the end of 1940, the chief of staff of the KOVO prepared a plan of military operations for the troops of the district in accordance with the general strategic plan. Naturally, the immediate strategic task of the troops of the Southwestern Front was "the defeat, in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Western Front, of the German armed forces in the areas of Lublin, Tomaszow, Kielce, Radom and Rzeszow, Jaslo, Krakow and exit on the 30th day of the operation to the front of the rivers Pilica, Petrokov, Oppeln, Neustadt, cutting off Germany from its southern allies. At the same time, firmly securing the state border with Hungary and Romania. The immediate task is, in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Western Front, to surround and destroy the enemy east of the Vistula River and on On the 10th day of the operation, reach the Vistula River and develop an offensive in the direction of Kielce, Petrokow and Krakow. Accordingly, the Western Front had the task of "strike the left-flank 4th Army in the direction of Drogichin, Sedlec, Demblin to assist the Southwestern Front in defeating the enemy's Lublin grouping and on the 15th day of the operation to reach the Vistula River. In the future, advance on Radom "1387.

The operation of the Southwestern Front was divided into three stages. The first stage was "defense at a fortified line along the state border line" with the task of "preventing the enemy from invading Soviet territory, and destroying the intruder and ensuring the concentration and deployment of front armies for the offensive," that is, a cover operation. The second stage was an offensive to carry out the immediate task of the front to a depth of 120-130 km. Moreover, it was envisaged "the start of the offensive in the morning of the 30th day of mobilization", and not "30 days after the enemy attack", as Yu.A. Gorkov, who quoted the above phrase in one of his works¹³⁸⁸. The third stage of the operation was "the completion of the immediate strategic task of the front" to a depth of 250 km, which took 20 days. In this case, the main blow was delivered by the forces of the 6th, 12th, 26th and Mechanized Cavalry Armies in the direction of Katowice, Krakow region. The remaining armies of the front provided this offensive from the Warsaw-Lodz front and along the borders of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, where a new front was to be created. "When the main enemy forces are defeated east of the Vistula River, the front proceeds to pursue the main forces in the general direction of the Katowice-Krakow region. Mobile formations are in the first echelon of the front. Rifle formations, reinforced

tanks and artillery, in turn, advance in the second echelons in readiness to repel counterattacks and break attempts at resistance. "The plan

outlined in detail the tasks of the armies of the front. So, the 5th army was supposed to "force the river. Bug, defeat the opposing enemy and by the end of the 3rd day go to the front - Michelsdorf, st. Zavaduvka, st. Wojslovice, capture Lublin with mobile units. In the future, advancing in the general direction through Lublin, on the 10th day, reach the river. Vistula". The 19th Army should "with the beginning of the offensive of the main forces of the front strike in the direction of Tomaszow, Zamostye. Using the success of the 5th and 6th armies, on the 12th day of the operation, reach the river. The Vistula in the Solets, Zavikhost sector. The troops of the 6th Army were ordered to "break through the enemy's front with a blow to Tarnograd, let the cavalry-mechanized army into the gap. By the end of the 3rd day of the operation, capture the northern exits from the Tanev forests in the Bilgorai region and the Yezhev region. With mobile units, capture the crossing at Sandomierz, on the 10th day of the operation, reach the river. Vistula". The 26th Army should "force the river. San and, striking on both flanks in the general direction of Rzeszow, by the end of the 3rd day of the operation, capture Rzeszow and the border of the river. Wiszoka, and capture the crossings over the Vistula and Dunajec with moving units. In the future, advancing through Radomysl, on the 10th day of the operation, reach the front of Shchutsin, Opatovets, Tarnow. "The 12th Army was supposed to" provide a strike group of the front from the south from Hungary and Slovakia, for which, inflicting the main blow in the direction Krosno, Jaslo, defeat the opposing enemy and on the 3rd day go to the Krosno area, and on the 10th day of the operation go to the Tarnow, Grybow front. "The 18th and 9th armies were given the task of covering the border with Hungary and Romania and being in readiness to respond to Romania's entry into the war. In particular, the 9th Army was supposed to "immediately attack through Tulcea on Medjidiv and Constanta to occupy northern

Dobruja and reach the border with Bulgaria, cutting off Romania from the sea" 1389. As we can see, the available documents are then they do not quite correspond to the version about the defensive preparations of the USSR Not being able to get acquainted with similar documents of 1941, one should refer to the available materials that show the direction of the training of the Red Army troops. for 1939-1940 testify that the troops as a whole represented their possible combat missions and forms of use in case of war. These documents show that the troops of the frontier districts practiced both front-line and army offensive operations, while the troops of the internal districts practiced only army operations. Training in defensive battles was carried out

mainly at the level of corps, divisions and their units¹³⁹⁰ For example, according to the order of the commander of the troops of the KOVO No. work out offensive, oncoming and defensive (with subsequent transition to the offensive) battles. The following activities were planned in the operational preparation of the army and district apparatus. February 9-12 was a district operational game (army) with the involvement of the command and headquarters of the 5th, 6th, 12th armies and the Cavalry Group, corps and the district apparatus. The game was held according to a special plan, so its theme is unknown from the document. February 25-29 - KOVO intra-staff game on the topic "The work of the front management during the period of concentration and deployment of front troops." The operational army game on the theme "Offensive operation of the army" was to be held in the 5th and 12th armies on March 2-5, and on March 7-10 - in the 6th army. On March 14-17, a game was planned in the Cavalry Group on the topic "The operation of the cavalry army in cooperation with rifle formations and aviation to disrupt the concentration and deployment of enemy troops in the initial period of the war." On March 21-22, an internal game of the headquarters of the KOVO on the topic "The work of the front department in preparing the organization and during the offensive operation of the front." A district operational (front) game was planned for April 7-11 with the involvement of the command and headquarters of the 5th, 6th, 12th armies and the Cavalry Group, corps and the district apparatus. At the headquarters of the armies, games were planned

topic "Rear in an offensive operation" - in the 5th and 12th armies on May 3-6, in the 6th - on May 8-11, in Kavgroup - May 14-17, 1941.

On May 23, 1940, a directive was issued in KOVO on operational training for summer period No. A-1/0067. The troops were offered "on field trips, staff exercises and during exercises with troops and during the maneuvers, work out in detail the following issues:

a) in the front-line - an offensive front-line operation with a breakthrough of a fortified lanes and forcing large river barriers. Operation planning and support.

b) in the army level - an offensive operation of the army, as a rule, with a breakthrough long-term fortified strip, with river forcing and overcoming strips barriers. c) in

corps and divisions: 1) control

of meeting combat; 2) offensive

battle with a breakthrough of a long-term fortified zone

crossing the river and overcoming the barriers;

3) defensive battle with the creation of fortifications, the construction of barrier lines and subsequent transition to the offensive. In the

13th sk, 96th and 192nd rifle divisions, everything should be worked

out in mountainous conditions. d) in

cavalry and tank troops: 1) oncoming combat against cavalry, tank troops and infantry (kk, kd, tbr, mmd, KMG); 2) actions on the flank in an offensive

operation; 3) entry into the breakthrough and actions in the

operational depth; 4) defense on a wide front with the creation of barriers and fortifications (kk, kd, mmd) and with subsequent transition to the offensive.

e) in 204 airborne brigade - parachute landing and landing of a large airborne assault and actions in the operational depth of the enemy with the aim of:

1) capturing enemy airfields and destroying his aircraft; 2) disorganization

of management, communications and rear and the production of sabotage; 3)

encirclement and destruction of the enemy in cooperation with mobile troops and aviation; 4)

capturing and holding bridges, crossings and important objects. In

working out these questions, pay special attention to troop command and control in mobile forms of combat, planning, organization and interaction of military branches, ground troops with aviation, communication and interaction with neighbors.

To teach and educate commanders and staffs to defeat the enemy piecemeal, by encirclement and destruction ...

In every possible way to instill surprise, secrecy, initiative and decisiveness of actions and massing of forces and means (artillery, tanks, aviation and material resources) on the main direction "1392. And

here is how in September 1940 the beginning of the war was played out in the 6th Army of the KOVO. "Western", having transferred the army to martial law, "preempt us in deployment, their offensive should be expected from the morning of September 12. "Vostochnye put into effect the plan cover and from the evening of September 10 they conduct "concentration and deployment, occupation starting position", since September 13, they have been reconnaissance of the enemy's cover strip by observation from the border line. On the morning of September 14, the 6th Army goes on the offensive and by the 16th September 17 destroys parts of the enemy's cover, creates conditions for entering a breakthrough Cavalry Army, in cooperation with it and the 5th (15th in the game) army defeats Tomashevskaya grouping of the enemy and goes to the line Zamostye - Belgoraj - Rzeszow - San River. In the period September 17-22, the troops develop success, destroy suitable reserves the enemy and go to the Vistula River, "having a strong barrier on the San River." After two days training troops must cross the Vistula, continuing the offensive to the west 1393. How we see again no action to repel the enemy offensive, which, on instructions to the game can begin 2 days before the strike of the 6th Army, is not practiced. Command

rather optimistically assessed the combat capability of their troops, who were to turn around for an offensive in 3 days and defeat the enemy grouping in 14-16 divisions in 9 days and reach the river. Wisla.

It is believed that, unlike the Wehrmacht, operational plans were not worked out in the Red Army during operational games. Unfortunately, most of the documents on the operational training of troops are not available for research. The available materials show that the operational-strategic games of January 1941 were not a single episode. So, on January 25, 1941, Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army K.A. Meretskov approved the "Plan for holding meetings of the highest commanding staff in districts and armies", according to which it was necessary to conduct a district front game on the topic "Offensive operation of the front" in the Western, Kiev, Baltic special, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Transcaucasian, Transbaikal, Moscow military districts and the Far Eastern Front ". During the training, it was planned to listen to two-hour reports on the topic "Modern front-line operation", "Artillery in the front-line operation", "Horse-mechanized army in the front-line operation", "Air force in the front-line operation", a military card game was also planned for 5 days. In the Odessa, Oryol, Volga, Urals, Siberian, North Caucasian, Central Asian, Moscow, Kharkov, Arkhangelsk, Transcaucasian, Leningrad military districts and in the armies of the border districts, it was planned to hold training camps to practice an army offensive operation. During the training camp, a four-hour report was planned on the topic "Modern Army Offensive Operation" and a military game on cards for 4 days. The command staff of the headquarters and departments of the districts and armies, corps, divisions of the ground forces and the Air Force, tank and motorized armored brigades, artillery regiments and commanders who graduated from the Academy of the General Staff¹³⁹⁴ should have been involved in these training camps.

From March 13 to March 20, 1941, the General Staff conducted field trips with the headquarters of the Leningrad, Ural and Oryol military districts on the theme "Offensive Operation in Winter". According to the order of the commander of KOVO No. A / 009 dated February 5, 1941, the commanders of the 5th, 6th, 26th and 12th armies, the commanders of individual corps were required to strengthen the operational training of the command staff, until July 1, 1941 to work out the offensive operation, until November 1 - defensive. In March-April, exercises of rifle corps on the topic "Offensive operation" were to be held. On May 7-10, a front-line offensive game was planned in Lvov under the leadership of the commander of the KOVO. On May 12-17 and May 25-30, command and staff exercises of armies and corps were planned to practice the offensive operation. In addition, a plan was approved for the preparation of army departments to manage an army defensive operation with a field defense device with a forefield and with a subsequent transition to a counteroffensive¹³⁹⁵.

On December 7, 1940, the commander of the LVO gave the order to prepare for the training and methodological gathering of the highest command personnel from January 13 to 18, 1941, during which it was required to work out exclusively offensive topics at the level of corps, divisions, tank brigades, and Air Force units. In March 1941, in the Leningrad Military District, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, General of the Army K.A. Meretskov held a multi-day operational game, which involved the command and headquarters of the district and armies. The existing assertion that this was a defensive game contradicts the above documents. In addition, the history of the district indicates that "field trips on the Karelian Isthmus and the Kola Peninsula were instructive, during which the nature of a modern offensive operation and combat in a wooded and swampy area on the scale of an army, corps and division was studied, and interaction with the Navy was worked out. Lectures were systematically delivered to the leadership, taking into account the experience of hostilities during World War II. Their topics were as follows: the nature of a modern offensive operation, the interaction of military branches, the actions of large groupings of mechanized troops, the organization and conduct of landing operations "¹³⁹⁶. The following fact from the memoirs of the former chief of staff of the 14th Army L.S. testifies to the mood of the district command staff. Skvir

At the beginning of 1941, he was summoned to Moscow to discuss the question of the participation of the USSR in the auction for Finnish nickel mines south of Petsamo. Having learned the purpose of the call, the author could not resist the question: "Why buy if we will soon, fighting Germany and its potential ally Finland,

return the mines without that?"¹³⁹⁷ In PribOVO in February 1941 in the 8th Army -staff exercise on the topic "Defensive operation of the front with subsequent transition to the offensive to destroy the enemy with equality in forces and means." In March, during the gathering of the command staff of the same army, "the issues of organizing a breakthrough for a fortified zone, introducing a mechanized corps into the breakthrough" were worked out. In April, a field trip took place on the topic "offensive army operation." Shortly before the start of the war, at staff exercises in the 8th Army, a "counterattack option in the Tilsit direction" was practiced.

According to the order of the General Staff of September 21, 1940 No. op / 103070 ss, for the period from October 10 to October 17, a front-line field trip to the ZapoVO was planned under the leadership of the People's Commissar of Defense, which was later postponed to October 15-22 due to the fact that the inspector of the demonstration the teachings of S.K. Tymoshenko did not have time to arrive on time. Of course, the materials of this trip are classified. But the history of the district says that in the course of exercises on maps and terrain, "the views developed by that time by Soviet military science on the nature of the offensive operation were tested and refined ... ZapoVO at the end of 1940. In this game, which was led by representatives of the General Staff, the administration of the district (in the role of the front administration), as well as the administration of all combined arms armies, took part"¹³⁹⁹. According to the testimony of the former chief of

staff of the 4th Army, L.M. Sandalov, "all the pre-war exercises, in their plans and execution, oriented the troops mainly to the implementation of a breakthrough for fortified positions." "Command-staff exercises and outings in the field during the entire winter period and spring of 1941 were carried out exclusively on offensive topics ... In March-April 1941, the headquarters of the 4th Army participated in the district operational game on maps in Minsk. A front-line offensive was being worked out operation from the territory of Western Belarus in the direction of Bialystok, Warsaw". In May 1941, already in the troops of the 4th Army, the offensive operations of the 28th Army Rifle Corps, together with the Pinsk military flotilla, were lost in the same direction. Participant of the March game, commander of the 3rd long-range bomber corps N.S. Skripko recalled that the corps "was entrusted with the deployment of an airborne corps in the interests of a front-line offensive operation," which was to be carried out in one flight. "According to the terms of the game, we did not solve bombing missions either, and cover for the landing was provided by seizing air supremacy"¹⁴⁰⁰. On July

17, 1941, in the context of the proceedings on the fact of the defeat of the troops of the Western Front at the beginning of the war, a member of the Military Council of the ZAPOVO, Corps Commissar A. Fominykh, prepared a memorandum addressed to the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Army Commissar 1st Rank L.Z. Mekhlis, in which he sought to whitewash the work of the Military Council of the district in the prewar period, pointing out the mistakes made by the General Staff. At the same time, the document makes it possible to obtain information about the focus of operational training on the eve of the war. Moreover, the author compares the preparation and the actual events. As Fominykh testifies, "tasks were always given to work out options for an offensive operation with a clear discrepancy between real forces. But from somewhere additional forces appeared and, in my opinion, an artificial advantage was created in our favor. Now, when analyzing the events that have taken place, it became clear that individual employees of the General headquarters, knowing that in the first period of the war, superiority in real forces was on the side of Germany, for some reason carried out and developed mainly offensive operations, and only recently (at the end of May 1941) did they conduct one game to cover the border, while it was necessary

develop defensive operations as well "1401. It is symptomatic that the author distinguishes covering operations and defensive actions of troops.

M.V. Zakharov points out that at the staff exercises in the OdVO at the beginning of 1941, the opportunity to "conduct active operations in the Foksha-Bucharest direction"1402.

The military planning documents cited above provide a fairly complete idea of the development of the views of the Soviet leadership on the method of entry the Soviet Union at war with Germany; that the Soviet side was not going to give the enemy the initiative to start hostilities. In addition, you should not forget that all these plans did not remain on paper, as the pace gradually picked up preparation process for their implementation. This can be seen especially clearly in an example of a document dated May 15, 1941, which the Red Army was supposed to guide at the start of the war. After outlining the general tasks of the fronts, it says the following: "In order to ensure the fulfillment of the above intention, it is necessary to carry out the following measures in advance, without which it is "impossible inflicting a sudden blow on the enemy (emphasized by me. - M.M.) both from the air and on the ground:

1. to carry out covert mobilization of troops under the guise of reserve training camps; 2. under the guise of an exit to the camps, make a hidden concentration of troops closer to western border, in the first place to concentrate all the armies of the reserve of the Main command;

3. covertly concentrate aviation on field airfields from remote districts and now begin to deploy aviation rear; 4. gradually, under the guise of training camps and rear exercises, deploy rear and hospital base". The military leadership asked "to allow consistent covert mobilization and covert concentration in the first place of all reserve armies High Command and Aviation "1403. All the

proposed measures began to be implemented immediately. Under paragraph

1. On March 8, 1941, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was approved, according to which was supposed to make a covert mobilization of 903.8 thousand people. military reserve under the guise of "large training camps." The implementation of these measures in the end of May - the beginning of June 1941 made it possible to call up 805.2 thousand people (24% of assigned personnel according to the mobilization plan). This made it possible to reinforce 99 rifle divisions in the main western border districts: 21 divisions were brought to 14 thousand people. Human; 72 divisions - up to 12 thousand people and 6 divisions - up to 11 thousand people with a military staff time in 14,483 people. At the same time, the personnel of the unit and formations of other branches of the military, and the troops received 26,620 horses1404.

According to paragraph 2. In the period from May 13 to May 22, 1941, the advance to the western the border of the formations of four armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and is preparing to advance another three armies (20th, 24th and 28th), which were to complete their concentration by July 10th. These armies, uniting 77 divisions, constituted the second strategic echelon. "This redeployment from the inner districts, in fact, was the beginning of a strategic concentration of Soviet troops in the theaters of operations. The promotion was made with observance of the strictest measures of disguise, with great care, gradually, without increase in the usual schedule of railways "1405. June 12-16, 1941

The General Staff ordered the headquarters of the western districts to begin under the guise of exercises and changes deployment of summer camps covert advancement of troops of the second echelon of covering armies and reserves of the western border military districts (total 114 divisions), which should were to occupy by July 1 areas of concentration 20-80 km from the border. This, by the way, refutes widespread assertions that "all preparations for war on the ground suppressed from above "1406.

Under paragraph 3. Information about the concentration of aviation is very scarce. Nevertheless, it is known that that on May 1, 1941 in the western military districts there were 57 fighter, 48

bomber, 7 reconnaissance and 5 assault aviation regiments, in which there were 6,980 aircraft. By June 1, 2 more attack air regiments arrived and the number of aircraft increased to 7,009, and by June 22 in the western districts there were 64 fighter, 50 bomber, 7 reconnaissance and 9 attack air regiments, in which there were 7133 aircraft. In addition, by June 22, 1941, the Western theater had four long-range bomber corps and one long-range bomber division, in which there were 1,339 aircraft. On April 10, 1941, by decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a transition began to a new system of aviation rear services, autonomous from combat units of the Air Force. This system provided freedom of maneuver for combat units, freed them from redeploying their rear behind them, and maintained constant readiness to receive aircraft and ensure their combat activities. The transition to this system was to be completed by July 1, 1941.¹⁴⁰⁷

On point 4. Until June 22, no data was published on the deployment of rear and hospital units. On the eve of the war, the rear units were kept in reduced staffing and were to be deployed: army units - on the 5th-7th day, front-line units - on the 15th day of mobilization. It is known that 41% of the stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army were located in the western districts, many of them were located within a 200-kilometer radius. Significant strip¹⁴⁰⁸ A.G. Khorkov, reserves were accumulated in these warehouses. As a border "district warehouses, having a design capacity of 91,205 wagons, were loaded with 93,415 wagons. In addition, 14,400 wagons of ammunition and 4,370 wagons of materiel and weapons were stored in the districts in the open air"¹⁴⁰⁹. In June 1941, the General Staff proposed to transfer more than 100,000 tons of fuel to the western districts. According to the directive of the General Staff No. 560944 of June 1, 1941, all border districts had to submit an application by July 10 "for the required amount of food and fodder ... in All this, according war time" ¹⁴¹¹. preparation "to ensure to G.P. Pastukhovsky, was the 1st month of the deep offensive operations"¹⁴¹². As noted in a study of the state of the rear of the Red Army, "with the depth of the front offensive operation of 250 km, the rate of advance of 15 km per day and the timely restoration of the railways, there were every opportunity to ensure the first operation with stocks created in peacetime in the army rear"¹⁴¹³.

Of course, the main process that makes it possible to speak of the completion of preparations for the implementation of the plan of May 15, 1941, is the strategic concentration and deployment of the Red Army. As you know, "the last six months before the start of the war were already directly connected with the covert strategic deployment of troops, which was supposed to constitute the final stage of preparation" for war¹⁴¹⁴ But it was from April 1941 that a full-scale process of focusing on the future theater of operations of 247 divisions allocated for the war with Germany began, which accounted for 81.5% of the available forces of the Red Army, which after mobilization would have numbered over 6 million people, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 15 thousand tanks and up to 12 thousand aircraft. Strategic deployment was driven by "the desire to pre-empt one's opponents in deploying armed forces to deliver the first strikes with larger forces and seize the strategic initiative from the very beginning of hostilities" ¹⁴¹⁵. It is clear that these measures were carried out in the strictest secrecy and an all-encompassing disinformation campaign against the German leadership, which, in particular, was inspired that the main efforts of the Soviet troops in the event of war would be directed to East Prussia¹⁴¹⁶.

Since the strategic concentration and deployment of troops is the final stage of preparation for war, the question of determining the possible time frame for a Soviet attack on Germany is of particular interest. In Russian historiography, this topic began to be discussed with the publication of the infamous work by V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", which names the "exact" date of the planned Soviet attack on Germany - July 6, 1941, which is in fact unjustified. The author's motivation boils down mainly to the fact that July 6, 1941 was Sunday, and Stalin and

Zhukov allegedly liked to attack on Sunday¹⁴¹⁷. But it can hardly be taken seriously. The author's assumptions are not supported by the quotation from the book "The Initial Period of the War", the meaning of which is distorted by him. This book says that "the Nazi command (and not the" German troops ", like Suvorov. - M.M.) literally in the last two weeks before the war (that is, from June 8 to June 22, and not "for two weeks", as in the "Icebreaker". - M.M.) managed to preempt our troops in completing the deployment and thereby create favorable conditions for seizing the strategic initiative at the beginning of the war "¹⁴¹⁸ Moreover, this quote by Suvorov is given twice: once correctly, and the second is distorted¹⁴¹⁹

As noted above, the attack on Germany was originally planned for June 12, 1941. Apparently, it was no coincidence that the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. time", demanded "by May 1, 1941, to supply the troops with medallions and leaflets according to the wartime states"¹⁴²⁰. However, as is known, on June 12, no hostile actions were taken against Germany by the USSR. It is not possible to unequivocally answer the question about the reasons for the postponement of this period due to the state of the source base. We can only make some assumptions about this. "I don't remember all the motives for canceling such a decision," Molotov recalled 40 years later. "But it seems to me that the flight to England of Hitler's deputy for the party, Rudolf Hess, played the main role here. to take part in a military campaign against the USSR ... If at that time (highlighted by me. - M.M.) we ourselves unleashed a war against Germany, moving our troops to Europe, then England would immediately enter into an alliance with Germany. .. And not only England. We could find ourselves face to face in the face of the entire capitalist world ... " ¹⁴²¹ Fearing a possible end to the Anglo-German war, the Kremlin considered it necessary to postpone the attack on Germany. Only after receiving information about the failure of the Hess mission and making sure that the Anglo-German military operations in the Eastern Mediterranean would continue, in Moscow, apparently, they decided not to postpone the implementation of their plans any

longer. As already noted, on May 24, 1941, a top secret meeting of the military-political leadership was held in Stalin's office in the Kremlin, at which, probably, the issue of a new deadline for completing military preparations was decided. Unfortunately, in such a serious matter, we are forced to confine ourselves to this working hypothesis, which has yet to be confirmed or refuted on the basis of drawing on new, as yet inaccessible documents.

Was there an exact date planned at all? Only a comprehensive study of documents reflecting both the process of military planning and the conduct of measures to prepare for an offensive will make it possible to give a final answer to this question. At the same time, the dates of these events known to historians do not exclude the possibility that such a date was nevertheless determined. According to V.N. Kiseleva, V.D. Danilov and P.N. Bobylev, the offensive of the Red Army was possible in July 1941. ¹⁴²² The available documents reflecting the process of preparing the Red Army for war indicate that most of the measures to increase the combat readiness of the troops of the western border districts were to be completed by July 1, 1941. To this the day it was planned to complete the formation of all units deployed in these districts; arm the tank regiments of the mechanized corps, which lacked tanks, with anti-tank artillery; complete the transition to a new organization of aviation logistics, autonomous from combat units; to concentrate troops of the districts in the border areas; camouflage airfields and military equipment.

At the same time, the concentration and deployment of the second strategic echelon of the Red Army was being completed. Thus, the troops of the 21st Army completed their concentration by July 2, the 22nd Army - by July 3, the 20th Army - by July 5, the 19th Army - by July 7, the 16th, 24th and 28th th Army - by July 10. Based on the fact that "the enemy preempted the Soviet troops in deploying

for about 25 days", the full concentration and deployment of the Red Army in the Western theater of operations was to be completed by July 15, 1941. By July 5, the organization of false airfields in the 500-kilometer border strip should have been completed. By July 15, it was planned to complete the construction of air defense facilities in Kiev and the camouflage of warehouses, workshops and other military facilities in the border zone, as well as to put all available weapons into the built structures of fortified areas on the new border. At the same time, the clarification of the question of the planned date of the Soviet attack on Germany requires further research with the involvement of new documentary material. Thus, the documents of Soviet military planning of 1940-1941 available to historians make it possible to critically treat the traditional official version of the defensive

intentions of the Soviet guides. These materials testify that the Soviet military-political leadership was engaged in the preparation of mainly offensive military operations against Germany and its allies. For a year and a half, the Soviet General Staff carefully and comprehensively developed plans for an attack on Germany. The Soviet military leadership did not have information about the real military plans of Germany, although the configuration of the Soviet-German border made it possible to make fairly accurate assumptions about the directions of possible Wehrmacht strikes. However, as the above documents show, no measures were prepared to repel these strikes, many of which were actually planned and carried out by the German command during the war. Now military historians are forced to admit that "measures to repel the first enemy strikes in the operational plans were not fully developed by the General Staff, and the content of defensive actions on an operational-strategic scale was not worked out"¹⁴²⁴. The lack of connection between a possible enemy strike and the actions of the Red Army refutes the version about the supposedly retaliatory nature of the offensive actions of the Soviet troops, the development of which was devoted to military plans.

The main idea of Soviet military planning was that the Red Army, under the cover of troops deployed on the border of the western border districts, would complete the concentration of forces intended for war on the theater of operations and go over to a sudden decisive offensive, delivering the main blow to southern Poland. For six months, the Soviet General Staff was engaged in resolving the issue of the most advantageous direction for concentrating the main efforts of troops in the war with Germany, since Soviet military science paid exceptionally great attention "to the correct choice of the direction of the main attack, in determining which it was recommended to take into account the factors of political, economic, military and geographical order. It was required to concentrate the bulk of the Armed Forces on the direction of the main attack in order to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy. It was believed that the outcome of the armed struggle to a large extent depends on the correct choice of the direction of the main attack "¹⁴²⁵. As a result, it was concluded that the offensive in the South-Western direction would solve several key strategic tasks and ensure the most effective actions of the Red Army. The first half of 1941 was devoted to the careful development of this strike. Appropriate training was also carried out at the level of military districts.

As the materials cited above show, the troops purposefully practiced offensive plans and learned how to conduct maneuver offensive operations. Unfortunately, the operational plans of the districts are still inaccessible to researchers, which does not allow recreating the operational plan of the Soviet military leadership in all details. In any case, as rightly noted by B.N. Petrov, "attention is drawn to the fact that in the General Staff efforts were directed to the development of only one option for the actions of our troops, namely the offensive one. As for the other defensive version of the plan, the development of its question is not even

was set. Developed before the war "Plan of defense of the state border in 1941" was not a defensive version of the war plan, it was a cover plan for the mobilization and deployment of the armed forces "1426

The main attention of researchers was attracted by a document dated May 15, 1941, in which the Soviet offensive plan was rather frankly stated. Naturally, supporters of the official version did everything to prove that this plan was not approved by the political leadership of the USSR, but was only a working document of the General Staff. However, this point of view was refuted, and now one should proceed from the fact that this particular document was the final operational plan of the Soviet General Staff, the Red Army was preparing for its implementation in May - June 1941, when the preparation of the Soviet attack on Germany entered the final stage. Just like Germany, the Soviet side, based on the content of its plans, sought to achieve the immediate strategic goals of the war in a short time by attacking strike groups deployed by a certain date. This should have been the main content of the initial period of the war "1427 The available materials allow us to state an assumption about the sequence

of the final preparations of the Soviet troops for war. Most likely, on July 1, 1941, the troops of the western districts would have received an order to put into effect cover plans, covert mobilization would have begun in the country, and the completion by July 15 of the deployment of the planned Red Army grouping in the Western theater of operations would have allowed the USSR to begin at any time after this date fighting against Germany. The impossibility of completely keeping Soviet military preparations secret did not allow for a long delay in striking Germany, otherwise the German side would have learned about them. Therefore, the completion of the concentration and deployment of the Red Army on the western border of the USSR should have served as a signal for an immediate attack on Germany. Only in this case would it be possible to keep these preparations secret and take the enemy by surprise.

Assessment by the Soviet leadership of the events of the Second World War in 1939-1941.

To study the problems of the prehistory of the Great Patriotic War, the question of how the Soviet leadership assessed the events of World War II in 1939-1941 is important, without solving which it is impossible to understand the policy of the USSR of this period. Unfortunately, documentary sources that would give a direct answer to this question are extremely few in number, but the information we are interested in can be gleaned from Soviet propaganda materials, which were prepared under the control of I.V. Stalin and his inner circle. Since the initiative to determine the "general line" in propaganda came from "above", minimizing the self-activity of middle-level functionaries, these materials give a fairly accurate picture of the mood in the Kremlin, albeit indirectly. Since any propaganda is carried out with the aim of preparing public opinion for certain events, the content of Soviet propaganda in conjunction with other materials reflecting the views of the Soviet leadership on the international situation at the turn of the 1930-1940s. and the national-state interests of the USSR in this situation, allows us to speak quite confidently about what exactly Moscow was preparing for. In domestic historiography, the opinion inspired by Soviet

propaganda prevails that the Soviet leadership in its policy was guided exclusively by ideological dogmas. It is no coincidence that in recent years the issue of Stalin's adherence to the idea of "world revolution" has been debated in the literature. So, M. Nikolaev and V.E. Molodyakov believe that Stalin was not guided by this idea, citing the opinion of L.D. Trotsky on Stalin's fear of war and revolution. An even more original version was put forward by A.D. Orlov, who claims to be Stalin. YES. Volkogonov, on the contrary, believes that he was guided by the ideas of pan-Slavism¹⁴²⁹

the strategic goal of the Soviet leadership was the "world proletarian revolution", and Stalin's thinking was Comintern¹⁴³⁰. The same opinion is shared by Yu.N. Afanasiev, believing that the Soviet leadership saw the goal of the war in planting "communism" in Europe¹⁴³¹.

Unfortunately, the debating parties ignored the question of what a "world revolution" is and why exactly this idea dominated Soviet propaganda in the 1920s-1940s. As is known, the idea of "world revolution" was an important part of the Marxist concept of the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism in the most developed countries and was formed in the second half of the 19th century. At the beginning of the XX century. The ideological evolution of European social democracy led to the formulation of a concept that considered the most important goal to be the emergence of a socialist revolution in Germany, which was seen as the most developed European country with the largest social democratic party. The prospects for a revolution in Russia, due to its backwardness, without the support of Europe, were considered too illusory, but if it did happen, then the only guarantee of retaining revolutionary power in Russia was only a revolution in Germany. However, after October 1917, the Russian Social Democrats (Bolsheviks) were faced with a choice. Either it was necessary, in spite of everything, to promote the revolution in Germany, which in case of failure could lead to the loss of power in Russia, or it was necessary to first retain power in Russia, but then it was necessary to maneuver between the countries leading the First World War. After certain internal party discussions, V.I. Lenin made a choice in favor of the second option¹⁴³².

True, the idea of a "world revolution" in Europe was not discarded, and in 1919-1923. it has been tried more than once with the help of the Comintern. However, these attempts failed, and as early as 1920 a new transformation of the idea of "world revolution" began. On September 22, 1920, at the IX Party Conference of the RCP(b), Lenin, after reviewing the current international situation, stated that the Versailles Treaty remained the main enemy and "our basic policy remained the same. We take every opportunity to move from defense to offensive. We have already torn Treaty of Versailles and we will break it at the first opportunity." Of course, in the current international situation, "we will have to confine ourselves to a defensive position in relation to the Entente, but, despite the complete failure of the first case, our first defeat (in Poland. - M.M.), we will again and again move from a defensive policy to offensive until we have completely crushed them all." Considering the Russian revolution from the point of view of the international communist movement, Lenin declared that "... we are really moving on an international scale from a semi-revolution, from an unsuccessful sortie to the fact that there was no miscalculation, and we will learn from this offensive war"¹⁴³³ Three years later month, December 23,

1920, at the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Lenin, condemning the speeches of the delegates with the idea that "we must wage only a defensive war," declared that if, in the conditions of a hostile imperialist encirclement, the Soviet leadership would have to "give a vow that we will never embark on certain actions that may turn out to be offensive in military-strategic terms, then we would be not only fools, but also criminals. Thus, the foundation was laid for the formation of the idea of a long-term coexistence of "capitalism" and "socialism" and the concept of building "socialism in one country", which will become the basis for the future "world revolution". On January 26, 1924, at the first meeting of the II All-Union Congress of Soviets, dedicated to the memory of Lenin,

Stalin's famous oath was pronounced, in which the ideas of "world revolution" and "socialism in one country" were combined. "Departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed us to strengthen and expand the Union of Republics. We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will fulfill this commandment of yours with honor!" - said the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The Union of the SSR "has deep sympathy and unshakable support in the hearts of the workers and peasants of the whole world," as it gives them "the basis of their hopes for deliverance from oppression and exploi

a sure beacon showing them the path of liberation." But "Lenin never looked at the Republic of Soviets as an end in itself. He always regarded it as a necessary link for strengthening the revolutionary movement in the countries of the West and the East, as a necessary link for facilitating the victory of the working people of the whole world over capital. Lenin knew that only such an understanding was correct not only from the international point of view, but also from the point of view of the preservation of the Republic of Soviets itself. Lenin knew that this was the only way to inflame the hearts of the working people of the whole world for decisive battles for liberation... Departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us loyalty to the principles of the Communist International. We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will not spare our lives in order to strengthen and expand the alliance of the working people of the whole world -

the Communist International! as long as the capitalist encirclement exists. On January 19, 1925, speaking at a plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin, having concluded that a new war was inevitable in the future, which this cannot but raise before us the question of our interference in these affairs." However, although the revolutionary movement in the West is strong and can lead to revolution in some countries, "but they will hardly be able to hold on without our help." In the event of the outbreak of war and growth of the revolutionary movement "our intervention, I will not say necessarily active, I will not say necessarily direct, it may turn out to be absolutely necessary. This is precisely the hope that victory could be won for us in the present situation. This does not mean that we must necessarily go to active action against someone. "However," if the war starts, we will, of course, be the last, the very last, in order to throw a weight on a scale, a weight that could outweigh "1436. But first it was necessary to create a powerful military-economic base, which would become a reliable foundation for the war with the "capitalist encirclement". Therefore, speaking with the Central

Committee's report at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) on December 3, 1927, Stalin, analyzing the international situation, concluded that the threat of war was growing and set the task - "to take into account the contradictions in the camp of the imperialists, delay the war," buying off "from the capitalists, and take all measures to preserve peaceful relations. We cannot forget Lenin's words to the effect that very much in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying the war with the capitalist world, which is inevitable, but which can be delayed either until the proletarian revolution matures in Europe, or until the moment when colonial revolutions are fully ripe, or, finally, until the moment when the capitalists quarrel among themselves over the division of the colonies.

The fulfillment of this task required further maneuvering between the great powers in order to prevent their possible consolidation on an anti-Soviet basis and use their technical capabilities to modernize the Soviet economy. The active anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda of the new national socialist government of Germany and the fear that Berlin would continue to move closer to Western countries demanded that the tactics of Soviet diplomacy be clarified, and in December 1933 Moscow supported the French idea of collective security in Europe. Both then and now, many perceive this step of the USSR as a desire for rapprochement with the West against Germany. However, it was still the same maneuvering policy applied in the new conditions. Already on January 26, 1934, in the Report to the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin explained that "we did not have an orientation towards Germany, just as we do not have an orientation towards Poland and France. We were guided in the past and are guided in the present by the USSR and only on the USSR. And if the interests of the USSR require rapprochement with certain countries that are not interested in breaking the peace, we go for this business without hesitation, "because we are interested in expanding business ties to develop the economic base, because "in our time with weak not accepted to be considered, are considered strong "1438

Now some authors believe that in 1921-1924. the Soviet leadership abandoned its revolutionary intentions in the international arena, and by the beginning of the 1930s. Stalin "now began to stubbornly strive to improve relations with the closest neighbors and the countries of the West, relegating revolutionary activity to the background"¹⁴³⁹. For some reason, in this case, the researchers forgot the well-known truth that real politics and the propaganda that supports it are far from the same thing, and began to take any official statements by Moscow seriously, not wanting to take an unbiased look at its real actions. Having staked on the accelerated military and economic development of the USSR, the Soviet leadership was forced to establish economic ties with Western countries, which, of course, required a certain disguise of their intentions. Under these conditions, the decline in "revolutionary activity" was associated only with diplomatic tactics, and not with the Soviet leadership's rejection of the idea of "world revolution." In this regard, it is difficult to disagree with the opinion of A.N. and L.A. Mertsalovs, who believe that Stalin's thinking eventually became the usual imperial one, no matter what it was covered with¹⁴⁴⁰.

In this case, the ideological dogma of the "world revolution" turned out to be closely connected with the national-state interests of the Soviet Union, whose leadership faced the following choice. Either Moscow had to accept its secondary status as a regional power on the world stage with the prospect of further weakening of Soviet influence, or the USSR had to join the fight to return to the "great powers" club. Having opted for the second alternative, the Soviet leadership followed the path of any country that aspired to become a "great power", which can be achieved only by subjugating some part of the world, and used the idea of "world revolution" to substantiate these claims. Naturally, as everywhere and always, propaganda spoke of global tasks. And in this case, the idea of "world revolution" is on a par with such ideas as, for example, "protection of culture from barbarians" in Ancient Rome, "freedom, equality and fraternity" at the turn of the 18th - 19th centuries. in France, "the burden of the white man" in the era of the colonial expansion of European countries, "open doors" in the United States of the late XIX - early XX centuries, "struggle for living space" in Germany and the "creation of Great East Asia" in Japan 1930-1940- x years. or the "struggle for democracy" in today's US.

In addition, it is important to note that the idea of "world revolution" was transformed from a hope for an abstract revolution into a slogan of expanding the boundaries of socialism, that is, expanding the influence of the USSR on the world stage. The task of returning to the club of great powers is the most difficult of all the international tasks of any state, since it requires it to be stronger than those who will be the object of capture, and their potential allies. As a rule, this is impossible due to limited resources, therefore, in such a situation, diplomacy is actively used in order to divide potential adversaries, and even better, help them enter into open conflict with each other. As has already been shown, it was precisely this task that Soviet diplomacy solved in the 1920s and 1930s. And in this case, the idea of "world revolution" was supplemented by the idea of struggle for "socialism - the bright future of all mankind." This important propagandistic addition was necessary for the moral justification of any actions of the USSR on the world stage and fit perfectly into the characteristic, especially for the 20th century, desire to hide real politics behind a fine moral screen. Therefore, any arguments about the Soviet leadership's rejection of the idea of a "world revolution" are based on an elementary misunderstanding of the laws governing the development of international relations. Now, if Soviet foreign policy during the 1920-1940s. in terms of its activity would be at the level of any Norway or Argentina, then it would be possible to state the refusal of the Soviet leadership to fight for the status of a "great power", but everything was just the opposite. Soviet propaganda widely popularized

the main goal of Soviet foreign policy - the struggle for socialism throughout the world. After analyzing the literature on "defense topics" of the 1930s, N.Yu. Kuleshova comes to the conclusion that "to the main question, to what

The Stalinist leadership was preparing for the war, it gave a clear answer: to a revolutionary class, like a civil one, on a worldwide scale", which "ultimately aimed at a radical change in the socio-political system that dominates [the enemy]. Namely, this was the main goal of the foreign policy aspirations of the Soviet country, shown in literary works. [...] Accordingly, the defense of socialism, along with a narrow one, received a broader interpretation - as a willingness not only to guard one's own borders, but also to fight for the destruction of capitalism throughout the globe. "In addition, it is important to note that such works had a wide public resonance, enthusiastically met by readers and spectators of performances and films, which, of course, reflects public sentiment in the USSR¹⁴⁴¹

Like the leadership of other great powers, the Soviet leadership was active in the international arena and sought to achieve its own goals, considering the Second World War as a unique chance for the implementation of the ideas of "world revolution". Moreover, now the USSR had a powerful autarchic economy, a developed military-industrial complex and a well-armed Red Army. It is no coincidence that on October 1, 1938, at a meeting of Moscow and Leningrad propagandists, Stalin explained that "there are cases when the Bolsheviks themselves will attack, if the war is just, if the situation is suitable, if the conditions are favorable, they themselves will begin to attack. They are not at all against the offensive, not against any war. The fact that we shout about defense is a veil, a veil. Everything The following states are masked perfectly in this explanation"¹⁴⁴². statement in November 17, 1938: "The moment the editorial of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper dated the Nazis dare to touch us, the Red Army will cross the border of the enemy country ... Our defense is an offensive. The Red Army will not remain on the frontiers for a single hour ", she will not stagnate, but will rush like a steel avalanche into the territory of the warmongers. From the moment when the aggressor tries to violate our borders, the borders of his country will cease to exist for us"¹⁴⁴³. In the conditions of the political crisis of 1939, Moscow maneuvered between the Anglo-French allies and Germany, trying to achieve the most

favorable agreement for itself¹⁴⁴⁴ According to the memoirs of N.S. Khrushchev, who led the actions of Soviet diplomacy from behind the scenes, in the summer of 1939, Stalin frankly stated that "there is a game going on, who will outwit and deceive whom", knowing full well that "Hitler wants to deceive us, just outwit us. But he believed that it was us , USSR, outwitted Hitler by signing the treaty "¹⁴⁴⁵. Interesting assessments of the events of 1939-1941. are contained in the diary of the writer V.V. Vishnevsky, although not involved in the development of the most important military-political decisions, but nevertheless, by virtue of his official duties and political functions, he was well aware of the moods "at the top", who had the opportunity to receive reliable, wide and varied information about the activities of the Soviet leadership, about the preparation to war.

Assessing the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the writer writes in his diary on September 1, 1939: "The USSR won free hands, time ... Now we are taking the initiative, we are not retreating, but advancing. Diplomacy with Berlin is clear: they want our neutrality and then reprisals against the USSR; we want them to be bogged down in the war and then reprisals against them. Conveying widespread sentiments: "We will beat Hitler in a year," Vishnevsky notes that "this is the most likely option ... For the USSR, the time has come for external world actions ... It is difficult to guess how the game will turn out. But one thing is clear: the world will again redrawn. In this war, we will try to maintain our winning positions to the end. Attract a number of countries to us. Gradually, sometimes by kindness, sometimes by force. This is a new chapter in the history of the party and the country. The USSR began an active world foreign policy "¹⁴⁴⁶.

On September 1, Germany attacked Poland, and on September 3, England and France declared war on Germany. Assessing the outbreak of war in Europe, Stalin, in a conversation with the leadership of the Comintern on September 7, 1939, stated that "the war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (poor and rich in terms of colonies, raw materials, etc.) for the redistribution

peace, for dominion over the world! We don't mind if they fight well and weaken each other. Not bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) is shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler, without realizing it and not wanting it, upsets and undermines the capitalist system... We can maneuver, push one side against the other, so that we can better tear ourselves apart. The non-aggression pact helps Germany to some extent. The next moment is to push the other side. "1447 This Stalinist statement did not remain a secret, and on November 10, 1939, the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, army commissar of the 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis, at a meeting with writers, stated that "Germany is doing a generally useful thing, shattering the British empire. Its destruction will lead to the general collapse of capitalism - this is clear"1448 .

Similar ideas were expressed in a conversation between the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania V. Kreve-Mickevicius on the night of July 3, 1940 in Moscow. "Now," Molotov said to his interlocutor, "we are more convinced than ever that the brilliant Lenin was not mistaken in assuring us that the Second World War would allow us to seize power in all of Europe, just as the First World War allowed us to seize power in Russia. Today we support Germany, but just enough to keep her from accepting peace proposals until the starving masses of the warring nations give up their illusions and rise up against their leaders. In order to put down the insurgent proletariat with our combined efforts, but at that moment we will come to its aid, we will come with fresh forces, well prepared, and on the territory of Western Europe ... a decisive battle will take place between the proletariat and the decaying bourgeoisie, which will forever decide the fate of Europe" 1449.

On February 10, 1941, this idea, in a slightly different formulation, also found its way into Vishnevsky's diary: "We use the old divide and rule method. We are out of the war, we pay something for this, we get a lot. We conduct trade relations with various countries, use them. We are acquiring something useful for both the army and the navy, etc. We are helping Germany to wage war, feeding it in "portions", at a minimum. Then - we act as a super-arbitrator, "broker", etc. "1450 .

It is clear that such ideas were not advertised by the Soviet leadership, on the contrary, everything was done to convince public opinion both in the country and abroad that the USSR was taking a neutral position in the outbreak of war in Europe. Therefore, in the fall of 1939, characteristic of Soviet propaganda in the second half of the 30s. anti-fascist campaign was curtailed. In the media, the topic of improving Soviet-German relations began to be pedaled, but regardless of the official glorifications about "friendship" with Germany, public opinion was dominated by the belief that everything was done for tactical reasons. This was facilitated by the fact that, at the same time, Soviet propaganda, in order to explain the non-aggression pact, had to interpret it as a kind of respite, similar to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, referring to, as is now known¹⁴⁵¹, the mythical threat of a Soviet-German war in the summer of 1939, which England and France tried to provoke . In this situation, in order "to delay the war with Germany and use the time to further strengthen the economic, and especially the military might of the USSR", the Soviet government concluded an agreement with Germany, putting England and France "in front of a war with the enemy that was being prepared against us "1452 In Soviet propaganda 1939-1940. a large place was occupied by ensuring the foreign policy.

actions of the USSR in Eastern Europe. In this case, the slogans of "liberation" and "expansion of the front of socialism", which were closely interconnected, were widely used. So, on September 9, 1940, during a meeting in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin declared that "we are expanding the front of socialist construction, this is favorable for

humanity, because Lithuanians, Western Belarusians, Bessarabians consider themselves happy, whom we delivered from the oppression of landlords, capitalists, policemen and any a capacious - other. That is, it was about liberation from the oppression of capitalism. Such bastard "1453 formula allowed Soviet propaganda to adapt to any international situation and give explanations for any actions of the USSR. At the same time, the war with Finland showed that such abstract slogans were not enough to influence Soviet soldiers, and the traditional slogan "protecting the north Western borders and Leningrad". As a result, it was the slogan "protecting the borders and interests of the USSR" that became the basis of Soviet propaganda, and the slogans of "liberation" and "expanding the front of socialism" provided additional justification for the actions of the Soviet leadership on the world stage.

These foreign policy actions were perceived in the Kremlin in a certain ideological context. Thus, on January 21, 1940, Stalin declared: "The world revolution as a single act is nonsense. It takes place at different times in different countries. The actions of the Red Army are also the cause of the world revolution"¹⁴⁵⁴. Naturally, the Soviet leadership was well aware that the annexation of new territories was possible only during a European war. So, speaking on April 17, 1940 at a meeting of the commanding staff of the Red Army under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the experience of the war in Finland, Stalin stated that the duration of this war depended "on the international situation. There, in the west, the three largest powers clung to each other in the throat, when will the issue of Leningrad be decided, if not under such conditions, when our hands are busy and we have a favorable situation in order to hit them at that moment. It would be great stupidity, political myopia to miss the moment and not try as soon as there is a war in the west, to raise and resolve the issue of the security

of Leningrad"¹⁴⁵⁵. Speaking on November 20, 1940 at the joint plenum of the Leningrad City Committee and the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, A.A. Zhdanov said that "now both sides are trying to use us as the biggest ace." Further, comparing Germany with a woodcutter, and the USSR with a bear, he stated that "while the woodcutter breaks trees, we walk through the forest and demand foam payment", since "the policy of the socialist state is to expand at any time, when it is presented possible, the position of socialism. We proceeded from this policy over the past year, it gave ... the expansion of the socialist territories of the Soviet Union. This will be our policy in the future, and here it is clear to you which line things should go on "¹⁴⁵⁶.

Since the spring of 1940, voices about the need to modernize military propaganda began to be heard more and more loudly in narrow but rather high-ranking audiences. Stalin himself set the tone for these statements. Speaking at a meeting of the commission of the Main Military Council on April 21, 1940, he proposed "to radically change our military ideology. We must educate our command staff in the spirit of active defense, which includes the offensive. These ideas must be popularized under the slogans of security, defense of our fatherland, our borders" ¹⁴⁵⁷. The practical embodiment of this wish of the leader was a meeting on military ideology on May 13-14, 1940. Head

of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, army commissar 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis delivered a keynote speech in which he stated that "The Red Army, like any army, is an instrument of war. All personnel of the Red Army must be educated in peacetime, based on the common goal of preparing for war. Our war with the capitalist world will be a just, progressive war. The Red Army will act actively, achieving the complete crushing and defeat of the enemy, transferring military operations to the territory of the enemy. In accordance with this, it is necessary to educate the entire personnel of the army and our entire country in the spirit that any of our wars that will be waged the army of socialism will be a progressive war, it will be the most just of all the wars that have ever been. On this score, Lenin unambiguously said: "It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other peoples from the bourgeoisie. Engels was absolutely right when, in his letter to Kautsky of September 12, 1882, he directly recognized the possibility of a "defensive war" already

victorious socialism. He had in mind precisely the defense of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other countries" (T.19, p.325).

And the second statement of Comrade Lenin.

The victorious proletariat of this country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production in itself, would stand against the rest, the capitalist world, attracting to itself the oppressed classes of other countries, raising uprisings in them against the capitalists, and, if necessary, even with military force against the exploiting classes and their states" (T.18. S.232-233).

We are talking about the active action of the victorious proletariat and the working people of the capitalist countries against the bourgeoisie, about such active action when our state and its Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army act as the initiator of a just war. In this spirit, we need to educate our Red Army and the entire proletariat, so that everyone knows that any of our wars, wherever it takes place, is a progressive and just war. that "our military doctrine was developed in a purely offensive spirit, but it

was developed in an offensive spirit in the last 3-4 years", and before that there was a cult of protecting our borders. In his opinion, "all our wars are completely just, but the military the ideology among us, the military, from the commander of the regiment down to the fighter, must be formulated in such a way that our commanders and fighters understand that regardless of a just or unjust [war], our troops must beat the enemy, and the orders of the military command are always fair and must always be fulfilled" 1459

According to the commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskova, "we can say that our army is preparing for an attack and we need this attack for defense. This is absolutely correct ... We must provide our country not with defense, but with an offensive, and that we will be able to give a stronger blow to the enemy. [...] Our army exists to provide for our state, our country, and in order to ensure this, we must defeat the enemy, and for this we must attack. Based on political conditions, we must advance, and the Government will indicate to us what we need do" 1460 .

In his speech, commander D.T. Kozlov pointed out that "our army must be educated, and also our population must be educated in the spirit of offensive doctrine. Not a single magazine, not a single newspaper should say that we will only defend ourselves and beat the enemy on our own of our own territory. It should be written in our country that we will defend only by attacking and beating the enemy and thereby defending our socialist fatherland and its borders, but this does not mean that we should not deal with other questions. As for defense, I suppose that enough has been done, but we have not done everything in the offensive. If we give such a directive, then it is necessary to revise all measures, and first of all, it is necessary to revise the whole organism, our entire army. character, because the infantry is so heavy that it will not be able to give the pace of attack that will be necessary ... If we want our army to be light and maneuverable, to be able to carry out the tasks that it faces, we need an organizational structure review strictly from this angle" 1461 . Major A.I. Samoilov suggested carefully studying the enemy. "After all, someday our commanders will occupy the position of British officers in the world. This is how it should be and how it will be. We will teach the whole world ... The next drawback of propaganda. I had to deal with the philistine, social democratic, pacifist

understanding of our peace policy. [...] We have too many peaceful moods. There is no special love for sports, formation, for weapons. Meanwhile, the whole modern situation requires that our people and our fighters be warlike people. [...] Our era is an era of wars, just - revolutionary and unjust - imperialist We may be attacked, but we

there is nothing to hide that the time will come when we will be the attacking side. Comrades, in the very essence of our system and in accordance with our historical vocation, we must be able to fight and love military affairs

"1462. The ideas expressed were already presented on June 25 as directive instructions at a meeting convened on the initiative of the editors of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, the Znamya magazine and Defense Commission of the Union of Soviet Writers at a meeting of writers developing military themes Colonel EA Boltin, editor-in-chief of Krasnaya Zvezda, instructed the "engineers of human souls" as follows: "Speaking of the ideology of the Red Army, I must begin with its doctrine. You know that the military doctrine of the Red Army is an offensive doctrine based on Voroshilov's well-known formula - "beat the enemy on his territory." This position remains in force today. However, the combat experience that the Red Army has acquired over the past two years introduces a number of essentially new features into our understanding of the war. Until 1939, the Red Army was essentially an army that had not been fired upon, and the positions on which its commanders were brought up were largely based on the experience of the civil war. There is a lot of value in this experience, a lot of things that will serve as a guide for us today and in the future. But at the same time, this experience could not take into account the true nature of modern warfare, because in that period, with the weak technique of the enemy, we often had the weakest technique. [...] Our tactics and operational art right up to 1938, i.e. before we began to master the experience of the war in Spain, we were based mainly on the experience of the civil war, "now this is not enough and we should reconsider our views on the future war based on the experience of the battles at Khasan, Khalkhin Gol and Finland.

"Strange as it may seem, we are cultivating a kind of Soviet pacifism in people. Often in the Red Star and in literature one could come across the expression that the Red Army is an instrument of peace. Instead of teaching people that the army is an instrument of war, an instrument active defense of our homeland, we said that this is the army of the world. On the other hand, we one-sidedly propagated the slogan about the invincibility of our army, "which gives rise to capricious moods. Therefore, during the Soviet-Finnish war, the slogan about the "liberation of Finland", which did not say anything to our soldiers, had to be replaced by the slogan about "defending the northwestern borders and Leningrad." "We are all perfectly aware of the enormous historical rightness and invincibility of our cause. But at the same time, we must be aware that our victory in a modern war can only be achieved at the cost of exerting all our strength. The experience of the war in Finland showed that we needed serious efforts to break even a potentially weak enemy. In future clashes, we will have to solve more difficult tasks, and therefore now we need to educate the Red Army and all our people not in the spirit of naked slogans about invincibility and sheer heroism, but we need to educate in the spirit of those difficulties which modern war causes, in the spirit of readiness to serve the motherland to everyone, if necessary, including with one's own life. The experience of the war in Europe should be carefully studied and a flexible approach to its assimilation should be made. "First of all, we

must educate people in the understanding that the Red Army is an instrument of war, and not an instrument of peace. We must educate people so that a future war with any capitalist state will be a just war, regardless of who started this war. there were such sentiments that we would defend ourselves, but we ourselves would not get into a fight. This is not true. Our people must be prepared for the fact that when it is profitable, we will be the first to go to war, because the experience of the war in Belgium and Holland shows what strategic passivity means We must be ready, if necessary, to strike first, and not just to kick back." At the same time, "it is impossible to educate people in the spirit of an indiscriminate offensive, as it has been until now. Our units were educated in such a way that the very word "retreat" was considered a disgrace. We must take into account that we will sometimes have to defend ourselves, we will even have to switch to positional war, to retreat in order to sacrifice a part, to win the whole." As practical tasks, Boltin named

the study of military history, the strengthening of combat training and the discussion of the

problems of military science. Vishnevsky, speaking in the debate, said: "With whom you will not meet, there is a conversation about the Baltic states, about the process of consolidating our historical right flank, about the prospects for the Black Sea - on the southern flank, etc." It would be good to discuss these problems widely and publicly, of course, "I do not at all advise in the front line of the Red Star to shout that if necessary we will break Hitler's back, but we need to think about how we will prepare for this war. [...] There can be no other formulation of the question. All my subjective opinion - I can express it here, we will fight the Germans - this is a great historical perspective. The people feel it ... "

However, excessive frankness in this matter was not encouraged, and Boltin asked a rhetorical question: "... Why do we need to say directly - who is our future enemy? the desired effect and at the same time observe the external decorum, "because our military reviews are closely watched abroad. "We must speak impressively, frankly, frankly, but very carefully and calmly, because we live in a very difficult international situation. Write in such a way that neither one nor the other is offended or teased. Why should we now arm Germany against ourselves or France? We will always do what is beneficial to our cause "1463. The propaganda of the Comintern also underwent a certain transformation. In the autumn of 1939, it was reoriented to combat the warmongers (Britain and France) and explain to the masses

that only the liquidation of the capitalist system could ensure "genuine peace." However, already in April 1940, the idea of a "popular front" for the struggle of the population of the countries occupied by Germany for freedom and independence reappeared in Comintern propaganda. In the future, the propaganda of the Comintern in continental Europe was increasingly oriented towards the need to fight the invaders and their accomplices. From December 1940, the ECCI demanded that the European Communist Parties intensify their propaganda of national and social liberation, independence and socialism. On February 21, 1941, an "information meeting" of members of the KKE was held at the Lux Hotel in Moscow, where foreign communists lived. W. Ulbricht briefed his comrades-in-arms with assessments of the course of the war, which, apparently, were expressed at a meeting of the Presidium of the Comintern. Stating that the victory of one of the parties is not yet possible and only the general exhaustion of the warring countries can push them to a compromise, Ulbricht stressed that the prolongation of the war leads to an increase in popular discontent and can cause a revolutionary explosion, which will be supported by the USSR. Under these conditions, the main tasks of the Communist Parties were to be the further strengthening of their influence on the masses, the propaganda of friendship with the USSR and the condemnation of British imperialism.

Of course, the Soviet leadership understood that the offensive of the Red Army under the slogans of social change could lead to the rallying of the capitalist states into a single anti-Soviet bloc. Therefore, in April 1941, the ECCI developed the idea of a national anti-fascist popular front, which was to guide the communist parties in the countries occupied by Germany. The first goal of the popular front was to be the solution of the question of national independence, and then of a new social order. From May 1941, the European Communist Parties began to implement this idea. In order to better mask the influence of the USSR on foreign communist parties and help expand their social base, on April 20, 1941, Stalin proposed dissolving the Comintern. In his opinion, it was "important that they (foreign communist parties. - M.M.) infiltrate their people and concentrate on their own special tasks ...", after the solution of which it would be possible to re-create an international communist organization. F.I. Firsov notes that the German attack prevented this intention from being realized, but does not indicate exactly when it was planned to dissolve the Comintern. Already in the first hours of the war, Stalin pointed out the need to remove

the question of social revolution and focus on the propaganda of the Patriotic War¹⁴⁶⁵ This slogan itself was borrowed from the work of V.I. Lenin's "The Main Task of Our Days", which stated that "Russia is now moving ... towards a national upsurge, towards a great patriotic war", which "is a war for the socialist fatherland, for socialism as a fatherland, for the Soviet Republic, as a detachment of the world army of socialism" and leads "to the international socialist revolution"¹⁴⁶⁶. It is likely that it was under this slogan that it was planned to wage war with Germany, but not the one that began.

In the meantime, as Soviet-German relations cooled, especially after the Berlin talks in November 1940, which demonstrated that Germany had taken a more uncompromising position towards the USSR, Soviet propaganda structures increasingly began to collect "negative" against Germany. From the end of 1940, the propaganda machine of the USSR began secret preparations for work in the conditions of a future war with Germany and the conduct of anti-fascist propaganda. Already in the spring of 1941, as A.F., who lived in Khabarovsk before the war, recalls. Rahr, "people began to bring dosed criticism of Germany from lectures on the international situation ... At the same time, persistent rumors about the approaching war with Germany began to circulate among the people"¹⁴⁶⁷.

Similar sentiments were reflected in the mentioned diary of Vishnevsky, who wrote on January 31, 1941: "The position of the USSR is expectant, we, if it is expedient, will be able to throw our weight on the scales of war ... It will probably be decided in the coming summer." On April 9, he makes the following entry: "The coming months are deciding. We are approaching a critical point in Soviet history. You feel it all clearly." Finally, on April 14: "The truth comes out. The provisional agreement with Hitler is bursting at all seams."¹⁴⁶⁸ At the same time, in political studies in the troops, more and more attention was required to be given to the study of the military-political situation in Europe, the disclosure of the aggressive nature of imperialism and the aggressive policy of Germany. On April 30, 1941, a directive letter from the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda (GUPP) of the Red Army "On the results of an inspection of political studies" was sent to the western border districts, in which it was noted that "it is not sufficiently explained to the Red Army soldiers and junior commanders that the Second World War is being waged by both belligerents for a new redistribution of the world ... Germany ... has moved on to conquests and seizures ... It is not sufficiently explained that the expansion of the Second World War

creates a direct military threat to our country"¹⁴⁶⁹. The turning point in the preparation of Soviet propaganda for action in the new conditions was Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 to graduates of military academies¹⁴⁷⁰. This kind of keynote speech by Stalin, delivered the day after the decision of the Politburo to appoint him to the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, made an indelible impression on the audience, who are unanimous in that it was anti-German. In addition to stating the aggressive actions of Germany in Europe, Stalin directly laid on her responsibility for unleashing a world war. Despite the fact that since the autumn of 1939 the idea that England and France were the "warmongers" was widely propagated in the USSR, this was the sounding of a clearly new course. G. Dimitrov, secretary of the executive committee of the Comintern, noted in his diary: "Our policy of peace and security is at the same time a policy of preparing for war. There is no defense without an offensive. We must educate the army in the spirit of the offensive. We must prepare for war." Vishnevsky assessed this speech more emotionally: "A speech of great importance. We are launching an ideological and practical offensive ... We are talking about a world struggle: Hitler is miscalculating [...] Ahead is our march to the West. Ahead are the opportunities

that we have dreamed of for a long time "¹⁴⁷¹ . The change in direction of Soviet propaganda was clearly articulated by Stalin on May 5, 1941. At a banquet in the Kremlin, after a ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the graduation of cadets from military schools, a toast was proclaimed to the peaceful Stalinist foreign policy. In response, Stalin took the floor. "Let me make an amendment," he said. "Peaceful foreign policy has brought peace to our count

good. For the time being, for the time being, we carried out a line on the defensive - until we re-equipped our army, did not supply the army with modern means of struggle. And now, when we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now we need to move from defense to offensive. In defending our country, we must act offensively. From defense to move on to a military policy of offensive operations. We need to reorganize our education, our propaganda, agitation, our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army, and the modern army is an offensive army"1472. This statement by Stalin was taken as the basis for the

preparation of the following policy documents. In May 1941, a number of draft policy documents were prepared at the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda (GUPP) of the Red Army, of which we are interested in the draft directive "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future" 1473. This document, after discussion on June 4, 1941 at the Main Military Council, was sent on June 9 by the head of the GUPP, army commissar 1st rank A.I. Zaporozhets to the head Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to G. F. Alexandrov. At the same time, in the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation itself, a draft directive of the Central Committee "On the tasks of propaganda for the near future" was prepared, which Alexandrov sent on May 28 to the secretaries of the Central Committee A. A. Zhdanov and A. S. Shcherbakov, on whose behalf this document was drawn up.1474 The draft did not satisfy the secretaries of the Central Committee, and in the first days of June Shcherbakov himself drew up a new draft directive "On the Current Tasks of Propaganda", which is clearly more logical and accurate than Aleksandrov's text1475. The draft directive of the GUPP was approved on June 20, and nothing is known about the fate of the draft directive of the Central Committee.

by the Main Military Council.) and secretaries of the Central Committee Zhdanov and Shcherbakov. On the document sent to Alexandrov, there is his resolution of June 19: "To the archive. According to the report, instructions were given to Comrade Zaporozhets"1477. We do not have data that allow us to judge the nature of these instructions, however, the ideas of this report echo the ideas of the GUPP directive of May 15, 1941, the above draft directive documents, and, judging by the data cited by I. Hoffman, in the report made, apparently, in the troops on June 15, 1941 "one authoritative political worker"1478. All this suggests that the report was not rejected by the leadership. In addition, attention should be paid to the speeches about the international situation of M.I. Kalinin at the party and Komsomol meeting of employees of the apparatus of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 20 and in front of graduates of the Military Political Academy. IN AND. Lenin on June 5, as well as Zhdanov's speech at a meeting of film workers in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on May 15, 1941. 1479 These materials are especially valuable because they were prepared at the level and by order of members and candidate members of the Politburo, the leadership of the

propaganda apparatus countries and armies. Consequently, the initiative for their training came from "above", minimizing the initiative of mid-level functionaries. All these documents, largely repeating and supplementing each other, make it possible, despite the presence of ideological and propaganda clichés in them, to give an generally objective assessment of the mood in the Soviet leadership in the last pre-war months.

The compilers of these documents, following Stalin's statements made on May 5, 1941, paid attention to the question of the reasons for Germany's military successes, linking this issue with the need to debunk the myth of "the invincibility of the Wehrmacht." Guided by the thesis that the outbreak of the war showed the unpreparedness of England and France for it, Shcherbakov outlined the reasons for the defeat of France as follows: "France - having won the first imperialist war - became arrogant, rested on its laurels, showed complete

carelessness in preparing for the war ... Her military thought, due to complacency, did not move forward, remained at the level of the lessons of the war of 1914-1918.

French aviation, which was once the strongest, moved to one of the last places. Tank and mechanized formations were in the pen. "In the army," not only did not have enough artillery, especially anti-aircraft and anti-tank, but even machine guns and pistols were not enough. The French government, sparing the money, did not continue the Maginot Line to the English Channel, which depreciated the entire fortified part of the front and made it possible for the German army to bypass the French fortifications. deeds, or people frozen in the lessons and traditions of the war of 1914-1918. The ruling circles of France were afraid not so much of Hitler's victory as of their own people... Defeatism and outright betrayal were widespread among the highest commanding staff and leading political figures. This is the first reason for the military defeat of France. The defeat of France is due not only to its military weakness. Starting the war, France and England not only did not acquire new friends and allies, but also lost those who were with them. The

rotten, mercenary policy of "non-intervention" and "appeasement" ... the betrayal perpetrated against their direct ally - Czechoslovakia ... a frivolous attitude to the question of the role and relative weight of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Europe - all this pushed part of the their allies, led them to isolation and strengthened the position of Germany. This is the second reason for the military defeat of France "1480. Assessing the reasons for Germany's successes, Shcherbakov wrote that "the German army, being defeated in 1918, learned the necessary military and political lessons from this fact. In Germany, for many years, especially since 1933, with the coming

to power of the National Socialists, the formation and training of a large army began. The national economy, rebuilt on a war footing, was entirely subordinated to the tasks of the war ... The military leaders of Germany developed operational war plans based on a swift offensive against a weak and unprepared enemy, with the massive use of modern military equipment ... Germany's military superiority at the first stage of the war was unconditional and overwhelming. This is the first reason for the military successes of the German army. But the outcome of the war is decided not only by the armament and organization of the army. To win, it is not enough to have good military equipment and organization; war is also prepared politically, and this primarily means drawing some states to their side as allies, trying to neutralize others. The entire experience of past

wars testifies to the correctness of this proposition. In 1870-1871. in the war with France, Germany won, thanks to the neutrality of Russia, as a result, thus, a war on one front. In the war of 1914-1918. - As a result of the war on two fronts, Germany was defeated.

That is why, in preparation for the Second World War, Germany tried to establish peaceful and friendly relations with the USSR. "In addition, Germany managed to "tear off allies from its opponents and attract some countries as allies to its side ... and intimidate some small neutral countries ", preventing them from going over to the side of England and France¹⁴⁸¹.

"The military victories of Germany and the defeats of its opponents caused a well-known spread of views about the alleged invincibility of the German army. Such views are fundamentally unscientific and contradict historical experience, as well as the course of hostilities in modern warfare. There were and are no invincible armies in the world, but there were and are armies are good and weak ... The victories of the German army are explained by the fact that the Germans still had military clashes with a weak "enemy" and the German army suppressed them with huge numerical superiority and equipment ... On the basis of such easy victories - in the army and

boasting, self-satisfaction and arrogance have become widespread in the political circles of Germany, which directly lead to backwardness.

Everything new that has been introduced into the operational art and tactics of the German army is not so difficult and is now accepted and studied by its opponents, just as the armament of the German army is not news. On the basis of boasting and self-satisfaction, the military thought of Germany no longer goes forward, as before. The German army lost its taste for further improvement of military equipment. If at the beginning of the war Germany possessed the latest military equipment, now ... Germany's military-technical advantage is gradually decreasing"1482.

As the war expands, Germany faces a number of difficulties, the GUPP report noted. First of all, this is the lack of oil, which means that "fuel is the first weak point of the German economy. Food is the second weak point of the German economy. It already makes itself felt extremely acute ... The prospects for food supply are getting worse ... The third weak point German economy is the situation with raw materials. Despite the fact that Germany receives some raw materials from the occupied countries, it is not provided with all kinds of raw materials. The reserves created in due time are drying up, and the British blockade closes non-European markets for Germany. The longer the war goes on, the more Germany will be depleted.

As the imperialist, predatory goals of Germany are revealed, the attitude towards the war of the popular masses of Germany itself is also changing "1483. "The preparation for war and the war at the first stage were carried out under the slogan of liberating the country from the oppression of the Versailles chains," Shcherbakov wrote. - This slogan was popular and met with a certain support and sympathy among the German people, since the people had suffered a lot as a result of the predatory Treaty of Versailles. This slogan found a certain sympathy in other countries, which considered the Treaty of Versailles humiliating and unjust. But during the war the situation changed radically.

The slogan - "Down with the chains of Versailles" - has disappeared. Now the German army, taking advantage of the military weakness of a number of countries, has moved on to the direct seizure and enslavement of foreign territories. Fascist Germany is seizing foreign territories under the slogan of establishing the so-called "new order" in Europe. This slogan means the suppression of the national independence of the occupied countries, their transformation into vassal, exploited states, into an agrarian appendage of Germany.

The aggressive nature of the slogan - the establishment of a "new order" in Europe by German politicians is masked by chatter about the need to continue the fight against "international plutocracy", the need to "smoke out the British from everywhere, wherever they appear." However, this disguise poorly conceals the program for the enslavement of peoples, and the broad masses are beginning to see and understand more clearly the predatory nature of this slogan. First, it does not meet with sympathy and support among the broad masses of Germany itself. Secondly, this slogan causes great discontent and bitterness among the peoples of the occupied countries and a gradual increase in resistance to the invader. The aggressive, aggressive policy of Germany sets against her not only the peoples of the occupied countries, but also the best part of the German people ... It is clear that the successes of the German policy and the German army under the slogan of an aggressive and imperialist war, under the slogan of conquering and enslaving other peoples, cannot be any strong "1484. "The German army is a great force that cannot be underestimated. However, as the war drags on, the military power of Germany is weakening, "the draft directive GUPP1485 concluded. All this dispels the myth of the invincibility of the German army. The Soviet leadership as a whole fairly correctly assessed

the military and economic state of Germany, which was facilitated by the visit of German enterprises by the Soviet military technical commissions in 1939-1941 Germany's own provision of such types of strategic raw materials as coal, iron ore, oil, copper, lead, sulfur and pyrite, aluminum (bauxite), manganese ore, chromium ore, wool, phosphates,

mercury, mica, amounted to only 17.1-18.3% in 1939, while for the USSR this figure was 82.5%¹⁴⁸⁶. Oil production and raw material resources of Germany, although replenished after the defeat of France and a certain increase in production, were limited. For example, the created stocks of fuel and rubber could only last until the autumn of 1941, while the stocks of non-ferrous metals did not even cover consumption, let alone actual needs. An equally tense situation has developed in Germany with food. According to German researchers, for the period from April 7 to June 29, 1941 (84 days), each adult received 27 kg of bread, 2.175 kg of cereals and pasta, 1.2 kg of ersatzkof, 5.6 kg of meat, 3.233 kg of fat, 0.75 kg of cheese, 0.375 kg of cottage cheese, 29 eggs, 4.05 kg of sugar, potatoes were sold freely until June 2, after - 7 kg per adult (for 28 days). The average calorie content of a daily ration per person has decreased from 3,000 calories in 1936-1938. up to 2,445 calories in 1940-1941.¹⁴⁸⁸ The German economy, due to its limited capabilities, could not serve as a reliable foundation for the struggle for world domination in the conditions of a protracted war¹⁴⁸⁹ Some penetration into the Soviet press of

German propaganda statements about the successes of the German economy and the power of the Wehrmacht caused in May -June 1941 the negative reaction of the Soviet leadership. First of all, this affected the work of employees of the Institute of World Economy and World Politics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the editors of the journal of the same name of this institute, which, according to the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "takes a theoretically erroneous and politically harmful position in assessing the most important issues of modern world politics and world economy". This was expressed in the fact that these employees and the editorial staff of the magazine "picked up and popularized the myths spread by fascist propaganda about the ideal organization and invincibility of the German army, about the supposedly organized, planned nature of the German economy, about improving the food situation in Germany and increasing during the war its economic and economic military resources" and, "to a certain extent, were on the occasion of bourgeois propaganda." Therefore, it was necessary to reorganize the institution¹⁴⁹⁰ and eliminate such shortcomings in Soviet propaganda, intensifying

criticism of the ideology of fascism and the fabrications of German propaganda¹⁴⁹¹. The version about the Soviet leadership's fear of Germany and its armed forces, which exists in Russian historiography, is not confirmed by the above material either. In Moscow, Germany was considered an equal enemy, which, from a military point of view, has nothing special either in tanks, or in artillery, or in aviation. In Stalin's opinion, Germany's military equipment "not only lags behind ours," but in terms of aviation, America begins to overtake it. Such a conclusion reflects a certain underestimation of the state of the Wehrmacht. However, it should be noted that in terms of the quality of military equipment, with the exception of aircraft of old designs, the Red Army was really not inferior to its future enemy¹⁴⁹⁴.

"The main factor determining the current international situation," noted in the report of the GUPP, "is the war between the major capitalist powers, which has been going on for about two years and has become world, protracted and total. The most important outcome of the second imperialist war at its present stage is a significant military the success of Germany on the land fronts, and the expulsion of England from the European continent. As a result, the question of the further direction of the war arose with all acuteness. England is still far from defeated,

continues to resist and, in view of increasing assistance from the United States, is strengthening its military forces. In this situation, Germany has no prospects of defeating England and ending the war in the near future, since she, having a large land force, does not have a strong navy. At the same time, England, having dominance at sea, does not have a strong land army and also cannot count on victory in the near future. All this creates an atmosphere of hopelessness in the war, that it cannot be ended in the near future with the victory of one side or the other ...

The time won by Germany at the beginning of the war is now turning against her. As the war drags on, the difference in the military potential of the two belligerents will act with inexorable force ... Therefore, the position of the United States acquires special significance for Germany. The struggle for world domination, supplemented by a thirst for military profits, is pushing America into the war with unstoppable force ... Formally, the United States is not yet at war, "but in fact they are creeping into the war more and more, which greatly complicates the position of Germany"¹⁴⁹⁵. According to Kalinin, "this war of attrition takes a long, bitter character, which is likely to be debilitating for both parties. It is still difficult to predict which of them will win now.

The authors of the report of the GUPP believed that "there is a growing fear in the ruling circles of the belligerent countries of the revolutionary consequences of a protracted war. The imperialists are especially worried about the growth of the might of the USSR. The bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries looks with great anxiety at the Soviet Union, which is shaking and weakens the capitalist countries, the USSR grows and strengthens, strengthening its economic and military might... Under these conditions, among some circles of the bourgeoisie of the belligerent countries, there is a growing desire to reach an agreement among themselves in order to conclude peace and direct the spearhead of war against the USSR. Hess' "flight" to England is a serious warning for the Soviet Union. And if in this case the attempt at conspiracy can almost be considered a failure, then the ground for such attempts in the future remains. This ground is the hopelessness of the war on the one hand and the fear of the revolutionary consequences of a protracted war - on the other hand. That is why the Soviet Union must be prepared for any surprises on the part of the imperialist powers, must be ready at any time to frustrate any conspiracy of the imperialists against us." Although class hatred may push the bourgeoisie of the belligerent countries to conclude peace, England and the United States understand that peace today is a concession to Germany, which means that this process is difficult¹⁴⁹⁷.

There is a crisis of bourgeois democracy in the world, because "the bourgeoisie misses the dictatorship ... - Kalinin noted in a speech of June 5. - If we now analyze the social processes that are observed in the democratic countries of the world, both belligerents and non-belligerents, we will notice that there is a strengthening of the political dictatorship, the strengthening of the dictatorship of this or that person ... Yes, it cannot be otherwise. During the war, all forces must be concentrated, otherwise the mass of funds will remain unused or will be used by the enemy. So, the strengthening of the dictatorship becomes a characteristic feature of the capitalist world. Of course, the very process of war accelerates the maturation of such dictatorships. If there were no war, then capitalism would move along this path in tiny steps, and now, in the process of war, it is taking leaps and bounds ... So, during the war there is an intensified maturation of dictatorship throughout the capitalist world, the concentration of material resources in the hands of the state, the concentration of capitalism—all this is accelerated and intensified during war.

We should also note the second process that we observe during the war ... - there is an intensification of the growth of the political consciousness of the masses. During the war, the egoism of the capitalists is more clearly revealed to the working masses, and it reaches the consciousness of these masses more quickly. And it must be said that the growth of the class consciousness of the working masses is undoubtedly accelerating to a greater extent than the dictatorship of capital is growing. "The war itself should contribute to the more rapid maturation of class consciousness in general." a rich school for the laboring masses will not be wasted" and they "will learn their due lessons and unleash their wrath on the bourgeoisie"¹⁴⁹⁸.

The Soviet leadership quite accurately assessed the course and prospects of World War II, noting its protracted nature, which sooner or later doomed Germany to defeat. The prolongation of the war really fed those forces in the opposing camps who advocated ending the war and creating the so-called "united front of the imperialist powers" against the USSR. It is no coincidence that Moscow closely followed such attempts, well aware of the difficulties that existed on the way to concluding peace. Documentation

testify that the Soviet leadership was quite well aware of the results of the "Hess mission", which is also confirmed by other data¹⁵⁰⁰.

Discourses about the growth of dictatorship and the political consciousness of the masses in the capitalist countries, despite the obvious imprint of ideologization, have a certain basis. It must be admitted that the war and the crisis of society associated with it contributed to the radicalization of public sentiment and thereby expanded the social base of the communist parties, increasing the danger of a social explosion. It is interesting to note that this danger was foreseen back in 1939 by the former President of Czechoslovakia, E. Benes, who, however, believed that such hopes of Moscow were unlikely to come true in full, since "Western Europe is still quite strong in socio-economic terms and will to oppose the social revolution very resolutely ... while Poland, Germany and Central Europe are in a situation much more dangerous"¹⁵⁰¹. True, in his forecast, Benes did not take into account the possibility of "exporting the revolution" on the bayonets of the Red Army, which would have contributed to the overthrow of the "yoke of capital" to a much greater extent, and, as we will see below, this was precisely what the Soviet leadership was betting on.

A significant part of the GUPP report was devoted to Soviet-German relations. "If we take into account the totality of economic and strategic factors of the international position of the USSR, it is quite obvious that the most real danger to us is that capitalist country that has large land forces and the greatest length of land borders with the USSR. A strong maritime power is not so dangerous for the USSR, as a major land power. Neither a blockade nor a landing force can deal a strong blow to the USSR, for the Soviet Union has vast expanses, a powerful army, all the necessary types of strategic raw materials, food and a developed machine industry. The most serious enemy of the USSR is only a major land power. Such a country [...] the situation has become all the more tense in recent times because there are much more points of contact between Germany and the USSR than 2-3 years ago"¹⁵⁰².

Although a non-aggression pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union, "it would be deeply erroneous to have illusions about this pact and to believe that a clash between the USSR and Germany is impossible and that, supposedly, the German National Socialists abandoned their anti-Soviet plans. [...] No pacts and treaties can and must not weaken the vigilance of Soviet citizens, create illusions about the eternity of our peaceful relations with the imperialist powers ... The events of recent years show us with distinct clarity that any pact can at any moment be turned by the capitalist state into piece of paper. We must not forget for a single minute that all capitalist states, without exception, are potential enemies of the USSR. The foreign policy of the USSR is a class policy. The struggle

between the two systems is a decisive moment in our relations with all capitalist countries without exception. This struggle does everything and all pacts and treaties between the USSR and the imperialist states are temporary and unstable. This or that capitalist state, which for a variety of reasons is going to conclude agreements with the USSR, does not abandon its anti-Soviet plans, but only postpones their implementation until the most favorable moment. The development of our relations with Germany shows this quite unambiguously right now. Previously, the Soviet Union did not directly border Germany, but now it does. From Narvik to the Black Sea, we currently have only one neighbor - Germany.

Previously, the USSR separated from Germany a number of small "buffer" countries, which now either completely disappeared from the political map of Europe as independent states, or, having retained an illusory independence, were subjected to German occupation. Over the past year, Germany, in fact violating the clause of the Soviet-German

agreement on consultations, without any agreement with us, took a number of measures in the northwest and southeast, which could not but affect the vital interests of the USSR in these regions of Europe. On the borders with the Lithuanian SSR, in Poland, Germany is concentrating a large number of troops, of course, not for peaceful purposes. In Finland, which has recently fallen significantly under the economic and political dependence of Germany, German troops have also been brought in. In addition, in Finland itself, as well as in Sweden, the Germans are conducting intensified anti-Soviet propaganda.

In order to plant espionage and sabotage groups on our territory, Germany widely uses against us hostile elements of the Polish, Ukrainian and Belarusian population of occupied Poland, the Moldavian population of Romania, the Lithuanian population of the Suwalki region, "and other nationalist emigration groups." Occasionally, especially in the provincial the press, nevertheless, articles clearly hostile to us are placed. In their verbal agitation and propaganda, the National Socialists completely retained their arrogant anti-Soviet tone. The population and soldiers are instilled that friendship with the USSR is temporary, that Germany must definitely fight against the USSR.

In southeastern Europe, in the Balkans, Germany has recently taken measures that run counter to the interests of the USSR ... Germany, violating the clause of the agreement on consultation with the USSR, sent its troops into Romania, Bulgaria and ignited the fire of war on the Balkan Peninsula. The seizure of the Balkan Peninsula by Germany undoubtedly affects our most important interests ... In

a whole series of recent statements by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs regarding the Balkan events, the Soviet government clearly demonstrated its extreme interest in resolving the issues of southeastern Europe and the Middle East ... With all these acts, the Soviet government actually condemned the policy Germany, aimed at drawing the Balkan states into the war, and made it clear that Germany's actions were contrary to the policy of the USSR. Thus, the Soviet government actually declared that it did not recognize the "new order" established by the Axis powers in the Balkans, and retained a free hand in this regard ...

Germany's policy in the Middle East, especially in relation to Turkey, also runs counter to the state interests of the USSR ... Security in the straits - the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles - plays a huge role for us, because this is the only way out for the great Black Sea power that we are . The Soviet government once again demonstrated its extreme interest in the security of the Black Sea straits with the latest statement to the Turkish government, "to which "the USSR made it clear that it would in every possible way prevent the kindling of war in the Middle East and Turkey's involvement in the war"1503. The above material shows that the Soviet leadership in the spring of 1941

considered Germany the main adversary. The version of Stalin's excessive confidence in the power of the non-aggression pact, widespread in Russian historiography1504, is confirmed, since Moscow knew well that it was impossible to rely on any agreements. Documents once again Not show that the Soviet leadership knew about the concentration German troops near the borders of the Soviet Union, but, judging by the general tone of the documents, there was no fear of an imminent German offensive. The list of anti-Soviet actions of the German leadership has not only propaganda value, but also indicates the real knots of Soviet-German contradictions. As already noted, the war between Germany and the USSR was generated by the struggle for dominance in Europe, but it was accelerated by clashes of Soviet and German interests in the Balkans, Finland and the Middle East. If in 1939 Berlin and Moscow were able to agree on their territorial aspirations and by the autumn of 1940 basically implement these agreements, then from the end of 1940 the expansionist aspirations of Germany and the Soviet Union came into conflict. It was not possible to settle them on the basis of a compromise, which was demonstrated by the negotiations between them in Berlin in November 1940. 1505 The compromise was

difficult because the parties no longer needed it, hoping to achieve their goals by military means, and from November 1940 Soviet-German relations entered a new phase - the phase of direct preparation for war. "The USSR lives in

a capitalist environment," Shcherbakov wrote. A clash between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism is inevitable. Based on the inevitability of this clash, ours, the first socialist state in the world, must, day after day, stubbornly and persistently prepare for decisive battles with the capitalist environment in order to emerge victorious from these battles and thereby ensure the final victory of socialism. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union has nothing in common with "pacifism", with the desire to achieve peace at any cost "1506

"The contradiction between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism is the most acute contradiction of our era," noted in the report of the GUPP. "The foreign policy of the USSR proceeds from the indisputable position that a clash between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism is inevitable. provide all the necessary prerequisites for a victorious solution of the question of "who wins" on an international scale. We are far from indifferent to the conditions under which the inevitable clash between the USSR and the capitalist encirclement will take place. We are vitally interested in these conditions being as favorable as possible for us. The main success of Lenin's -Stalinist foreign policy of the world lies in the fact

that, thanks to it, it was already possible to postpone the war between the imperialist countries and the USSR, firstly, before socialism triumphed in our country ... and, secondly, before the imperialist powers themselves quarreled among themselves because of world domination ... Thus, the Leninist-Stalinist peace policy successfully resolved the tasks that confronted it. However, it would be wrong to regard our peace policy as eternal and unchanging. This is a temporary policy, which was caused by the need to accumulate sufficient forces against the capitalist encirclement. Now we have accumulated such strength and entered a new, offensive period in the foreign policy of the USSR, which imposes on us great and responsible duties ...

The possibility is not ruled out that the USSR will be compelled, by virtue of the prevailing situation, to take the initiative in offensive military operations... despite the existence of pacts and treaties with this state". When analyzing the immediate prospects of world capitalism, one should proceed from the growing "revolutionary crisis", while clearly "the role of the USSR as an armed stronghold of the world socialist revolution looms ... This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that offensive actions by the USSR against individual imperialist countries that threaten our security are possible in a situation where there is not yet a revolutionary situation in the capitalist countries. But in either case, the USSR can go on the offensive against the imperialist powers, defending the cause of victorious socialism, fulfilling the greatest mission that history has entrusted to the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants to destroy the capitalist encirclement that constantly threatens us. teaches," Shcherbakov wrote, "that the country of socialism, using the favorable international situation, must and will be obliged to take the initiative in offensive military operations against the capitalist encirclement in order to expand the front of socialism. For the time being, the USSR could not proceed with such actions due to

military weakness. But now that military weakness is a thing of the past. Relying on its military might, using a favorable environment - the USSR liberated Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, returned Bessarabia, helped the working people of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to organize Soviet power "1508" If only,

of course, to annex Finland, then the situation has improved even more in terms of strategy," Kalinin declared frankly on May 20 1941 "Thus, capitalism had to make room, and the front of socialism expanded. The international situation is extremely aggravated, the military danger for our country has approached as never before. In these conditions, the Leninist slogan "to defend one's own land on a foreign land" can at any moment turn into practical actions," Shcherbakov warned¹⁵¹⁰. According to documents,

the "peace-loving policy of the USSR" was interpreted in Moscow is rather peculiar. "The Bolsheviks are not pacifists, it was noted in the abstracts for the speech Kalinin dated May 20, 1941 - They have always been and remain opponents only unjust, predatory, imperialist wars. But they always stood, stand and will stand for just, revolutionary, national liberation wars. By socialism will not triumph all over the world, or at least not in the main capitalist countries, until then both wars are inevitable. The capitalist world is full of flagrant abominations that can only be destroyed by the red-hot iron of the sacred war.

You can't revel in the world unconsciously - this leads to the transformation of people into vulgar pacifists ... If we really want peace - and not unsteady, not short-lived, not as a moment of war, but lasting and reliable - then for this we must do our best to prepare for war. We must prepare not for the kind of war that is going on now - after all, this is not a war, but a game of spillikins - but to such a war in which the capitalists will not stop even before what, the most diabolical means in the struggle for their existence. To imagine at least an approximate idea of this war, it is enough to remember, for example, the war with Finland. This is the kind of war we must prepare for"¹⁵¹¹

Similar ideas echo the Zaporozhets note addressed to Zhdanov dated February 22 1941, containing "some considerations on military propaganda among the population", in which clearly defines "that our party and the Soviet government are not fighting for peace for the sake of peace, but link the slogan of peace with the interests of socialism, with the task of ensuring state interests of the USSR "¹⁵¹²

All this once again confirms the fact that the so-called "peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR" was nothing more than a propaganda campaign, under the guise of which the Soviet leadership sought to provide the most favorable conditions for "crushing capitalism" by military means. These conditions, according to the cited documents, were to create a military-industrial complex capable of providing offensive actions of the Red Army, and in the outbreak of war between the rest of great powers. Under these conditions it was possible, under the guise of slogans about "peacefulness" USSR" to begin the "export of the revolution" to the countries of Europe, the first stage of which was the aggression of the Soviet Union against its Western neighbors and the annexation of territories in Eastern Europe in 1939-1940. Only due to the difficult international situation Moscow failed to capture Finland, which was seen as a strategic base for action in Scandinavia and the Baltic. It is

interesting to note that the question of a new expansion of the "front of socialism" arose it was in May - June 1941. As Zhdanov stated on May 15 at a meeting of film workers in the Central Committee VKP(b), "if circumstances allow us, we will continue to expand the front of socialism" ¹⁵¹³. "If you are Marxists," said Kalinin in a speech of May 20, "if you study the history of the party, then you must understand that this is the main idea of the Marxist teachings - in case of huge conflicts within humanity, to extract the maximum benefit for communism" ¹⁵¹⁴. On June 5, he formulated this idea more briefly: "after all, war is such the moment when communism can be expanded "¹⁵¹⁵. Speaking at the Main Military Council in during the discussion of the GUPP directive on June 4, 1941, Zhdanov stated that "we have become stronger, we can set more active tasks. The wars with Poland and Finland were not wars defensive. We have already embarked on the path of an offensive policy "¹⁵¹⁶. However, in 1941 to expand the "front of socialism" further to the West was possible only by crushing Germany,

which, according to the Soviet leadership, was the main opponent of the USSR and was its the only western neighbor. For this purpose, a fairly serious instrument - the Red Army, which in the fall of 1939 was awarded the epithet "liberator army"¹⁵¹⁷. "The wise foreign policy of

the party and the Soviet government ensured the peoples The USSR has been peaceful labor for 20 years now," Shcherbakov wrote. On this basis, our the country has achieved further steady growth of political, economic and military power ... The Red Army, widely using the achievements of domestic and world military-technical thought, reorganized organizationally and seriously re-equipped based on the experience of modern warfare "¹⁵¹⁸ "It has powerful artillery, powerful tanks and high-speed aircraft in numbers exceeding any capitalist army, - noted in the report of the GUPP. - Restructuring in teaching methods of all branches of the armed forces, with the maximum approximation to the combat situation, significantly raised combat readiness of the Red Army. Military discipline has also been greatly strengthened. Red The army is strong in its political and moral state, its devotion to the Motherland, its readiness not to spare one's strength and life itself in the name of the triumph of communism.

The Red Army really was in the summer of 1941 a gigantic military a tool that gave the Soviet leadership confidence in the success of the attack on Germany. How already noted, in 1939-1941. significant work has been done to improve Soviet armed forces. Correspondingly, direct military spending increased, which in 1938-1940. almost doubled the overall increase in spending¹⁵²⁰. During these years the following redistribution of budget expenditures took place: if in 1938 for the national economy (including industry) spent 41.7% (19%), and 18.7% for defense, then in 1939 these figures were respectively 39.4% (20.3%) and 25.6%, and in 1940 - 33.4% (16.4%) and 32.6%¹⁵²¹. If we take into account the total expenditure on the armed forces, the NKVD, military-industrial people's commissariats, the Main Directorate of State Material reserves, the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet and other paramilitary organization, the total share of military spending in 1940 will reach 52% of the costs budget, or 24.6% of the national income¹⁵²². In 1940, for military needs was 26% of industrial production was spent (for example, in the USA this figure was 10.8%, and in Germany in 1939 the first war year - 23%)¹⁵²³.

The annual increase in military production in 1938-1940. was 39%, three times (!) surpassing the growth of all industrial output¹⁵²⁴. Accordingly, the share of military products in gross industrial production (in 1926/27 prices) increased from 8.7% in 1937 to 18.7% in 1940 and up to 22.5% in the first half of 1941¹⁵²⁵. In the first half of 1941 Soviet industry produced 100% of tanks and 87% of new types of combat aircraft, completing the transition to the release of only these samples¹⁵²⁶. Total for 1939 first half of 1941 the troops received from industry 92,492 guns and mortars, 7,448 tanks and 19,458 combat aircraft in ¹⁵²⁷. Ammunition production only in the first half of 1941 increased by 66.4%, and the mobilization plan adopted on June 6 for the second half of 1941 and 1942, its further growth was envisaged¹⁵²⁸. After the XVIII Party Conference (February 15-20, 1941) defense industry enterprises began to be transferred to wartime mode of operation¹⁵²⁹. On June 6, 1941, Stalin signed a number of decrees according to which the industrial people's commissariats were to carry out measures allowing "to prepare all enterprises ... for a possible transition from July 1, 1941 to work according to the mobilization plan "¹⁵³⁰ (highlighted by me. - M.M.). Soviet armed the forces, the growth of which is shown in table 42, really surpassed the army of any other countries by the number of military equipment.

Table 42

Development of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1939-1941

¹⁵³¹ As of 01.01.1939 As of 06.22.1941 In %

to 1939 Personnel (thousand people) 2,485 5,774 232.4

Crew divisions 131.5 316.5 240.7 Guns
and mortars (thousand) 55.8 117.6 210.7 Tanks
(thousand) 21.1 25.7 121.8
Combat aircraft (thousand) 7.7 18.7 242.8

True, the Soviet leadership exaggerated the combat effectiveness of the Red Army. At the same time, the allegations in Russian historiography¹⁵³² about the supposedly low combat effectiveness of the Red Army in 1941 seem to be insufficiently substantiated. This conclusion is based on the failures of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, but it does not take into account the fact that the Soviet troops had to fight defensive battles for which they were not prepared, which, naturally, could not but affect their results. In addition, the troops did not have time to complete the concentration and deployment, to mobilize and were taken by surprise by the German attack, which also had a negative impact on their combat capability.

"The new conditions in which our country lives, the modern international situation, fraught with surprises, and the tasks set by the party of Lenin-Stalin and the Soviet government for the Red Army, noted in the draft directive of the GUPP, require a decisive turn in propaganda work, the Bolshevik education of personnel in the spirit of fiery Soviet patriotism, revolutionary determination and constant readiness to launch a crushing offensive against the enemy. [...] "The entire personnel of the Red Army should be imbued with the consciousness that the increased political, economic and military power of the Soviet Union allows us to carry out an offensive foreign policy, decisively eliminating the centers of war at our borders, expanding our territories. This offensive policy was expressed in liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, in the defeat of the White Finnish adventure. The Soviet Union is now stronger than before, and tomorrow it will be even stronger. The Red Army and the Soviet people, defending our country, are obliged to act in an offensive manner, from defense to switch, when circumstances so require, to a military policy of offensive action. According to the authors of the report of the GUPP, "the current international situation is exceptionally tense. The war has directly approached the borders of our homeland. Every day and hour, an attack by the imperialists on the Soviet Union is possible, which we must be ready to prevent with our offensive actions. [...] The experience of the military actions showed that the defensive strategy against superior motorized units (Germany. - M.M.) did not give any success and ended in defeat. Therefore, against Germany it is necessary to apply the same offensive strategy, backed up by powerful equipment (highlighted by me. - M.M.). The task of the entire command staff of the Red Army is to study the experience of modern warfare and use it in the training of our fighters. All studies of all branches of the Red Army must be imbued with an offensive spirit. "

"The German army has not yet encountered an equivalent enemy, equal to it both in the number of troops and in their technical equipment and combat training. Meanwhile, such a clash is not far off." It is interesting to note that Alexandrov made the following note to this proposal: "Such a wording must not be allowed. It would mean revealing the cards to the enemy"¹⁵³⁵.

Such arguments in the directive documents of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, along with data on the direct military preparations of the Red Army for the offensive, clearly indicate the intention of the Soviet leadership to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. Such plans, of course, had to be kept in strict secrecy, which explains the above note by the head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee. In this context, the sharply negative reaction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the publication on May 21, 1941 in Komsomolskaya Pravda of an article by the regimental commissar I. Bakanov, "Lenin-Stalin's Teachings on War", which attracted the attention of the British press, is understandable. In it, somewhat so

form, some of the ideas of the above documents were outlined - on the fight against pacifism, preparing young people for military service, strengthening defense power and combat offensive spirit of the Soviet people, constant preparation for war, since only the destruction of capitalism will lead to a world without wars, and until this happens, the Bolsheviks stand for progressive, just wars¹⁵³⁶ The Politburo resolution

on this publication pointed out the need for tighter control by the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation for articles on foreign policy topics, and the direct culprits of its appearance in the newspaper were removed from work. The only thing allowed in the press were vague allusions "Pravda" on the possibility of "all sorts of surprises" in the current international setting in 1938. At the same time, a series of publications in the anti-German spirit was planned during all major editions of 1939. The regime of strict disguise extended even to The Comintern, which was denied the publication of an appeal by May 1, 1941 with a detailed analysis of the international situation, since this "could reveal our cards enemy"¹⁵⁴⁰. In general, in April - June 1941, the Soviet leadership led such a cautious foreign policy, which gave a number of authors a reason to talk about the policy of appeasement Germany¹⁵⁴¹. However, the materials known today do not confirm this version.

"In connection with the tense situation that has developed for the USSR in the West, it was noted in report of the GUPP, - the prisoner by the Soviet government is of great importance neutrality pact with Japan. This pact, temporarily preventing a clash of the USSR with Japan, and to a certain extent guaranteeing our Far Eastern borders, is a new victory for the wise Stalinist foreign policy. The conclusion of the pact by Japan is undoubtedly an attempt to secure its northern borders in order to with more force to strike in the south, obviously in the direction of British Malaya, Singapore, Philippines, etc. [...] At this historical stage, the interests of the USSR and Japan in relation to preservation of peace on their joint borders coincided, however, in different, diametrically opposite considerations. The USSR does not intend to interfere in the fight between Japan and the United States and promises Japan to maintain strict neutrality. In turn, Japan refuses anti-Soviet adventures on our borders. This is the basis of the pact between Japan and the USSR on this stage"¹⁵⁴².

Moscow's assessment of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of April 13, 1941. shows that the Soviet leadership was well acquainted with the situation in the Far East and knew about Japan's preparations for war with England and the United States. Japan was interested in the neutrality of the USSR for the period of the war in the Pacific Ocean¹⁵⁴³ Soviet The Union, in turn, was interested in diverting the attention of England and the United States from European problems and in the neutrality of Japan for the period of the defeat of Germany and "liberation" of Europe from capitalism. Thus, the interests of Japan and the USSR really coincided, but not in "diametrically opposite", but in identical reasons: the Soviet-Japanese treaty was supposed to play the same role for the Far East, what did the Soviet-German non-aggression pact play for Europe, and most importantly - it should was to provide the Soviet leadership with a free hand in Europe.

Simultaneously with the development of all these directives, a targeted reorientation of Soviet propaganda to educate the population in the spirit of "all-destroying offensive war", to a serious ideological confrontation with Germany and its allies. The picture of these preparations is covered in detail in the study by V.A. Nevezhina¹⁵⁴⁴ The most important thing is that this activity was not limited to offices leaders of propaganda structures, but affected propaganda, which conducted among the troops and among

the population. The restructuring of propaganda in the army with the task of "educating personnel in militant and offensive spirit, in the spirit of the inevitability of a collision of the Soviet Union with the capitalist world and constant readiness to move into a crushing offensive" began in accordance with the decision of the Main Military Council of May 14, 1941.

The next day, a directive was sent to the troops "On political activities with the Red Army men and junior commanders of the Red Army for the summer period of 1941", which stated that "the just and unjust wars are sometimes given the following interpretation: if the first country attacked another and leads offensive war, then this war is considered unfair, and vice versa, if the country was attacked and only defends, then such a war supposedly should be considered just. From this it is concluded that the Red Army will wage only a defensive war, forgetting the truth that any war, waged by the Soviet Union will be a just war. From the second half of May 1941, a demonstration of anti-fascist films began in the troops;

To maintain the combat offensive spirit of the command staff of the Red Army in May 1941 (signed for publication on May 5), a brochure by V.M. Frunze "Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army", the content of which echoed the above documents. Analyzing the doctrines of Germany, France and England in 1914, the author concluded that the military doctrine of any state "is determined by the nature of the general political line of the social class that is at the head of it" and must correspond to "the general goals of the state and those material and spiritual resources, which are at his disposal." Since the main goal of the USSR is to build communism throughout the world, it is necessary to crush the hostile capitalist encirclement, which means that a stubborn and uncompromising struggle lies ahead. "And one must fully realize and openly admit," Frunze wrote, "that the joint parallel existence of our proletarian Soviet state with the states of the bourgeois capitalist world is impossible for a long time ... This contradiction can be resolved and eliminated only by force of arms in the bloody battle of class enemies. There is no way out and there cannot be. To do this, it is necessary to strengthen Soviet military power, taking into account that "by the very course of the historical revolutionary process, the working class will be forced to go on the offensive against capital when favorable conditions arise for this ... Hence the need to educate our army in the spirit of the greatest activity, to prepare it for completion of the tasks of the revolution through energetic, resolutely and boldly carried out offensive operations. In late May - early June 1941, a huge edition was published and sent to the troops of the western border districts of the "Russian-German

Phrase Book for a Soldier and Junior Commander", the content of which was supposed to help Soviet soldiers act among the German-speaking population and thereby facilitate the "liberation mission" 1549 According to the memoirs of a member of the Military Council of the 16th Army A.A. Lobachev, who was in Moscow on June 10-14, 1941, "at the Military-Political Academy named after V.I. Lenin, special courses for members of the Military Councils and heads of political departments have just completed their work. I met many old friends and comrades here. Most of them considered a military conflict inevitable, a fight was imminent. Head of the Political Propaganda Department A. I. Zaporozhets invited a group of leading political workers for a talk. He stated that, apparently, he would have to work in a new environment, familiarized, in particular, about the need to expose the reactionary essence of fascism". Commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin also "believed that the war was about to begin" 1550

Naturally, all this gave rise to rumors about the upcoming war with Germany, which were recorded by the "competent authorities" already in mid-May 1941. anti-Soviet statements" among the population of the western regions of the country and the soldiers of the Red Army. Thus, during the concentration of the 75th Rifle Division of the ZapOVO to the border on May 12-13, the following statements were recorded. Red Army soldier Radinkov during the march

said: "We are led to war and we are not told anything." Lieutenant Dashkevich said about the May 9 TASS denial that "the Soviet government is engaged in deceit and refutes reality." According to lieutenant Kondakov, "if the second imperialist war ends, then the Soviet Union will end" 1551. On May 15, a Red Army soldier of the 337th separate anti-aircraft artillery division of the ArchVO Zyuzin believed that "if there is no war now between the USSR and Germany, England, then this is because the USSR is not yet ready for war, and if it is ready, it will announce to you, fools, let's go free the brothers of England and Germany, and all of you, fools, will go" 1552.

On May 20, 1941, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO reported on the mood in the troops of the KOVO. The following rumors circulated among the civilian personnel of the units. "The arrival of Soviet generals in the city of Rovno speaks of the fact that Russia will soon be at war with Germany ... Since the Soviet troops began to set up radio stations and conspire them, there will soon be a war between Russia and Germany" (cook of the military hospital Sorokin). "Soviet troops are intensified being thrown into the city of Rovno, obviously a war with Germany is being prepared" (former employee of the Visht military hospital). "Many generals of the Red Army have arrived in Rovno, soon there will be a war with Germany" (electrician Becker). "... There is a headquarters here, many generals, colonels, everyone is preparing for war" (master of the city battery workshop Rozhok). "A war with Germany will be inevitable. Mobilization is currently taking place in the USSR. A large batch of pre-conscripts was sent from Rovno. In addition, many troops are being transferred from the Far Eastern Territory (DVK) to the West ... Now it is clear that what was in the Japanese newspaper fully corresponds reality" (dental technician of the military hospital

Toshman). Military personnel allowed themselves similar statements. "The top commanders came not just for exercises, but to start a war with Germany" (Junior commanders course student Zhukov). "Many generals and political workers have arrived in Rovno, which means there will be a war soon" (paramedic Surikov). "60 generals arrived and it's as if they are all at the game. Well, what kind of game can there be if everyone says how we will sow and go to war with the Germans. Although the government is engaged in deceptive denials, you yourself need to understand that there will be a war. I today he himself received reinforcements from the DVK" (doctor of military unit 2811 Dvornikov). "The refutation of TASS is not true. Units are arriving from the Far East, the high command is moving in, and presumably there will be a war in the near future" (soldier of military unit 2906 Voronkov). "Now you won't have to go on a long vacation, because you need to carefully prepare for the war that will be with Germany and you need to prepare carefully, because Germany is not Poland" (clerk of the 2nd battalion of military unit 2806

On May 25, 1941, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO reported new facts. "Now the international situation is fraught with all sorts of surprises. The arrival of generals in Rovno is not an accident ... The transfer of troops from the Far East, as well as the transfer of German troops to Finland, of which there are already 60 thousand there, the graduation of commanders from schools and academies of the General Staff is also not accidental. There is an order to provide the fighter with full equipment soon" (political instructor of military unit 2806 Trofimov). "The Soviet Union is intensively preparing for a war with Germany, which is why the generals came to Rovno" (junior sergeant of military unit 2806 Amelkin). "They say that the generals came to the exercises, but we do not believe in this because so many senior command personnel came to Proskurov before the attack on Poland" (lieutenant of military unit 2811 Tsaberyaby). "Lately it smells of something bad. Here, a train of nurses was brought to the headquarters of the corps, it's not for nothing" (foreman of the 6th battery of military unit 2806 Polishchuk). "There are a lot of cars in Rovno. Telephones are being installed, many pilots have arrived, a war with Germany is inevitable" (local resident Litovchenko). "The fact that there will be a war is a fact. But why has

the USSR not attacked Germany for so long" (local resident Dolgy) 1554. Naturally, the Soviet leadership tried in every possible way to suppress such rumors, and it is possible that it was their spread that led to the well-known TASS statement being published on June 14, 1941 and anti-fascist propaganda among the troops was somewhat muffled, but not curtailed. As a result, even

rumors continued to circulate that the USSR was the initiator of the war. Similar statements were recorded already in the first days of the war. As A.F. Rahr, June 23, 1941 in Khabarovsk, having learned about the beginning of the war, his mother and her girlfriend (both teachers) expressed the thought: "Yes, it's probably we who started the war, we bombed our cities ourselves" 1555 The same thoughts on June 23 In 1941, a certain Spund (a former Socialist-Revolutionary) said in Moscow: "The war with Germany was started by ours. This war was started by our government in order to divert the attention of the broad masses of the people from the discontent that grips the people - the dictatorship that exists in our country"1556.

However, it is much more significant that similar sentiments took place among the military. So, a student of the military veterinary academy Potapov, having listened to Molotov's speech on the radio, said that "this, apparently, was a provocation on our part that forced the Germans to go to war with the USSR." Breusenko, a lecturer at the academy, said that "it was not they (the Germans) who started the war, but we." I don't know how the Germans could break into the USSR, that this is sabotage or something else "1558. Paleev, head of the 3rd department of the Clothing Allowance Directorate of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, Paleev believed that "the acceleration of the war with Germany was caused by our provocative actions, that is, the concentration of troops on the Western border, and most importantly, Comrade Stalin's speech at the graduation of Academicians, where he stated that the entry of the USSR into the war is a matter of timing. In addition, all reports on the international question, especially closed ones, also said that war with Germany was inevitable, so it would be strange for Germany to expect our concentration. It must be admitted that the German strike on us, from their point of view, was the only correct decision in the current situation"1559 . The assistant to the head of the Military-Political Academy for Logistics, Major General Petrov, said that "the war did not start at 4 a.m. on June 22, but earlier, which he knows from a conversation with some relative Vadim, who knew that the Soviet Union started the war before June 22, 1941." 1560

As you know, in the conditions of the German attack, Soviet propaganda had to reorganize itself, this time to ensure a defensive war, and fight the above rumors.

The above materials show that the Soviet leadership, having entered the struggle to achieve the status of a "great power" for the Soviet Union, considered the Second World War as an opportunity to solve this problem. This explains Moscow's policy in the summer of 1939, when, having made sure that England and France were not ready to make concessions to the USSR, the Soviet leadership made an agreement with Germany. Thus, the USSR avoided participation in the European war and got the opportunity to annex new territories in Eastern Europe. But this was only an intermediate task, the main goal of the USSR was to expand the "front of socialism" to the maximum possible territory. In the opinion of the Soviet leadership, the situation was conducive to the implementation of this task. The occupation by Germany of most of the continent, a protracted, hopeless war, the growing discontent of the population of the occupied countries, the dispersal of Wehrmacht forces on different fronts, the close Japanese-American conflict - all this gave the Soviet leadership a unique chance to defeat Germany with a sudden blow and "liberate" Europe from "decaying capitalism" ". In anticipation of this blow, Soviet propaganda was given the task of smoothly leading public opinion to the conviction that the current international situation was pushing "the world's first socialist state" to deal a crushing blow against the "stronghold of the most reactionary bourgeoisie" - Germany, which would not only make it possible to secure the USSR, but also fundamentally affect the fate of capitalism as a whole.

The place of the "Eastern campaign" in the strategy of Germany in 1940-1941. and the forces of the parties to the beginning of Operation Barbarossa

The question of the beginning of the Soviet-German war has always been one of the central ones in Russian historiography and was considered mainly in the ideological aspect of the struggle between fascism and communism. The important role played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of Germany in World War II has been retrospectively used in historiography to prove the thesis that the war in the East was the main goal for the German leadership, which determined all other actions of Berlin. Explaining the beginning of the war, which was unsuccessful for the Red Army, domestic historiography, following I.V. Stalin of November 6, 1941, with the idea of "we have a lack of tanks and partly aviation"¹⁵⁶¹, emphasized the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the enemy's weapons, adjusting all statistical data to this thesis. Only in the late 1980s, more objective information on this matter appeared in the literature, and in the early 1990s the traditional point of view was finally refuted. However, a tendency has emerged: taking advantage of the ambiguity of the issues of the qualitative state of weapons, under this pretext, to nullify the Soviet quantitative superiority, and thereby reanimate the old version of German superiority in a new form¹⁵⁶². Now there is an opportunity to unbiasedly consider the place of the war with the USSR in the strategy of Germany in 1940-1941. and about the balance of forces of the parties on the Soviet-German front by the beginning of the war.

In May - June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, withdraw France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. Naturally, the victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for an early end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its forces to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would give her a free hand to fight the United States. It is no coincidence that it was in June-July 1940 that the traditional anti-Soviet intentions of the German leadership began to take concrete shape. However, in the course of the "peaceful" offensive against England in July 1940, it became clear that an immediate end to the war should not be expected. As the military-political events unfolded in the summer of 1940, the German leadership had to decide an extremely complex strategic question: should England be completely defeated first, or should we move to the East, crush the USSR, and then concentrate on the war

with England and the USA. The preparations by the German command for the operation "Sea Lion" showed that the Wehrmacht did not have the forces capable of carrying out a landing operation on the British Isles. The price of an unsuccessful landing would be extremely high politically. In addition, the main military-political events were gradually shifting to the Mediterranean Sea and South-Eastern Europe, which also attracted the attention of Berlin. Therefore, if in July-August 1940 the German command was practically not engaged in planning actions outside Europe, then as doubts grow about the feasibility of an early invasion of England and the effectiveness of using other means of military influence against it, the peripheral strategy is gaining more and more weight in German plans. wars against the British. On August 12, 1940, the OKW ordered to prepare for the possible transfer of tank forces to North Africa for an attack on the Suez Canal if "Operation Sea Lion" was not carried out this year. On August 13, 1940, the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKW, Colonel-General A. Jodl, prepared a memorandum for Hitler with an assessment of the situation, in which he proposed to achieve the surrender of England to go for "significantly closer military cooperation between the Axis powers than what was before since." For this it was necessary:

"a) to continue the air war until the military industrial base of the country is liquidated in southern England. All Italian air forces not currently brought into action in these air battles must be used in them;

b) expand the submarine warfare waged from French bases by bringing into action half of all Italian submarines;
c) capture Egypt, if necessary, with German help; d) take possession of Gibraltar in agreement with the Spaniards and Italians; e) refuse to conduct operations that can be dispensed with to defeat England and which pursue only military goals that are easily achievable after the victory over England (Yugoslavia) "1563. However, in practice, all these proposals turned out to be good intentions, since they did not

arouse much enthusiasm neither the Italian, nor the Spanish, let alone the Vichy governments. The leadership of Italy still hoped to wage its own parallel war with England, and Spain and France were in no hurry to get too close to Germany, waiting for developments. Thus, Germany failed in 1940 to fulfill the main strategic task of the war in the West - to completely withdraw England from the war and free his hands to fight in other directions.

The German leadership could not help but take into account the ever-increasing assistance to England from the United States, which gradually moved from a position of neutrality friendly to London to the position of a "non-belligerent ally" of England. True, Berlin was not afraid of the possibility of direct US military intervention in a European war in the near future, but was fully aware of the importance of Washington's economic support for London's military efforts. In an effort to keep the United States from further rapprochement with England, create favorable conditions for action in peripheral theaters and prevent the formation of an anti-German coalition, Berlin set about creating an anti-British continental bloc, the first step towards which was the resumption of German-Japanese negotiations on an alliance. To create a threat to England in the Mediterranean, Italy should have been used, which entered the war in June 1940, but which, however, needed some military and economic support. As a result, on September 27, 1940, Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, which was to become the basis for the creation of a wider continental bloc led by Germany, subordinated to the task of finally crushing England. Upon reaching this goal, Germany could concentrate all its forces on the implementation of the campaign to the East.

In October 1940, Germany made attempts to involve Spain and France in this bloc, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR. Moscow, of course, was concerned about Germany's advance into the Balkans, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and the German-Finnish rapprochement, and was not slow to express its claims to Berlin. This clearly showed that the USSR was not going to be limited to the role of a passive spectator, but was striving to actively participate in European affairs. True, this position did not correspond to the interests of Germany, but the German leadership nevertheless decided through negotiations to find out the possibility of a new compromise with Moscow and try to use it against England, preventing the Russians from further entering Europe. The Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 showed that the USSR was ready to join the Tripartite Pact, but the conditions set by it were completely

unacceptable for Germany, since they demanded that it refuse to interfere in Finland and closed the possibility of advancing to the Middle East through the Balkans. Berlin's agreement to these conditions would have meant that all that remained for it was the possibility of continuing a protracted war against England in Western Europe or Africa, with the constant strengthening of the Soviet Union behind German lines. And although the German leadership did not yet see a real danger in the position of the USSR, the potential threat posed by such a powerful neighbor did not allow them to simply ignore its position. Even abandoning the agreement with the USSR and advancing to the Middle East through the Balkans without the consent of Moscow would put the German troops in a vulnerable position, since their communications would pass in an 800-km corridor along the Soviet borders. If we take into account that the Soviet border was 700 km from Berlin, while from the north, west and south the entire coast

Europe was controlled by Germany, the entire Middle Eastern expedition was becoming too adventurous an enterprise.

As the center of the Anglo-German war shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean, Germany expanded its penetration into Southeastern Europe, which in the future brought the Wehrmacht to the approaches to the Middle East. The German command had supporters of a more decisive offensive in this strategic direction, where, if successful, Germany could gain control over the largest oil fields and completely secure the Mediterranean from the English fleet, which, in turn, led to the strengthening of Italy's positions and the removal of an external threat to throughout southern Europe. Moreover, Germany had forces at its disposal that fully ensured the fulfillment of this task, and anti-British sentiment in the Arab world would allow Berlin to have an active "fifth column" and support in the region. However, the implementation of this strategy required the creation of political

conditions for bringing the war against England to an end. Moreover, this issue was closely connected with the problem of a war on two fronts in the event that London manages to find an ally on the continent. As early as July 30, 1940, the command of the ground forces came to the conclusion: "To the question of how to get out of the situation if a decisive victory over England is not achieved and there is a danger of a rapprochement between England and Russia, which will force us to wage war on two fronts, and against Russia in the first place, there can be one answer strengthening friendship with Russia. A meeting with Stalin is desirable. In the Balkans, which are economically within our sphere of influence, we can make concessions. Italy and Russia can agree on a Mediterranean Sea. Under this condition, we we can deliver a decisive blow to the British in the Mediterranean theater, cut them off from Asia, help Italy create a Mediterranean empire and, with the help of Russia, strengthen their possessions captured by us in Western and Northern Europe. Then we will be able to wage a long war with England "1564 A similar way out of The strategic impasse in which Germany found itself was also

proposed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral E. Raeder. "We must," he told Hitler on September 24, 1940, "try by all means to intensify our war against England, and without delay, while the United States has not yet joined the fight. In doing so, I again pointed to Gibraltar, Suez, and also the Middle The East and the Canary Islands. The weakening of British imperial positions could be of decisive importance. We must under no circumstances violate the pact concluded with Russia, as it will save us from a war on two fronts. It is impossible to imagine," I said to Hitler, " so that he decides to unleash a war on two fronts: after all, earlier he constantly emphasized that he would not repeat the mistakes of the government of 1914. In my opinion, I declared, under no circumstances should we take on such responsibility. On the contrary, we must concentrate all our forces on defeating England ... To do this, we need to wage a naval war with the greatest energy, relying on the ports of the Atlantic, to expand, in cooperation with the French, the system of strongholds to the western coast of Africa and, with the help of Italy and France, to win dominance in the Mediterranean Sea and over the African coast to the Suez Canal . Thus, for England, the path to India will be cut off, and North Africa will be connected to the European economic system, which is important for the supply of Europe. The problem of food supply for Europe at the expense of the East disappears by itself"1565

In addition, from the Suez Canal "you can move to Palestine and Syria. Then Turkey is in our hands. In this case, the Russian problem takes on a different look. Russia will constantly be afraid of Germany. It is doubtful that in this case it will still be necessary to act on November to Russia in the North "1566. 14, 1940 . Raeder told Hitler, who was increasingly opposed was inclined to the need for a war with the USSR, which recommends postponing it "until victory over England, since Germany's forces are too tense, and the end of the war is not in sight ... Russia, in his opinion, will not seek conflict in the coming years, as it is going to improve with with the help of Germany, its fleet (expects us to supply 380-mm guns to

towers for battleships), and, therefore, for a number of years will continue to depend on the support of Germany "1567.

Even after the signing of Directive No. 21 ("Plan Barbarossa"), Raeder tried to dissuade Hitler from the "Eastern Campaign". At a meeting at headquarters on December 27, he defended his plan to concentrate all efforts to crush England. It is inexpedient, said Raeder, to start a war against the Soviet Union without fully securing its rear in the west. In Greece, Albania, Libya, and East Africa, the British took the initiative; they strengthened their positions in the Mediterranean. Under these conditions, the capture of Gibraltar becomes even more important. Achieving this goal will improve the position of Italy, ensure the dominance of the Axis powers in the western Mediterranean, deprive England of the most important link in the system of her world communications and make it difficult for her to conduct military operations in Cyrenaica and Greece, give Germany the opportunity to launch an offensive in Africa through Spanish Morocco. All this must be done as quickly as possible, before the active action of the United States in support of England. To do this, it is necessary to expand the maximum production of aircraft and

submarines¹⁵⁶⁸. Therefore, Raeder expressed "the most serious doubts about the possibility of a war against Russia before England is defeated." Hitler agreed with the need to increase the production of submarines, but stated that "given the current political situation (Russia's tendency to interfere in the Balkan affairs), it is necessary in any case to eliminate the last enemy on the continent before England can be taken. Therefore, the ground forces should receive necessary power. Only then will it be possible to fully concentrate all efforts on the naval and air forces "1569 . The last attempt to influence Hitler's strategy was made by Raeder on June 6, 1941, when he presented to the Führer the main considerations on the strategic situation in the eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the capture of Crete. It was suggested that the situation in the Middle East be used quickly and as energetically as possible before England, with the help of the United States, had time to strengthen its positions there again. Operations in the Middle East theater to oust the British from there should have been carried out along with Operation Barbarossa in 1570. However, all these proposals did not find support from the political leadership of Germany, and the Wehrmacht did not have sufficient forces to solve such difficult tasks in two different theaters. After the war, many former Wehrmacht generals expressed the opinion that Hitler missed the very

favorable opportunities that opened up for Germany as a result of the Balkan campaign to intensify the struggle and defeat England, after which it would be possible to solve military-political tasks in the East. So, according to the former employee of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Major General A. Filippi, "Hitler did not bother to seriously consider the idea put forward by the command of the ground forces and navy and supported by the headquarters of the operational leadership to hit the main artery of the British Empire in the Mediterranean together with Italy and thereby to achieve a decisive outcome of the war in combination with an offensive against the British metropolis... In essence, Hitler, shackled by continental thinking, was afraid of any risk in general in operations on the periphery of Europe. Therefore, he chose a different path from the strategic impasse into which he leadership of his state short-sightedness and lack of military plans "1571 Drawing attention to the fact that the German Air Force made it possible to negate the superiority of the British in the

Mediterranean Sea, K. Toppelskirch believed that "if Hitler had not been so military campaign," he would have to admit that this circumstance opens up new prospects for a decisive war against England in the Mediterranean basin. But, given the weakness of Italy and doubting the possibility of establishing dominance in the Mediterranean, he was afraid of these prospects. Meanwhile, the Axis powers could keep the air

dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean, to seize the island of Malta as the first goal, to secure sea communications to North Africa and shake the position of England in the Middle East, then, probably, to return again to the plan of capturing Gibraltar, i.e., in general, to direct the conduct of the war against England in the course that Raeder outlined in his report on December 27 "1572.

Supporters of this point of view based on purely military factors do not take into account the general complex military-political situation in which Germany found itself. The protracted war with England, supported by the United States, required rapprochement with the USSR, but the cost of such a rapprochement was, according to Berlin, too high. The offensive in the Middle East was also associated with the position of the Soviet Union, which also required concessions. Unwillingness, and indeed the impossibility of finding a new basis for the Soviet-German compromise, convinced the German leadership of the need for a military solution to the eastern problems that should have opened up new prospects for Germany. As a result, as A. Hilgruber wrote, "all Hitler's military activities in the West, in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean region in the first half of 1941 should be considered from the point of view of one big idea - that they should have served during the operation "Barbarossa" to consolidate the continental European bastion captured in 1940. From the point of view of this next phase of the overall planning of the war, they were conceived as strategically defensive even where it was a question of offensive operations, as in the Balkan campaign or during operations in North Africa. were at the same time to create the prerequisites for the subsequent deployment of strategic operations - to the southeast against British positions in the Middle East, to the southwest in order to create a German bridgehead in northwestern Africa against Great Britain and the USA. Despite all the temptations to use the weak points of the British enemy and prematurely penetrate into areas that could be apparently or most definitely captured by rapid strikes using small German forces, Hitler retained priority over his plan "Barbarossa" even when it came to the tempting prospects of an attack on British positions in the Middle East "1573

Among the motives that guided Berlin when deciding to start a war with the USSR, ideological considerations occupied not the last place. Traditional anti-communism, which was one of the foundations of the National Socialist ideology, which declared itself the only force capable of resisting communism, the defeat of the communist movement in Germany and the ideological struggle against it in the occupied countries of Europe, seemed to push the National Socialist leadership to crush the center of communist propaganda in Moscow. Of course, we should not forget that the anti-communist and anti-Soviet foundations of the National Socialist ideology reflected a more fundamental confrontation between the "Western" and "Russian" civilizations and the next stage in the struggle of the "West" with any socio-economic alternative to its domination of the world. It is no coincidence that the racist and nationalist ideas of the NSDAP have never caused general rejection in Europe - after all, the Eurocentric perception of the world is based on them. In this sense, National Socialism was just the next step in the development of Western liberalism and a kind of testing ground for the future concept of the "golden billion"1574

The anti-communist and anti-Soviet components of the ideology of the Third Reich were naturally supplemented by the idea of fighting for "living space", which was necessary to create a powerful empire with an autarkic economy. Since Eastern Europe, including the European part of the USSR, was regarded as one of the most important components of this "living space", the purely ideological justification for the new expansion was combined with the economic demands of the ideologists of National Socialism and the leaders of the German economy. Moreover, in this matter, the German leadership did not take into account the fact that Soviet deliveries on trade

treaties and especially transit through the territory of the USSR played an important role in German foreign trade. Based on the experience of the war in Europe, in Berlin they believed that the lightning defeat of the Red Army would allow them to freely seize most of Soviet industry and set up production in the interests of Germany.

Strategically, all these considerations linked up with the real problem of the stalemate in the war with England. It turned out that Germany did not have the opportunity to immediately withdraw it from the war, and the war became more and more protracted. Moreover, in Berlin it was assumed that the resistance of England was connected with its hopes for the US or the USSR to enter the war. In this case, it is not so important to what extent this opinion really reflected the motives of the policy of the British government in the second half of 1940 - early 1941. Much more important is the fact that, as a result of the persistence of Great Britain, Germany found itself in a strategic impasse, and the loss of momentum led to a loss of time, to catch up which was no longer possible. Since Germany could not force the United States to refuse assistance to England, Hitler concluded that the defeat of the USSR would push London to concessions and peace negotiations. Moreover, this strategic idea, first expressed in a general form by Hitler on July 13, 1940,¹⁵⁷⁵, was constantly developed and refined in the future. On July 31, 1940, Hitler declared that "England's hope is Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in an incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia." Therefore, it was necessary to crush the USSR with one blow, since "if Russia is defeated, England will lose its last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans"¹⁵⁷⁶.

Considering the war with the USSR as one of the episodes of the war with England, Hitler further developed his idea of the importance of victory in the East to achieve victory in the West. On January 9, 1941, during a discussion of the situation with the military leadership, Hitler again touched upon the hopes of England, which was striving to "put together a large continental bloc against Germany," for help from the United States and the USSR. As the Fuhrer believed, "the ruler of Russia, Stalin is smart, he will not openly oppose Germany, but it must be reckoned with the fact that in difficult situations for Germany he will create more and more difficulties for us. He wants to take over the legacy of impoverished Europe, he also needs successes, he is encouraged by the Drang nach Westen, and it is also quite clear to him that after the complete victory of Germany, the position of Russia will become very difficult.

The British are supported by the hope of the possibility of Russian intervention. They will only give up resistance when this last continental hope of theirs is crushed ... If they can hold out, form 30-40 divisions, and if the United States and Russia provide them with assistance, then a very difficult situation will be created for Germany. This cannot be allowed... Therefore, now it is necessary to defeat Russia. Then either England will surrender, or Germany will continue to fight against England under the most favorable conditions. The defeat of Russia will also allow Japan to turn all its forces against the United States. And this would keep the latter from entering the war. The question of time is especially

important for the defeat of Russia. Although the Russian armed forces are a clay colossus without a head, it is impossible to accurately predict their further development. Since Russia must be defeated in any case, it is best to do so now, when the Russian army is leaderless and ill-prepared, and when the Russians have to overcome great difficulties in the military industry created with outside help. Nevertheless, even now the Russians cannot be underestimated. Therefore, the German offensive must be carried out with maximum forces. Under no circumstances should the frontal pushing back of the Russians be allowed. Therefore, the most decisive breakthroughs are necessary... The goal of the operation should be to destroy the Russian armed forces, to seize the most important economic centers and destroy other industrial regions, primarily in the Yekaterinburg region; in addition, it is necessary to take possession of the Baku region.

The defeat of Russia will be a great relief for Germany. Then only 40-50 divisions would have to be left in the East, the strength of the land army could be reduced, and the entire military industry could be used to arm the air and naval forces. Then it will be necessary to create a reliable anti-aircraft cover and move the most important industrial enterprises to safe areas. Then Germany will be invulnerable. The gigantic expanses of Russia are fraught with incalculable

riches. Germany must take possession of these areas economically and politically, but not annex them. Thus, it will have all the possibilities for waging a future struggle against the continents, then no one can defeat it anymore. When this operation is carried out, Europe will hold its breath"1577.

In a conversation with Mussolini and Ciano on January 20, 1941, Hitler stated that "the general situation in the East can only be correctly assessed from the point of view of the situation in the West. An attack on the British Isles is the last goal. Here we are in the position of a man with a rifle only one cartridge left: if he misses, the situation will become even worse than before. The landing will not be repeated, as in case of failure too much equipment will be lost. Then England will no longer have to fear anything, and she will be able to direct her main forces to the periphery wherever she pleases. And while the landing has not yet taken place, the British have to reckon with her possibility ... America, even if she enters the war, poses no great danger. The biggest threat is the huge colossus of Russia. Although Germany signed with Russia very advantageous political and economic treaties, it is still better to rely on one's own means of force. But at the same time, very significant forces are tied up on the Russian border, not allowing enough people to be sent to the military industry to increase the production of weapons to the limit for aviation and the navy. As long as the smart and cautious Stalin is alive, there is no danger. But when he is gone, the Jews, who have now receded into the background, may again come to the fore.

Therefore, caution must be exercised. The Russians put forward more and more new demands, which they subtract from the treaties. That is why they do not want firm and precise formulations in these treaties. Therefore, one must keep in mind such a factor as Russia, and insure oneself with force and diplomatic dexterity. Previously, Russia did not pose any threat to Germany, but now, in the age of military aviation, from Russia or from the Mediterranean, the Romanian oil region can be turned into smoking ruins in an instant, and it is vital for the Axis "1578

On March 30, 1941, Hitler declared that "now there is an opportunity to defeat Russia, having a free rear. This opportunity will not appear again so soon. I would be a criminal before the German people if I did not take advantage of this"1579. Once again, Hitler outlined his vision of the strategic situation in a letter to Mussolini dated June 21, 1941, in which he informed the Duce that he had decided to start a war against the USSR, since "there is no other way to eliminate this danger. Further waiting will lead at the latest either this year or next, to disastrous consequences." Assessing the situation, Hitler argued that "England lost this war. With the despair of a drowning woman, she clutches at every straw that in her eyes can serve as an anchor of salvation." In this case, this hope is "the Soviet Union. Both states, Soviet Russia and England, are equally interested in a disintegrated Europe weakened by a long war. Behind these states, the North American Union stands in a pose of instigator and expectant. After the liquidation of Poland in Soviet Russia, a consistent a direction that - cleverly and cautiously, but steadily - returns to the old Bolshevik trend of expanding the Soviet state. The prolongation of the war necessary for the realization of these goals is supposed to be achieved by pinning down German forces in the East so that the German command cannot decide on a major offensive in the West, especially in the air."

Since the battle for England requires the use of the entire German air force, Germany must be insured "against a surprise attack from the East, or even from the threat of such an attack. The Russians have enormous forces ... Actually, all available Russian troops are on our borders. With the onset of warm weather in defensive work is being carried out in many places. If circumstances force me to throw German aircraft against England, there will be a danger that Russia, for its part, will begin to exert pressure in the south and north, before which I will be forced to silently retreat for the simple reason that I will not have superiority in I could not then launch an offensive against the Russian defenses with the divisions stationed in the East without sufficient air support. will be even more opposed to the conclusion of peace, since she will still rely on a Russian partner. Moreover, this hope, of course, will grow as the combat readiness of the Russian armed forces increases. And behind all this are still the American massive deliveries of war materials, which have been expected since 1942. In the event of a war in the East, "my retreat would bring us a heavy loss of prestige. This would be especially unpleasant, given the possible impact on Japan. Therefore, after much thought, I came to the conclusion that it is better to break this loop before it is tightened. I believe, Duce, that by doing so this year I will render our joint conduct of the war, perhaps, the greatest service that is possible."

According to Hitler, the will of England to fight is based "only on two factors: Russia and America. We have no opportunity to eliminate America. But it is in our power to exclude Russia. will create an opportunity to greatly complicate the actions of the Americans with the help of Japanese intervention. Under these conditions, I decided, as I have already mentioned, to put an end to the hypocritical game of the Kremlin." Informing Mussolini that Finland and Romania would take part in the war against the USSR, Hitler asked him to strengthen the operations of the Italian armed forces in the Mediterranean and assured that Germany was able to defend Europe from any possible actions of England. Recognizing that the struggle in the East "would be hard," Hitler had no doubt "of a major success" and hoped that "as a result, we will be able to secure a common food base in Ukraine for a long time. It will serve us as a supplier of those resources that, perhaps, we will need in the future... It is quite possible that Russia will try to destroy the Romanian oil sources. We have put in place defenses which I hope will prevent this from happening. The task of our armies is to eliminate this threat as quickly as possible... What whatever happens now, Duce, our situation will not worsen from this step, it can only get better. Even if I were forced to leave 60 or 70 divisions in Russia by the end

of this year, it would still be only a part of the forces that I must now constantly keep on the eastern border. Let England try not to draw conclusions from the terrible facts that she will face. Then we will be able, having freed our rear, to fall upon the enemy with triple force in order to destroy him "1580. Thus, the idea of achieving victory in the West through victory in the East until June 22, 1941, was the basis of German strategy. The above statements by Hitler once again testify that the German leadership, when deciding to attack the USSR, was guided by its own strategic goals, and not by fear of an imminent Soviet attack, since the eastern neighbor was regarded only as a potential threat to Germany in the future. Rather, in this case, the German leadership sought to put into practice the basic law of German foreign policy formulated by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*: "Never put up with the existence of two continental powers in Europe! In any attempt to create a second military power on the borders of Germany, or even only a state that could later become a major

military power, you should see a direct attack on Germany. Once such a situation is created, you not only have the right, you are obliged to fight against it by all means, even to the use of weapons. And you have no right to rest until you succeed in preventing the emergence of such a state, or until you succeed in destroying it, if it has already arisen.

The protracted war in the West, the gradual strengthening of the English economic blockade of Europe created a real threat of the economic collapse of Germany, therefore in Berlin it was decided to conquer such a "living space" so that Germany, "resistant to blockade, territorially united and economically independent of the import of strategic raw materials, is continental European empire" would be able to endure a long war with England and the USA¹⁵⁸². The rooting of the idea of the "Eastern campaign" in the German leadership was also facilitated by the fact that German intelligence had extremely scarce data on the Soviet armed forces and evaluated the Red Army based on the results of the battles of the Soviet-Finnish war. In the conditions of reassessment of the Wehrmacht's own forces, which had so quickly crushed the French army, a conclusion was drawn about the weakness of the Soviet armed forces. During the discussion of the plan for the "Eastern Campaign" on December 5, 1940, Hitler stated that "it should be expected that the Russian army at the first blow of the German troops will suffer an even greater defeat than the army of France in 1940." ¹⁵⁸³ That is, in Berlin there was an opinion that the USSR is not only a key link in the strategy of a future victory in the war with England, but also a rather weak enemy, the defeat of which would allow Germany to turn the tide

of the war in its favor. In addition to purely strategic considerations, an important problem for Germany remained its economic capabilities in the protracted war. Even before the outbreak of World War II, it was clear that Germany did not have the economic capacity to wage a prolonged war with one or more of the great powers. According to the German leadership, the strategy of "blitzkrieg" could become a way out of this situation, which was supposed to ensure the defeat of any enemy before he was able to fully deploy his military and economic potential. Proceeding from this idea, Berlin relied on the most efficient use of available economic opportunities to prepare the armed forces for individual lightning campaigns, the pauses between which made it possible to accumulate new reserves for the next strike. Any attempts to start restructuring the economy to ensure combat operations in the conditions of a protracted war were sharply suppressed by Hitler, who believed that this would primarily affect the living standards of the population and stimulate dissatisfaction with the government¹⁵⁸⁴. Another problem was the limited resources of Germany, which replenished them

thanks to its foreign trade. Under the conditions of the war and the English economic blockade, Berlin's ability to use non-European markets narrowed significantly, and although in 1939-1940. Germany, due to the occupation of most of Europe, managed to increase its military and economic resources, it could not simultaneously maintain a relatively high standard of living of the population and develop its armed forces. As a result, Germany faced a dilemma: either in the shortest possible time to repeatedly strengthen the blitzkrieg weapon - the Wehrmacht and continue to smash opponents one by one, or to expand the military-industrial base and thereby lose time, which would be used by the opposing great powers, with the combined economic power of which Germany cannot compete could. Having staked on the lightning defeat of the USSR, the German leadership hoped to achieve this with the maximum use of the available economic base, and in the future, using the captured Soviet resources, to intensively develop industry to fight England and the USA.

If initially, after the end of the fighting in France, the priority of military production was given to the development of the Air Force, Navy and tank troops, then from September 28, 1940, the task was set to provide "military equipment for 180 field divisions and the corresponding

the number of occupying divisions by the spring of 1941. production in the occupied countries, especially in France, which also narrowed its economic opportunities. There was also the problem of a shortage of workers. The mobilization of new contingents in the Wehrmacht was accompanied by an increase in the use of foreign labor, the number of which increased from 1,154 thousand people in May 1940 to 3,033 thousand people in May 1941. In an effort to make up for the lack of manpower, the German command went on to provide temporary long-term leave to military personnel, which made it possible to use about 500 thousand people in industry until April 1, 1941. However, the general shortage of workers did not allow to transfer military production to two- and three-shift work; therefore, the vast majority of military enterprises worked in one shift with an extended working day. The occupation of most of Europe allowed Germany to obtain significant reserves of strategic raw materials, which to a certain extent eased the position of the German economy, but narrowed the possibility of using the industry of the occupied countries for military needs. In addition, the annual supply of strategic raw materials did not even cover consumption, not to

mention actual needs. Already in the spring of 1941, it became clear that fuel and rubber reserves would last only until autumn. The problem of oil supply was especially acute, although since 1940 Germany has almost completely controlled oil production in Romania. It is no coincidence that an important place in the strategic plans of Berlin was occupied by hopes of capturing the Middle East, without which, generally speaking, victory in the war was impossible. Nevertheless, at the cost of significant efforts, Germany managed to significantly increase its ground forces, which were entrusted with the main strategic task of 1941 - to defeat the USSR in the course of a lightning campaign even before England was withdrawn from the war. Summing up the results of the work of the German military industry for December 1940 - June 1941, General G. Thomas, head of the military economy and armaments department of the OKW headquarters, wrote on July 10, 1941 that "due to the extreme tension of all productive forces both in the economic space of Greater Germany and in the occupied areas, a

powerful increase in the material equipment of the armed forces was achieved ... The achieved increase in indicators both directly in the field of military production and in related areas turned out to be possible only thanks to a number of measures, such as: attracting a large number of prisoners of war and foreign workers to military production, secondment of skilled labor from the armed forces, the transfer of orders from overloaded enterprises to others, the widest use of the production resources of the occupied regions and the strictest restriction in the production of all products that are not of military importance. It should be noted that despite all these efforts, it has never been completely possible to fulfill the requirements for the military industry. It is clear that, in accordance with the situation at any given moment, these requirements have undergone numerous changes, but in general they have steadily increased. To satisfy them, even the production capabilities in the expanded Great German space were not enough. Therefore, each time it was possible to complete only those parts of the program that turned out to be the most important in a given military situation. in the field of mobilizing and using the country's economic potential for waging war and did not experience so many problems in providing the economy with the necessary resources. The results of the military production of Germany and the USSR in 1940 and the first half of 1941 are presented in

table 43, when considering which it should be borne in mind that German industry worked at the highest possible voltage, while the Soviet one had just begun switch to wartime. Table 43 Military production in

Germany

and the USSR¹⁵⁸⁷ * Calculated based on average monthly production. Now it is necessary to turn to the question of direct military planning.

Germany war with the USSR. This topic as a whole is quite well studied in the historiography of 1588, which allows us to limit ourselves to mentioning only the main points.

The main military goal of the "Eastern campaign" was to be "quick disabling one enemy in a war on two fronts, so that you can fully force to fall on another enemy [England]". When developing an operational strategic plan for the war in the East, the German command proceeded "from the following prerequisites:

a) the exceptional size of the territory of Russia makes it absolutely impossible for her complete conquest;

b) to achieve victory in the war against the USSR, it is enough to achieve the most important operational-strategic frontier, namely the line Leningrad Moscow - Stalingrad - Caucasus, which will exclude the practical possibility for Russia to provide military resistance, since the army will be cut off from its most important bases, primarily from oil; c)

to solve this problem, a quick defeat of the Red Army is necessary, which should be carried out within a time frame that does not allow the possibility of a war for two front ¹⁵⁸⁹.

The development of the operation against the USSR began after the German command July 21-22, 1940 received the appropriate order, and was carried out in parallel in the OKH and OKW. In total, according to incomplete data, about 12 versions of the plan and operational sketches. One of the first on July 26, the head of the department proposed his own version foreign armies of the East, Colonel E. Kinzel, who believed that the main blow should apply "to Moscow (while maintaining the junction with the Baltic Sea), after which it was supposed to strike at the rear of the Soviet grouping located in Ukraine and Black Sea coast, which will be forced to act with an inverted front ¹⁵⁹⁰.

July 27, Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the OKH, Colonel H. von Greifenberg and seconded to the General Staff to develop operational plans lieutenant colonel Feyerabend offered an alternative option: the main grouping from 100 divisions will inflict the main blow in Ukraine, crush Soviet troops there and further will develop an offensive against Moscow¹⁵⁹¹. However, these variants of a kind of "plan Schlieffen, adapted for the Eastern theater of operations, did not find support due to the complexity their implementation.

On August 5, the chief of staff of the 18th Army stationed in the East, Major General E. Marx presented to the chief of the General Staff of the OKH an operational-strategic development ("Plan Fritz"), according to which 147 German divisions deployed in two army groups on Moscow and Kiev directions, were supposed to deliver the main blow to Moscow, after occupation of which it was necessary to turn part of the forces to support the troops operating on Ukraine. The operation was to end with the withdrawal of troops to the Arkhangelsk line - Gorky - Rostov-on-Don. In early September, the first quartermaster of the General Staff ground forces of the Wehrmacht, General F. Paulus received a task based on the Marx plan draw up a general plan of the campaign, which he completed by October 29, 1940. However further study of the issues of the war with the USSR led to the emergence of several more options. So, on September 15, 1940, in the operational department of the OKW headquarters, operational version of Lieutenant Colonel B. von Lossberg, according to which it was planned to deploy three army groups against the USSR. Two army groups

deployed north of Polissya and struck in the Baltic and Belarus. The Central Army Group, upon reaching the Smolensk region, was to receive an operational pause and, if necessary, to help the Northern Army Group in the offensive against Leningrad. The Southern Army Group, with two shock groups from Lublin and from Romania, would strike at Dnepropetrovsk with the aim of encircling and destroying Soviet troops in the Ukraine. The general goal of the campaign was the line Arkhangelsk - Gorky - Stalingrad - Rostov-on-Don¹⁵⁹². The chief of staff of Army Group South,

General G. von Zodenshtern, proposed the creation of three army groups. The northern army group from East Prussia and the northern regions of Poland was to advance on the Vitebsk-Mogilev front and further to Moscow. The southern group of armies, deploying forces in southern Poland and Romania, was to advance on Kyiv and further to the northeast and towards Kharkov. Between them it was necessary to create a third group of armies, which was supposed to cover Polesie and cover the flanks of the rest of the troops. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal G. von Rundstedt, proposed the following option. The Northern Army Group advances on Leningrad and, having taken it, establishes contact with the Finns. The central and southern army groups at this time reach the line Ilmen - Orsha - Kyiv - Odessa and are fixed on it until next spring. In the event of a favorable situation at the front, it was possible to launch an offensive against Moscow by the forces of the northern and central army groups, and all other operations were postponed until 1942. The chief of staff of Army Group B, General G. von Salmuth, proposed to deliver the main blow north of Polesie in order to capture Leningrad and Moscow. A similar option was considered by the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, General G. Blumentritt, and the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General G. Goth, proposed to concentrate all tank groups in East Prussia, from where they were supposed to attack Leningrad, then Moscow and further to Ukraine. At the same time, the rest of the troops were to reach the line of the Dnieper¹⁵⁹³.

Along with general planning, staff games were held at the General Staff of the Ground Forces on November 29, December 3 and 7, at which the following issues were worked out: deployment of forces at the beginning of the operation; coordinating the actions of the two groupings of the Army Group "South", deployed in southern Poland and Romania; the dividing line between Army Groups "North" and "Center"; the distribution of forces and supplies after reaching the first goal on the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers; availability of reserves; Air Force tasks; cooperation with the Navy. As a result, the German command came to the conclusion that it was necessary to act in three strategic directions: Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. True, as A. Filippi later noted, "the study of all these issues confirmed, first of all, the opinion that in the course of operations on an ever-expanding, like a funnel, to the east of the territory, there would not be enough German forces if it was not possible to decisively break the strength of Russian resistance to the line Kiev - Minsk - Lake Peipsi"¹⁵⁹⁴. Nevertheless, a bet was made that the German troops would be able to inflict a decisive defeat on the main forces of the Red Army in the border zone up to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, and this, perhaps, would lead to the collapse of the USSR and would allow

avoiding intense battles in the future. As a result, the target setting of the "Eastern campaign" has changed. Giving the order to start developing the Barbarossa plan, Hitler believed that "the operation will only make sense if we defeat the entire state with one swift blow. Only capturing some part of the territory is not enough"¹⁵⁹⁵. The Führer thus admitted that in any other case the whole campaign to the East was pointless. However, when the final strategic version of the operation against the USSR was reported to him on December 5, Hitler agreed that "the offensive should be carried out so far to the east that Russian aviation could no longer raid the territory of the German Reich and that, on the other hand, German aviation could deliver air strikes against Russian military industrial regions"¹⁵⁹⁶. Therefore, in Directive No. 21 of December 18, it was stated that "the ultimate goal of the operation is to create a barrier against the Asian

Russia along the common line Volga Arkhangelsk. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region remaining with the Russians in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation "1597. True, Hitler still hoped that" if the Russians were defeated as a result of a series of our strikes, then starting from a certain moment, as was the case in Poland, transport, communications, and the like will fail and complete disorganization will set in."1598 According to the Barbarossa

plan, by May 15, 1941, it was planned to complete the preparation of an attack on the USSR with the forces of three army groups operating on Leningradsky, Moscow and At the same time, the German command understood that the available forces of the Wehrmacht might not be enough for successful operations in all strategic directions at once, and therefore the plan of the operation included the idea of stopping the offensive of Army Group Center at the turn of the Dnieper to transfer part of its troops to north to defeat the Soviet troops in the Baltic and take Leningrad. Although all these maneuvers made it even more difficult to defeat the USSR with lightning speed, it was believed that in a maximum of 5 months the German troops would reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga line, which was supposed to secure Germany from the East. True, in Berlin they tried not to think about the question of whether the implementation of this plan would lead to the defeat of the USSR, which in this case would have retained significant human resources and a certain economic base for the continuation of the war.

Nevertheless, as the military preparations for the campaign in the East, certain fears arose in the German military command, which Halder recorded in his diary on January 28, 1941 as follows. "Operation Barbarossa": The meaning of the campaign is not clear. We do not affect England in the least. Our economic base will not improve significantly from this. The riskiness of our position in the West cannot be underestimated. It is even possible that Italy, after losing its colonies, will collapse and be formed against us southern front on the territory of Spain, Italy and Greece. If at the same time we are pinned down in Russia, the situation will become even more difficult "1599. However, these doubts did not give rise in the German command to any serious resistance to the political line for the war with the USSR, as was the case during the preparation of the offensive in France, when there were disputes in the German military-political leadership "about the adoption of a fundamental decision, and then an operational plan in general" 1600 . Table 44 Concentration of

the

Wehrmacht near the borders of the

USSR The development and approval of the strategic plan for the "Eastern Campaign" allowed the German command from the second half of February 1941 to begin the direct deployment of its troops near the borders of the USSR. Within 4 months, 95 divisions were transferred to the border with the USSR (see table 44). In three so-called "deployment echelons" until May 21, 1941, 42 infantry and 1 tank divisions (45.3%) arrived in the East. From May 22, the German railways were put on a maximum traffic schedule, and the concentration of troops in the East accelerated sharply. In the last month before the attack, 16 infantry, 14 tank, 13 motorized and 9 security divisions (54.7%) arrived there. In addition, by June 22, 2 infantry divisions arrived completely and almost completely - 1 motorized division and 1 motorized brigade of the OKH reserve. In the first half of June, simultaneously with the completion of the strategic concentration, the withdrawal of troops to the 30-km border strip to the initial areas for the offensive began. The deployment schedule provided for the main forces of strike groups to reach the border line the night before the attack, so that they would linger there for only a few hours. Infantry formations began advancing to the border 12, and tank and motorized 4 days before the attack. In February - May 1941, rear units and services of the Air Force were transferred to the East, and on May 22 - June 18 - flight units. During June 21, the flight units of the first strike occupied airfields west of the river. Vistula, and in the evening they flew to the field

airfields near the border On the night of June 22, 1941, the German command completed all preparatory measures for the implementation of Operation Barbarossa.

What forces did Germany have at its disposal to carry out the Barbarossa plan? On June 15, 1941, the Wehrmacht consisted of 7,329 thousand people: 3,960 thousand in the active army, 1,240 thousand in the reserve army, 1,545 thousand in the Air Force, 160 thousand in the SS troops, 404 thousand. - in the Navy, about 20 thousand - in foreign formations. In addition, up to 900 thousand people accounted for the civilian staff of the Wehrmacht and various paramilitary formations¹⁶⁰². The Wehrmacht had 208 divisions, 1 combat group, 3 motorized and tank brigades and 2 infantry regiments. These troops had advantage of the absence of a 88,251 guns and mortars, 6,292 tanks and assault. Taking land front in Europe, guns and 6,852 aircraft,¹⁶⁰³ Germany was able to deploy the most combat-ready

part of its armed forces on the border with the USSR. The basis of the "Eastern Army" of Germany was, of course, the ground forces, which allocated 3,300 thousand people. For Operation Barbarossa, out of the four available army group headquarters, three were deployed (North, Center and South), 8 out of 13 field army headquarters (61.5%), which led the actions of 34 army corps headquarters out of 46 (73.9%), available in the Wehrmacht. In total, 101 infantry, 4 light infantry, 4 mountain infantry, 10 motorized, 19 tank, 1 cavalry, 9 security divisions and 5 divisions and 1 SS battle group, as well as 1 motorized brigade, 1 motorized infantry regiment and a consolidated SS formation were allocated for the Eastern Campaign - in total over 155 settlement divisions, which accounted for 73.5% of their total number. Most of the troops had combat experience gained in previous military campaigns. So, out of 155 divisions in military operations in Europe in 1939-1941. 127 participated, and the remaining 28 were partially manned by personnel who also had combat experience. In any case, these were the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht¹⁶⁰⁴.

Here, in the East, 92.8% of the units of the High Command Reserve (RGK) were deployed, including all divisions and batteries of assault guns, 3 out of 4 battalions of flamethrower tanks, 11 out of 14 armored trains, 92.1% cannon, mixed, mortar, howitzer battalions, railway batteries, batteries of tethered balloons, Karl installations, AIR battalions, battalions and regiments of chemical mortars, motorized reconnaissance, machine gun, anti-aircraft battalions, anti-aircraft batteries, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery battalions of the RGK, as well as 94, 2% of sapper, bridge-building, construction, road-building, scooter battalions, degassing and road-degassing detachments. Of these RGK units, 23% were deployed in the North Army Group, 42.2% in the Center Army Group, 31% in the South Army Group, 3% in the German forces operating in Finland, and 0.8% was in the reserve OKH¹⁶⁰⁵

The main striking force of the troops in the East were 11 motorized corps out of 12 available in the Wehrmacht (91.7%). 10 of them were combined into four tank groups by June 22, 1941, the composition of which is indicated in table 45. In addition, there were 228 combat vehicles in 11 divisions and 5 batteries of assault guns, and 18 assault guns were in service with a motorized regiment " Great Germany", SS Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler" and the 900th Motorized Brigade (246 assault guns in total). For operations in Finland, two tank battalions (40th and 211th) were allocated, in which there were 106 tanks, and three battalions of flamethrower tanks (100th, 101st and 300th) had up to 116 combat vehicles. Thus, by June 22, 1941, the "Eastern Army" had up to 3,865 tanks and assault guns, and the OKH reserve in Germany had 2 tank divisions (about 350 tanks)¹⁶⁰⁶. Table 45¹⁶⁰⁷ By June 22, 1941, out of 155 divisions in three army groups and the army

"Norway", there

were 127 divisions, 2 brigades and 1 regiment on the border with the USSR (see table 46). These troops numbered 2,812 thousand people, 37,099 guns and mortars, 3,865 tanks and assault guns¹⁶⁰⁸.

German Air Force deployed to support Operation Barbarossa 60.8% of the flying units, 16.9% of the air defense troops and over 48% of the signal troops and other units. Each army group received one air fleet. Army Group North supported the 1st Air Fleet as part of the 1st Air Corps, Air Command "Baltika" and air district "Kenigsberg". 2nd Air Fleet as part of the 8th and 2nd air corps, the 1st anti-aircraft corps and the Posen air district supported the group armies "Center". The 4th Air Fleet was assigned to support Army Group South, consisting of the 5th and 4th air corps, the 2nd anti-aircraft corps, two air districts - "Breslau" and "Vienna" and the Air Force mission in Romania. The actions of the army "Norway" were supported part of the forces of the 5th Air Fleet, subordinate to the "Inspector General of the Air Force of the Northern Norway" and the air command "Kirkenes" 1610. In addition, 51 aircraft were at the disposal of the Air Force High Command (OKL). The composition of the air fleets is shown in Table 47

people (3,300 thousand in the ground forces and SS troops, 650 thousand in the Air Force and about 100 thousand in Navy). "Eastern Army" consisted of 155 settlement divisions, 43,812 guns and mortars, 4,215 tanks and assault guns and 3,909 aircraft¹⁶¹² Of these forces, on June 22, 1941, on 128 settlement divisions were deployed on the Eastern Front, and the German grouping numbered 3,562 thousand people, 37,099 guns and mortars, 3,865 tanks and assault guns and 3,909 aircraft.

Together with Germany, her allies were preparing for war with the USSR: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Italy, which contributed the following forces to the war (see table 48).

Table 48¹⁶¹³

Personnel of the Division Guns and Tanks Airplanes

Designed mortars

Finland 340 600 17.5 2 047 86 307

Slovakia 42 500 2.5 246 35

51 Hungary 44 500 2.5 200 160

100 Romania 380 400 17 .5 3,255

60,423 Italy 61 900 3 925

61 83 Total 869 900 42.5 6 673

402 964 In addition, Croatia contributed 56 aircraft and up to 1.6 thousand people¹⁶¹⁴ By 22 June 1941 there were no Slovak and Italian troops on the border, which arrived later. Consequently, there were 765,500 people in the troops of Germany's allies, 37 settlement divisions, 5,502 guns and mortars, 306 tanks and 886 aircraft.

In total, the forces of Germany and its allies numbered 4,327.5 thousand people, 166 divisions, 42,601 guns and mortars, 4,171 tanks and assault guns, and 4,846 aircraft (of which 51 were at the disposal of the Air Force High Command and, together with 8.5 thousand people of the Air Force personnel are not taken into account in further calculations).

Armed forces of the Soviet Union in the context of the outbreak of war in Europe

continued to grow, and by the summer of 1941 they were the largest army in the world. By the beginning of the war, the Soviet the armed forces totaled 5,774,211 people: 4,605,321 in the ground forces, 475,656 in the Air Force, 353,752 in the Navy, 167,582 in the border and 171,900 in the internal troops of the NKVD¹⁶¹⁵. The ground forces had 303 divisions, 16 airborne, 1 tank and 5 rifle brigades. The troops had 117,581 guns and mortars, 25,784 tanks and 24 488 aircraft¹⁶¹⁶ Of these troops in five western border districts 174 settlement divisions were deployed (see table 49). The

NKVD troops consisted of 14 divisions, 18 brigades and 21 separate regiments of various appointments, of which in the western districts there were 7 divisions, 2 brigades and 11 operational regiments of internal troops, on the basis of which in PribOVO, ZapOVO and KOVO before

the war began the formation of the 21st, 22nd and 23rd motorized rifle divisions of the NKVD¹⁶¹⁸. The border troops consisted of 18 districts, 94 border detachments, 8 separate detachments border courts and other units. By the summer of 1941, there were 8 districts, 49 border detachments, 7 separate detachments of border courts and other units¹⁶¹⁹.

The grouping of Soviet troops in the West totaled 3,088,160 people (2,718,674 in Red Army, 215,878 in the Navy and 153,608 in the NKVD troops), 57,041 guns and mortars, 13,924 tanks (of which 11,135 are serviceable) and 8,974 aircraft (of which 7,593 are serviceable). Besides, aviation of the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea fleets and the Pinsk military flotilla had 1,769 aircraft (of which 1,506 are operational). Unfortunately, the technical equipment of the troops The NKVD is still unknown. In addition, since May 1941, the concentration of 77 divisions began the second strategic echelon from the internal military districts and from the Far East. K 22 June 16 divisions arrived in the western districts (10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized), in which there were 201,691 people, 2,746 guns and 1,763 tank ¹⁶²⁰. The grouping of Soviet troops on the western borders was quite powerful.

The overall balance of forces by the morning of June 22, 1941 is presented in table 50, judging by the data which the enemy surpassed the Red Army only in terms of the number of personnel, for his troops were mobilized. Table 50

Red Army

Enemy Division ratio 190,166 1.1:1 Personnel

3,289,851 4,327,500

1:1.3 Guns and mortars 59,787 42,601 1.4:1

Tanks and assault guns 15,687 4,171 3.8 : 1

Aircraft 10,743 4,846 2.2: 1 Now consider the

question of the balance of forces

of the parties at various strategic

directions on the scale of the district (front) - army group, and on individual operational directions (army - army). In this case, only ground forces and air forces are taken into account, and for the Soviet side and border troops. Let's start with the Northwest direction, where Army Group North and the Baltic Special Military District opposed each other (North-Western Front) (see table 51).

The Wehrmacht had a rather significant superiority in manpower and some artillery, but inferior in tanks and aviation. However, it should be taken into account that directly only 8 Soviet divisions were located in the 50-km border strip, and another 10 were 50-100 km from the border. From mid-June, the advance of Soviet troops to the border began, but by June 22, this process could not be completed. As a result, in the direction of the main blow Army Group North managed to achieve a more favorable balance of forces (see table 52).

In the Western direction, the Army Group "Center" and the troops of Western Special Military District (Western Front) with part of the forces of the 11th Army of PribOVO. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore, Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire front. Here it was concentrated 40% of all German divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea (including 50% motorized and 52.9% tank). The army group was supported by the largest air Luftwaffe fleet. In the offensive zone of Army Group "Center" in the immediate vicinity only 15 Soviet divisions were located from the border, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. The rest of the troops began to concentrate on the border in mid-June, and by June 22 in troops of the 2nd (100th, 161st rifle divisions), 47th (55th, 121st, 143rd rifle divisions), 44th (64th, 108th rifle divisions) and 21st (17th, 37th, 50th rifle divisions) rifle corps. In addition, within the district in the region Polotsk concentrated the troops of the 22nd Army from the UrVO, from which by June 22, 1941. 3 rifle divisions arrived at the scene, and the 21st mechanized corps from the Moscow Military District - with a total number of 72 016 men, 1,241 guns and mortars, and 692 tanks^{1,623} Total held by state

in peacetime, the troops of the ZAPOVO were inferior to the enemy only in personnel, but outnumbered him in tanks, aircraft, and slightly in artillery (see table 53). However, unlike the troops of Army Group Center, they did not complete the concentration, which allowed to smash them piece by piece.

Army Group "Center" was supposed to carry out a double coverage of the troops of the Western districts located in the Bialystok ledge, with a blow from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, therefore, the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. From the south (from Brest) dealt the main blow. On the northern flank (Suwalki) the 3rd Panzer Group was deployed Wehrmacht, which was opposed by units of the 11th army of PribOVO (see table 54).

Table 541625

Parts of the 11th Army 3rd Panzer Group Division ratio

3 12 1: 4 Personnel

34,700 265,000 1: 7.6 Guns and

mortars 646 3,060 1: 4.7 Tanks 102

1,057 1: 10.4 Troops of

the 43rd Army Corps of the 4th

German army and the 2nd tank group. In this area, the enemy was also able to achieve significant superiority (see table 55). Table 55 4th

Army Parts

of the 4th Army Ratio and 2nd Panzer Group

Divisions 7 20.5 1: 2.9

Personnel 71 349 461

680 1: 6.5 Guns and mortars 1 657 5

953 1: 6, 5 Tanks 520 1,021 1: 1.9

Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian troops, opposed parts of the Kyiv Special and Odessa military districts (South-Western and Southern fronts). Soviet grouping on The southwestern direction was the strongest on the entire front, since it was she who should was to deal the main blow to the enemy. However, even here the Soviet troops did not complete focus and expansion. So, in KOVO in the immediate vicinity of the border there were only 16 divisions, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. From mid June the advance to the border of the troops of the 31st (193rd, 195th, 200th rifle divisions), 36th (140th, 146th, 228th rifle divisions), 37th (80th, 139th, 141st rifle divisions), 49th (190th, 198th, 109th rifle divisions) and 55th (130th, 169th, 189th rifle divisions) rifle corps. In the OdVO, in the 50-km border strip, there were 9 divisions, and 6 located in the 50-100 km band. In addition, troops of the 16th th and 19th armies, from which by June 22 concentrated 10 divisions (7 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized), with a total number of 129,675 people, 1,505 guns and mortars and 1,071 tanks in 1626 . Even without being staffed according to the states of the military times, Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping (see table 56), however they have not completed their concentration and

deployment.

Table 561627 KOVO and OdVO Army Group "South"

Division ratio 91.5 63.5

1.4: 1 Personnel 1,412,136 1,530,800 1: 1.1

Guns and mortars 26,580 16,008 1.7: 1

Tanks 8 069 1 144 7: 1

Aircraft 4 696 1 829 2.6: 1

The enemy troops had only some superiority in manpower, but significantly inferior in tanks, aircraft and somewhat less in artillery. But in the direction of the main the strike of the Army Group "South", where the Soviet 5th Army was opposed by parts of the 6th German Army

and the 1st Panzer Group, the enemy managed to achieve a better balance of forces for himself (see. table 57).

Table 57

5th Army 6th Army and Ratio 1st Tank

Group Divisions 8 15

1: 1.9 Personnel

93,368 339,340 1: 3.6 Guns and

mortars 2,215 4,035 1: 1.8 Tanks 712

521 1.4:1 The most

favorable ratio for the Red Army was at the front

Leningrad military district, where he was opposed by the Finnish troops and parts of the German army "Norway" (see table 58). In the Far North, the troops of the Soviet 14th Army resisted the German units of the mountain infantry corps "Norway" and the 36th army corps (see table 59), and here the enemy had superiority in manpower and insignificant in artillery. True, it should be borne in mind that, since hostilities on the Soviet-Finnish border began in late June - early July 1941, both sides built up their forces, and the given data do not reflect the number of troops of the parties to the start of hostilities.

Thus, the German command, having deployed the main part of the Wehrmacht, could not achieve overwhelming superiority, not only in the entire future front, but also in the bands of individual army groups. However, the Red Army was not mobilized and has not completed the process of strategic concentration and deployment. As a result, parts of the first echelon of covering troops were significantly inferior to the enemy, whose troops were deployed directly at the border. Similar arrangement Soviet troops allowed to smash them in parts. On the directions of the main strikes of groups armies, the German command managed to create superiority over the troops of the Red Army that was close to overwhelming. The most favorable balance of power happened for the Wehrmacht in the zone of the Army Group "Center", since it was on this direction was dealt the main blow of the entire Eastern campaign. On other directions even in the bands of the covering armies, the Soviet superiority in tanks had an effect. General the balance of power allowed the Soviet command to prevent superiority the enemy even in the directions of his main attacks. But what really happened the

opposite. Since the Soviet military-political leadership did not expect the German attacks, the Red Army, starting in May 1941 strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater of operations, which was supposed to be completed by July 15, turned out to be 22 June 1941 was taken by surprise and had neither offensive nor defensive groupings. Soviet troops were not mobilized, did not have deployed rear structures and only completed the creation of management bodies in the theater. At the front from the Baltic sea to the Carpathians from 77 divisions of the Red Army covering forces in the first hours of the war only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could provide the enemy, of which only some managed to take equipped positions on the border. The rest of the troops were either in places of permanent deployment, or in camps, or on the march. However, if we take into account that the enemy immediately threw 103 divisions into the offensive, it is clear that the organized entry into the battle and the creation of a continuous front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. Having preempted the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, creating powerful operational groupings of their fully combat-ready forces in selected directions main attack, the German command created favorable conditions for the capture strategic initiative and the successful conduct of the first offensive operations.

Let us now turn to the question of the qualitative correlation of the sides' military equipment. The main striking force of the armies of that time were tank troops. However, each the great power had its own classification system for armored vehicles. In Red

Army tanks were classified according to their combat weight (mass of a refueled tank with full ammunition and crew). Accordingly, there were light (T-27, T-37, T-38, T-40, T-26, BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, BT-7m), medium (T-28, T-34) and heavy (T-35, KV-1, KV-2) tanks. In the mechanized corps, according to the state, there should have been 71.4% of light tanks (of which 43% were BT)¹⁶³¹. The Wehrmacht had its own classification of tanks, based on the caliber of a tank gun. The T-I and T-II belonged to the light ones, the T-III was considered a medium escort tank, and the T-IV was considered a heavy fire support tank. In addition, the captured Czech tanks T-35 (t) and T-38 (t) were in service with the Wehrmacht. Thus, a direct comparison of the techniques of the parties, as is usually the case in historiography, is impossible. V. Suvorov, who

drew attention to this fact, suggested using the American classification of armored vehicles for comparison, which was based on the fact that all tanks up to 20 tons were considered light, up to 40 tons - medium, and over 40 tons - heavy. Considering the difference in the layout of the tank in the USSR and Germany, he concluded that, in principle, such an approach that all German tanks were light¹⁶³³ is a completely possible solution to this difficult issue, but it should be borne in mind that the American classification is still closer to the Soviet than to Germanic. Therefore, Table 60 provides not only quantitative data on the types of tanks in the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, but also weight and armament (the number and caliber of guns and machine guns) are indicated in brackets, which, in our opinion, allows us to more objectively compare the armored vehicles of the parties. For 38 years, Russian historiography claimed that by June 15, 1941, 29% of Soviet old-type tanks needed an average, and 44% needed a major overhaul¹⁶³⁴. However, the currently available materials completely refute this version, and in table 60 the number of serviceable tanks of both armies is indicated in brackets.

For a complete picture of the state of the tank fleet of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, it should be remembered that in June 1941, 305 tanks were produced in the USSR, and 312 in Germany. that, except for the T-34 and KV, all other

tanks were obsolete¹⁶³⁷. However, a comparison of the tactical and technical data of Soviet and German tanks shows that German technology did not have any significant superiority. Some parameters were better for enemy tanks, and some for Soviet tanks. Greater speed and better maneuverability made it possible to use Soviet "outdated" tanks to fight the Germans on an equal footing. The course of hostilities in 1941 showed that if the Soviet "obsolete" tanks roughly corresponded to the German technology, then the T-34 and especially the KV were significantly superior to all types of Wehrmacht tanks. Moreover, it turned out that the German troops did not have at all the means that would allow them to fight on an equal footing with these types of tanks of the Red Army. However, it should be noted that the Wehrmacht's tank troops had the experience of modern mobile warfare, clear interaction with other branches of the armed forces on the battlefield, which allowed them to gain a certain qualitative superiority over the Soviet tank forces, which did not complete the next reorganization and were often forced to engage in battles without support not only aviation, but also infantry or artillery. A comparison of the qualitative indicators of the artillery of both sides shows that there can be no question of any qualitative superiority of the German artillery. If we take into account that

most of the enemy guns were modernized models of the First World War era, and the Soviet ones were created in the 1930s, then it must be recognized that the groundwork for improving Soviet artillery was more significant than the German one. In addition, the Red Army received the BM-13, the famous Katyusha, into service, eliminating the German monopoly on multiple launch rocket systems in the ground forces. So there is no reason to talk about the superiority of the Germans as artillery. Another thing is that the artillery units of the Wehrmacht had combat experience and well-developed interaction

with other branches of the military on the battlefield. Using their experience of modern warfare, the German artillerymen at the beginning of the war acted more skillfully and achieved serious successes.

With aviation, the situation was somewhat different. Comparing performance data aviation technology, it should be noted that the Soviet aircraft put into service in the first half of the 1930s, were significantly inferior to the same type of enemy aircraft, which were modernized taking into account the experience of the war in Europe. Soviet aircraft new structures, adopted in 1939-1941, not only were not inferior to aircraft Luftwaffe, but also had much greater potential for further improvement. But in the Soviet Air Force, new aircraft accounted for about 25% of the total quantities and have not yet been mastered by personnel. It should also be noted that the best organization of the German Air Force, which had large air formations. Soviet aviation was fragmented between armies, fronts and long-range aviation. actions. In addition, the training of the Luftwaffe flight personnel was better, and he had a lot of combat experience. The training of Soviet pilots was weaker, most of them did not have and combat experience. So, the flight training of Soviet pilots was 30-180 hours, and German - 450 hours. Consequently, the German Air Force had a qualitative superiority.

Table 61

Number of aircraft in the Air Force of Germany and the USSR	
1638 Germany	USSR
Ratio Bombers	2,642 6,887 1: 2.6
Scouts	823 1,934 1: 2.3
Fighters	2,249 9,881 1: 4.4
Attack aircraft	- 57
Other	1,138 5,729 1 : 5
Total	6,852 24,488 1: 3.6

army of the Wehrmacht by June 22, 1941 shows that "the divisions with the best equipment were concentrated around the panzer groups, while between them and on the flanks predominantly less combat-ready and inactive divisions were used. Generally The eastern army gave the impression of more of a "patchwork quilt", contrary to very widespread in post-war literature that Hitler, thanks to flexible the economy of a lightning war and the robbery of the occupied territories, to mobilize a powerful uniformly equipped army against the USSR. This one on its own rather unexpected fact is explained not only by the then available material the capabilities of the German military command, but also the fact that the decision to attack The Soviet Union was not provided with appropriate vigorous measures in the field of weapons. Its production was not correlated with the potential of the enemy, since The German leadership proceeded from the fact that it could destroy the existing forces military potential of the USSR within a few weeks" 1639 .

Thus, the clear qualitative superiority of technology, as well as its quantitative superiority, the Wehrmacht did not have. However, the training of personnel and the operation of this technology in the Wehrmacht was higher than in the Red Army. A clear advantage Wehrmacht was that the troops concentrated to attack the USSR were in deployed and full combat readiness, and the Red Army has just begun concentration and deployment of troops in the West. German troops had enough high morale and counted on another lightning war. By the summer of 1941 The Wehrmacht was the strongest army in the world, which made it a very serious opponent. And if Soviet designers managed to create equipment even before the war, which became the basis for future qualitative superiority over the German, then the Red Army is still only I had to learn how to beat the enemy with this technique, and this study was long and difficult.

All this once again shows that the attempts of Russian historiography to explain following Stalin, the defeat of the Soviet troops at the beginning of the war was either quantitative or

qualitative superiority of German technology are not sufficiently substantiated. There was no significant qualitative superiority of German technology, and the Germans were able to achieve quantitative superiority only in personnel and in certain areas in artillery. However, the overall balance of forces allowed the Red Army to prevent even this superiority. Therefore, the question of using the available forces of the Red Army, of the ability to properly dispose of them, comes to the fore. It was precisely this skill that the Soviet military-political leadership lacked, which led to such a tragic start to the war. The lack of a well-developed defensive war strategy in the Soviet command and shortcomings in the combat training of the troops became the main reasons that predetermined the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war. The troops, not being deployed and equipped, had to immediately engage in battle with enemy forces superior to them in each individual battle, who acted on the whole more professionally. Unfortunately, the heroism of the soldiers of the Red Army could not replace a clear and thoughtful system of defense and leadership of troops. The materials available to researchers show that, finding themselves in a strategic

impasse in the summer of 1940, the German leadership was forced to look for new opportunities to win the war with England. However, it soon became clear that the Wehrmacht did not have enough forces to land on the British Isles, which was already too risky, and the expansion of hostilities against England on the periphery of Europe required some preparation, and most importantly, the creation of political conditions through closer cooperation with Italy and other interested parties. parties - from Spain to Japan. However, the negotiations showed that neutral countries are in no hurry to get involved in the war, waiting for developments. Not the last place in these political and strategic calculations of Berlin was occupied by the USSR, negotiations with which showed that Moscow is not averse to continuing the policy of cooperation with Germany, but at the same time demands new territorial concessions from Berlin regarding Finland, the Balkans and the Middle East. All this clearly demonstrated that the Soviet Union was not only a politically independent powerful neighbor of Germany, but also was striving to pursue a policy of ensuring its own interests in Europe, which did not at all correspond to Berlin's plans. The outcome of the Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 clearly pushed the German leadership to stake on the military crushing of the USSR. Initially, in Berlin, they thought about implementing the idea of the "Eastern Campaign" in the euphoria of the

victory over France. However, unsuccessful attempts to withdraw England from the war led the German leadership to consider a future war with the USSR as a real chance to achieve victory in the West. It was believed that the rapid defeat of the Soviet Union would allow Berlin to obtain a broad raw material base, the use of which would make Germany capable of resisting England and the United States in a protracted war. Such a perception of the problem of the "Eastern campaign" was facilitated by the underestimation of the military and economic power and political stability of the USSR and the extreme overestimation of the forces of the Wehrmacht. Even when, during the preparations for the war in the East, it became clear that Germany did not have forces capable of inflicting a guaranteed defeat on the Soviet Union, the German leadership, instead of looking for another way out of the strategic impasse, decided, based on the experience of the war in Europe, to rely on the strongest possible initial strike, which, probably, was supposed to lead to the collapse of the Soviet state. Moreover, knowing about the limitations of the German forces, in Berlin they seriously planned to victoriously complete the "Eastern Campaign" by November 1941 at the latest, since, as modern German researchers note, "the German command was confident that, if not materially, then in the operational art of warfare, it will be able to achieve decisive military superiority.

A retrospective examination of this problem shows that the entire military planning of the "Eastern Campaign" was so adventurous that doubts involuntarily arise whether the German military-political leadership was generally guided by common sense.

meaning. Firstly, from the very beginning it was clear that the defeat of the USSR in the framework of a short-term lightning campaign was not feasible, if only for geographical reasons. Secondly, a protracted war in the East would put Germany in a situation of war on two fronts, which would mean her inevitable defeat. Not imagining the real power of the USSR and the stability of the Soviet political system, the German leadership made a completely impossible decision. Moreover, they were going to defeat the USSR in 5 months from May (later - June) to October (November) 1941. Even if the Wehrmacht managed to occupy Soviet territory up to the Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan line, this did not mean the defeat of the USSR, which in this case would have saved significant human resources and a certain economic base for the continuation of the war. As a result, all Berlin's calculations for a quick victory over the USSR were built on the expectation of a miracle. The miracle did not happen, the German ground forces were pinned down in the East, while England received a respite and time to build up its military and economic efforts. Germany lost the initiative in the war and now its defeat was only a matter of time. Thirdly, as A. Filippi carefully formulated this idea, "the German ground forces operating on the Eastern Front and the funds allocated to support them from other branches of the armed forces were hardly able to fulfill. In other words, Germany simply did not have the strength to defeat this kind of task" 1641. Red that in the event of war Army. And by the way, the German General Staff was well aware the Russians could mobilize up to 12 million people, but, based on erroneous information about Soviet military production, they believed that the Red Army would not have enough weapons for such a large number of troops. Despite the fact that the Wehrmacht had a reserve to make up for losses of only 475 thousand people, the gap in mobilization capabilities, not to mention the fact that literally all combat-ready units were thrown to the East, only confirms the conclusion of the German general. If we also take into account, fourthly, the fact that the Soviet military-industrial complex was much more adapted to supply the army with the necessary equipment during a protracted war, then the entire "Eastern campaign" cannot be regarded otherwise than as a suicidal adventure of the German leadership. Or, as its participant, General G. Blumentritt, noted after the war, "by making this fatal decision, Germany lost the war" 1642.

Conclusion

Consideration against a broad background of military-political problems on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, taking into account the latest historiography and documents that have become available to researchers, shows that the concept of events of 1939-1941 created back in the Soviet period. needs significant modernization. First of all, one should abandon the completely fantastic idea inspired by Soviet propaganda about a certain pathological peacefulness of the USSR. Arising back in the 1970s and 1980s. on this occasion, playful aphorisms such as: "Whoever laughs at our peacefulness will shed tears of blood" and "We need peace, preferably all!" show that the population already at that time treated this idea rather ironically. Of course, no liberties were allowed in historiography, and as a result, a rather original picture emerged. If all other states in their international policy were guided by their own interests, then the Soviet Union was engaged only in demonstrating its peacefulness and fighting for peace. In principle, of course, it was admitted that the USSR also had its own interests, but usually they were spoken about so vaguely that it was almost impossible to understand the motives of Soviet foreign policy. However, the rejection of such an ideological approach makes Soviet foreign

policy as understandable as the policy of any other country. Consideration of the international situation within the framework of the historical and political analysis of the development of systems of international relations shows that the Soviet leadership in the early 1920s.

faced with a difficult but rather traditional problem. During the years of the Revolution and the Civil War, Soviet Russia lost the positions won by the Russian Empire in the international arena and territories in Eastern Europe. In terms of its influence in Europe, the country was thrown back 200 years into the past. Under these conditions, the Soviet leadership could either agree to the regional status of the USSR, or re-start the struggle for a return to the club of great powers. Having made a choice in favor of the second alternative, the Soviet leadership adopted the concept of "world revolution", which combined the new ideology and the traditional tasks of foreign policy to strengthen the country's influence in the world. The strategic goal of Moscow's foreign policy was the global reorganization of the system of international relations, which made England, France and their allies the main opponents. In the 1920s The Soviet Union

managed to achieve diplomatic recognition, but attempts to strengthen its position in Europe and the Far East did not produce noticeable results. In addition, the events of the late 1920s. highlighted a number of internal problems of the USSR, which limited the country's foreign policy activity. Therefore, the period of the world economic crisis was, on the whole, successfully used by the Soviet leadership to start a radical economic modernization based on the latest technological achievements of the West. In the 1930s the international situation has changed

significantly in connection with the beginning of the open struggle of a number of great powers for the revision of the Versailles-Washington system. Having staked on the inevitability of the emergence of a new inter-imperialist conflict, the USSR sought to prevent the consolidation of the other great powers, rightly perceiving this as the main threat to its interests. The Soviet leadership skillfully used official diplomatic channels, the illegal possibilities of the Comintern, social propaganda, pacifist ideas, anti-fascism, assistance to some victims of the aggressors to create the image of the main fighter for peace and social progress. The struggle for "collective security" has become Moscow's foreign policy tactic, aimed at strengthening the weight of the USSR in international affairs and at preventing the consolidation of other great powers without its participation. However, the events of 1938 clearly showed that the USSR is not only still far from becoming an equal subject of European politics, but also continues to be considered by the European great powers as an object of their policy. Under these conditions, only a new aggravation of the crisis in Europe allowed the USSR to return to big politics as a great power.

These aspirations of Moscow were facilitated by the fact that during the political crises of the 1930s. The Versailles-Washington system in Europe and the Far East was practically destroyed, which could not but lead to another clash between the great powers. In this sense, we can say that the Second World War was a natural phenomenon in the period of changing systems of international relations and could hardly have been prevented, since the uneven economic development led to a change in the balance of power of the great powers, each of which, to one degree or another, turned out to be interested in the reorganization of the Versailles-Washington system of international relations. Germany, the USA and the USSR were striving for a complete reorganization of the system of international relations, England and France were ready for some changes that did not affect their leading position in the world, and Italy and Japan tried to expand their influence at the regional level. During the political crisis of 1939, two military-political blocs

emerged in Europe: Anglo-French and German-Italian, each of which was interested in an agreement with the USSR. For its part, Moscow got the opportunity to choose with whom and under what conditions it should negotiate, and used it to the maximum, balancing between various military-political blocs. International relations in the spring and summer of 1939 in Europe were a tangled tangle of diplomatic activities of the great powers, each of which sought to achieve its own goals. Events

developed in parallel in several directions: there were secret and open Anglo-French Soviet, Anglo-German and Soviet-German negotiations; clearance took place Anglo-French-Polish and German-Italian coalitions. Moscow in its calculations proceeded from the fact that the outbreak of war in Europe - as with the participation of the USSR in the Anglo-French bloc, and while maintaining its neutrality - opened up new prospects for strengthening Soviet influence on the continent. An alliance with England and France would make Moscow equal partner with all the ensuing consequences, and the preservation of the neutrality of the Soviet Union in the face of the weakening of both belligerents allowed him to take the position of a kind of arbiter, on which the outcome of the war depends. Based on such calculations determined the Soviet foreign policy course. The course of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations showed that Britain and France were not ready for equal partnership with the USSR. Under these conditions, Germany's proposals turned out to be more attractive, and on August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German treaty was signed in Moscow on non-aggression, which became a significant success of Soviet diplomacy. USSR managed to stay outside the European war, while gaining considerable freedom of hands in Eastern Europe, greater room for maneuver between warring factions in their own interests, and at the same time shift the blame for the failure of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on London and Paris. Thanks to the agreement with Germany, the USSR for the first time in its history received recognition of their interests in Eastern Europe by a great European power. In 1939 Europe was split into three military-political camps: Anglo-French, German-Italian and Soviet, each of which sought to achieve its own goals, which could not but lead to war.

The outbreak of the European war allowed the USSR to start revising its Western borders imposed on him in 1920-1921. Thus, Moscow was able to return control over territories, most of which were previously part of the Russian empire. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army invaded Poland, which meant the actual entry of the USSR into the Second World War as an independent military-political force, while more loyal to Germany. Soviet military-political penetration into the Baltic states went through two stages. On the first of mutual assistance treaties and Soviet military bases were imposed on these countries, and on the second - in the summer of 1940, the Baltic states were annexed to the USSR. Military-diplomatic successes of the USSR in establishing Soviet control over the sphere of interests in the Eastern Europe were interrupted by Finland, which, at the cost of a war with the USSR in the conditions the threat of intervention from England and France managed to maintain independence, although she lost some territories. In the second half of June 1940, the Bessarabian problem.

Thus, by the middle of 1940, the Soviet Union, as a result of the Polish, Finnish, The Baltic and Bessarabian campaigns were able to annex most of the territory Eastern Europe, which was assigned to its sphere of interests in accordance with the Soviet-German agreements of 1939 in 1943 (in international legal terms, these territories were fixed in the USSR thanks to the treaties of 1945-1947). It's significant improved its strategic position and strengthened its defenses. We must not forget that most of these territories were torn away from Russia as a result of foreign aggression. Therefore, the events of 1939-1940. were in a sense a Soviet revenge for defeats during the Civil War. Therefore, as A. Taylor rightly noted, "Russia's rights to the Baltic states and the eastern part of Poland (as well as Bessarabia. M.M.) were much more justified than the rights of the United States to New Mexico" 1644 In this sense, it is impossible not to join the opinion of N.M. Karamzin: "Let foreigners condemn the division of Poland: we took our own" 1645 As a result The Soviet Union again managed to combine political and geopolitical borders between "Western" and "Russian" civilizations, as was already the case at the end of the XVIII century 1646 .

Soviet-British and Soviet-French relations worsened in the autumn of 1939, as England and France were dissatisfied with the fact that they failed to use the USSR in their interests, and the Russians dared to prefer some of their own interests to the "common cause" of protecting Western democracies. London and Paris tended to view Moscow as a non-belligerent ally of Berlin, harming which was a form of indirect pressure on Germany. Counteracting these sentiments, the Soviet leadership pursued a cautious foreign policy course, demonstrating its neutrality in every possible way in the European war. However, the Soviet-Finnish war and the intensification of the struggle for Scandinavia in the winter of 1939-1940. put the USSR in front of a real threat of war with England and France. The Soviet leadership tried to avoid a possible conflict, while at the same time taking a number of military measures that would make it possible to give an adequate response to the Anglo-French attack. Under these conditions, Moscow was relieved to learn about the German invasion of Scandinavia, and later France, which completely eliminated the threat of a clash between the USSR and the Western allies. At the same time, the Soviet leadership, although it took a firmer position in negotiations with England, was not going to completely spoil relations with it. Moscow continued to maneuver between Berlin and London, which sought by any means to worsen Soviet-German relations in order to divert Germany to the East. For its part, the Kremlin viewed Germany as a force capable of undermining Britain's position and undermining the "capitalist system." Then, at the right moment, the Red Army will crush Germany and liberate Europe from both fascism and "decaying capitalism."

Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941. developed rather unevenly. They also included military-economic cooperation, in which the parties firmly defended their interests, but still found a compromise. There were also protracted disputes on a number of issues. Of course, none of the parties forgot about the likelihood of a military clash between them and closely followed the actions of a rival partner. Mutual suspicion of the parties clearly began to grow from the summer of 1940, when, after the unexpectedly rapid defeat of France, Germany became the hegemon of Western Europe and freed itself from the land front, although the continuation of the war with England fettered its naval and air forces. True, although the victories of the Wehrmacht in Western Europe made a strong impression on world public opinion, they did not solve the main task of Germany to withdraw England from the war. Already in the summer of 1940, it became completely clear that the war had taken on a protracted character, and Germany's position remained difficult. Under these conditions, the German leadership, faced with the need to wage a protracted war with England, tried to create a continental anti-British bloc with the participation of the USSR. In Moscow, apparently, they were interested in weakening the English influence in continental Europe through the hands of Germany, but they were not at all going to give it to the undivided domination of Berlin. On the contrary, the Soviet leadership intended to obtain new territorial and political concessions from Germany in Scandinavia, the Balkans and the Middle East, but the Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 showed that Berlin views Europe as a sphere of its undivided influence, and a new compromise turned out to be impossible.

In recent years, in some, especially journalistic works, one can come across the assertion that the creation of a full-fledged alliance between Germany and the USSR, to which Italy and Japan could join, would make it possible to win the war and completely rebuild the system of international relations in their own interests, since England and the United States do nothing could not oppose the Euro-Asian bloc. In principle, this conclusion is correct, but it is too speculative. As a rule, it is completely ignored that the interests of Moscow and Berlin were opposed. Both sides aspired to world domination, therefore, the partner was assigned a subordinate role in advance. It is clear that neither Hitler nor Stalin could make such a concession. As a result of such an alliance, the USSR would have to provide military assistance to Germany, that is, fight for its interests, strengthening its senior partner. As you know, even a much more real Franco-Russian alliance

1807-1812 ended in a war between France and Russia. What can we say about the Soviet-German relations of 1939-1941, which never went beyond the limited framework of external normalization, which for both sides was only a temporary maneuver.

In addition, the USSR would have to abandon any attempts to penetrate into Europe, which would be completely transferred to the control of Germany and Italy. Since this continent over the past few centuries has been considered the political center of the world, the main center of technological progress, the refusal to fight for Europe pushed Moscow to the sidelines of world development, would force it to receive any technical innovations from the hands of Germany. That is, the second-class status of the USSR was only consolidated. Even if the Soviet leadership had agreed to become a secondary partner of Germany, this would not at all guarantee against new disagreements, discontent, resentment, etc., which would eventually lead to a new fight for the redivision of the world, but in less favorable conditions for the USSR. If we take into account that all of the above does not take into account the ideological differences between the USSR and Germany, the subjective assessments that prevailed in the Kremlin and the Reich Chancellery, then it is quite obvious that the Soviet-German alliance could not be realized in the specific historical

conditions of 1940. From November 1940 it became clear that it was Berlin that was the main obstacle to Soviet penetration into Europe, and Soviet-German relations entered a new phase - the phase of direct preparation for the war, which was generated by the struggle of Germany and the USSR for dominance in Europe, accelerated its collision of Soviet and German interests on specific political issues. Formally, Moscow and Berlin maintained normal relations, but waged a growing diplomatic struggle, especially in the Balkans. The Soviet leadership, without bringing matters to an open conflict, firmly defended its interests in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The result of the Soviet-German diplomatic struggle for influence on the non-belligerent small countries of Northern and South Eastern Europe was their rapprochement with Germany, since their ruling elites saw in her the only defense against the "red danger". Military operations in the Balkans in April-May 1941 were on the whole in the hands of Moscow, since they confirmed the impossibility of a German-British compromise. Accordingly, the Soviet leadership in every possible way demonstrated to Berlin its understanding of Germany's actions in the Eastern Mediterranean¹⁶⁴⁷, the expansion of hostilities in the Middle East could ^{because} divert the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht from Eastern Europe. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union could calmly and consistently prepare for war with Germany.

This required the Soviet leadership to take certain diplomatic steps towards Britain and the United States in order to present themselves as their ally and make it difficult to end the Anglo-German war. It was known about the position of London in Moscow that they were interested in the entry of the USSR into the war, because they hoped to alleviate their own situation. They were not going to provide any real support to the Soviet Union in the war with Germany in London, considering any war in Eastern Europe as a respite. Washington was also interested in a clash between Germany and the Soviet Union, which would significantly reduce the German threat to the United States. Of course, Moscow was more interested in the position of England, but they were not going to aggravate relations with the United States either. Based on their own calculations, London, Washington and Moscow in June 1941 began to take into account the likelihood of the need to establish some kind of interaction in the war with Germany¹⁶⁴⁸. In April 1941, the normalization of Soviet-French relations began, interrupted in mid-June by the French side due to increased rumors about a possible war between Germany and the USSR¹⁶⁴⁹. In addition, the Soviet leadership began to establish contacts with the

Eastern European countries occupied by Germany. From the second half of 1940, contacts began with the Polish government in exile in London on the subject of interaction in the war with Germany, agents were sent to occupied Poland for anti-fascist work, according to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 4, 1941, staffing began

Poles and persons who know the Polish language, the 238th Infantry Division, which was to be completed by July 1, 1950. At the same time, secret contacts were being established with the Czechoslovak exile government of E. Beneš. Until the German attack, negotiations were being held, deeply concealed from both the Germans and the British, on cooperation between Soviet and Czech intelligence services in the event of a war between the USSR and Germany and the creation of a Czechoslovak military unit on Soviet territory. In the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, pro-Soviet and pro-Russian sentiments were spreading more and more, the activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia were expanding, which from the autumn of 1940, at the insistence of Moscow, began to move away from propaganda of social change, highlighting the slogan of national liberation. The Czechoslovak Communist Party even started talking about cooperation with E. Beneš, although it had previously rejected any interaction with bourgeois circles¹⁶⁵¹.

On the eve of the war with Germany, the Soviet leadership tried to split off the Eastern European allies from it, but these attempts did not give results, because both Finland and Romania remembered the Soviet "friendship" of 1939-1940 too well. Preparations for a war in Europe required the security of the Soviet Far Eastern borders. Knowing that Japan was preparing for a war with England and the United States and its interest in the neutrality of the USSR for the period of the Pacific War, the Soviet leadership, which sought to divert the attention of England and the United States from European problems and ensure Japan's neutrality for the period of the defeat of Germany and the "liberation" of Europe from capitalism, April 13, 1941 went to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty¹⁶⁵². From mid-June 1941, the Soviet side began to intensively propose new Soviet-German negotiations, using Berlin's hints of the possibility of such negotiations¹⁶⁵³. The implementation of this proposal would allow the USSR to probe Germany's intentions, to complete the last military preparations, and the breakdown of these negotiations would give Moscow a good reason to start hostilities. In the prewar years, the Soviet armed forces received

a certain practice of combat operations, mobilization, concentration and deployment in the theater of operations (theater of operations), on the basis of which the process of their organizational improvement and technical re-equipment took place. Taking into account the experience of the campaigns of 1939-1940. Since the summer of 1940, Soviet troops have been trained in maneuvering offensive operations in conditions close to combat, hard work has begun on the engineering equipment of the Western theater of operations, preparation of starting areas for an offensive, and the accumulation of material reserves. From the beginning of 1941, measures were taken in the western border districts to increase the combat readiness of the troops, most of which were to be completed by July 1, 1941. The development of the Red Army in 1939-1941. was in fact

a covert mobilization deployment, since according to the system of mobilization deployment adopted in the summer of 1939, the number of units and formations was brought to the wartime level even in peacetime, which simplified the mobilization process, shortened its terms and should have contributed to a higher degree of combat effectiveness of the mobilized troops. Most of the troops whose deployment was provided for by the mobilization plan had already been formed or were completing their formation, and by the summer of 1941 the Red Army was the largest army in the world, armed with a number of unique military equipment systems. After analyzing more than 30 indicators of material support for the mobilization deployment of the armed forces of the USSR, G.I. Gerasimov came to the conclusion that "our army has never been so well equipped, provided with material resources, as in the pre-war period. Of course, it was not without its shortcomings, but the main types of equipment, ammunition and supplies of material resources of the Red Army were not worse than during the period of their victorious operations in the second half of the war. The existing material reserves and the mobilization system ensured the deployment of an army that significantly exceeded the army of fascist Germany in the number of weapons and military equipment, mainly provided by other

material resources in an amount that allows you to effectively conduct combat operations in the initial period of the war. The defeats of the initial period are explained by the fact that the army did not have time

to deploy "1654. The Soviet diplomatic and military documents of 1939-1941 introduced into scientific circulation in recent years show that no foreign policy zigzags prevented the Soviet leadership from considering Germany as a likely enemy and carefully preparing to war. In October 1939, the General Staff of the Red Army began to develop a plan in case of war with Germany. This process gained particular intensity from the second half of March 1940, and in 1940-1941 at least four variants of the operational plan of the Red Army were developed, the content of which testifies to the preparation of only offensive actions of the Soviet troops. The main idea of Soviet military planning was that the Red Army, under the cover of troops deployed on the border of the western border districts, would complete the concentration of forces intended for war on the theater of operations and go over to a sudden decisive offensive. Any mention of possible defensive operations by the Red Army shows that it is not about preparing a "retaliatory strike", but about an attack on Germany and its allies. This idea is especially clearly expressed in the document dated May 15, 1941, by which the Red Army was to be guided at the beginning of the war. For half a year, the Soviet General Staff was engaged in resolving the issue of the most

advantageous direction for concentrating the main efforts of troops in the war with Germany. As a result, it was concluded that delivering the main blow in the South-Western direction while simultaneously pinning down the enemy through private operations in the North-Western direction and in Romania would solve several key strategic tasks and ensure the most effective actions of the Red Army. The clash of Soviet German interests in the Balkans, which became apparent in early 1941, prompted Moscow to begin concrete preparations for an attack on Germany. The first half of 1941 was devoted to the careful development of this strike, and in May-June 1941 the preparation of the Soviet attack on Germany entered its final stage, when a full-scale process of concentrating 81.5% of the available forces of the Red Army on the future theater of operations began, due to the preempt their opponents in deploying armed forces to deliver the first blows with larger forces and seize the strategic initiative from the very beginning of hostilities. In total, 247 of the 303 divisions available in the Red Army were allocated for the war with Germany, which, after mobilization, would have numbered over 6 million people, 62 thousand guns and mortars, 14.2 thousand tanks and 9.9 thousand aircraft. A certain transformation in 1939-1941. Soviet propaganda has also undergone, which was not some kind of frozen dogma, but sensitively reacted to changes in the

international situation. In the second half of the 1930s. in Soviet public opinion, a stable anti-fascist stereotype of the image of the enemy was formed. However, the policy of the USSR in the conditions of the beginning of the war in Europe in the autumn of 1939 required changes in propaganda, and instead of Germany, Soviet propaganda fell upon England and France, which were nominated for the role of "warmongers". At the same time, the use of the thesis of a hostile "capitalist encirclement" continued, which to a certain extent compensated for the curtailment of anti-fascist propaganda. From the second half of 1940, a new transformation of Soviet propaganda began, when the anti-fascist component again appeared in the Comintern propaganda. The veiled criticism of Germany gradually intensified in intra-union propaganda, and from the winter of 1940-1941. Soviet propaganda structures began preparing to ensure the war with Germany. After I.V. Stalin on May 5, 1941, a clear restructuring of propaganda began with the task of carefully preparing Soviet public opinion for "the inevitability of a collision between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world and the constant readiness to go on a crushing offensive."

Since March 1941, the transfer of Soviet industry to wartime working conditions began. On June 6, 1941, the Soviet government decided to carry out all measures so that from July 1 industry could go to work according to the mobilization plan. The content of Soviet operational plans, directive ideological

documents of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and military propaganda, along with data on the immediate military preparations of the Red Army for the offensive, unequivocally testifies to the intention of the Soviet leadership to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. Since the strategic concentration and deployment of troops is the final stage of preparation for war, the question of determining the possible time frame for a Soviet attack on Germany is of particular interest. Initially, the attack on Germany was planned for June 12, 1941. However, as you know, this did not happen. It is not possible to unequivocally answer the question about the reasons for the postponement of this period due to the state of the source base. One can only suggest that, having learned on May 12, 1941, about the flight of R. Hess to England and fearing a possible cessation of the Anglo-German war, the Kremlin considered it necessary to postpone the attack on Germany. Only after receiving information about the failure of the Hess mission and making sure that the Anglo-German military operations in the Eastern Mediterranean would continue, in Moscow, apparently, they decided not to postpone the implementation of their plans any longer. Most likely, the issue of a new deadline for the completion of military preparations was decided on May 24, 1941 at a secret meeting of the military-political leadership in the Kremlin. The sources now available show that the full concentration and deployment of the Red Army in the Western theater of operations was to be completed by July 15, 1941, so this date can serve as a lower limit in the search for an exact answer to the question of the timing of the impending Soviet attack on Germany. At the same time, the final clarification of the question of the planned date of the Soviet attack on Germany requires further research with the involvement of new documentary material. The rate of concentration of the Red Army on the western borders increased. Along with the transfer of 77 divisions of the second strategic

echelon, on June 12-16, 1941, the redeployment of the troops of the second echelon of armies and reserves of the western border military districts (114 divisions in total) began, which were supposed to occupy concentration areas 20-80 km from the border by July 1. All these troop movements were carried out in conditions of extreme secrecy and were accompanied by an all-encompassing disinformation campaign against the future enemy. At the same time, the command of the Red Army was afraid that it would not be possible to completely hide the process of concentration and deployment of troops in the Western theater of operations. Thus, there was a danger that the German leadership, due to the more developed communications routes and the smaller territorial capacity of the theater of operations, would have time to respond to these actions of the USSR and deliver a preemptive strike in the conditions of the incomplete deployment of the Red Army. Therefore, the military insisted on the implementation of cover plans in full. However, Stalin was forced to take into account not only the purely military expediency of this decision, but also the general political situation. Confident that Germany would not go to war with the USSR until England was withdrawn from the war, he feared that the deployment of cover troops on the border would attract the attention of Berlin and provoke a war before the Soviet troops completed all preparations for it. Moreover, Moscow was striving for negotiations with Berlin, the failure of which would have provided an excellent pretext for a strike against Germany. Therefore, on the night of June 22, the military managed to get Stalin's consent only to carry out a number of measures to increase the combat readiness of the troops of the border districts, but not to put into effect cover plans.

A supporter of the traditional version of A.S. Orlov believes that the preparation of the Soviet Union for an attack on Germany would be evidenced by the fulfillment by Moscow of a number of conditions: 1. A decision taken in advance by the political leadership to prepare and conduct such a war;

2. A developed war plan indicating the political goals of the war, as well as tasks strategic offensive;
3. The presence of a fully mobilized army, staffed by states wartime and well prepared to carry out the assigned tasks;
4. A military economy that can effectively ensure the conduct of hostilities; 5. Support for political and military leadership by the people. A.S. himself Orlov believes that since not all of these conditions were met, then

It is impossible to speak about the preparation of the USSR for an attack -

on Germany¹⁶⁵⁶ This interesting idea requires discussion. Hardly anyone will dispute the fact that the conditions under Nos. 4 and 5 have been met. As for condition No. 1, then, in our opinion, the development of a plan for war with Germany, which began in the autumn of 1939, testifies to advance adoption by the Soviet leadership of the decision "to prepare and maintain such a war." As has already been shown above, condition No. 2 was also fulfilled. Formally only condition No. 3 was not met by June 22, 1941. True, it should be borne in mind that the mobilization of the Red Army was supposed to take place in the first half of July 1941, therefore the state of the Soviet armed forces by June 22, to which A.S. Orlov, no has nothing to do with the issue under discussion. Definitely answer the question, is it good the Red Army was prepared for the offensive, it is impossible, since in real in reality, she had to repel the German attack. True, what the Soviet troops managed not only to survive in 1941, but also to turn the tide of hostilities and winning the war, of course, testifies in favor of the good preparation of the Red Army. Thus, the thesis of A.S. Orlova does not at all refute the fact that the Soviet Union is preparing for attack on Germany. For its

part, the German leadership, having defeated France, freed itself from land fronts in Europe and hoping for an early end to the war with England, decided start developing a plan for war with the USSR. However, it quickly became clear that England continues the war, and Germany does not have the necessary forces to defeat it. IN As a result, Germany became dependent on the position of England and the USSR in 1937 and the German the leadership began to consider the future "Eastern Campaign" as a real chance to win war in the West. It was believed that the rapid defeat of the USSR would allow us to capture the Middle East and give Germany the necessary resources to win a protracted war with England and the United States. Absolutely not representing the real military-economic potential of the USSR and extremely overestimating the strength of the Wehrmacht, in Berlin they were sure that the Eastern Campaign would another lightning victory. These strategic calculations were closely connected with anti-communist, anti-Soviet and racist component of Nazi ideology, which was an additional justification for the need for war with the USSR¹⁶⁵⁸

December 18, 1940 Hitler approved the final version with his Directive No. 21 plan for the war in the East, according to which it was planned on May 16, 1941 to suddenly attack The Soviet Union and defeat it during a lightning campaign. At the beginning of 1941, this the plan was made separate changes regarding the tasks of the troops and the duration of the attack, postponed, as you know, because of the war in the Balkans on June 22. To implement the plan "Barbarossa" three army groups were created to attack three strategic directions (Leningrad, Moscow, Kyiv), the main of which was the central one. Although Germany allocated 74.5% of its ground forces for the war with the USSR - almost all the most combat-ready units - and attracted Finland to participate in the Eastern campaign, Romania and Hungary, their total forces were inferior in number to the Soviet troops in western military districts. Given the military mobilization and economic the possibilities of the parties, it should be concluded that Germany and its allies did not have forces capable of inflicting a guaranteed defeat on the Red Army. Limitation resources of Germany, the extreme overestimation of the combat capability of the Wehrmacht and the underestimation of the military and economic power of the USSR led to the fact that the Barbarossa plan became a plan for a war without reserves, without large inventories, a one-act campaign plan. Everything was

subordinated to the idea of a strong initial strike, which, according to Berlin's calculations, was supposed to decide the outcome of the war, at the latest by the beginning of the autumn of 1941.

June.

Concentrating such a large grouping of troops near the Soviet borders, the German command waged a massive disinformation campaign to disguise its intentions. This made it possible to achieve a surprise attack and, having lulled the vigilance of the Soviet leadership, did not give him the opportunity to take preemptive actions. Berlin was well aware of the danger to deployed troops if the Red Army went over to the offensive. As early as April 7, 1941, the chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, Colonel-General F. Halder, noted in his diary that the grouping of Russian troops "quite allows for a quick transition to the offensive, which would be extremely unpleasant for us"¹⁶⁶⁰. Somewhat later, similar fears were entrusted to his diary by the German Minister of Propaganda J. Goebbels, who wrote on June 14: "East Prussia is so saturated with troops that the Russians, with their preventive air raids, could inflict heavy damage on us. But they will not do this. enough courage!"¹⁶⁶¹ In their plans, the German command also proceeded from the fact that the Soviet leadership would not have time to correctly assess the danger of an attack.

In connection with all of the above, the question arises whether the German attack on the USSR in this case was not a "preventive war", as German propaganda claimed. Since preventive war is "military actions taken to forestall the actions of the enemy, who is ready to attack or has already begun one, by his own offensive"¹⁶⁶², it is possible only if the side carrying them out knows about the intentions of the enemy. However, German documents testify that in Berlin they perceived the USSR only as an abstract potential threat, and the preparation of the "Eastern Campaign" was not at all connected with the feeling of "immediate danger posed by the Red Army"¹⁶⁶³. The German command knew about the transfer of additional forces to the western districts of the USSR, but regarded these actions as a defensive reaction to the discovered deployment of the Wehrmacht. The grouping of the Red Army was assessed as defensive, and no serious offensive actions were expected from the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941¹⁶⁶⁴. Therefore, supporters of the thesis of Germany's "preventive war" against the USSR fall into a foolish position, trying to prove that Hitler decided to thwart the Soviet attack, about the preparation of which he actually knew nothing. Unfortunately, Soviet intelligence was unable to provide the Kremlin with evidence that Germany would attack the USSR in the summer of 1941. The Soviet leadership was aware

of the presence of a rather large Wehrmacht grouping near the western borders of the USSR, but was not afraid of an imminent German attack, believing that Germany, bound by the war with England, would continue its offensive in the Middle East or try to land on the British Isles, and would not start a war for two front. Since neither Germany nor the USSR counted on an enemy attack in the summer of 1941, it means that the thesis of "preventive" actions is not applicable to either of them. In this case, the version of a "preventive war" has nothing to do with historical science at all, but is purely Hitler's propaganda thesis to justify German aggression. As a result of the fact that in their calculations the parties proceeded from different dates for the start of the war, the German command, due to a random combination of circumstances, managed to preempt the Soviet troops in completing the deployment and thereby create favorable conditions for seizing the strategic initiative at the beginning of the war. As a result, the Red Army, which was completing its concentration and deployment in the theater of operations, was taken by surprise and at the time of the German attack was not ready for any immediate action - neither defensive, nor even more offensive, which had the most negative impact on the course of hostilities in 1941 .

However, the picture will be incomplete if we do not try, at least hypothetically to imagine how events could develop if the Soviet leadership carried out its original plan and on June 12, 1941 would strike at Germany. At that time German troops were completing preparations for Operation Barbarossa and concentrating at Soviet borders, where 81.6% of divisions from those that were planned to be deployed by the evening of June 21, 1941 June 10 divisions of the first echelon began to secretly withdraw into the 30-km border zone. The rest of the troops were either on the move to the East, or were waiting for their turn. transfers in the camps. The Luftwaffe was also completing its redeployment after the Balkan campaigns. The Wehrmacht had neither a defensive nor an offensive grouping, and the Soviet an attack at that moment would put him in a very difficult position, which would allow him to smash his strength piecemeal.

In accordance with the Soviet operational plan, the main events were to turn around on the front from Ostrolenka to the Carpathians, where the troops of the South-Western and left wing Western fronts dealt the main blow to the enemy troops. The balance of forces of the parties on the Ostroleka - Karpaty front is indicated in table 62, the data of which indicate that Soviet troops had forces capable of ensuring the fulfillment of the assigned tasks before them. The troops of the Northwestern and right wing of the Western fronts must were private offensive operations to pin down German troops deployed in East Prussia, and occupy the Suwalki ledge and the Memel region. Troops of the Northern Front were preparing for an offensive in Finland, and the Southern Front - in Romania. However the primary measures were the actions of the Red Army on the Soviet-German border from Baltic to the

Carpathians.

Table 62 Red Army Wehrmacht Division

ratio 128 55 2.3:1

Personnel (million) 3.4 1.4 2.1:1

Guns and mortars (thousand) 38.5 16.3

2.4:1 Tanks (thousands)

7.5 0.9 8.7:1 Aircraft

(thousands) 6.2 1.4 4.4:1

enemy airfields on the territory of East Prussia, Poland and Romania. General Soviet superiority in aviation made it possible to subject the airfields of the Luftwaffe to 250 km border strip to many hours of continuous air assault, which would lead to a significant weakening of the enemy air force and would facilitate operations ground forces of the Red Army. The range of the Soviet Air Force made it possible to provide reliable fighter cover for bombing operations in the 350 km zone. At necessary, the guaranteed air impact zone could be increased to 500 km using the latest MiG-3 aircraft. The loss of Soviet aviation could rather quickly replenish by transferring flight formations from internal military districts, which made it possible to use more than 2.3 thousand aircraft. Make up for losses the Luftwaffe was much more difficult, since they were involved in different fronts. On the territory of Germany, the air defense forces had only 282 aircraft. The German Air Force in Western Europe (861 aircraft) were connected by the reflection of the British raids, and in the Mediterranean Sea (423 aircraft) provided the actions of the German-Italian troops in Libya 1941. A similar deployment of German aviation gave the Soviet Air Force certain prospect of gaining air supremacy.

Attacking the Wehrmacht at dawn on June 12, 1941, when the German troops completed the concentration and deployment, would allow to capture the enemy, not who had plans for defensive actions, taken aback in the grouping, did not adapted for defense. Impact of the Southwestern and Left Wings of the Western Fronts would hit 55 enemy divisions, immediately pinning down 55.6% deployed in the East

troops, which would greatly complicate his counteractions. Using the configuration of the border, the Red Army would conduct operations to envelop and encircle enemy troops, the outcome of which would be decided by the ability of the parties to build up their forces. In the zone from Przemyśl to the Carpathians against the 2 infantry, 2 light infantry and 2 security divisions of the Wehrmacht deployed there, the Soviet command would deploy at least 28 divisions (of which 6 were tank and 3 motorized), which opened the way for the Soviet troops to Sandomierz and through Tarnobrzeg - to Kraków. This breakthrough would divert additional Wehrmacht forces, which would probably have to create a new front west of the Vistula, where

the main battles would unfold. The Soviet command could use 24 divisions deployed in the rear of the Southwestern Front, as well as another 15 divisions of the High Command reserve, which could be used in southern Poland or the Balkans, to build up the strike in the South-Western direction. The German command could initially use 22 divisions to repel a surprise attack (of which 6 were security divisions, not suitable for operations at the front), which did not have time to turn around on the Soviet border, and 26 divisions of the OKH reserve, of which almost immediately it was possible to start transferring to the front 14 divisions, which, according to the original plan of the German command, were to be sent to the front before July 4, 1941. The remaining 12 divisions (including 2 tank divisions) would have to be hastily prepared for redeployment, while it should be borne in mind that the 2nd tank division is only at the beginning June, arrived on vacation in the central regions of Germany after the fighting in the Balkans and did not have time to make up for the losses incurred, and the 5th Panzer Division was in the process of redeployment from Greece to Germany. In addition, the transfer of these troops to the front would be hampered by the influence of the Soviet Air Force on the railways. In addition, the German command could try to transfer 5-6 infantry divisions from East Prussia, which would be difficult as a result of the actions of the troops of the North-Western and right wing of the

Western Fronts and the significant impact of the Soviet Air Force. The development of the offensive of the Red Army in southeastern Poland made it possible for the troops of the Southern Front to go on the offensive in Romania without fear of a blow from the rear. In Romania, there were only 6 divisions of the Wehrmacht, and the Romanian army was not a serious enemy, which doomed the attack of the Southern Front to success. The defeat of the northern flank of the enemy front opened the way for the Red Army to the central regions of Romania and threatened Germany's dominance in the Balkans. The German command simply had nothing to fend off this threat: 10-12 German divisions scattered across the territory of Yugoslavia and Greece could not delay the advance of the Soviet troops for a long time. The breakthrough of the Red Army into Romania would most likely spur the national liberation movement in the Balkans and, above all, in Yugoslavia, which would further complicate the position of the German troops stationed there. The need to plug the gap in the Balkans would force the German command to transfer there part of the troops from those 24 divisions.

Of the 38 German divisions serving in Western Europe, only 14 could be used at the front, which still had to be prepared for transfer to the East. The use of the remaining 24 divisions was difficult because they were mostly stationary formations that did not have the necessary vehicles, were kept on a reduced staff and had a limited set of heavy weapons¹⁶⁶⁷. Of course, it was possible to bring two divisions into one more full-blooded one, but this required considerable time, which also played into the hands of the Red Army. In addition, it was necessary to take into account the need to maintain a sufficient number of troops to maintain the occupation regime and repel possible British landings.

Germany simply did not have the forces capable of repelling the sudden blow of the Red Army. This was recognized after the war by Field Marshal W. Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht High Command, who believed that the Soviet attack on Germany in 1941 could "put us in strategic and economic terms in

extremely critical situation. [...] In the very first weeks, an attack by Russia would put Germany in extremely disadvantageous conditions"1668.

Of course, one should not consider the combat operations of the Soviet troops in the event of a surprise strike against Germany as a "walk to Berlin." Of course, it would be a difficult, bloody struggle with a serious opponent. However, the force and inertia of a sudden strike would allow the Red Army, if not to defeat, then significantly weaken the German formations on the Ostrołęka-Carpathians front. With the most favorable course of events, the troops of the Western and Southwestern Fronts would be able to complete the main task and would reach the Ostrołęka - Warsaw - Łódź - Opole Olomouc front. The least favorable result of the offensive of the Soviet troops could be the stabilization of the front along the Narew and Vistula rivers, i.e. approximately where the Soviet-German front stabilized at the end of 1944. In the Balkans, the German command had nothing to stabilize the front at all, and the depth of the advance of the Red Army would be limited only by the inertia of the strike. Of course, this

offensive by the Red Army would not have led to an immediate decision on the outcome of the war, but a Soviet attack would have led to the disruption of the German invasion of the USSR and would have facilitated victory in the war, saving our country millions of lives and significant material values. The Red Army could have been in Berlin no later than 1942, which would have allowed Moscow to control a much larger territory in Europe than it happened in 1945. The defeat of Germany and the Sovietization of Europe allowed Moscow to use its scientific and technical potential, opened the way to "just social reconstruction" of the European colonies in Asia and Africa. Created within the framework of the Old World, the socialist camp would control most of the Earth's resources. Accordingly, even if the New World had not been captured, it would most likely not have been able to significantly surpass the Old in terms of living standards. As a result, a significant number of dissatisfied people would remain there, looking with hope for help from across the ocean. In the case of the complete coverage of the Earth by the socialist system, the task formulated in the liberal European tradition of creating a single state of Mankind would be fully realized. This, in turn, made it possible to create a fairly stable social system and would provide great opportunities for development. Today it is quite obvious that the creation of such a State on the basis of the Russian Soviet tradition of unity and equality of different peoples was much more in the interests of the vast majority of mankind than the essentially racist model of the "new world order" currently being implemented to ensure the interests of the "golden billion"1669. Naturally, the question arises, how would Britain and the United States react to the Soviet attack on

Germany? The opinion of the official Russian historiography was expressed by M.A. Gareev, who argues that in this case "the Soviet Union would appear before the whole world as an aggressor, and in the same England the forces advocating an alliance with Germany could prevail"1670. However, this approach completely ignores both the centuries-old tradition of military-political actions in such a situation, and the real policy of England in 1939-1941. The entire military history of mankind testifies that the intervention of a third country in a war between two states has never led to an immediate unification of the belligerent countries against it. In addition, it is not clear what could have prompted England to break this pattern? If we turn to the real politics of England at the beginning of the Second World War, then it is impossible to deny the generally recognized fact that she alone could not win the war with Germany. That is why in 1939-1940. England tried in every possible way to preserve and expand its alliance with France by including other European countries in it. Since the summer of 1940, after the defeat and surrender of France, the British leadership relied on the possible involvement of the United States in the war with Germany and the deterioration of Soviet-German relations: this could lead to war in the East

Europe, or at least to the fact that Germany would be forced to keep an impressive military grouping there, which excluded its use against England. Known

materials show that the British leadership actively sought to put both of these possibilities into practice. By the beginning of 1941, he managed to enlist the material support of the United States. In relation to the USSR, the policy of England was to force the Soviet leadership to take a less benevolent position towards Germany. To do this, information about the threat to the USSR in the event of a German victory was constantly and methodically transmitted to Moscow. In the spring of 1941, England's attempts to drag the USSR into the war began to take on the character of blackmail: if Moscow did not enter the war, then London would be forced to make an agreement with Germany, which as a result would be able to carry out *Drang nach Osten*. When, in early June 1941, British intelligence concluded that the concentration of the Wehrmacht near the Soviet borders indicated Germany was preparing to put pressure on the USSR to meet the demands of an economic, and even political nature, London, interested in Moscow's uncompromising position, decided to prepare an operation to launch an airstrike on Baku's oil refineries. This would make it possible to put pressure on the USSR so that it would not yield to German demands. At the same time, England, through diplomatic channels, promised Moscow its assistance in the event of a war with Germany. On the other hand, information about the intentions and actions of the USSR threatening Germany was transmitted to Berlin through various channels. Therefore, it seems completely unbelievable that England, in every possible way interested in the outbreak of a Soviet-German war, would suddenly immediately rush to the aid of Germany.

Proceeding from these goals, on June 15, 1941, Churchill telegraphed US President F. Roosevelt, informing him of the possibility of a German attack on the USSR and that "if this new war breaks out, we, of course, will provide the Russians with every possible encouragement and assistance, proceeding from the principle that the enemy we need to defeat is Hitler" 1671. It should be noted here: at that moment, no one was completely sure that Germany would nevertheless attack the USSR, and could not predict exactly what turn the events on the Soviet-German front would take. On June 21, Roosevelt replied that according to Churchill's personal secretary, the he supported Churchill's position and, United States would provide "Russia with all possible assistance" 1672. Colville, on the afternoon of June 21, he discussed his position with the Prime Minister and asked: "Wouldn't this be a departure from principle for him, the worst enemy of the Communists." "Not at all," answered Churchill. "I have only one goal - to destroy Hitler, and this greatly simplifies my life. If Hitler invaded hell, I would at least speak favorably of Satan in the House of Commons" 1673. Churchill repeated the same position in his famous speech on the radio on the evening of 22 June. "The Nazi regime has the worst features of communism," he said. Nevertheless, the main threat to England at present is represented by Hitler and his regime, which "we are determined to destroy", therefore "any person or state that fights against Nazism will receive our help" 1674.

All this once again confirms that the main goal for the British leadership was to win the war with Germany with the help of anyone, and in principle it was completely indifferent to how exactly the Soviet-German war would begin. The same can be said about the United States, which in the first half of 1941 was increasingly drawn into an undeclared war with Germany. At the secret Anglo-American negotiations of January 21 - March 29, 1941, it was decided that Germany was the main adversary, and a general strategy for war with her was formulated. Simultaneously, on March 11, the US Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, giving the president the right to provide military and other assistance to any country whose defense was considered vital to US security. March 24 England was given the opportunity to repair their military

ships in American shipyards. On March 30, all German and Italian ships that were in American ports were captured by the United States and after some time transferred to England. On April 10, Roosevelt declared the Red Sea a "non-military zone", which allowed the American merchant fleet to freely supply British troops in North Africa. On April 13, American troops began to deploy to bases in Greenland. On April 24, the US "safety zone" in the Atlantic Ocean was extended to 30 degrees west longitude. On May 27, Roosevelt declared an "unrestricted state of emergency" across the United States. On June 14, German and Italian property on American soil was "frozen" (ie actually seized). On June 16, all German consulates and bureaus of various German agencies operating in the USA were closed.

Naturally, Washington did not even think about any military assistance to Germany in the event of a Soviet attack. This would be completely contrary to US policy, not to mention the fact that there was influential opposition to the course of bringing the country into the war, and, as you know, the Roosevelt administration had to go to great lengths to provoke Japan to attack, which allowed the US to enter the war. World War II. Already on June 23, 1941, when no one could have known that the events on the Soviet German front would take such a difficult turn for the Red Army, the US State Department issued an official statement condemning the "principles and doctrine" of communism, but emphasizing the danger of the German expansion, which "at the present time most of all affects our own national defense and the security of the New World where we live. Therefore, in the opinion of our government, any defense against Hitlerism, any association of forces opposing Hitlerism, whatever their origin, will hasten the overthrow of current German leaders and thus serve our own defense and security." On the same day, Missouri Senator G. Truman (future US President) rather frankly expressed the opinion of the ruling elite: "If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia wins, then we should help Germany, and thus let them kill as many as possible, although I do not want Hitler's victory under any circumstances"¹⁶⁷⁶ That is, the American leadership considered the Soviet-German war as a favorable factor that reduced the danger of German expansion for the United States itself. Thus, there was an opportunity for the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack on Germany, pinned down by the war with England, and to obtain at least the benevolent neutrality of London and Washington (and most likely their help, albeit limited). Of course,

as the Red Army advanced deeper into Europe, these sentiments could change, but it would have been too late: Germany would have been on the verge of defeat. England and the USA simply would not have been able to provide real support in the war with the USSR. The United States had no ground forces at all that could be sent to Europe, and British troops were too dispersed: from the British Isles to the Far East. It took too much time to transfer to Europe a grouping of British troops sufficient for defense against the Red Army. In any case, the opposition of the Red Army, liberating Europe from fascism, would hardly have been a very popular measure in England. If we take into account the long-term goals of the foreign policy of both the United States and Britain, in whose interests was the clash between Germany and the USSR and their protracted war with the subsequent weakening of both opponents, then it seems most likely that initially London and Washington would have taken a wait-and-see attitude. And then everything would be decided by the scale of the military successes of the Red Army.

The political conditions for an attack on Germany by the USSR were quite favorable. Unfortunately, Stalin, fearing an Anglo-German compromise, delayed the attack on Germany for at least a month, which, as we now know, was the only chance to thwart the German invasion. Probably, this decision "is one of the main historical miscalculations of Stalin" ¹⁶⁷⁷, who missed a favorable

the opportunity to defeat the most powerful European power and, having reached the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, to eliminate the age-old Western threat to our country. As a result, the German leadership was able to begin on June 22, 1941, the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, which, in the conditions of the Red Army's unpreparedness for defense, led to the tragedy of 1941.

Thus, both Germany and the USSR carefully prepared for the war, and from the beginning of 1941 this process entered its final stage, which made the start of the Soviet-German war inevitable precisely in 1941, no matter who initiated it. Initially, the Wehrmacht was preparing the invasion for May 16, and the Red Army - for June 12, 1941. Then Berlin postponed the attack, moving it to June 22, a month later, Moscow did the same, setting a new tentative date - July 15, 1941. As is now known, both sides in their calculations proceeded from the fact that the war would begin on their own initiative. Unfortunately, what is known today was a secret in 1941, and the Soviet leadership made a fatal miscalculation. The sudden German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941 and the first failures at the front had a stunning effect on the Soviet leadership. This situation was most vividly described in his memoirs by the then People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, noting that "the state machine, directed along the rails of the improbability of Hitler's attack, was forced to stop, go through a period of confusion and then turn 180 degrees. The consequences of this had to be corrected on the go at the cost of great sacrifices" 1678.

The events of 1941 on the Soviet-German front are perhaps the most studied period of the Great Patriotic War on both sides. However, in recent years, the beginning of the war was considered, especially in popular science and journalistic works, mainly only as a period of endless defeats of the Red Army and victories of the Wehrmacht. As a result, it seems that the USSR was not defeated only by a lucky chance. However, Soviet and German documents and studies show that things were much more complicated. In addition, the events on the Soviet-German front in the second half of 1941 had a huge impact on the development of the situation throughout the Second World War. Therefore, one should at least briefly dwell on the main stages of the "Eastern campaign" of the Wehrmacht, which ended in the collapse of all the strategic calculations of the German leadership. At 3.15 am on June 22, 1941, 637 bombers and 231 fighters of the German Air Force launched a massive attack on 31 Soviet

airfields. In total, on that day, enemy air strikes, in which 1,765 bombers and 506 fighters participated, were subjected to 66 Soviet airfields, on which 70% of the air forces of the border districts were located 1679. According to German data, the first strike led to the destruction of 890 Soviet aircraft (668 on the ground and 222 in air battles), the losses of the Luftwaffe amounted to only 18 aircraft. But the Soviet Air Force was not defeated at all and almost immediately began retaliatory operations on German territory. Unfortunately, these rather disparate raids, in the presence of a deployed air defense system, could not inflict significant damage on the enemy. By the evening of June 22, the losses of the Soviet Air Force, according to German data, reached 1,811 aircraft (1,489 destroyed on the ground and 322 shot down in air battles), while the Luftwaffe lost 35 aircraft and about 100 aircraft were damaged 1680.

Having crossed the border, the shock groups of the Wehrmacht began to develop an offensive deep into Soviet territory. Unfortunately, being taken by surprise, the Soviet troops were not able to engage in battle in an organized manner and were unable to create a continuous front of defense. Although some Soviet units managed to stop the advance of the enemy, the general situation at the front was in favor of the Wehrmacht, which seized the strategic initiative. By the end of June 22, German troops advanced 60-80 km in the Baltic states, 40-60 km in Belarus, and 10-20 km in Ukraine. The disorganized entry of the Soviet troops into the battle was also facilitated by the state of shock of the Soviet leadership, which did not expect the German invasion at all. It is no coincidence that in the first hours of the war, Moscow banned retaliatory actions against the invading enemy, and only after the formal declaration of war did the Red Army receive an order

"act in combat", and at 7.15 in the morning Directive No. 2 was issued, which set the task expel the enemy from Soviet territory¹⁶⁸¹. As noted by the German command, only after 9 o'clock in the morning the actions of the Soviet troops began to wear a more purposeful character.

The Soviet military-political command, having a poor idea of the situation at the front, tried to wrest the strategic initiative from the hands of the enemy, and on the evening of June 22 troops received Directive No. 3, developed on the basis of pre-war plans, which provided for the transition of the troops of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts to offensive to defeat the German groups in the areas of Suwalki and Lublin 23-24 June 1941¹⁶⁸². So inappropriate for the current situation, the decision once again confirms that the Soviet General Staff had no defensive plans, in as a result, hastily prepared counterattacks met with minimal success. So, counterattacks by the troops of the North-Western (June 23-24) and Western Fronts (June 23-25) led only to significant losses, but practically did not affect the development of strike operations enemy groupings. Only on the Southwestern Front, where on June 26-29 in the Lutsk region - Rivne - Brody was the largest tank battle of the beginning of World War II 1939-1941, the Soviet troops managed to stop the advance of the German troops, but the losses incurred in tanks led to the virtual cessation of the existence of a larger parts of the mechanized corps

of the front. As a result, it was not possible to turn the tide of hostilities, and on June 25 the Soviet the command decided to withdraw troops to the line of the Western Dvina and the lines of the old fortified areas. However, this decision was too late. German troops have already crossed Western Dvina and developed an offensive against Pskov, which was occupied on July 9. IN Belarus On June 28, enemy tank groups united in the Minsk region, surrounding 26 divisions of the 3rd, 10th and 13th armies in Nalibokskaya Pushcha. In the Western direction formed 400 km gap. Having concluded that the enemy is delivering the main blow in the Western direction, On June 26, the Soviet command decided to redeploy to Belarus troops of the 16th and 19th armies from Ukraine and transfer from internal districts and other directions of 70 divisions. All these transfers took time, but for now, individual Soviet units tried to delay the advance of the German tank units to the Dnieper. By the end of 9 July, the troops of the Army Group "Center" went to the front Polotsk - Vitebsk - Orsha Zhlobin, advancing 450-600 km. On the Southwestern Front, Soviet troops began to retreat to the line of old SDs, but units of the 1st tank group of the enemy managed to overcome these fortifications until they were occupied by Soviet units. By July 9, Army Group South in Western Ukraine has advanced 300-350 km. Thus ended the first stage of the summer-autumn campaign 1941

Table 63

Losses of the parties by July 10, 1941

1683 Red Army Wehrmacht

Personnel 815,700 79,058 Guns

and mortars 21,500 1,061 Tanks

11,783,350 Aircraft

4,013,826 It is clear

that the events that took place were perceived differently in Moscow and Berlin. Having learned on June 28 that the enemy had captured Minsk, Stalin declared: "Lenin left us proletarian Soviet state, and we pissed it off" - and left for a nearby dacha, where stayed until July 1, 1941. The German leadership, on the contrary, was full of enthusiasm and optimistic expectations. On July 3, Halder assessed the situation at the front as follows: "On the whole now we can already say that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian land army before The Western Dvina and the Dnieper have been completed ... Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia is won within 14 days. Of course, it's not finished yet. The vast extent of the territory and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, using

all means will fetter our forces for many more weeks ... When we force the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, it will be not so much about defeating the enemy's armed forces, but about taking away his industrial areas from the enemy and not giving him the opportunity, using the gigantic power of their industry and inexhaustible human reserves, to create new armed forces "1685 July 4, Hitler said: "I always try to put myself in the position of the enemy. In fact, he had already lost the war" 1686

In the euphoria of the initial successes of the Eastern Campaign, on July 14, 1941, Hitler ordered preparations for the reorganization of the Wehrmacht in anticipation of shifting the main efforts to the fight against England and the USA, which was to come to the fore again due to the defeat of the USSR. It was envisaged to increase the size of the Air Force and Navy by reducing the ground forces, which, nevertheless, should have increased the number of tank and motorized divisions. Since Germany did not have the economic capacity to carry out this program while maintaining the pace of production of weapons for the ground forces, it was decided to reorient production to the needs of aviation and navy. As a result, military production for the ground forces began to decline. Thus, the production of ammunition decreased (from August to December 1941) by 13.6%, and weapons (from July to December 1941) - by 29%, which did not allow to simultaneously accumulate stocks and make up for losses at the front. In 1941, the German industry produced 540 thousand tons of ammunition, and the Wehrmacht spent 583 thousand tons in the East, and "as a result, the combat power of German artillery was undermined" 1687. The development of events on the Soviet-German front in August 1941 led to the fact that the German leadership was forced to postpone plans for the reorganization of the Wehrmacht for the future. On July 4, 1941, the future development of

operations on the Eastern Front seemed to Halder as follows: "In general, it should be considered that the enemy no longer has sufficient forces for a serious defense of his new line, passing from the former Russian-Estonian border along the Western Dvina and Dnieper and beyond to the south ... In the course of the advance of our armies, all attempts at enemy resistance will obviously be quickly broken. Then we will face the question of capturing Leningrad and Moscow "1688. Hitler was also sure that by the end of August "he would somehow cope" with the USSR 1689. However, a little more than a week passed, and it turned out that, contrary to pre-war assumptions, the successes of the Wehrmacht in the border battle did not lead to the collapse of the resistance of the Red Army, and the German command again faced the problem of a lack of forces for a simultaneous offensive in three strategic directions. While Army Group Center was able to break through to the Smolensk region, Army Group North's offensive bogged down at the Luga line, and Army Group South was drawn into protracted battles between Kiev and Vinnitsa. In this situation, the German military-political leadership was increasingly inclined to reinforce the flank groups of the Eastern Front at the expense of Army Group Center.

For the first time, this idea was formalized by Directive No. 33 of July 19, and already on July 23, in addition to this directive, Hitler approved, in his opinion, the "ideal" plan: the infantry divisions of Army Group Center were to independently advance on Moscow, and the "tank connections are deployed in divergent directions" 1690. On the same day, reporting to Hitler the situation at the front, Halder noted that "although the enemy has been decisively weakened, he has not yet been completely defeated"; True, it was still believed that the Wehrmacht would be able to reach the Volga line in early October. 1691 For its part, the Soviet command decided to make a new attempt to wrest the strategic initiative from the enemy, and on July 23 the Red Army launched a counterattack on Smolensk. Although the poorly prepared counterattacks did not lead to a breakthrough of the enemy's front, the troops of the Army Group "Center" were pinned down, and protracted stubborn battles continued until the beginning of September. All this led to the fact that the German command was forced to aban

ongoing plans and focus on solving pressing problems. Therefore, already on July 30, 1941, the tasks for the troops of the Eastern Front were again changed. According to Directive No. 34, Army Group North was to continue the offensive in Estonia and Leningrad. Army Group "Center" should have gone on the defensive and prepared for an operation to support Army Group "South", which was tasked with capturing the Right-Bank Ukraine in 1692. August was the time when

the German command began to have doubts about the possibility of completing the "Eastern Campaign" before the winter of 1941. So, on August 4, Hitler, noting that "in general, operations on the Eastern Front have so far developed more successfully than could be would have been expected, given the unexpectedly large number of tanks and aircraft that the Russians had, "admitted that if he" had been informed about this before the start of the war, it would have been much more difficult for him to decide on the need for an attack "1693. On August 11, Halder made a noteworthy conclusion: "The general situation shows more and more clearly that the colossus Russia, which deliberately prepared for war with all the unrestraint characteristic of totalitarian countries, was underestimated by us. This statement extends to organizational and economic efforts, to means of communication, but above all for purely military combat effectiveness. As you can see, it took only a month for the chief of staff the situation on of the OKH to [Russians] "1694 . completely reconsider its assessment of the Eastern Front. Goebbels' diary entries in August 1941 also testify to doubts about the possibility of "completing the Eastern Campaign, at least before winter." On September 10, "after it became clear that the Eastern campaign could not be completed in a short time," Goebbels concluded that it was necessary to "gradually prepare the people for a long war" 1695

Nevertheless, the German command still hoped that he would be able to capture Ukraine and Moscow, "because otherwise we would not be able to defeat the enemy before the onset of autumn" 1696. However, the development of the situation at the front did not allow us to hope for a quick victory, since until the end of August the USSR had not lost a single vital milestone. In the north, stubborn battles continued on the outskirts of Leningrad, in the south, German troops fought their way along the Right-Bank Ukraine to the Dnieper, there was nothing to think about an attack on Moscow or the Donbass as long as the Soviet troops held the front Bryansk - Gomel - Kiev - Dnepropetrovsk . Since this ledge did not allow to develop the offensive further to the east, and one by one the Army Groups "Center" and "South" could not cut it off, on September 6 it was decided that these army groups, acting on adjacent flanks, should finally establish a direct connection and give yourself freedom of movement. In September, the Wehrmacht managed to blockade Leningrad and defeat the Kyiv group of Soviet troops. True, as early as August 27, the OKW concluded that, since the USSR, apparently, would not be completely defeated "during 1941, the continuation of the Eastern campaign in 1942 is in the first place. The seizure of territory on the southern wing [of the Eastern Front] will have great political and economic

consequences" 1697 . Thus, during the second stage of the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, despite new heavy losses, the Red Army was able to slow down the advance of the enemy and to a large extent deplete his forces. The Soviet leadership received time to expand military production, create new reserves, the commissioning of which was supposed to turn the tide of the war. At the same time, it should be noted that the enthusiasm of the Soviet command for frequent and poorly prepared counterattacks led to unnecessary losses and made it difficult to prepare defensive operations. Meanwhile, the successes of the Wehrmacht in the battles for Kiev gave rise to new hopes in the German leadership for the possibility of still achieving victory on the Eastern Front as early as 1941. For this, in addition to the main operation in the Moscow direction, it was decided to join the Finns east of Lake Ladoga in the north, and in the south to capture the Crimea, Donbass and break into the Caucasus. It was believed that only near Moscow could there be serious resistance from the Soviet troops, the defeat of which would lead to the victory of Germany. In fact, the impending offensives

an attempt to carry out the campaign plan, or at least capture the largest possible territory in order to use it for operations in 1942. All the troops that could be used were drawn into Army Group Center, which received the order on September 26 to begin Operation Typhoon 1698.

True, in September, the head of the military economy and armaments department of the OKW headquarters, General G. Thomas, analyzing the military and economic results of operations on the Eastern Front, came to the conclusion that only the capture of the Ural Moscow. For industrial region would lead to the collapse of the USSR¹⁶⁹⁹ attack on their part, the Soviet troops, who received an order to go on the defensive only on September 27 and failed to open the enemy grouping, could not hold back the powerful blow of Army Group Center, and the enemy managed to surround up to 77% of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts. The general situation was complicated by the fact that in order to restore the front on the Left-Bank Ukraine, the Soviet command was forced to use up almost all of its reserves, and the decline in military production as the zone of industrial evacuation expanded made it difficult both to equip new reserve formations and to replenish the losses of active troops. Therefore, the Soviet leadership was forced to transfer troops from Central Asia and the Far East to the front, but this took time. In mid-October, the German troops had the opportunity to break through to Moscow, but the need to defeat the encircled Soviet groups, which fought for almost two weeks, and the growing resistance on the outskirts of the capital, fettered the actions of the Wehrmacht. In addition, as they moved east, the German troops were diverted to cover the flanks, which also weakened their grouping. If in the first half of October the Wehrmacht advanced at an average rate of 16 km per day, then in late October, in the second half of the month, the rate of advance fell to 5 km per day. There was some lull in the Moscow sector of the front. Blitzkrieg failed.

On October 16, in the zone of Army Group North, German troops crossed the Volkhov and tried to break through to the Svir River to join the Finnish units. On November 8, they occupied Tikhvin, but already on November 10, Soviet troops counterattacked and by December 30 pushed the enemy back to their original position. On the southern sector of the Soviet-German front, on September 29, the troops of the Army Group "South" again went on the offensive and broke into the Donbass. Unable to transfer reserves to the South-Western direction, the Soviet command was forced to withdraw troops. In October, German troops broke into the Crimea and laid siege to Sevastopol. On November 17, fighting began for Rostov-on-Don, which was captured by the enemy on November 21. However, the counterattack of the Soviet troops led on November 29 to the liberation of the city, and on December 2 the front stabilized on the Mius River. Thus, the tasks of the Wehrmacht on the flanks of the Eastern Front were only partially completed, and its troops were pinned down by battles, which did not allow the German command to transfer a single formation from these sectors of the front to Army Group Center. For its part, the Soviet command deployed up to 99 new settlement divisions in the

Moscow direction, recreating the front of defense. In the conditions of the disruption of the offensive, the German military-political leadership, confident that the Red Army, after so many defeats, was on the verge of final collapse, continued to insist on the need for a new breakthrough towards Moscow, although the command of the troops at the front was skeptical about the possibility of a new offensive. On November 13, 1941, at a command meeting in Orsha, it was concluded that the war with the USSR would continue in 1942, and the general situation in the world was not favorable for Germany's victory in the war with England. november. The enemy tried to surround the capital, but he managed to break through only to Yakhroma, Kryukovo, Kashira. True, instead of strengthening the troops of the Eastern Front, on November 5, the transfer of the 2nd Air Fleet to the Mediterranean theater of operations began, where on November 18 the British troops went on the offensive in Cyrenaica. Already on November 20, it became clear that the breakthrough to Moscow had failed, and on November 30, t

concluded that the troops did not have the forces for the offensive, which "has no meaning, no purpose" 1702. In the early days of December 1941, the German troops actually went on the defensive, and then it turned out that the German there is no command, since the opinion prevailed in Berlin that the enemy did not has forces for a counterattack 1703.

The "Eastern Campaign", despite the significant successes of the Wehrmacht, failed. Even in the most favorable operational and strategic conditions in 1941, the task of defeating the USSR turned out to be beyond the strength of Germany, which threw to the East all its most combat-ready connections. Having staked on the lightning defeat of the Soviet Union, carefully preparing an attack, choosing the most convenient moment for the invasion and from the very beginning war, having seized the strategic initiative, the German command failed use their advantages, because they had absolutely no idea with what the enemy will have to face in the East. As acknowledged after the war, General G. Blumentritt, "we were opposed by an army, in terms of its fighting qualities much superior to all other armies we have ever encountered on battlefield" 1704 By the end of November 1941, Germany was on the verge of a major military and economic crisis that erupted in December 1941. 1705 Already on November 24, in an interview with Halder, the commander of the reserve army, Colonel-General F. Fromm, outlining the "general military-economic situation", concluded that "a truce is necessary" 1706. 29 November Minister for Armaments and Ammunition F. Todt told Hitler that "in the military and in the military-economic sense, the war has already been lost" and a political settlement of 1707 .

Table 64

Losses of the parties on the Soviet-German front by December 31, 1941, 1708

* Of these, 244,744 became trophies of the

Wehrmacht. ** Of these, 30,275 became

Wehrmacht trophies. *** Of these, 13,405 became

trophies of the Wehrmacht. **** Of these, 52,247

became trophies of the Wehrmacht. ***** Data for

German troops only. Despite heavy losses (see table 64), the Soviet armed forces managed to disrupt the German plan for a lightning war and, having exhausted the enemy, create conditions for transition to a counteroffensive near Moscow, which began on December 5-6. German troops were taken by surprise and, unable to hold the front, began to retreat. December 8 the German command allowed the troops to go on the defensive on the entire Soviet-German front, finally recognizing the failure of the Eastern Campaign. Soviet troops managed to seize the strategic initiative and push the enemy back within a month south and north of Moscow for 250 km. In January 1942, the Red Army went into general offensive on the entire front, which lasted until the end of April 1942. Winter the counter-offensive of the Red Army clearly showed that the German stake on the "blitzkrieg" finally failed, and Germany faced the prospect of a protracted war for two front. Therefore, the failure of the "Eastern Campaign" was not just a defeat for the Wehrmacht on one of the theaters of military operations, but was the complete and final collapse of the German strategy of warfare, required a radical restructuring of the military-economic organism of Germany for waging a protracted war. Attack at the same time Japan at Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war by Germany and Italy on the United States marked the transformation of a European war into a global world war, which has taken on the character of a permanent tense and protracted struggle, which Germany could not win 1709 Events December 1941 - January 1942 marked the beginning of a radical change in the Second world war.

Annex A

Table 1A

Development of the rifle troops of the Red Army 1934 -

1938 Subdivisions 1934 1935 1936 1937

1938 Personnel SD 18 17

38 48 87 Mixed SD 16

16 4 - Territorial SD 42 38 35 25

Personnel SD 5 5 5 10 11

Mixed SD 3 3 4 -

Kolkhoz SD 3 3 - 3 U

Rovskie SD - 1 11 12

Territorial "B" SD - 4 - - Total

87 87 97 98 98 rifle

brigades - - - - 5 Det. rifle

regiments - 2 2 - Source:

RGVA. F.40442. Op.2. D.180. L.93. Table 2A

Development

of the tank forces of the Red Army
1934-1939

Units 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Tank

brigades 12 18 30 30 29 31

Motorized armored brigades - - -

1 2 3 Rifle and machine gun brigades 3 3

3 3 3 4 Tank regiments 5 2

2 - - 10 Motorized armored

regiments - - - 1 1 Tan military

battalions RGK 9 4 6 6 6 Source: RGVA.

F.7. Op.15.

D.152. L.122. Table 3A Development
of the Red

Army Cavalry 1934-1938 Units

1934 1935 1938

Personnel KD 17 24

18 Personnel GKD 5 5 5

Territorial KD -

3 Cossack KD - - 2 Cavalry

brigades - - 2 Source: RGVA. F.40442. Op.2.

D.121. L.1

- 12. Table 4A Development of rifle troops

in 1939-1940. Note: 1. The columns indicate the proposals of NGOs on the organization of rifle troops

2. The sign * marks the proposals of NGOs approved by the government.

3. The columns for 1.02.40 and 1.12.40 indicate the actual state of the Red Army,
in square brackets - NPO proposals. Table

5A

Development of artillery in 1939-1940

Notes: 1. The columns show the NPO proposals for the organization of artillery. 2.

The sign * marks the proposals of NGOs approved by the government. 3.

The columns for 1.02.40, 9.05.40, 1.09.40 and 1.12.40 indicate the actual state

artillery.

Table 6A

Development of tank troops in 1939-1940

Notes: 1. The columns indicate the proposals of NGOs on the organization of tank troops.

2. The sign * marks the proposals of NGOs approved by the government. 3. The columns for 1.02.40 and 1.12.40 indicate the actual state of the tank troops. Table 7A Development

of the cavalry in 1939-1940 Notes: 1.

The columns indicate the NPO proposals for the organization of the cavalry. 2. The sign * marks the proposals of NGOs approved by the government. 3. The column for 1.02.40

indicates the actual state of the cavalry. The Red Army at the beginning of

World War II (1939-1941) List of departments of fronts,

army groups and

armies 1) Departments of fronts Belorussian Front. The Front Office

was created on September

6-11, 1939 on the basis of

BOVO control for use in the Polish campaign. Disbanded November 14, 1939

G.

Far East Front. The Directorate was created on June 21, 1940 on the basis of the Directorate Chita front group to lead troops in the Far East.

Western front. The department was created in June 1941 on the basis of the ZapOVO department.

Northwestern Front. The department was created on January 7, 1940 on the basis of the LVO department to lead the troops on the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish campaign. Disbanded March 26, 1940

Northwestern Front (new). The department was created in June 1941 on the basis of control PribOVO. Ukrainian

front. The Front Office was created on September 6-11, 1939 on the basis of KOVO control for use in the Polish campaign. Disbanded November 14, 1939

G.

Southwestern front. The department was created in June 1941 on the basis of the KOVO department.

Southern front. The department was created on June 9, 1940 on the basis of the KOVO department for use in the Bessarabian campaign. Disbanded on July 10, 1940. 2) Army Group

Directorates 1st Army Group. The

department was formed in July 1939 on the basis of the department 57-th special rifle corps stationed in the MPR. 21 June 1940 renamed command of the 17th army.

Bobruisk army group. The department was formed in July 1938 on the basis of command of the 5th Rifle Corps in BOVO. In September 1939, it was renamed to command of the 4th army.

Vinnitsa army group. The department was formed in July 1938 on the basis of command of the 17th Rifle Corps in KOVO. From September 16, 1939 it was called Volochisk AG, from September 24 - Eastern AG, September 28, renamed the 6th Army Directorate.

Vitebsk army group. The department was formed in July 1938 on the basis of command of the 4th Rifle Corps in BOVO. In September 1939, it was renamed to command of the 3rd army.

Dzerzhinsky horse-mechanized group. Management formed in September 1939 on the basis of the KalVO administration. In September 1939 he took part in the Polish campaign. Disbanded on September 26, 1939

Zhytomyr Army Group. The department was formed in July 1938 on the basis of command of the 8th Rifle Corps in KOVO. From September 16, 1939 it was called Shepetovskaya AG, from September 18 - Northern AG, on September 28 it was renamed into the department of the 5th army.

Cavalry Army Group. The department was formed in July 1938 in KOVO. WITH On September 16, 1939, it was renamed Kamenetz-Podolsk AG. Recreated from September 28 1939 In June - July 1940, he participated in the Bessarabian campaign. January 1, 1941 renamed to 26th Army Directorate.

Kamenetz-Podolsky army group. Directorate formed 16 September 1939 by renaming the Cavalry AG, from September 20 it was called the Southern AG, from 24 September it was renamed to the administration of the

12th Army. Minsk army group. The department was formed in January 1939 on the basis of command of the 16th Rifle Corps in BOVO. Renamed to September 1939 command of the 11th army.

Murmansk army group. The department was formed in September 1939 on the basis of command of the 33rd Rifle Corps in the LVO. November 29, 1939 renamed management 14th Army.

Novgorod army group. The department was formed in August 1939 in the Leningrad Military District. 14 September 1939 renamed to the management of the 8th army.

Odessa army group. The department was formed in July 1938 on the basis of command of the 6th Rifle Corps in KOVO. In September 1939, it was renamed to command of the 13th army.

Northern Army Group. The Directorate was formed in October 1939 to leadership of troops on the lower Amur, Kamchatka and Sakhalin with subordination to the military Council of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army. In June 1940, it was reorganized into management of the Special Rifle Corps. 3)

Office of the armies of the 1st Red Banner Army. The office was deployed in August 1939 on the Far East. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet.

2nd Red Banner Army. The office was deployed in August 1939 on the Far East. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet.

3rd army. Management formed in September 1939 by renaming management of Vitebsk AG. In September - October 1939 he participated in the Polish campaign. WITH October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1940, he participated in the Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

4th army. Management formed in September 1939 by renaming management of Bobruisk AG. In September - October 1939 he participated in the Polish campaign. WITH October 1939 in BOVO. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

5th army. Management formed on September 28, 1939 by renaming management of Northern AG. In September - October 1939 he participated in the Polish campaign. WITH October 1939 in KOVO. In June - July 1940, he participated in the Bessarabian campaign. Since July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

6th army. Management formed on September 28, 1939 by renaming management of the Eastern AG. In September - October 1939 he participated in the Polish campaign. WITH October 1939 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 7th

Army. The department was formed in September 1939 on the basis of the KalVO department. IN December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Disbanded 26 March 1940

7th Army (new). The department was formed in September 1940 on the basis of the department 56th rifle corps in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO. 8th army.

Management formed on September 14, 1939 by renaming administration of the Novgorod AG. In December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since March 1940 in the LVO. In June 1940, he participated in the Baltic campaign. WITH July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

9th army. The Directorate was formed in November 1939 on the basis of the Directorate of the Special rifle corps in the LVO. In December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Disbanded 26 March 1940

9th Army (new). The department was formed in June 1940 on the basis of the OdVO department. In June - July 1940, he participated in the Bessarabian campaign. Disbanded 10 July 1940

9th Army (new). The department was formed on June 14, 1941 on the basis of the OdVO department.

10th Army. The department was formed in September 1939 on the basis of the department of the Moscow Military District. IN September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. WITH July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 11th

Army. Management formed in September 1939 by renaming management of Minsk AG. In September - October 1939 he participated in the Polish campaign. WITH October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1940, he participated in the Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

12th army. Management formed on September 24, 1939 by renaming management of the Southern AG. In September - October 1939 he participated in the Polish campaign. Disbanded 23 October 1939 12th Army

(new). Management formed on October 23, 1939 by renaming command of the 13th army. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In June July 1940, he participated in Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 13th Army.

Management formed in September 1939 by renaming management of Odessa AG. On October 23, 1939, it was renamed the 12th Army Directorate.

13th Army (new). The Directorate was formed on December 25, 1939 on the basis of the Directorates group commander V.D. Grendal and the 3rd Rifle Corps. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Disbanded March 26, 1940 13th Army (new).

The department was formed in May 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in Zapovo.

14th Army. Directorate formed November 29, 1939 by renaming Murmansk AG. In December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Since March 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

15th Army. The department was formed on February 11, 1940 in the LVO. February - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Disbanded 26 March 1940

15th Army (new). The department was formed in July 1940 on the basis of the department of the 20th rifle corps in the Far Eastern Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 16th Army. The Directorate was formed in July 1940 on the basis of the Directorate of the 32nd rifle corps in ZabVO. Since May 1941, as part of the RGC troops in KOVO. 17th Army.

Directorate formed on June 21, 1940 by renaming management of the 1st AG. Since June 1940 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in ZabVO.

18th Army. The directorate was formed in June 1941 on the basis of the HVO directorate. 19th Army.

The department was formed in May 1941 on the basis of the department of the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 as part of the RGC troops in KOVO.

20th Army. The Directorate was formed in June 1941 on the basis of the OrVO Directorate. IN June 1941 as part of the RGC troops in the Moscow Military District.

21st Army. The department was formed in June 1941 on the basis of the PriVO department. 22nd

Army. The department was formed in May 1941 on the basis of the department of the Ural Military District. In June 1941 as part of the RGC troops in the ZapOVO.

23rd Army. The department was formed in May 1941 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO. 24th Army.

The Directorate was formed in June 1941 on the basis of the Directorate of the Siberian Military

District. 25th Army. The department was formed in January 1941 in the Far East Fleet. In June 1941 in the

Far Eastern Fleet. 26th Army. The Directorate was formed on January 1, 1941 on the basis of the Directorate Cavalry AG in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 27th Army. The department was formed in May 1941 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

List of divisions of the Red Army in 1939-1941. Below is information about all rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized, cavalry and tank divisions that were available in the Red Army during the period from September 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941 For divisions that existed by August 1939, the term formation is not specified. For newly formed or reformed

divisions indicate the approximate date for these events, based on orders
Defense Commissar.

1) Rifle, motorized rifle and mountain rifle divisions 1st Rifle. In August 1939,
she was stationed in the Moscow Military District. In December 1939
converted to motorized. 2nd Rifle. In August

1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September October 1939
participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

3rd Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the Siberian Military District. From October 1939 in the 2nd
OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far Eastern Fleet.

4th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September October 1939
participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. December 1939 - March 1940
participated in the Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO.

5th rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September October 1939
participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 she was stationed in Lithuania. From July 1940
in PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO. 6th Infantry.

In August 1939, she was stationed in the Orvo. September October 1939
participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

7th Infantry. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. September October 1939
participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. January - March 1940
participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in KOVO. June-July 1940
participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In August 1940
converted to motorized. 8th Infantry. In August

1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September October 1939
participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. January - March 1940
participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the North Caucasus Military District. June-July 1940
participated in the Bessarabian campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

9th mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in
ZakVO.

10th Infantry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the Moscow Military District. September October 1939
participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1940 she participated in
Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

11th Infantry. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. January March 1940
participated in the Finnish campaign. In June 1940 she took part in the Baltic campaign. WITH
July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

12th Infantry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 2nd OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN
June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 13th Infantry. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. In September - October 1939
took part in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

14th Infantry. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940
took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

15th Infantry. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. Since October 1939 in the OdVO.
In December 1939, it was reorganized into a motorized one. In June - July 1940 she participated in
Bessarabian campaign. Since July 1940 in the OdVO, where it was reorganized into a motorized one.

16th Infantry. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. Since October 1939 in Estonia.
From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO. 17th

Infantry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the Moscow Military District. In January 1940
reorganized into motorized rifle. In January - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish
campaigns. Since April 1940 in the Moscow Military District, where it was reorganized into a rifle. June-July 1940
participated in the Bessarabian campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

18th Infantry. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940
took part in the Finnish campaign, during which it was defeated by the enemy. In March
1940 disbanded.

18th rifle (new). Formed in April 1940 in the PriVO by renaming of the 111th Infantry Division. In June 1941 in the 20th Army.

19th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the OrVO. In June 1941 in OrVO. 20th Mountain Infantry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO.

21st Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 22nd Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 23rd Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the KhVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in the HVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

24th Infantry. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

25th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the KhVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in the HVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO.

26th Infantry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 27th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

28th mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in SKVO.

29th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In January 1940 converted to motorized. In April 1940, it was reorganized into a rifle division. IN June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In August 1940 reorganized into motorized.

30th Infantry. In August 1939 she was stationed in the KhVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in the OdVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In May 1941 converted to mountain rifle. In June 1941 in the OdVO.

31st Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the North Caucasus Military District. Since January 1940 in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO. 32nd

Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 33rd Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In January 1940 converted to motorized. In April 1940, it was reorganized into a rifle division. IN June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO. 34th

Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 2nd OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 35th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 2nd OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 36th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st AG. In February 1940 reorganized into a motorized rifle division. In June 1941 in ZabVO. 37th Rifle. In August

1939, she was stationed in the Siberian Military District, where she was reorganized into motorized rifle. In February - March 1940 she participated in the Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the LVO, where it was reorganized into a rifle. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in Zapovo.

38th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the 19th army.

39th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 40th Infantry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 41st Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the KhVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

42nd Rifle. Formed in January 1940 in the LVO. February March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

43rd Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

44th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In May 1941 reorganized into mountain rifle. In June 1941 in KOVO.

45th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

46th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. Since September 1939 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in the 16th Army. 47th mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO.

48th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KalVO. In June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

49th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

50th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. January - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in BOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

51st Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. Since October 1939 in the OdVO. In January - March 1940 she participated in the Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the OdVO. In June - July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in OdVO.

52nd Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

53rd Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the PriVO. In June 1941 in the 21st army.

54th mountain rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the Leningrad Military District, where it was reorganized into rifle. In June 1941 in the LVO.

55th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the Orvo. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in OrVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

56th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

57th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st AG. In February 1940 reorganized into motorized rifle. In June 1941 in ZabVO.

58th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In January 1940 converted to motorized. In April 1940, it was reorganized into a rifle division. IN June - July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In May 1941 reorganized into mountain rifle. In June 1941 in KOVO.

59th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 60th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. January - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In May 1941 converted to mountain rifle. In June 1941 in KOVO.

61st Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the PriVO. In June 1941 in the 21st army.

62nd Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. January - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

63rd mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO.

64th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KalVO. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. IN June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

65th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Ural Military District. Since December 1939 in ZabVO. In January 1940, it was reorganized into a motorized one. In April 1940, it was reorganized into rifle. In June 1941 in ZabVO. 66th Rifle. In

August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 67th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KalVO. Since October 1939 in Latvia. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

68th mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in SAVO. In June 1941 in SAVO.

69th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 2nd OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN in March 1941 it was reorganized into a motorized one. 70th

Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

71st Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the Siberian Military District. In January 1940 disbanded. 71st rifle

(new). Formed in May 1940 in the LVO on the basis of the 1st Rifle FNA Corps. In June 1941 in the LVO. 72nd

Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. January - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In May 1941 converted to mountain rifle. In June 1941 in KOVO.

73rd Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the Siberian Military District. Since October 1939 in PRIVO. In November 1939, it was disbanded.

73rd rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the 20th army.

74th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the North Caucasus Military District. June July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO.

75th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. IN June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

76th mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO.

77th mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO.

78th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the Siberian Military District. From December 1939 in the 2nd OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far Eastern Fleet.

79th mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 2nd OKA. In April 1940 converted to rifle. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far Eastern Fleet.

80th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the KhVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. January - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

81st Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In January 1940 converted to motorized. 82nd Rifle. In August

1939, she was stationed in the 1st AG. In February 1940 reorganized into motorized rifle. In March 1941, it was reorganized into a motorized one.

83rd mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in SAVO. In June 1941 in SAVO.

84th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the Moscow Military District. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in the Moscow Military District. In January 1940 reorganized into motorized rifle. In January - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since April 1940 in the Moscow Military District, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In August 1940 converted to motorized. 85th Rifle. In August

1939 she was stationed in the Ural Military District. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. IN June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

86th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the PriVO. In January 1940 reorganized into motorized rifle. In January - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since April 1940 in the PriVO, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June - July 1940 took part in the Bessarabian campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 87th Rifle. In

August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In March 1940 she participated in Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

88th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the LVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the ArkhVO. In June 1941 in the ArkhVO. 89th

Rifle. Formed in July 1940 in OrVO. In June 1941 in OrVO. 90th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

91st Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Siberian Military District. In January 1940 reorganized into motorized rifle. In February - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since April 1940 in the Siberian Military District, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June 1941 in 24th Army.

92nd Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. IN June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 93rd Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in ZabVO. In June 1941 in ZabVO.

94th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the Siberian Military District. Since December 1939 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in ZabVO.

95th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. Since October 1939 in the OdVO. In January - March 1940 she participated in the Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the OdVO. In June - July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in OdVO.

96th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In January 1940 converted to mountain rifle. In June 1941 in KOVO.

97th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. January - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

98th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Ural Military District. In June 1941 in the 22nd army.

99th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

100th Rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. In September - October 1939 took part in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the North Caucasus Military District. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

101st mountain rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 2nd OKA. From June 1940 in DVF. In June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 102nd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Siberian Military District. In January 1940 disbanded. 102nd

Rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the HVO. 103rd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the North Caucasus Military District. In March 1941 converted to motorized. 104th mountain

rifle. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. In December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the Leningrad Military District, where it was reorganized in the rifle. In June 1941 in the LVO. 105th

Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From June 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 106th Rifle. Formed in November 1939 in the LVO. In December 1939 reorganized into the 1st Rifle Corps of the FNA. 106th

rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in OdVO.

107th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Siberian Military District. In June 1941 in the 24th army.

108th Rifle. Formed in July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 109th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in ZabVO. In January 1940 converted to motorized. 110th Rifle. Formed

in September 1939 in the Ural Military District. In January 1940 disbanded. 110th

rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the 20th army.

111th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the PriVO. In April 1940 Redesignated 18th Infantry Division.

111th rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in the ArkhVO. In June 1941 in ArchVO.

112th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Ural Military District. In June 1941 in the 22nd army.

113th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in BOVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in BOVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

114th Rifle. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st AG. Since October 1939 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in ZabVO.

115th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Moscow Military District. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

116th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the KhVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO.

117th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the PriVO. In June 1941 in the 21st army.

118th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the North Caucasus Military District. In January 1940 disbanded. 118th

rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the Moscow Military District. 119th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Siberian Military District. In January 1940 reorganized into motorized rifle. In February - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since April 1940 in the Siberian Military District, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June 1941 in 19th Army.

120th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in OrVO. In January 1940 disbanded. 120th

rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in OrVO. In June 1941 in OrVO.

121st Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in BOVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

122nd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in OrVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

123rd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the LVO. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

124th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KOVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

125th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Ural Military District. In January 1940 reorganized into motorized rifle. In February - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since April 1940 in BOVO, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

126th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Moscow Military District. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

127th Rifle. Formed in July 1940 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the 19th Army. 128th Rifle.

Formed in September 1939 in the Ural Military District. In January 1940 reorganized into motorized rifle. In February - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since April 1940 in the ArkhVO, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

129th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the PriVO. In January 1940 disbanded. 129th

rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the 19th army.

130th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

131st Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In December 1939 reorganized into a light motorized rifle. In December 1939-March 1940 she participated in Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in KOVO, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In November 1940 converted to motorized. 132nd Rifle. Formed

in September 1939 in the KhVO. Since October 1939 in the OdVO. WITH April 1940 in the HVO. In June 1941 in the HVO.

133rd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Siberian Military District. In June 1941 in the 24th army.

134th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the 19th Army.

135th rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the KhVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

136th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Moscow Military District. From October 1939 in BOVO. IN December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the ZakVO. IN June 1941 in ZakVO.

137th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the Moscow Military District. 138th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KalVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO.

139th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in BOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in BOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

140th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

141st Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the KhVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

142nd Rifle. Formed in September 1930 in the LVO. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

143rd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in BOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. Since April 1940 in OrVO. IN June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in ZapOVO.

144th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Moscow Military District. In January 1940 reorganized into a volunteer motorized rifle. In March 1940 she participated in Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the Moscow Military District, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June 1941 to the 20th Army.

145th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in BOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. Since April 1940 in OrVO. IN June 1941 in OrVO.

146th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. Disbanded in July 1940. 146th rifle (new).

Formed in July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

147th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the KhVO. Since October 1939 in the OdVO. IN June - July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in OdVO.

148th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the PriVO. In June 1941 in the 21st army.

149th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in OrVO. In June 1941 in OrVO. 150th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in BOVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in BOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO.

151st Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the KhVO. Since October 1939 in the OdVO. WITH April 1940 in the HVO. In June 1941 in the HVO.

152nd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in the 16th army.

153rd Rifle. Formed in July 1940 in the Ural Military District. In June 1941 in the 22nd Army. 154th Rifle. Formed in July 1940 in the PriVO. In June 1941 in the 21st Army. 155th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KalVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. IN June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

156th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the KhVO. Since October 1939 in the OdVO. IN June 1941 in the OdVO.

157th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District. 158th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the 19th army.

159th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Ural Military District. In January 1940 disbanded. 159th

rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

160th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the North Caucasus Military District. In January 1940 disbanded. 160th

rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the Moscow Military District. 161st Rifle. Formed in July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 162nd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the KhVO. In January 1940 disbanded. 162nd

rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the 19th army.

163rd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Moscow Military District. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in the LVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. Reorganized in August 1940 into a motorized one.

164th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in BOVO. September October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. December 1939 - March 1940 participated in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the North Caucasus Military District. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 165th Rifle.

Formed in July 1940 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District. 166th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Siberian Military District. In June 1941 in the 24th army.

167th Rifle. Formed in July 1940 in the PriVO. In June 1941 in the 21st Army. 168th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the LVO. December 1939 - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

169th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

170th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Ural Military District. In June 1941 in the 22nd army.

171st Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the 19th army.

172nd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Moscow Military District. In January 1940 reorganized into a volunteer motorized rifle. In March 1940 she participated in Finnish campaign. Since April 1940 in the Moscow Military District, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June 1941 in the 20th

Army. 173rd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the PriVO. In January 1940 reorganized into motorized rifle. In January - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since April 1940 in the OdVO, where it was reorganized into a rifle. In June - July 1940 took part in the Bessarbian campaign. Disbanded in July 1940. 173rd rifle (new). Formed in July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

174th Rifle. Formed in July 1940 in the Ural Military District. In June 1941 in the 22nd Army. 175th Rifle. Formed in July 1940 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District. 176th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in the OdVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarbian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO. 177th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.

178th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Siberian Military District. In June 1941 in the 24th army.

179th Rifle. Formed in September 1940 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

180th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in OrVO. In January 1940 disbanded. 180th

rifle (new). Formed in September 1940 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in Pribovo.

181st Rifle. Formed in September 1940 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

182nd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Moscow Military District. In January 1940 disbanded. 182nd

rifle (new). Formed in September 1940 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in Pribovo.

183rd Rifle. Formed in September 1940 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

184th Rifle. Formed in September 1940 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

185th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in OrVO. From April 1940 in BOVO. IN June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. From July 1940 in the PribVO. March 1941 was reorganized into a motorized one.

186th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Ural Military District. In June 1941 in the 22nd army.

187th Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in KOVO. September-October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in the HVO. In June 1941 in the HVO.

188th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

189th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO.

190th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 191st Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO. 192nd Rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the KhVO. In November 1939 converted to mountain rifle. From January 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 193rd Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 194th rifle. Formed in September 1939 in the Siberian Military District. In December 1939 converted to motorized. Since January 1940 in SAVO. Since April 1940 converted to rifle. From May 1941 it was reorganized into a mountain rifle. In June 1941 in SAVO.

195th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 196th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO. 197th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 199th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 200th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 201st Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the Siberian Military District. In May 1941 disbanded. 203rd Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the Ural Military District. Disbanded in May 1941. 206th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO. 207th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District. Disbanded in May 1941. 211th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in OrVO. Disbanded in May 1941. 214th rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the HVO. 217th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in OrVO. In June 1941 in OrVO. 222nd Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in OrVO. In June 1941 in OrVO. 223rd Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the Ural Military District. Disbanded in May 1941. 224th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the Moscow Military District. Disbanded in May 1941. 225th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the Siberian Military District. In May 1941

disbanded. 226th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in OrVO. Disbanded in May 1941. 227th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the HVO. 228th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 229th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the Moscow Military District. 230th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the KhVO. Disbanded in May 1941. 231st Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the Moscow Military District. Disbanded in May 1941. 232nd Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the HVO. 233rd Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the Moscow Military District. 234th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the PriVO. In May 1941

disbanded. 235th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the Moscow Military District. 237th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO. 238th Rifle. Formed in March 1941 in SAVO. In June 1941 in SAVO.

2) Motorized divisions 1st. Formed in December 1939 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic operation. Since July 1940 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the 20th Army. 7th. Formed in August 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 15th. Formed in August 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO. 29th. Formed in August 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 69th. Formed in March 1941 in the Far East Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far Eastern Fleet. 81st. Formed in January 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 82nd. Formed in March 1941 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in ZabVO. 84th. Formed in August 1940 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO. 103rd. Formed in March 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the 19th Army. 109th. Formed in January 1940 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in the 16th Army.

131st. Formed in November 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.
163rd. Formed in August 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO.
185th. Formed in March 1941 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in the Moscow Military District. 198th. Formed in March 1941 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO. 202nd. Formed in March 1941 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO. 204th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 205th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 208th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 209th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 210th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 212th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 213th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 215th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 216th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 218th. Formed in March 1941 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO. 219th. Formed in March 1941 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the HVO. 220th. Formed in March 1941 in OrVO. In June 1941 in OrVO. 221st. Formed in March 1941 in SAVO. In June 1941 in SAVO. 236th. Formed in March 1941 in ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO. 239th. Formed in March 1941 in the Far East Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far Eastern Fleet. 240th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941

in KOVO. 3) Panzer divisions 1st. Formed in July 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO. 2nd. Formed in July 1940 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO. 3rd. Formed in July 1940 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO. 4th. Formed in July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 5th. Formed in July 1940 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO. 6th. Formed in July 1940 in ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO. 7th. Formed in July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 8th. Formed in July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 9th. Formed in July 1940 in SAVO. In June 1941 in SAVO. 10th. Formed in July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 11th. Formed in July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO. 12th. Formed in July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 13th. Formed in July 1940 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in the 16th Army. 14th. Formed in July 1940 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the 20th Army. 15th. Formed in July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 16th. Formed in July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO. 17th. Formed in July 1940 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in the 16th Army. 18th. Formed in July 1940 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the 20th Army. 19th. Formed in October 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 20th. Formed in October 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 21st. Formed in March 1941 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO. 22nd. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 23rd. Formed in March 1941 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO. 24th. Formed in March 1941 in the LVO. In June 1941 in the LVO. 25th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 26th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 27th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 28th. Formed in March 1941 in PribOVO. In June 1941 in PribOVO. 29th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 30th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

31st. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 32nd. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 33rd. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 34th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 35th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 36th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 37th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 38th. Formed in March 1941 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 39th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 40th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 41st. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 42nd. Formed in March 1941 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the 22nd Army. 43rd. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 44th. Formed in March 1941 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO. 45th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 46th. Formed in March 1941 in the Moscow Military District. In June 1941 in the 22nd Army. 47th. Formed in March 1941 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO. 48th. Formed in March 1941 in OrVO. In June 1941 in OrVO. 49th. Formed in March 1941 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 50th. Formed in March 1941 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the 21st Army. 51st. Formed in March 1941 in OrVO. In June 1941 in OrVO. 52nd. Formed in March 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the 19th Army. 53rd. Formed in March 1941 in SAVO. In June 1941 in SAVO. 54th. Formed in March 1941 in ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO. 55th. Formed in March 1941 in the KhVO. In June 1941 in the 21st Army. 56th. Formed in March 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District. In June 1941 in the 19th Army. 57th. Formed in March 1941 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in ZabVO. 58th. Formed in March 1941 in the Far East Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far Eastern Fleet. 59th. Formed in March 1941 in the Far East Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far Eastern Fleet. 60th. Formed in March 1941 in the Far East Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far Eastern Fleet. 61st. Formed in March 1941 in ZabVO. In June 1941 in ZabVO. 4) Cavalry divisions 3rd Cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. September - October

1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO.

4th cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In March 1941 disbanded. 5th

cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO.

6th cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In June 1940 participated in the Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO. 7th

Cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. February - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in BOVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. Disbanded in July 1940.

8th cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From July 1940 in the Far Eastern Fleet. In June 1941 in the Far Eastern Fleet.

9th cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in the OdVO.

10th cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the North Caucasus Military District. In March 1941 disbanded. 11th

cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In July 1940 disbanded.

12th cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the North Caucasus Military District. In March 1941 disbanded. 14th

Cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. In June 1941 in KOVO. 15th

cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in ZabVO. In March 1941 disbanded. 16th

cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. Disbanded in July 1940. 17th mountain

cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the ZakVO. In June 1941 in ZakVO.

18th mountain cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in SAVO. In June 1941 in SAVO.

19th mountain cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in SAVO. In March 1941 disbanded. 20th

mountain cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in SAVO. In June 1941 in SAVO.

21st mountain cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in SAVO. In June 1941 in SAVO.

22nd Cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in ZabVO. In March 1941 disbanded. 24th

Cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. In January 1940 reorganized into motorized cavalry. In February - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since April 1940 in the ZakVO, where it was reorganized into a cavalry. In June 1941 in ZakVO.

25th Cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in the Leningrad Military District. In January 1940 reorganized into motorized cavalry. In January - March 1940, she participated in the Finnish campaigns. Since April 1940 in the Leningrad Military District, where it was reorganized into a cavalry. In July 1940 disbanded. 31st

Cavalry. In August 1939, she was stationed in the 1st OKA. From July 1940 in DVF. In June 1941 in the Far

Eastern Fleet. 32nd Cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. From July 1940 in KOVO. Since May 1941 in the OdVO. In June 1941 in OdVO.

34th Cavalry. In August 1939 she was stationed in KOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. Since October 1939 in KOVO. June-July 1940 participated in the Bessarabian campaign. Disbanded in July 1940. 36th Cavalry.

In August 1939 she was stationed in BOVO. September - October 1939 participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1939 in BOVO. February - March 1940 took part in the Finnish campaign. From April 1940 in BOVO. In June 1940 she participated in Baltic campaign. Since July 1940 in the ZapOVO. In June 1941 in the ZapOVO.

Annex B

The development of the armored fleet of the Red Army in

1930-1941. According to the history of the origin and development of the Soviet armored forces, their organizational improvement and rearmament written a lot of research. However, the hallmark of Soviet historiography was the almost complete lack of information on the main issue - which fleet of armored vehicles located the Soviet armed forces in the interwar period. In the spring of 2001 in The Russian State Military Archive (RGVA) declassified some inventory Fund of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army. The materials they contain answer the question about the presence of armored vehicles in the Red Army in the 1930s.

As a rule, statistical data is contained in various references or summaries. the availability of armored vehicles on different dates, compiled both in military districts and in Armored Directorate of the Red Army. First of all, there is a discrepancy information from these different authorities. Definitely answer the question about the reasons for this discrepancies are not yet possible. Therefore, the creation of a complete and accurate statistics on the availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army will require the hard work of researchers from involving an even wider range of sources reflecting both production and the flow of equipment into the Red Army, and its distribution among the troops. For now on based on the materials of the RGVA, it is possible to show relative statistics, which nevertheless gives a general idea on such an important issue in the history of the Soviet armored forces. Since it is not yet possible to determine which particular information is most are accurate, the available options for specific data on the presence of tanks and armored vehicles in the Red Army.

The development of Soviet armored forces originates in the 1920s, when The Red Army was armed mainly with captured equipment from the times Civil War. So, on January 1, 1928, there were 79 tanks in the Red Army (45 "Ricardo" Mk V, 28 "Reno" FT17, 6 "Taylor" Mk A) and 7 just started to be produced in the USSR BA-27 armored vehicles [RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.979. L.5, 8]. 1929 was a turning point in history of the Soviet armored forces. The Department of Motorization was created and mechanization (UMM) of the Red Army, and on November 25, 1929, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the structure of tank troops and the production of armored vehicles across the entire spectrum: wedges, small, light, medium, heavy tanks and armored vehicles. The presence of an armored equipment in the Red Army on January 1, 1930 and May 1, 1931 is shown in Table 1B.

Table 1B

Type January 1, 1930 May 1, 1931

MS-1 (T-18) 76,715

T-24 - 7

Large tanks 44 44 Total

120,766

Armored vehicles

129,167 Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.62.

L.16 However, there are other data, according to which, as of January 1, 1930, the Soviet armored forces consisted of 75 MS-1 tanks, 17 "Large", 1 - "Medium" (T-24) and 7 - "Small" (T-27) tanks [RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.979. L.5]. Other information as of May 1, 1931 are given in table 2B. Table

2B

Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of May 1, 1931 - - 25

Large 2 - - 13 - - - - - 15 T-27
 15 - 15 15 - - - - - 45 Total
 364 24 17 392 - 1 - - - 16 814 BA 28
 24 37 56 - 7 - - - 4 168 Source:

RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.65. L.92. During the preparation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR and Red Army, the Soviet leadership headed for motorization and mechanization armed forces. Calculations were prepared for the required number of tanks and armored vehicles in case of war, on the basis of which mobilization applications were created industry. At the same time, the industry began large-scale production of armored vehicles. Of course, this new and complex production had its own problems and 1931-1932. became the period of formation of the tank industry in the USSR.

Available statistics on the production and supply of tanks of the Red Army, given in tables 4B and 5B, has a number of contradictions. Part of the machines, incompletely equipped in 1932, completed in 1933, but they did not fall into the statistics of the current year. AND on the contrary, the military acceptance of equipment at factories took into account the machines upon their surrender to the Red Army. This statement can be illustrated by the following data on the production of T-26 in 1931-1933 (see table 3B). Much less clear is the discrepancy between the data on the T-27, which the Soviet armed forces received more than they were produced industry. Thus, as already noted, precise scaling production and supply of armored vehicles to the Red Army will require scrupulous studies of the statistics of manufacturing plants and military acceptance authorities.

Table 3B

Year Produced Accepted
 1931 123 19
 1932 1341 1032
 1933 993 1405
 Total 2457 2456

Source: RGAE. F.1562. Op.329. D.13. L.16ob. - 18rev.

Table 4B

Production of armored vehicles in the USSR in 1930-1944 Source:

RGAE. F.4372. Op.91. D.1198. L.71ob; D.1265. L.83-85; D.1643. L.107-108; D.1676. L.109; D.1751. L.20, 125; D.2511. L.5-11; D.2835. L.196-198; F.1562. Op.329. D.6. L.81; D.13. L.16ob. - 18rev.; F.8752. Op.4. D.728. L.157ob. - 164.

Table 5B

Deliveries of tanks of the Red Army in

1931-1940. Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.521. L.330-331; D.602. L.10; D.1064. L.198; D.1083. L.5.

Table 6B

Number of tanks and armored vehicles in the Red Army 1932-1939

Type 1.01.32 1.01.33 1.01.34 1.01.35 1.01.36 1.01.37 1.01.38 1.01.39

T-35 - - - 10 17 32 42 53

T-28 - - 41 91 123 224 263 359

Total - - 41 101 140 256 305 412

BT-2 - 396 620 620 620 620 620 620

BT-5 - - 781 1 884 1 884 1 884 1 884 1 884

BT-7 - - - 2 502 1 471 2 249 3 351

BTchem. - - - - 80 80

80 Total - 396 1,401 2,506 3,006 4,005 4,833

5,935 MS-1 953 953 953

- - - - ÿ-26 (2) 100 1,050 1,626 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627
 1,627 T-26 - - 712 1,680 2,969 4,277 4,827 5,544

KhT-26 - 53 168 598 605 616 616
906 T-26 (Super) - - 1 45 65 65
65 65 T-26 (Tele) - - - -
- - 55 Total 1,053 2,056 3,460 3,950 5,266 6,585 7,135
8,197 T-37 - - 125 1,076 2,182 2,552 2,552
2,552 T-37 (chemical) - - - -
34 75 75 75 T-38 - - - - 1,046
1,228 1,228 Total - - 125 1,076 2,216 3,673
3,855 3,855 T-27 393 2,086 2,547 2,547 2,547 2,547
2,547 2,547 T-27 (chemical) - - - -
164,164 164 164 Total 393 2,086 2,547 2,547 2,711
2,711 2,711 2,711 Total 1,446 4,538 7,574 10,180 13,339
17,280 18,839 21,110 BA (I) 50 60 60
162 663 71 3 967 1 268 BA (sr) 163 184 266
302 370 715 834 1 326 Total 213 244 326 464
973 1 428 1 801 2 594 Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.602.
L.14; D.979.
L.83. Table 7B Number of tanks and armored vehicles in the Red Army
1934-1940 Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.420. L.9; D.446. L.12, 13; D.574. L.385; D.582. L.166;
D.521. L.603; D.1199. L.56.
Table 8B
Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of January 1,
1934. Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.446.
L.16-30.
Table 9B Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army on
January 1, 1935 Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2.
D.446.
L.16-30. Table 10B Availability of armored vehicles in the Red
Army as of January 1, 1936. Source: RGVA.
F.31811.
Op.2. D.531. L.48-60. Table 11B Availability of armored vehicles
in the Red Army as of January 1, 1936 Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.582. L.192, 194, 196, 198, 200,
214, 216, 218.
Table 12B
Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of January 1,
1936. Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.602.
L.7-8. Table 13B
(beginning) Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as
of January 1,
1938 Table 14B Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army
as of January 1, 1938 Source: RGVA. F.31811.
Op.2. D.979.
L.1. Table 15B Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army
as of January 1, 1939. Including 100 BT-2-5, 70 T-28, 10 BT-7, 43 BHM and
1 BA (s).
Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.979. L.133.
Table 16B
Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of June 1,
1939 Note: * Data as of May 25, 1939 **
Data as of July 1, 1939
Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.926. L.2, 7, 12, 17, 22, 27, 32, 37, 42, 47, 52, 57, 62, 67,
72, 77, 82.

Table 17B

Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of September 1, 1939. Note: * Data as of August 1, 1939.

Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.926. L.2, 7, 12, 17, 27, 32, 37, 42, 47, 52, 57, 62, 67, 72, 77, 82; D.980. L.26-28.

Table 18B (beginning)

Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of June 1, 1940 Table

19B Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of September 1, 1940 Source: RGVA. F.31811.

Op.2. D.1086. L.57.

Table 20B (beginning) Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of September 15, 1940. Including 2 KhT-26, 1 T-38, 6 T-27, 8 BA-6, 4 BA-20 and 8 D-8-13.

Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.1195. L.141-142.

Table 21B (beginning)

Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army on December 1, 1940 -20 and

8 D-8-13.

Source: RGVA. F.31811. Op.2. D.1195. L.141-142.

Table 22B

Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of January 1, 1941 Source: RGASPI. F.71. Op.25. D.4133. L.1-17.

Table 23B

Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of April 1, 1941 Source: RGASPI. F.71. Op.25. D.4133. L.1-17.

Table 24B

Availability of armored vehicles in the Red Army as of June 1, 1941 216 T-26, 76 KhT-26, 84 T-38, 61 T-37, 188 T-27, 29 BA (I) and 20 BA (sr),

taking into account which the total number of tanks was 25,479, and armored vehicles - 5,260. Source: RGASPI. F.71. Op.25. D.4134.

L.1-8. Table

25B Staffing of mechanized corps with tanks. *

The corps administration was disbanded in the spring of 1941. ** The total number of tanks in the troops

of the Far Eastern Fleet. Source: RGVA. F.40442. Op.2. D.171. L.116-146, 254-290; Krikunov V.P. "Simple arithmetic" V.V. Shlykov // Military History Journal. 1989. No. 4. P. 42; 1941.

Documentation. Book 1. S.676-677; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. M., 1992. P.29.

Annex B

Table 1B Share of great powers in arms production (%)
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942

Germany 46 43 40 31 27

USSR 27 31 23 24 17

England 6 10 18 20

17 USA 6 4 7 14

30 Italy 6 4 5 4 3

Japan 9 8 7 7 6

Source: Knorr K. Military Potential of States. M., 1960. P.67. Table 2B

Military production in 1944 prices (billion dollars)
1935 - 1939 1939 1940 1941 1943

Germany 12 3.4 6 6 13.8

USSR 8 3.3 5 8.5 13.9

USA 1.5 0.6 1.5 4.5 37.5

England 2.5 1 3.5 6.5 11.1

Japan 2 ? 1 2 4.5

Source: Duic M. Die Achsenpartner und der Krieg im Mittelmeerraum//Österreichische
Militärische Zeitschrift. 1996. No. 2. S.196.

Table 3B

Aircraft production by the great powers in 1930 - 1944 Year USSR USA

England Germany Japan Italy France 1930 1149 3437 1434 -
445 ? ? 1931 1489 2800 ? 13

368? ? 1932 2490 1396 ?

36691? ? 1933 4116 1324 1102

368 766 ? ? 1934 4,354 1,615 1,108

1,968,688 ? ? 1935 2529 1710 1807

3183952 ? ? 1936 4270 3010 1830 5112

1181 ? 569 1937 6039 3773 2218 5606

1511 ? 743 1938 7,727 3,623 2,828 5,235

3,201 1,850 1,382 1939 10,362 5,856 7,940 8,295

4,467 1,750 3,163 1940 10,565 12,813 15 049 9 869*

4 768 3 257 2 441*** 1941 15,735 26,289 20,094 10,940*

5,088 3,503 1942 25,436 47,836 23,672 14,664*

8,861 2,813 1943 34,884 85,898 26,263 24 365*

16,693 1,930** 1944 40,261 96,318 26 461 40 482* 28

180 - Notes: * Not including airframe production.

** Until September 1, 1943. *** Until July 1, 1940.

Source: RGAE. F.4372.

Op.91. D.1221. L.25;

D.1643. L.107 - 108; D.2101. L.46 - 47;

Groehler O. Geschichte des Luftkrieges 1910 bis 1980. Berlin. 1981. S.207, 213, 494; Das
Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Stuttgart. 1979 - 1983. Bd.1. S.242, Bd.3. S.71;
Historical Statistic of the United States. Washington. 1975. P.768; 1941 Documentation. M., 1998.
Book 2. S.490 - 491; Dashichev V.I. Bankruptcy strategy of German fascism. M., 1973. T.2.
S.645; Aircraft building in the USSR. 1917 - 1945. M., 1992. Book 1. pp. 431 - 435.

Table 4B

The number of aircraft in the Red Army Air Force on June 1,

1940 * This refers to the transport aircraft PS-84 (American designation Douglas DC

3).

Note: The data in the table are based on two different documents. Source: RGVA.

F.29. Op.73. D.21. L.1 - 4, 14 - 18. Table 5B Plans for the
development

of the Red Army Air Force by the end of 1941.

Source: RGVA. F.40442. Op.2. D.169. L.321 - 335, 351 - 358. Table
6B Dynamics

of the number of commanding officers of the ground forces in 1935 - 1939. Source: RGVA.
F.37837. Op.18.

D.886. L.64 - 65, 66, 67, 70. Table 7B Staffing of the mechanized
corps of the

western border districts on June 22, 1941

Source: Glantz D. Stumbling Colossus. The Red Army on the Eve of World War.
Lawrence. 1998. P.551.

Table 8B

Production of weapons in the second half of 1941 Germany USSR

Rifles and carbines

535,152 1,567,141 Machine guns 115,150 89,665

Machine guns 31,662 53,813

Guns 8,498 15,737 Mortars

3,840 40,784 Tanks

2,253 4,742 Aircraft 5,470* 9

777 * Calculated

based on average monthly

production. Source: Strategic essay on the Great Patriotic
War 1941 - 1945.

M., 1961. S.196, 265; History of the Second World War 1939 - 1945. M., 1975. T.4. P.150; Das
Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Stuttgart. 1983 - 1988. Bd.4. S.974-975; Bd.5/1. S.633.

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